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Abstract 
 
In this thesis we construct a critical encounter between the composer John Cage and the 
philosopher Gilles Deleuze. This encounter circulates through a constellation of 
problems found across and between mid-twentieth century musical, artistic, and 
philosophical practices, the central focus for our line of enquiry being the concept of 
experimentation. We emphasize the production of a method of experimentation through 
a practice historically situated with regards to the traditions of the respective fields of 
music and philosophy. However, we argue that these experimental practices are not 
reducible to their historical traditions, but rather, by adopting what we term a 
problematic reading, or transcendental critique, with regards to historical givens, they 
take their historical situation as the site of an experimental departure. We follow Cage 
through his relation to the history of Western classical music, his contemporaries in the 
musical avant-garde, and artistic movements surrounding and in some respects 
stemming from Cage’s work, and Deleuze through his relation to Kant, phenomenology, 
and structuralism, in order to map the production of a practice of experimentation 
spanning music, art, and philosophy. Some specific figures we engage with in these 
respective traditions include Jean-Phillipe Rameau, Pierre Schaeffer, Marcel Duchamp, 
Pierre Boulez, Robert Morris, Yoko Ono, La Monte Young, Edmund Husserl, Maurice-
Merleau-Ponty, Alain Badiou, and Félix Guattari. In so doing we seek to find between 
these practices points of both conjunction and disjunction which enrich our 
understanding of Cage’s and Deleuze’s work, and, more widely speaking, of the passage 
of twentieth century music and philosophy in general. Here we hope to make 
contributions to the fields of continental philosophy and music theory especially, and to 
open a point of engagement with the nascent field of sound studies. 
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Introduction 
 
In this thesis we will construct a critical encounter between the composer John Cage and 
the philosopher Gilles Deleuze, based around the notion of experimental practice. Cage 
is located in the mid-twentieth century emergence of a musical avant-garde, his 
compositional practice defined not only through and against the tradition of Western 
classical music from which his early work sought a break, but alongside other 
contemporary musical practices oriented towards similar goals and artistic practices 
with resonant objectives. The development and theorization of these fields is 
inextricably implicated in a wider intellectual climate not only of aesthetics and art 
theory, but of questions at the core of the development of philosophical movements such 
as phenomenology and structuralism. With Deleuze alike, his mid-twentieth century 
engagement with a philosophical milieu dominated by phenomenology and 
structuralism is posed upon problems whose articulation is inseparable from their 
engagement with the arts. 
 
As such our confrontation will circulate across a constellation of problems between and 
across the two bodies of work, Cage and Deleuze, the engagement with which is 
articulated through what we are terming their experimental practices. With this notion 
we are emphasizing a historically-situated practice which is nevertheless not reducible 
to its given conditions, which takes the given and through a practice of experimentation 
can construct a line of flight away from it. This follows Deleuze’s early claim that “the 
only possible theory is a theory of practice”,1 a form of practice necessarily bound up in 
experimentation.2 
 
As such the philosophical method here is less the often cited but perhaps overinvested 
and not entirely illuminating Deleuze remark regarding a “sort of buggery” performed 
                                                 
1 Gilles Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume’s Theory of Human Nature, trans. 
Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 32. 
2 See Sjoerd van Tuinen, “Difference and Speculation: Heidegger, Meillassoux and Deleuze on Sufficient 
Reason,” in Deleuze and Metaphysics, ed. Alain Beaulieu, Edward Kazarian, and Julia Sushytska 
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014). 
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with the history of philosophy,3 than it is a form of problematic reading, a deep 
exploration of the problems posed in philosophy so as to discover what has been 
obscured in their historical articulation, and orient them anew. As Deleuze says in a 
1968 interview, regarding engagement with philosophers 
 
First you have to know how to admire; you have to rediscover the problems he poses, 
his particular machinery. It is through admiration that you will come to genuine critique 
[…] You have to work your way back to those problems which an author of genius has 
posed, all the way back to that which he does not say in what he says, in order to extract 
something that still belongs to him, though you also turn it against him. […] In every 
modernity and every novelty, you find conformity and creativity; an insipid conformity, 
but also “a little new music”; something in conformity with the time, but also something 
untimely —separating the one from the other is the task of those who know how to love, 
the real destroyers and creators of our day.4 
 
We find something of this sentiment persisting through to What is Philosophy?, 
Deleuze’s final collaborative work with Félix Guattari, precisely with regards to 
experimentation – “Without history experimentation would remain indeterminate and 
unconditioned, but experimentation is not historical”.5 Here philosophy is posed in 
relation to the ‘now’, not as an overdetermining condition for any practice, but as a site 
of experimental becoming.6 
 
We find a similar notion in Cage’s mature relation to tradition. In distinction from an 
earlier modernist concern with the novelty of the break we find something more 
nuanced, the notion of ‘composition in retrospect’, of the past as something to be 
“invented”, “made alive in another way” by asking the right questions of it.7 Concerning 
ourselves with tradition will allow us some understanding of why it is that Cage remains 
a composer, remains concerned with the field of music, without this becoming a 
foreclosed and restrictive notion – and how he can remain a composer while working in 
numerous fields, such as the mesostic poetry used to present this understanding of 
                                                 
3 Gilles Deleuze, “Letter to a Harsh Critic,” in Negotiations: 1972-1990, trans. Martin Joughin (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 6. 
4 Gilles Deleuze, “On Nietzsche and the Image of Thought,” in Desert Islands and Other Texts 1953-
1974, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Michael Taormina (Los Angeles ; New York: Semiotext(e), 2004), 139. 
5 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 111. 
6 Ibid., 112. 
7 John Cage, X: Writings ‘79-’82 (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1983), 145. 
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tradition, and what the relation of these seemingly distinct practices is. 
 
Our starting point for this exploration is on the status of Cage and Deleuze’s respective 
musical and philosophical problems, orienting our discussion through a critical relation 
between problem and experimentation. In Deleuze’s case this begins through the notion 
of the problematic Idea, derived from Kant. This understanding immediately raises a 
point of tension in our Cage-Deleuze conjunction, insofar as Cage’s project appears 
resistant to any kind of transcendental understanding. However, in working through this 
tension and others like it we will find a motivating force in our understanding of the 
construction of an experimental practice. Through Deleuze we can navigate the tensions 
and apparent impasses we find in Cage’s thought and work, and through Cage we can 
follow the unfolding and articulation of a method of experimentation that brings into 
focus the practical aspect of Deleuze’s thought. 
 
Following this early announcement of a Kantian element to our investigation, our 
method of problematic reading is also one of transcendental critique. This is to be 
understood as a problematic enquiry into conditions, oriented towards locating the 
presuppositions implicit in posited conditions, that is, by which the conditions are 
themselves conditioned by an unacknowledged element.8 
 
Key to our transcendental critique will be a concern with the question of experience. A 
particular target will be an exploration of traditions in which possible experience – 
functional harmony, the Kantian faculties - has been foregrounded, and finding beneath 
them their conditions – experimental philosophy and experimental music understood 
here as practices of unearthing real experience, of immanence, not of experience being 
immanent to thought but of “the genesis of the act of thinking in thought itself”.9 As 
such, using the thought of Deleuze as a point of origin is not merely grounding 
                                                 
8 Jeffrey Bell’s reading has particularly guided us here, especially regarding Deleuze’s specific procedure 
of transcendental critique with regards to phenomenology. See Jeffrey A. Bell The Problem of Difference: 
Phenomenology and Poststructuralism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998). 
9 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (London ; New York: Continuum, 1994), 
139. 
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philosophically what would otherwise be a loosely defined musical question, but rather 
locating a point of encounter, a collision between one form of production – musical – 
and another – philosophical – that sees the two be mutated and expanded through an 
openness to their respective outsides, which can yet ignite an internal move of critique 
and creation. As Deleuze remarks, it is “not a matter of setting philosophy to music, or 
vice versa. Rather, it’s once again one thing folding into another”.10 
 
In this context, the first sense of immanence we would like to consider is that which 
Christian Kerslake recognizes as emerging from the specific form of Deleuze’s 
redeployment of the Kantian critical project. Here Kant’s critical philosophy is 
understood as giving birth to a form of immanent critique through which philosophical 
immanence not only means a kind of self-perpetuation operating only within the terms a 
system, but rather forms the basis for a philosophy that can take a critical stance with 
regards to itself – another understanding of our problematic reading will be of 
autocritique – that is to say, a philosophy which can indeed delve into the genesis of 
philosophy itself.11 Cage and Deleuze alike develop distinct practices by questioning 
and intensifying the fundamental questions of music and philosophy respectively, two 
traditions which differ in significant ways but which nevertheless hold significant 
structural points of contact. This critical model of immanence leads to what is for 
Kerslake the specifically Deleuzian procedure – but which we will consider to be 
likewise a Cagean procedure - with regards to the notion of immanence, beyond that of 
Kantian transcendental critique and, as we will develop in our fifth chapter, finally into a 
Spinozist register, where “the question is asked what living in a plan (or in English, 
‘plane’) of immanence would in any case be like”.12 
 
This indicates why we begin our investigation with Deleuze and only gradually work 
towards his work in collaboration with Guattari. It is in Deleuze’s work before his 
encounter with Guattari that we can most clearly pinpoint and map Deleuze’s 
                                                 
10 Deleuze, Negotiations, 143. 
11 Christian Kerslake, Immanence and the Vertigo of Philosophy from Kant to Deleuze (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 3. 
12 Ibid., 265. 
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engagement with and path of departure from the history of philosophy and from the 
dominant philosophical traditions of this period, namely phenomenology and 
structuralism. In so doing we can see how Deleuze strives to generate a notion of 
experimentation from a history of philosophy that would seem to have little place for it, 
but also demonstrate the necessity of experimentation within the practice of philosophy 
in general. This will also allow us to better see the mutations and breaks that take place 
across Deleuze’s thought, but also its generative continuity. In this we can map an 
experimental practice by which ‘experimentation’ and ‘practice’ are not taken as givens, 
but through which an increasingly refined experimental practice is produced, tracing the 
historical contexts and points of departure by which we follow, as Cage says of Silence, 
“a history of changing ideas”.13 
 
In our first chapter we will set up the terms of our investigation through the shared 
notion of experimentation, and begin to develop this through an enquiry into its relation 
to the problem. This will be explored through Cage and Deleuze’s respective critical 
relations to the formalism that came to ground music theory from at least the eighteenth 
century alongside philosophical forms of representation.  
 
Ending with a situation in which the problem, understood as problematic Idea, of music 
has been determined to be sound, our second chapter will consider the conceptual 
development of sound in relation to musical practice over the early to mid-twentieth 
century, so as to clarify the tensions between musical and artistic formalism and anti-
formalism that reside within this problematization. This chapter will develop a 
conceptual context for music’s concern with sound, maintaining a lineage of 
experimental music and focusing it through Pierre Schaeffer’s development of his 
concept of the sound object. This will allow us to begin to consider more deeply many 
of the fundamental problems of experimental music practice – its relation to technology, 
of composer-performer-listener relations, of the theme of developing a ‘language’ 
appropriate to music, be it notation or otherwise, and so on. From here we will also be 
able to develop further the notion of the ‘experimental’ in music as it was enacted in the 
                                                 
13 Kenneth Silverman, Begin Again: A Biography of John Cage (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010), 176. 
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mid-twentieth century, insofar as Schaeffer offered an experimental practice with points 
of both connection and distinction from that of Cage, and insofar as Schaeffer’s revision 
and regrounding of his experimental practice under the terms of Husserlian 
phenomenology allows us to reconnect experimental music practice with the 
philosophical problematic that takes us from Kant to Deleuze. 
 
Our third chapter will take this concern with sound outside of the field of music, as it 
came to operate in the constellation of artistic practices following Cage in the late 1950s 
and into the 1960s. Of particular interest here will be Cage’s increasing concern with 
opening the field of music to the other arts and to ‘life’ more generally, and the 
development of the concept of indeterminacy at the level of performance. These factors 
will introduce a series of tensions regarding the terms ‘sound’ and ‘music’ and a number 
of critical perspectives regarding Cage’s practice, which we will develop by extending 
the philosophical and musical-artistic transcendental critique through Merleau-Ponty, in 
terms of both the relation of a Cagean silence to a philosophical ‘invisible’, and a 
consideration of the use of a certain Merleau-Ponty in theorizing the artistic breaks and 
transitions of the 1960s. 
 
With our fourth chapter we will step back and resituate Cage in a musical context 
through an exploration of his understanding of chance, so as to better understand the 
conditions for the later openness and plurality of practice. We will consider the relation 
of chance to Cage’s temporal rethinking of structure, posing this in relation to earlier 
artistic notions of chance in Duchamp and Mallarmé and in opposition to serialist forms 
of structure and its own development of aleatory features. This will be drawn out in 
connection to the entanglement of chance and structure we find particularly in The Logic 
of Sense, which positions Deleuze both within and without structuralism, and ultimately 
brings into focus the limits of a structuralist model with regards to developing a form of 
practice, setting out the direction towards which Deleuze moves in his encounter with 
Guattari. Here the developing opposition between experimentation and interpretation 
will become increasingly clear, and offer us a basis for engaging with how interpretation 
has been positioned in both philosophical and musical discourses. 
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This will allow us to develop in our fifth chapter a deeper theoretical reading of the 
critical interpretations of Cage, and return the discussion more directly to the status of 
the problem, clarifying one of Difference and Repetition’s more opaque elements. We 
will consider the status of the problematic Idea, of whether it is adequate in accounting 
for the open network of relations we find developing through Cage’s experimental 
process, of how through our historical-theoretical enquiry the conceptual status of sound 
and music has shifted from that with which we set out. This will particularly be 
developed by considering the problematic status of the score – the score and the 
problematic Idea both maintaining a tense relation with the notion of interpretation – 
and its connection to performance. Using the theory of sensation Deleuze develops 
through his study of the painter Francis Bacon as a point connecting Deleuze’s pre- and 
post-Guattari thought, we will develop a series of musical-philosophical concepts 
operating across Deleuze’s and Cage’s work, focusing particularly on the notions of 
rhythm and modulation. Through this we will investigate how in Cage’s own late return 
to a more specifically musical domain we find a rich experimental practice 
encapsulating and carefully articulating the consequences of a broad constellation of 
musical, artistic, theoretical, and social encounters, articulated through a machinic 
theory of modulatory rhythm. 
 
 
Threading through this is a passage from the thing-in-itself that a Kantian transcendental 
would deny knowledge of, through a Husserlian critique of Kant and a concern with 
going back to the ‘things themselves’14 but while still maintaining some of the structural 
impasses of Kantian transcendental philosophy, to Merleau-Pontyan move towards an 
embodied, ontologized phenomenology, onto a Deleuzian understanding of difference-
in-itself. Through this a richer understanding of key Cagean themes such as ‘letting 
sounds be themselves’ or art as ‘imitating nature in its manner of operation’ will be 
developed, taking claims that are often posed as dogma and mapping out a distinct 
                                                 
14 Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, Volume II, trans. J. N. Findlay (Abingdon, Routledge, 2001), 
§1. 
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practical, experimental heritage and a process of transformation ongoing through the 
terms themselves, marking a general movement from the ‘work’ as object to notions of 
process in Cage’s practice.  
 
A final note – while we do not consider this piece to be concerning Deleuze’s relation to 
music as such, it is nevertheless notable that after a period of music being 
underrepresented in studies of Deleuze compared to the other arts there has been in 
recent years an increasing volume of important work in this field, work which set some 
key parameters for our own research.15 We hope to have made some small contribution 
to this body of work.  
                                                 
15 Of particular note are Edward Campbell, Music After Deleuze (London: Bloomsbury, 2013) and the 
edited volumes Sounding the Virtual: Gilles Deleuze and The Philosophy of Music, ed. Brian Hulse and 
Nick Nesbitt (Farnham, Ashgate, 2010), Gilles Deleuze: la pensée musique, ed. Pascale Criton and Jean-
Marc Chouvel (Paris: Centre de documentation de la musique contemporaine, 2015), and the journal 
special edition Filigrane. Musique, esthétique, sciences, société Numéros de la revue, Deleuze et la 
musique (20/01/2012). As we are not so much concerned with Deleuze’s relation to music we will 
consider the role of the composer Pierre Boulez, crucial to our articulation of both Cage’s and Schaeffer’s 
experimental practices, in Deleuze and Deleuze & Guattari’s thought only in passing. This topic, however, 
along with Boulez’s other philosophical associations, has been treated in detail by Edward Campbell in 
Boulez, Music and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
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Experimentation and the problematization of music 
 
In truth, only one kind of objection is worthwhile: the objection which shows that the 
question raised by a philosopher is not a good question, that it does not force the nature 
of things enough, that it should be raised in another way, that we should raise it in a 
better way, or that we should raise a different question.16 
 
What can be analyzed in my work, or criticized, are the questions that I ask.17 
 
These particular instances of the foregrounding of the question are found in specific 
contexts – a generalized philosophical practice and a personal compositional routine – at 
quite different moments of the work of Deleuze and Cage respectively. In Deleuze’s 
case, it is in his earliest monograph, the 1953 work on Hume, Empiricism and 
Subjectivity, fifteen years prior to the culmination of his deep exploration of the history 
of philosophy, Difference and Repetition. In Cage’s case, from a 1980 interview with 
David Cope for Composer magazine, conducted forty-eight years after the composition 
of Cage’s first work, and twenty-eight years after that of his most famous, the ‘silent’ 
piece 4’33”. This concern resounds, however, forwards through Deleuze’s thought, back 
through Cage’s work, and across the two practices. We find Deleuze’s interest in the 
question echoing still in his final collaborative work with Félix Guattari, 1991’s What is 
Philosophy?, with the necessary connection of philosophical concepts to problems,18 
and in Cage through his early alignment with composers such as Henry Cowell, who 
saw themselves not so much as part of a continuous musical tradition but rather as 
questioning the foundations and conditions of what can in any case be termed ‘music’. 
Cutting across these two trajectories, we find one central notion: experimentation.  
 
In this chapter, then, we will begin to explore the conditions for the development of a 
practice that can be termed experimental. Some founding terms for an experimental 
practice will be set out – in Cage’s case, his famous visit to an anechoic chamber, in 
Deleuze’s the notion of a philosophical practice of transcendental empiricism – not in 
                                                 
16 Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity, 107. 
17 John Cage, quoted in Richard Kostelanetz, Conversing with Cage, second edition (New York, London: 
Routledge, 2003), 89. 
18 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 16. 
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order to ground the enquiry, but to set points of reference from which to depart and with 
which to contend and question. Among a small number of brief references to Cage 
throughout Deleuze’s work, it is in Deleuze & Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus that we find 
expression of the most theoretically significant connection between the two. Late in that 
text Deleuze & Guattari foreground a contemporary model of art aligned to their 
‘schizorevolutionary’ project,19 an art in which aims and objects, recodings and 
axiomatics are eschewed, in favour of pure process – art as ‘experimentation’.20 This 
form of art is associated with Burroughs and Artaud among others, but it is Cage to 
whom the explicit formulation of the term ‘experimentation’ is credited. Citing Cage’s 
1955 text ‘Experimental Music’ (reprinted in Silence as ‘Experimental Music: 
Doctrine’), ‘experimental’ is to be understood “not as descriptive of an act to be later 
judged in terms of success and failure, but simply as of an act the outcome of which is 
unknown”.21 As such it is a model of art which does not find itself axiomatically 
grounded – the experiment cannot be a ‘method’, if method is taken in terms of a 
“premeditated decision”22 regarding the approach towards an object of study. The 
question arises, then, of what an experimental practice, of music, art, philosophy, or 
otherwise, would look like, how it can be enacted – what can ‘ground’ an experimental 
methodology, and what problems and questions must an experimental practice contend 
with in order to be experimental? 
 
To begin to outline Cage’s experimental practice, we will first look at two key 
theoretical texts, separated by several decades, in which Cage discusses the practice of 
experimental music – the 1937 piece ‘Future of Music: Credo’ and the rethinking of this 
text found in 1974’s ‘Future of Music’ – and outline the changes in Cage’s 
characterization that occur over this period. Numerous scholars have expressed doubts 
as to whether Cage’s most radical work, such as 4’33”, can be considered music at all. 
                                                 
19 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 370. 
20 Ibid., 371. 
21 John Cage, Silence: Lectures and Writings (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), 13. 
22 This definition is used by Deleuze in two similarly-worded passages in Nietzsche and Philosophy and 
Difference and Repetition – cf. Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson 
(London ; New York: Continuum, 2006), 108; Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 165. 
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For example, in the 2012 documentary John Cage: Journeys in Sound, the philosopher 
and musician Chaim Tannenbaum offers the objection that Cage’s work seems to 
preclude itself from playing the role of music in our reception of it by not maintaining 
enough of the fundamental characteristics of ‘music’, that it offers “terrific pieces of 
theatre which may cause interesting reflections on the nature of music without 
themselves being music”.23 More generally, Nelson Goodman asks whether a piece in 
which no determinate correspondence between the score and the sounds produced can 
be found to qualify as a musical ‘work’.24 This position is often not presented as a 
criticism of Cage, but it does nevertheless diminish the notion of Cage-as-composer, 
often for a Cage who is situated, not incorrectly, as an integral part of an artistic lineage 
leading from the pre-war to the post-war avant-garde. While this reading of Cage will 
itself be important in later chapters, particularly our third chapter, part of our goal is to 
unfold what Cage’s procedure with regard to the history of music is, if not interpreted as 
a sharp break, so as to understand the specifically musical function of Cage’s work and 
thought rather than its philosophical, critical, or artistic, corollaries. An expansion 
beyond the musical realm becomes an inevitability in Cage’s practice, for reasons that 
will be explored throughout, but insofar as Cage continually returns to music, elects to 
be seen as a composer, and considers the material that he deals with as musical material, 
it is fundamental that we begin by developing the specifically musical function of 
Cage’s work, so as to best understand the subsequent artistic, theoretical, and social 
relations and consequences. As such we will move on to contextualize these pieces in 
terms of their specifically musical character – what do we mean, what tradition are we 
referring to, when we discuss ‘music’? 
 
To locate Cage’s attempt to propose a future of music within and against a music 
theoretical tradition, we will outline a dominant model in the theoretical understanding 
of Western music, namely the development of a formalist aesthetics grounded in a 
representational epistemology, particularly with regards to the status of sound, pointing 
                                                 
23 John Cage: Journeys in Sound, dir. Alain Miller and Paul Smaczny (UK: Accentus Music, 2012). 
24 See Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols (Indianapolis ; New 
York ; Kansas City: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1968), especially chapter four. This particular example 
will be addressed in detail in our final chapter. 
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towards a key question which will drive twentieth century avant-garde and experimental 
practices. This dominant model, we suggest, begins with Descartes’ earliest text, his 
‘Musicae Compendium’, in which sound is announced as the object of music, but only 
to be quickly reduced to a secondary consideration for a music theory grounded rather in 
deciphering the cognitive representation of musical experience. Beginning from this 
point will allow us to follow the interplay of models of immanence and transcendence in 
the history of the Western classical theorization of music, and the shift between an 
epistemological and an ontological understanding of sound and music, so as to begin to 
understand the sense in which Cage’s project is one driven towards the formulation of a 
musical immanence based on a reontologization of sound. We will argue that the 
dominant strain of music theory that takes the ‘Musicae Compendium’ as a starting 
point, most thoroughly formalized and exemplified by the functional harmony 
developed Jean-Philippe Rameau and those following him, anticipates and in some 
respects provides in advance an exemplary case of Kantian aesthetics, which served as 
an epistemological ground for dominant tendencies in both art theory and a wider 
philosophical arena for well over a century afterwards. 
 
It is this history of understanding music, and more precisely its characterization of the 
foundations of music, against which Cage sets his own project in his early ‘Future of 
Music: Credo’ piece. As such, under the terms in which we have set out this history, 
Cage’s project stands as a critique of representation. It is on this basis that we will 
attempt to philosophically clarify Cage’s critique and how it propels him towards his 
own distinct project – by turning to Deleuze. While a critique of representation is 
present in many thinkers and fields of the twentieth century, we draw Cage together 
specifically with Deleuze, and more specifically still with an initially post-Kantian 
characterization of Deleuze’s project, for a number of reasons. Both Deleuze and 
Foucault position Kantian critical thought at the threshold between classical and modern 
thinking, but it is with Deleuze whom we that see this idea taken to its endpoint, 
whereby Kant stands as a kind of culmination, an apotheosis, of a history of 
philosophies of representation that Deleuze posits as stretching back not only to 
Descartes but to the beginning of philosophy. By reaching this point, however, it is also 
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Kant who has the most precise insight into the conditions for the emergence of 
representation and the contours of representational thought, and so it is Kant who acts as 
an unrealized source for allowing thought to step outside of representation.  
 
Deleuze locates the basis of this potential in the concept of the problematic Idea, which, 
like the critique of representation, we find present in other forms in thinkers such as 
Foucault and Bachelard. However, significantly for locating points of connection to 
Cage’s project, the theoretical impasse that is at the root of Deleuze’s use of the 
problematic Idea precisely concerns Kantian aesthetics – dealing as it does with the gulf 
in Kant’s thought between the Critique of Pure Reason’s theory of the sensible and the 
Critique of the Power of Judgement’s theory of the beautiful. It is as such by unfolding 
Deleuze’s utilization of the Kantian problematic Idea in conjunction with Cage’s 
formulation of the problem of music that the methodological bond between their 
respective practices will begin to be developed. Deleuze’s approach begins, following 
Maimon, with the argument that Kant does not prove the fact of possible experience – 
that the Kantian faculties appear as a necessary, pre-given and harmonious ordering of 
the world. Like functional harmony in the realm of music, the Kantian categories erect a 
fixed and systematic understanding of possible experience which cannot be adequate to 
the contingencies of real experience. With Maimon, and Deleuze following him, the 
problematic Idea is given objective reality, as a differentially structured multiplicity, and 
can thus serve as the basis of Deleuze’s ‘transcendental empiricism’, described as a 
rehabilitation of the theory of the faculties. In this, the relation of the faculties is 
reformulated as concerning a dynamic and creative co-evolution of subject and object, 
rather than merely positing the subject as basis for its objects – extracting an 
experimental tendency from a history of philosophy in which such tendencies have been 
suppressed. 
 
On this basis we can return to Cage. Against a history of music theory in which sound is 
posited as the object of music but quickly supplanted by extra-acoustic relations, the 
problematic Idea presents a basis for thinking sound as an object which is not reduced to 
a perceiving subject, and as an objective problem with which the composer must 
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contend. Cage formulates this in his notion of ‘sound-space’, a five-dimensional space 
from which all sounds whatsoever can be actualised. We will unfold the idea of sound-
space by analyzing Cage’s 1951 work Music of Changes, in terms of its structure 
providing a basis for the production of unique sound events. This formulation of the 
sound-space, however, appears to draw Cage close to a formalist, post-Kantian art 
theoretical tradition to which he has been presented as antithetical, namely Clement 
Greenberg’s medium-specific modernism. The question arises of how a practice 
grounded on a structurally-defined problematic Idea can avoid falling back again into a 
type of formalism. Our discussion across the coming chapters will develop from this 
constellation of problems, situating and contrasting musical, artistic, and philosophical 
formalism with an ethos of experimentation. 
 
As such to close this chapter we will begin to delve more deeply into the relation 
between an experimental methodology and an experimental practice. We will turn 
primarily to two key methodological texts by Cage, the aforementioned ‘Experimental 
Music: Doctrine’ and 1957’s ‘Experimental Music’, in order to begin to track how a 
practice of experimentation brought about the changes in Cage’s thought between his 
two ‘Future of Music’ texts. We will look at Cage’s development of the prepared piano, 
resulting in the Sonatas and Interludes pieces of the late 1940s, as a prime example of 
an experimentation in action, where seemingly fixed notions – including the sound-
space – are merely moments along the development of a fluid practice, pointing us 
towards a re-evaluation of the problematic nature of music and sound. 
 
 
Founding moments of experimentation 
 
In the midst of Cage’s practice there is one particular moment to which he would often 
return, posing it as a turning point, a kind of singular epiphany in his thought and work, 
namely his famous visit, in late 1950 or early 1951, to an anechoic chamber and his 
consequent ‘discovery’ of his concept of silence. This is what Julia Robinson terms the 
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“founding moment” of Cage’s narrative.25 Describing his visit to the chamber, an 
environment designed to have as little acoustic resonance as possible and as such to be 
as silent as possible – the chamber walls are designed to absorb sound and thus prevent 
echo, the means by which most sound in an environment is transmitted, meaning that 
the only environmental sounds audible are those directed precisely into the ear canal – 
Cage recounts hearing two sounds, one low and one high. Asking the engineer what 
these sounds were, Cage was told that the former was the sound of his nervous system 
in operation, the latter his blood in circulation.26 What Cage takes from this is that there 
can be no genuine silence, that “until I die there will be sounds”,27 and that this entails a 
conception of sound wherein it is not simply defined by its analytical characteristics, but 
also by the fact that it necessarily exceeds intentionality, of both composer and of 
listener. 
 
In this notion lies what Cage will position as the core principles of his practice, and what 
he will term the source of the experimental methodology developed across his work, 
referring back to it as late as 1990 to note that “I found out by experiment (I went into 
the anechoic chamber at Harvard University) that silence is not acoustic. It is a change 
of mind, a turning around. I devoted my music to it. My work became an exploration of 
non-intention.”28 Through the experience Cage had “become a listener”,29 insofar as it 
became necessary to recognize the impossibility of having complete compositional 
control over the sound material. As such Cage contrasts this to his earlier resistance to 
the term ‘experimental’ – where he had previously thought that experimentation took 
place prior to finished works, thus placing him in a position of knowledge contrary to 
that of the first time listener, with the acceptance of unintentional sounds the composer 
                                                 
25 Julia Robinson, “John Cage and Investiture: Unmanning the System,” in John Cage: October Files 12, 
ed. Julia Robinson (Cambridge, Mass. ; London: The MIT Press, 2011), 190. 
26 That Cage defers to the engineer’s opinion (in contrast to some of his other retellings of this story) and 
that he does not mention a more likely source of the higher pitch, namely the early onset of tinnitus, both 
complicates Cage’s resulting theorization of the experience and perhaps makes clearer the kind of 
theoretical and narrative grounding he wishes the experience of the anechoic chamber to give him, as we 
will see in the pages to come. 
27 Cage, Silence, 8. 
28 John Cage, “An Autobiographical Statement,” in John Cage: Writer (New York: Cooper Square Press, 
1993), 241. 
29 Cage, Silence, 7. 
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can no longer hold such authority. This is the basis for Cage’s often-repeated but 
obscure claim that the function of art is to “imitate Nature in her manner of operation”,30 
and its implication in the other oft-repeated Cagean mantra of “let[ting] sounds be 
themselves”31 – that the basis of art cannot be the certainty of a creative or observational 
standpoint. However, what this ‘imitation’ consists in, what it means to speak of a 
‘manner of operation’ or indeed of ‘Nature’, and what this ‘letting be’ could consist in, 
will only be understood by closely following the trajectory of Cage’s work. 
 
Beginning with a self-enclosed, self-understanding subject which ultimately stands in a 
position at once transcending its material base and requiring itself to be adequate to its 
object, in relation to a form of musical structure which is likewise detached from sound, 
Cage introduces silence as a point of rupture, where these self-sufficient structures are 
forced to exceed themselves, demanding an understanding of sound as something other 
than the tool of a composer, and silence as something other than the absence of sound – 
as unintentional sound. Cage’s concern becomes not sound as subject to transcendent 
organization, or the regulation of sound through the rule of harmony, but towards sounds 
in themselves, towards an approach to music centered on inclusive listening rather than 
an exclusive drawing of attention to structure, and as such towards an approach to music 
entailing what Branden Joseph describes as “a thoroughgoing disarticulation of any and 
all abstract connections between sounds”.32 We see here, then, the basis of 
experimentation as concerning acts of which the outcome is unknown – a moment 
gesturing towards an compositional ethos grounded in the understanding that his or her 
choice and intention are not adequate to the sound world the composer deals with, that 
every performance can provide something unintentional, unexpected, outside of 
preconceived understandings, and it is the ethos of experimentation to allow for this. 
 
We can contrast the above outline of Cage’s notion of experimentation with that of 
                                                 
30 John Cage, A Year from Monday: New Lectures and Writings (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University 
Press, 1968), 31. This notion is drawn from the thought of Ananda Coomarawamy, which Cage 
encountered at some point in the mid-1940s. See also Silence, 100, 155, 173, 194, and elsewhere. 
31 For example, Cage, Silence, 10. 
32 Branden W. Joseph, Beyond the Dream Syndicate: Tony Conrad and the Arts after Cage (A “Minor” 
History) (New York: Zone Books, 2011), 77. 
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Deleuze, in whose case we find the development of an experimental methodology as 
what he terms “transcendental empiricism”,33 or “science of the sensible”. The use of 
the term ‘transcendental’ immediately places an apparent distinction and point of tension 
between Cage’s and Deleuze’s understandings of an experimental practice, the term 
being drawn from Immanuel Kant’s use, as concerning a form of cognition that is 
“occupied not so much with objects but rather with our a priori concepts of objects in 
general”34 – that is, with the “a priori conditions of the possibility of experiences”.35 
How can such a determination of a priori conditions relate to a “thoroughgoing 
disarticulation of any and all abstract connections”, and how can the Cagean approach, 
fundamentally resistant to the authority of any organizational schema, relate to a 
philosophy concerned with the “formal and objective condition of experience”?36 
 
Hence the seemingly paradoxical status of anything called a transcendental empiricism 
is key. For Deleuze, while transcendental philosophy is a method of interpretation, 
empiricism is immediately experimental37 – as he would later say, “[e]mpiricists are not 
theoreticians, they are experimenters: they never interpret, they have no principles”.38 
The persisting role of empiricism in Deleuze’s thought is hinted towards again in 
Empiricism and Subjectivity, where Deleuze argues that “culture is a false experience, 
but it is also a true experiment”39 by which the constructive capacities of the 
imagination have an active role of schematization. For Deleuze the experimental urge of 
empiricism is defined as neither a reaction against concepts nor a recourse to lived 
experience, but as that approach which “undertakes the most insane creation of concepts 
ever seen or heard”, the concept as an object of encounter,40 only finding its “full 
                                                 
33 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 56 and passim. 
34 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), B25. 
35 Ibid., A94/B126. 
36 Ibid., A96/B129. 
37 At this point in Deleuze’s thought the terms of interpretation and experimentation are not quite distinct 
– we will later see how the separation of experimental philosophy from any method of interpretation is a 
crucial step in the development of Deleuze’s work. 
38 Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, “On the Superiority of Anglo-American Literature,” in Dialogues II, 
trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (London ; New York: Continuum, 2006), 41. 
39 Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity, 62. 
40 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, xx. 
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experimental use”41 under the terms of transcendental empiricism. 
 
The Deleuzian experiment, then, will take into consideration what a situation 
presupposes, the common sense experience of the world that transcendental philosophy 
has traditionally implied, underneath which is posited “a swarm of differences, a 
pluralism of free, wild or untamed differences; a properly differential and original space 
and time”.42 For Deleuze it is only empiricism that “knows how to transcend the 
experiential dimensions of the visible”.43 As with the Cagean notion of experimentation, 
there is a concern with taking experience beyond the organizational schemas of the 
everyday, with allowing for the existence of a world not reducible to the fixed faculties 
of human understanding. 
 
This is not yet reason enough to draw Cage together with a Kantian philosophical 
approach, but what we will begin to show here is how Cage’s experience in the anechoic 
chamber cannot be taken as quite the break that Cage poses it as, and rather how it 
comes as part of a practice engaging with a tradition. With both Cage and Deleuze we 
pose an approach taking experience and experimentation as the basis for engaging with 
the impasses of a tradition of formalism from within. 
 
 
Cage and the problematization of music 
i. Future of music 
 
‘Future of Music: Credo’ appears at a very early stage in Cage’s career, coming at the 
tail end of his studies, conducted with Henry Cowell and Adolph Weiss, and later with 
Arnold Schoenberg, from 1933 to 1937.44 The mature work and theory of Schoenberg is 
characterized by its bold step into atonality, the claim that the progression of Western 
classical music had led to the position where the validity of its harmonic foundations 
                                                 
41 Ibid., 169. 
42 Ibid., 50. 
43 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1990), 20. 
44 See Silverman, Begin Again, 10-18. 
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could no longer be affirmed. Schoenberg’s move to reinvent and reground composition 
in the wake of this dismantling was his dodecaphonic technique – later termed serialism 
and integrated into a European musical trajectory that will be central to our later 
discussions – founded on the principle of sounding each note of the chromatic scale an 
equal number of times, such that no priority is given to a note and no key signature is 
asserted.45 The influence of Schoenberg weighs heavily on the text, with Cage noting 
that the new methods of music which will be discovered will bear “a definite relation to 
Schoenberg’s twelve-tone system”,46 but even at this point Cage appears to be 
distinguishing himself from the developing serialist practice. In contrast to the serialism 
of the period, for Cage the modern composer is not limited to the traditional orchestral 
instrumental model. The focus of the ‘credo’ is rather on the use of technological 
advances to produce “new sound experiences”,47 a relation to technology that will be 
key throughout our discussion, and insofar as Schoenberg’s approach is celebrated, it is 
with a surprising emphasis on the social rather than musical aspects of Schoenberg’s 
method, concerning its relation between the individual and the group. 
 
With the use of electric instruments that can, at the time in theory and now in practice, 
generate any sound whatsoever, with any rhythmic characteristic whatsoever, the 
division between musical sound and non-musical sound, between noise and music, is 
dissolved. The music of the future, says Cage, is an ‘all-sound’ music,48 in which the 
composer deals with both the entire field of sound and the entire field of time. In this is 
reflected another aspect of Cage’s departure from Schoenberg, which would not be 
explicitly expressed until many years later – a rejection of the reliance on stepped 
divisions found in both the Western classical tradition and in serialism, through either 
the twelve tones of the chromatic scale or the regularity of music that is tied to time 
                                                 
45 See Paul Griffiths, Modern Music: A Concise History from Debussy to Boulez (London ; New York: 
Thames and Hudson, 1978), 25-28. 
46 Cage, Silence, 5. 
47 Cage, Silence, 4. The boldness of this position indicated by the fact that Cage is willing to cede the use 
of the word ‘music’ for this new sonic practice: “If the word ‘music’ is sacred and reserved for eighteenth- 
and nineteenth-century instruments, we can substitute a more meaningful term: organization of sound” 
(ibid., 3), a statement which carries through Cage’s work and is perhaps amplified in those readings of 
Cage which wish to thoroughly separate him from any form of musical practice.  
48 Ibid., 5. 
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signatures. Cage’s own commitment is clear, and it is to an American experimental 
tradition characterized Cowell and (French émigré) Edgard Varèse among others, a 
tradition which was ever more distinctly distinguishing itself from European serialism. 
This distinction will be clarified in the chapters to come, but in this period central to this 
for Cage is percussion music. Percussion music marks a point between the keyboard-
influenced music of the past and the all-sound music of the future, as in percussion Cage 
saw a field where noise could be reclaimed into the territory of music – insofar as it is 
not concerned with a control of tones but only with rhythmic structures, any sound is 
permissible, and this, aligned with the increasingly technological capacity to create new 
sounds, sets a path for establishing what he terms, in the 1942 article ‘For More New 
Sounds’, “another valid form of musical expression”.49 The notion of the ‘rhythmic 
structure’ of a piece is positioned here as central to Cage’s practice to come, replacing 
harmony as the structural basis for percussion music and the key to Cage’s early 
compositional practice – a foregrounding not only of the entire field of sound but of the 
entire field of time, understood not in terms of notational divisions but related only to 
fractions of seconds.50 
 
At this early stage a constellation of questions Cage has concerning music and sound are 
already clear, emphasizing a total sound field which the composer structures only 
temporally. This continuous sound field, we will see, persists in Cage’s work in various 
forms, while the notion of temporal structure undergoes numerous mutations and shifts 
in emphasis but is likewise a persisting core element of Cage’s compositional practice. 
Likewise we find here in nascent form the relation between this formulation of sound 
and music and the social – an element of Cage’s work and thought that will become 
gradually and increasingly central over the decades to come. This comes, indeed, while 
Cage is only at the earliest stage of enacting it as a compositional practice, having only 
composed two percussion pieces to this point. As such the theory is perhaps not yet 
‘experimental’ in the sense previously described. It appears rather as the proposed end 
                                                 
49 Cage, quoted in James Pritchett, The Music of John Cage (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), 11. 
50 John Cage, Silence, 5. See Pritchett, The Music of John Cage, 13-16 on the development of Cage’s 
rhythmic structure form. 
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goal – an all-sound music – which must yet be achieved through experimental means. If 
this is the case, then what is the status of this stated goal within an experimental 
methodology? How do we understand such a goal within a non-teleologically structured 
practice? 
 
The 1974 ‘Future of Music’ text (no longer a credo) is found in a drastically different 
context from the 1937 text, and offers some insights into a path to be traced through 
Cage’s work over the preceding decades. The concerns of the original text have now 
been filtered through four decades and dozens of compositions, encompassing what we 
are inclined to agree with James Pritchett as including five major (if fluid) shifts in 
practice,51 alongside several volumes of written works and compiled lectures. A 
prominent element of this text is the idea that the goals of the original ‘Future of Music: 
Credo’ have to a large extent been achieved. Noises are now accepted in the vocabulary 
of music,52 new temporalities have been incorporated into a standard model of listening 
– “We notice brief events that formerly might have escaped our notice and we enjoy 
very long ones” – and technological innovation has become inseparable from musical 
practice. The polemic tone of the 1937 text is left behind – Cage no longer stands in 
opposition to the features of orchestral music, but rather suggests that the model 
projected in that text has extended what came before – again following Schoenberg in 
an understanding of Klangfarbenmelodie which includes but goes beyond traditional 
melodic structures, where aperiodic rhythm contains within it periodic rhythm, and 
“processes do not exclude objects”.53 While still valuing the goals of the Credo, then, 
Cage is more elusive with defining the terms of a musical future, and even the terms of a 
musical present. 
 
Much more prominently foregrounded, however, is the question of the social. The text 
opens with Cage noting that “[s]trictly musical questions are no longer serious 
                                                 
51 Pritchett, The Music of John Cage, 4. 
52 John Cage, Empty Words: Writings ‘73-’78 (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1981), 
177. 
53 Ibid., 179. 
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questions” – music is not an activity that is separable from the rest of life.54 Cage detects 
in modern music a blurring of the “Renaissance-honored” distinction between 
composers, performers, and listeners, for which he credits the use of indeterminacy in 
the work of Morton Feldman and Christian Wolff alongside technological advances and 
the interpenetration of cultures.55 Echoing his idiosyncratic early interpretation of 
Schoenberg, Cage suggests that with experimental music we find a shift in how identity 
is constituted, a blurring of individual roles such that with a different mode of musical 
expression comes a different mode of collective existence – points which here are still 
obscure, but central. In this understanding of collective existence lies a fundamental 
shift between the two ‘Future of Music’ texts. In 1937 Cage’s project had a single goal – 
an all-sound music, with Schoenberg central as a figure who presents a music that brings 
individual utterances into a grouping, a certain plurality that comes to be unified. Cage’s 
move away from Schoenberg was already under the surface of this text, but the form of 
this move is, four decades later, clear. The future of music is not a case, as described in 
1937, of a number of practices oriented towards a single goal. It is rather a number of 
distinct practices, indicated by the vast proliferation of names in the closing pages of the 
1974 text, which nevertheless bear certain resonances with each other, circulating 
around certain problems concerning sound, art, and society, but without reducing these 
problems to concrete identities to be pursued. We find plurality, rather than fragments 
seeking unity. How does this shift occur? Cage guides us by offering a strikingly simple 
answer to the question of what his definition of music is, resisting finality or 
prescription to the utmost – “This is it. It is work. That is my conclusion”.56 
 
This gradual shift occurs through a complex interplay of developments and 
interruptions, and will be gradually mapped through this chapter and beyond. To begin 
the initial context for the 1937 text must be explored, by asking the question – if Cage is 
setting up the future of music, what constitutes the past and present of music? How does 
Cage’s problematization of music relate to how it has been problematized in the 
                                                 
54 Ibid., 177. 
55 Ibid., 181. 
56 Ibid., 186. 
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tradition to which he is responding? The ‘music’ of the past is quite clear – the straight 
line of a Western classical tradition grounded in functional harmony – so to begin to 
unfold Cage’s position I will return to the theoretical root of this lineage. 
 
ii. Formalist aesthetics 
 
In Renaissance music theory, typified by the thought of Gioseffo Zarlino, music was 
considered a manifestation, and often a privileged expression, of universal order, but as 
such one which held no specific identity of its own, rather standing as one point of 
resemblance in an analogical system of knowledge.57 As Foucault characterizes the 
Renaissance episteme, “sixteenth-century knowledge condemned itself to never 
knowing anything but the same thing”.58 The bold opening of Descartes’ ‘Musicae 
Compendium’ indicates a shift from this model of thought: “Hujus objectum est Sonus”, 
the object of the art of music is sound.59 Descartes’ piece has a curious character, 
oscillating with little sense of cohesion between musicology, mathematics, physics and 
acoustics,60 at points seemingly ‘pre-Cartesian’ in nature, prior to the moment of 
modernity its opening line appears to inaugurate, but its sharpest moments can 
nevertheless be heard through the rest of Descartes’ thought and into subsequent music 
theory.61 While at this point there remains an ambiguity regarding the embodiment of 
the subject’s mental faculties, there is nevertheless outlined a specific discourse of 
music, distinct from reference to universal order, via the constitution of sound as an 
object of study for a perceiving subject. This marks what Foucault terms the transition to 
the Classical episteme, wherein resemblance is no longer sufficient as a model of 
                                                 
57 Gary Tomlinson, Music in Renaissance Magic: Towards a Historiography of Others (Chicago ; London: 
Chicago University Press, 1993), 55. Jairo Moreno’s extensive and detailed work on the subject and 
representation in the historical development of music theory has been invaluable for our argument here. 
See Jairo Moreno, Musical Representations, Subjects, and Objects: The Construction of Musical Thought 
in Zarlino, Descartes, Rameau, and Weber (Bloomington ; Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004). 
58 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An archaeology of the human sciences (London ; New York: 
Routledge Classics, 2002), 34. 
59 René Descartes, Compendium of Music, trans. Walter Robert (Rome: American Institute of Musicology, 
1961), 11. 
60 See Bertrand Augst, “Descartes’s Compendium on Music,” in 
 Journal of the History of Ideas 26, no.1 (1965): 119. 
61 On the status of sound and listening in Descartes’ thought, see Veit Erlmann, Reason and Resonance: A 
History of Modern Aurality (New York: Zone Books, 2010). 
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knowledge, supplanted by representation, a rational order generated through the relation 
between subject, object, and intuition62 – and so music theory is therefore present in the 
earliest stages of the emergence of a rational aesthetics. 
 
With Descartes we have the construction of an object of study, but sound and music are 
rarely addressed in his later works. It is not until the work of mid-eighteenth century 
composer and music theorist Jean-Philippe Rameau, a reader of Descartes whose 
method he explicitly attempted to transplant to music theory,63 that we find the 
development of a discursive practice concerning the question of the musical subject and 
its relation to musical structure and, through his debate with Rousseau, the beginnings 
of a tension which persisted into twentieth century theories of music and art. Rameau’s 
1722 work Traité de l’harmonie64 is known as the most detailed formal theory of 
harmony that had been developed up to that point, and served as the basis for all 
Western harmonic theory of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.65 Focusing on the 
specificity of Rameau’s theory for a moment will be useful, as it reflects something 
wider than is immediately apparent and offers it a more significant role in this aesthetic 
and epistemological history.  
 
The extent to which the harmonic features found in Rameau’s theory were original 
rather than reducible to a synthesis of existing ideas is still a question of debate in the 
music theory literature, but Rameau’s significance and the point at which he can be seen 
to break with harmonic theories past lies in the thoroughness of his systematization and 
naturalization of the laws of harmony and, in turn, what this entailed for the role of the 
listening subject. What is ultimately crucial in Rameau’s thought is the notion that the 
act of judging music occurs through an asymmetrical union between our own rational 
capacities of judgement and the object (understood as a harmoniously structured nature) 
to which our judgement is directed. Prior to Rameau’s work musical practice and theory 
                                                 
62 Foucault, The Order of Things, 58. 
63 Jean-Philippe Rameau, Démonstration du principe de l’harmonie servant de base à tout l’art musical 
théorique & pratique (Paris: Durand, Pissot, 1750), 7-11. 
64 Jean-Philippe Rameau, Treatise on Harmony, trans. Philip Gossett (New York: Dover Publications, 
1971). 
65 Brian Hyer, “Before Rameau and after,” Music Analysis 15, no. 1 (1996): 80-81. 
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were considered disparate and diverse – Rameau’s greatest success, perhaps, was to 
render the diverse conventions which came together under the new theory of harmony 
invisible, that is to say, to naturalize conventions.66 His primary concept for grounding 
this naturalization was that of the son fondamental, or what has come to be known as the 
root note, by which any chord’s place in a progression can be understood harmonically. 
Crucial to note is that while the son fondamental underlies any given chord, it is not 
necessary that it be sounded. Even when not sounded, Rameau suggests, it will 
nevertheless underlie the chord by implication, as a phenomenological characteristic 
distinct from any acoustical qualities – as Jairo Moreno argues, central to the listening 
subject depicted in Rameau’s theory is “the mental capacity to conceive something not 
explicitly perceived”.67 This necessitates a move away from a music theory based on a 
practice, often loosely oriented towards a fundamental truth of the cosmos of which 
sound is a part (hence notions of cosmic harmony, ‘music of the spheres’), to a music 
theory based on epistemology, whereby sonic characteristics themselves are not 
adequate to our understanding of music and it is only through cognitive representation 
that a musical movement can be adequately comprehended. As such we see with 
Rameau, for the first time, a listening subject whose cognition and perception is in 
harmony with nature but not merely reducible to it.68 This provides a depiction of the 
constitutive role of the autonomous listening subject within a formal aesthetic regime, 
and a representative concept of music which is at once descriptive and prescriptive, 
                                                 
66 Ibid., 79. This naturalization of convention is at the core of what makes Rameau best known to a 
philosophical audience, namely his debate with Rousseau. We will not be addressing this topic at length in 
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serving to describe musical practice but counter-inductively coming to be used as a 
prefigured corrective to ‘incorrect’ practice.69 
 
With the systematization of functional harmony came a line of musical theorists who, as 
Max Weber argues, found themselves rationalizing the anomalies of harmony, and in 
turn suppressing those sonic characteristics which could not be rationalized.70 This 
tendency is not to be viewed wholly negatively, however, as it this closure of harmony 
and definition of the listener as interpreter that allows for the construction of modern 
orchestral music.71 It was only with the systematization of harmony that the complex 
and contradictory whole that is the modern symphony orchestra could be brought to 
cohere, at the expense of elements which did not easily fit under the terms of harmony, 
such as untuned percussion. This development coincides with the emergence of custom-
built concert halls, designed to offer a balance of sound such that the audience hears the 
sounding of the orchestra as a unified whole, and with as much of the audience as 
possible facing the orchestra, emphasizing an attentiveness to the performers in a way 
that had been less prominent in previous music venues. This development has been 
covered by several social histories, in the greatest depth by Michael Chanan’s Musica 
Practica, but is best known to philosophical audiences through Jacques Attali’s Noise: 
The Political Economy of Music. The scope of Attali’s argument – a universal history in 
which musical change prefigures social change72 – is perhaps excessively far-reaching 
and occasionally factually inaccurate,73 but its emphasis on the philosophical model of 
representation that is reinforced by this move, insofar as the silence of the concert hall 
gives an autonomous existence to what previously was entangled in social practice and 
ritual, is crucial. It is the purification of thought as order found in representational 
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epistemology and the new emphasis on interpretation and analysis74 which allows music 
to be an object of understanding in a way that would not have been conceivable before. 
 
This model of concert music was coming into place in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, and it reflects the increasing formalism that had come to dominate 
music discourse after Rameau. Indeed, while in the Critique of the Power of Judgement 
Kant deems music the lowest of the arts because it is the art most concerned with the 
“mere play of sensations”,75 it is to a practice of music that was at that time being left 
behind that Kant specifically refers, discussing tafelmusik, the practice in which music 
was written as accompaniment for social gatherings, which is in contrast to beautiful art, 
that art which “is a kind of representation which is purposive in itself”.76 The Kantian 
aesthetics of the beautiful can, as such, be characterized as mapping onto the new laws 
of harmony which had made music the most formally-defined of the arts, with the 
Critique of the Power of Judgement extending this formalism to an argument that the 
judgement of taste in its entirety, and by consequence judgement itself, is founded on a 
judgement of form.77  
 
These remarks offer us some basis for defining what we mean when we describe music 
and music theory as ‘formalist’, a term often slippery and opaque in its usage.78 The 
history of a refinement of Rameau’s formal techniques is long and dense,79 but in Cage’s 
context, a telling marker is the publication, two years before ‘Future of Music: Credo’, 
of Heinrich Schenker’s Free Composition, which takes a reading of Rameau and those 
theorists who followed and emphasizes degrees of structural hierarchy so as to develop a 
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model of analysis in which a fundamental, formal notion of structure is extracted from 
all that is considered extraneous.80 Schenker’s analytical methods came to underpin the 
dominant academic models of the coming decades, to which the cultural or ‘new’ 
musicology of the late 1980s and 1990s was a response, aiming to foreground social, 
political, and historical aspects which strictly formal models had excluded.81 
 
From this we can derive some basic working definitions for musical formalism, from 
which the specificity of different approaches can be developed – first, as an aesthetic 
approach taking the work as something that is “hermetically sealed” from any outside, 
and second, as an approach which concerns itself with the operation of relationships 
within the work.82 These tendencies, given detailed expression perhaps first in the 
musical context, begin to take prominence in the visual arts in the early twentieth 
century, through for instance the work of Clive Bell, who emphasized the understanding 
of a painting as distinct from its external relations, appreciation being derived rather 
through “nothing but a sense of form and colour and a knowledge of three-dimensional 
space”.83 As such, the contingency of Kant’s denigration of music aside, Kantian 
thought is located at the core of an aesthetic framework for several generations ahead of 
him, in music as in the visual arts, in the latter up to the refined formalist modernism of 
Clement Greenberg which dominated the early understanding of American modern art. 
This lineage, in which aesthetics has a powerful grounding in the relationship between 
the judging subject and the structurally defined object, is implicated in a diverse set of 
compositional and analytical practices to which we will return in later chapters. 
 
iii. A critique of representation 
 
The co-emergence of the subject and object allowed, for the first time, the positioning of 
sound as the problem of music, but this problem is ultimately oriented away from sound 
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in itself and towards a transcendental realm of understanding due to the subject position 
we find in the representational regime of knowledge – the co-emergence is founded on 
assumptions regarding the subject element of the pairing. The twentieth century saw 
numerous attempts to break with this history of music theory, to pluralize music beyond 
one fixed representational framework, from the microtonal extensions of equal 
temperament found in Charles Ives or Harry Partch84 to La Monte Young’s explicit 
return to a pre-modern fundamental harmony (which we will look at in our final 
chapter), but here we will consider the lineage through Schoenberg and Cage. At the 
core of Schoenberg and Cage’s response to the Western classical tradition is a 
questioning of the relegation in status the individual musical note suffers under the 
terms of structural harmony. To recapitulate some of the formalist aspects of functional 
harmony, any unit – chord or note - of a musical composition is defined only through its 
subordinate relation to the tonic chord to which it corresponds, and the aesthetic 
perception of the work is presented as a logical activity regarding the understanding of 
the work’s structural qualities.  
 
The individual sound unit, then, has no internal qualities as such, and instead its musical 
role is thought only in terms of its position in the vertical harmonic and horizontal 
melodic movement of a piece, under the terms of a significantly pre-defined and 
external structural language of functional harmony. The note is shorn of its fundamental 
difference and subsumed under a marker of the same – tonal music, as Deleuze notes in 
an essay on Boulez, “restore[s] a principle of specific identity”.85 In addition to this, 
Rameau’s naturalization of the theory of harmony lent a rigidity to its development 
which may not have occurred were the previous conventionalist practices of harmony 
maintained. While the theory of Western art music continued to develop after Rameau, 
the continued centrality of Rameau’s rationalization of fundamental harmonic rules 
ensured that any malleability or variation remained founded upon another principle of 
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identity, and that as such the rules of harmony became an ever-denser extrapolation of 
Rameau’s founding insights rather than a productive ordering of a particular note 
relation. The profusion of regulatory principles for the relations between notes leads to 
what Robin Mackay terms a “wasteland of redundancy”,86 where music theory serves to 
legislate and limit far beyond the purview of the specific musical situation with which a 
composer is faced. What, then, is the basis for a theoretical and practical response to this 
historical condition of music? Clarifying the philosophical structure of the problem will 
be helpful here – what precise form does representation take, and how can a critical 
response to it be constructed? 
 
 
Deleuze and the problematic Idea 
 
We find that Cage, in his 1937 ‘Future of Music: Credo’, echoes Descartes’ move of 
locating the problem of music in sound, but extracts it from the representational theory 
of harmony developed over the previous three centuries. What is the status of 
‘representation’, and what does a problem look like when it is not shaped by 
representation, that is, when it is not thought in terms of what can appear as a prefigured 
subject cognizing its object? A closer analysis of both representation and the problem, 
and the relation between the two, is required. Key Deleuze’s project of transcendental 
empiricism is his reading of Kant – a Kant who, for Deleuze, stands as a kind of 
culmination of philosophies of representation but also as the unrealized source of a 
retreat of thought from representation.87 
 
It is perhaps in Difference and Repetition’s third chapter, ‘The Image of Thought’, that 
the specifically post-Kantian character of Deleuze’s own critique of representation is 
most closely developed. Here it is on Kantian terms that this critique takes place, Kant 
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being subjected to a kind of auto-critique, by which Kantian philosophy is pushed to its 
limits on an immanent basis. It will be useful here to quote at length from this chapter, 
and work both forwards and backwards from this point: 
 
The transcendental form of a faculty is indistinguishable from its disjointed, superior or 
transcendent exercise. Transcendent in no way means that the faculty addresses itself to 
objects outside the world but, on the contrary, that it grasps that in the world which 
concerns it exclusively and brings it into the world. The transcendent exercise must not 
be traced from the empirical exercise precisely because it apprehends that which cannot 
be grasped from the point of view of common sense, that which measures the empirical 
operation of all the faculties according to that which pertains to each, given the form of 
their collaboration. That is why the transcendental is answerable to a superior 
empiricism which alone is capable of exploring its domain and its regions. Contrary to 
Kant’s belief, it cannot be induced from the ordinary empirical forms in the manner in 
which these appear under the determination of common sense. Despite the fact that it 
has become discredited today, the doctrine of the faculties is an entirely necessary 
component of the system of philosophy.88 
 
Both the historical root and a projected orientation of Deleuze’s thought, towards 
transcendental empiricism as experimental method, can be extracted from this passage. 
Kant’s introduction of the transcendental as concerning the conditions of experience 
remains central – Deleuze’s project can be read as a regeneration of the Kantian doctrine 
of the faculties. For Deleuze Kant’s mistake is in deducting the transcendental via a 
mere tracing from the empirical,89 that is to say, the transcendental is derived from the 
mode of representation that is the empirical – a difficulty we likewise encounter in the 
history of music theory, wherein music comes to no longer pertain to its purported 
object of sound, but rather only to its own principles of harmonic structure. The form of 
this tracing requires closer analysis, and returns us to Deleuze situating Kant firmly 
within a long lineage of philosophy which falls back on what Deleuze calls ‘common 
sense’. Deleuze’s suggestion in the opening pages of ‘The Image of Thought’ is that 
while philosophy has traditionally been understood as beginning with the elimination of 
all presuppositions, this has generally been enacted as a rejection of objective 
presuppositions which has nevertheless fallen back onto subjective presuppositions90 – 
as concerning the conditions for possible experience, a presupposed subject, rather than 
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those of real experience.91 This ultimate reliance on subjective presupposition has taken 
the basic form of “[e]verybody knows, no one can deny”,92 and with this comes a 
distinct form and discourse, namely of representation and of the representative.  
 
The Cartesian image of thought, Deleuze suggests, takes the “old saying” that good 
sense is of all things in the world most evenly distributed and transforms it into a 
philosophical principle of pure thought, whereby thought, in its purity distinct from the 
contingencies of imagination, memory and so on, has a priori an affinity with truth. 
While thought may remain difficult to attain in the face of the contingencies of the 
world, once it has been achieved it becomes its own marker of validity, on the 
assumption that with thought immediately comes a good sense and a common sense 
linked to truth in principle.93 In this lies the subjective presupposition of Descartes’ 
philosophy, which leads us to a philosophical model in Descartes and Kant alike built 
upon a doctrine of recognition. For thought to be in principle good and common, it must 
in its nature have a capacity to unify, both internally, within the individual thinker, and 
externally, within the community of thinking beings. In the case of Kant we have him 
placed in the role of the “great explorer” with his discovery of the transcendental, 
deducing that individual faculties contributing to thought can “[grasp] that in the world 
which concerns it exclusively and [bring] it into the world”, that each faculty is 
synthesized and functions independently of the others. However, we ultimately see a 
faculty of recognition appear as a culmination of this analysis, transcending the other 
faculties by both operating within them and remaining outside of them, and taking the 
guise, again, of an ‘I think’, a psychological consciousness whose recognition of objects 
every function of a faculty is traced to.94 
 
In terms of the musical lineage we have set out, many points of connection are evident. 
Deleuze’s broad critique of recognition is itself a critique of formalism – that the “form 
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of recognition has never sanctioned anything but the recognizable and the recognized; 
form will never inspire anything but conformities”95. As Levi Bryant articulates this 
point, formalism “always sanctions the universalization of that which is historically 
produced in such a way that the production of the produced […] becomes invisible” – 
“Formalism sanctions the decontextualization of the produced”.96 The Cartesian 
formulation marks a path towards an increasingly rigorous purification of 
understanding, exemplified in music’s shift away from the contingencies of plural 
practices, brought under the sole organising tool that is a structural harmonic articulation 
of recognition. Harmony comes to unify the diverse practices it considers, but only by 
excluding those aspects deemed aberrant and retroactively erasing the role that those 
practices served as the basis for the development of harmony itself.  
 
While for Deleuze the philosophical commitment to recognition leads to a political 
commitment to conservatism,97 it is not yet clear in this context why the method of 
recognition should be rejected. To make this shift in the argument, Deleuze expands this 
critique of recognition by arguing that the method of recognition depends upon the more 
fundamental principle of representation, with which the earlier chapters of Difference 
and Repetition had been concerned. In this case we find recognition as the instance of 
representation specifically when applied to the faculties – the understanding concerns 
identity with regards to concepts, the imagination depends on oppositions, judgement 
concerns analogy, and perception depends on resemblance.98 Under these terms, 
Deleuze argues, difference in itself is “crucified”, insofar as it is conceived only in terms 
of identity, as an object of representation determined under the strictly delimited scope 
of each faculty. 
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This points back to Cage’s early understanding of sound, and to what in Cage’s work 
will be considered an interest in ‘sound in itself’ as a musical articulation of the notion 
of difference in itself – whereby Cage, from his earliest works, will attempt to extract 
sound from its reduction to an object of representation under the operations of functional 
harmony. The theoretical status of this break is not yet clear, however, and to develop it 
and understand the significance of a transcendental or superior empiricism and the 
importance of a rehabilitated doctrine of faculties, it will be useful to retrace this 
argument through Kant. Deleuze offers some hints as to the continued significance of a 
Kantian mode of thought, suggesting that Kant “seemed equipped to overturn the Image 
of thought” (namely that of recognition) but “in spite of everything, and at the risk of 
compromising the conceptual apparatus of the three Critiques, Kant did not want to 
renounce the implicit presuppositions”.99 The key to deducing what Kant’s missed 
opportunity was – how the conceptual apparatus of the three Critiques could have 
operated if not for the persistence of subjective presuppositions – is found in Deleuze’s 
specific sense of the “transcendent exercise” of a faculty.  
 
‘Transcendent’ here is not being used in the same sense as when the faculty of 
recognition was described as transcendent. In the case of the faculty of recognition, 
‘transcendence’ concerns how the faculty of recognition regulates and limits the other 
faculties while remaining distinct from them, and the faculties are left relying on a 
principle which lies outside of – transcends – their own operation. The transcendent 
exercise of a faculty which is found in the rehabilitated doctrine of the faculties that is 
transcendental empiricism, on the other hand, concerns the use of the faculty to and 
beyond its limit, considered in relation to other faculties outside of itself. The Kantian 
use of the faculties can be described as ‘immanent’ insofar as its exercise is internal to 
its boundaries, but this is, as François Zourabichvili notes, down to “the confusion of 
immanence with closure,100  a closure which relies on the transcendent faculty of 
recognition – for Kant the exercise of the faculties is immanent because the faculty of 
                                                 
99 Ibid., 136. 
100 François Zourabichvili, Deleuze: A Philosophy of the Event, trans. Kieran Aarons (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 47. 
35 
 
recognition allows us to determine the boundaries of a faculty, the operation ‘proper’ to 
a faculty under the terms of good and common sense. 
 
In this distinction between the immanent and transcendent exercise of the faculties we 
see why Deleuze would famously describe his Kant’s Critical Philosophy as “a book 
about an enemy”,101 but Deleuze’s move in this regard is to turn Kant against himself, to 
find within Kant a site of auto-critique – it is in Kant himself that we find the clue to 
how a revised, transcendental empiricist theory of the faculties can function, in his 
concept of the sublime. In his study of the Critique of Pure Reason in Kant’s Critical 
Philosophy Deleuze suggests that in immanent exercise of the faculties under the 
subjective presupposition of recognition we find that a form of harmony is illegitimately 
posited as existing not merely between subject and world but in turn within both subject 
and world102 – ultimately, the ‘free accord’ between the faculties that Kant claims to 
discover beneath the faculties can be founded only on a pre-established harmony. With 
the discussion of the sublime in the Critique of the Power of Judgement, however, we 
find another kind of harmony, one not pre-ordained under the terms of recognition and 
identity, but what Deleuze describes as the first example of “discordant harmony”,103 
whereby the relation between faculties is not posited from a prior term but a form of 
communication between them nevertheless exists. Under these terms the communication 
would not take place under the terms of pre-existing laws which serve to maintain the 
boundaries of the exercise of a faculty, but would rather open the faculties to 
metamorphosis through an opening to that which is outside of them, where the 
interiority of the faculty is overcome and thought is seized by that which is exterior to it. 
 
Deleuze’s use of Kant against Kant, then, centers on bringing to the forefront of critical 
philosophy the idea of genesis he locates in the Critique of the Power of Judgement, and 
deploying it against conceptual predeterminism. Within Kant himself, the 
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epistemological core of this is found in the distinction between reflective and 
determining judgements in the Critique of the Power of Judgement, but this formulation 
is prefigured in the Critique of Pure Reason by what Kant calls the “hypothetical” use of 
reason104 – when it is used “problematically”. This realm concerns universals which are 
not certain or given, but are nevertheless assumed, as an Idea, and tested to determine 
their universality. For Deleuze, Kant too quickly settles on three such universals – God, 
World, and Self – but this structure nevertheless forms the basis of Difference and 
Repetition’s concept of the problematic Idea. A break with representation is staged 
insofar as the problem is no longer a knowable object, but rather concerns the movement 
of a regulative process – the inexhaustible exploration of a virtual Idea. 
 
In order to articulate this reformulation of Kant, Deleuze turns to Kant’s contemporary 
and one of his earliest critics, Salomon Maimon.105 Maimon finds in Kant a failure to 
prove the fact of ‘possible experience’, arguing that Kant rather presupposes necessary 
and lawlike connections,106 a consequence of which is an absolute and illegitimate 
heterogeneity between the faculties between sensibility and understanding.107 For 
Maimon, Kant requires an understanding of the internal genesis of a Kantian external 
conditioning. This points us to one of the key concerns in Deleuze’s critique of Kant, 
and a distinction which will be central to our mapping of Deleuze’s transcendental 
critique over our coming chapters – that Kantian aesthetics is “divided into two 
irreducible domains”.108 We find in the Critique of Pure Reason a theory of the sensible 
which pertains to the real only insofar as it conforms with the possible experience of the 
subject, and in the Critique of the Power of Judgement a theory of the beautiful which 
“deals with the reality of the real”.109 Deleuze’s concern with transcendental empiricism 
is to understand how we can invert the Kantian formula and understand the conditions 
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of real experience, as the basis for sensible experience more generally.  
 
Crucial for Deleuze is that Maimon’s solution to this comes through the development of 
an understanding of differential relations – as the most basic elements of sensation, the 
rule for generation of sensible objects. Representation, in the Kantian sense, is here 
understood as being produced by an accumulation akin to that of Leibniz’s petites 
perceptions, but through which its self-subsistence cannot be maintained. Leibniz speaks 
of “the confused murmur coming from the innumerable set of breaking waves heard by 
those who approach the seashore”,110 which, as Deleuze interprets it, unbinds the 
traditional Cartesian logic of the clear and distinct. Instead we find an apperception of 
the whole that is clear and confused, insofar as it finds itself incapable of grasping the 
fundamental elements of the sound, or distinct and obscure, insofar as the petites 
perceptions themselves are grasped, as differential relations or singularities, but their 
distinction into the whole of the sound has not yet been established: 
 
These singularities then condense to determine a threshold of consciousness in relation 
to our bodies, a threshold of differenciation on the basis of which the little perceptions 
are actualised, but actualised in an apperception which in turn is only clear and 
confused; clear because it is distinguished or differenciated, and confused because it is 
clear.111 
 
By this understanding of the differential basis for sensibility and understanding, we see 
a notion of genesis inserted into transcendental philosophy, first at the level of qualities, 
then of space and time, and then of concepts, and it is in the “reciprocal synthesis of 
differential relations” that we find “the substance of Ideas”.112 As such Deleuze pushes 
Kantian transcendental philosophy through Maimon so as to confer an objective status 
onto the Kantian problematic Idea. In this understanding the Idea is made up of 
differential elements in reciprocal relation,113 and is completely determined, 
differentiated, at the level of the virtual, but not yet actualised into species and 
distinguished parts, differenciated – at the level of its virtual differentiation it remains 
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“enveloped and in need of interpretation”,114 that is to say, it remains a problem awaiting 
a solution. As Deleuze writes, “[w]hereas differentiation determines the virtual content 
of the Idea as problem, differenciation expresses the actualisation of this virtual and the 
constitution of solutions (by local integrations)”.115  
 
Deleuze offers a useful example to reconnect to our musical discussion – the Idea of 
colour, Deleuze says, is like white light, it is ‘perplicated’, its singular points folded 
through itself, providing genetic element of all colours, individual visible colours 
‘solving’ the ‘problem’ posed by white light as the Idea of colour.116 Likewise, as 
Deleuze notes, the Idea of sound is white noise, and, if we bear in mind the 
understanding of the Idea as reciprocally determined elements held together in a 
differential relationship, we find a key artistic forebear to this in Cage’s idea of ‘sound-
space’.  
 
 
Sound-space and Music of Changes 
 
In Cage’s characterization of this space in the mid-1950s, differing little from his 
original articulation of sound in 1937, any given sound is determined by five distinct but 
inseparable variables – frequency, amplitude, timbre, duration, and morphology, 
resembling what is called envelope in modern electronic music practices.117 In a musical 
practice where the production of sounds is oriented towards this sound-space, sound is 
no longer a matter of a gradated schema of predetermined pitch relations, but is rather 
                                                 
114 Ibid., 24. 
115 Ibid., 209. 
116 Ibid., 206. The discussion of white light indicates also the importance of Bergson for this aspect of 
Deleuze’s thought, echoing the account in his early essay ‘Bergson’s Conception of Difference’ (Desert 
Islands, 43). From Bergson we derive the virtual-actual distinction and the concept of multiplicity which 
will resist the fixing of the problematic Idea towards which Maimon tends, integrating a vital element at 
the level of the Idea rather than only its genesis (see Éric Alliez, “On Deleuze’s Bergsonism,” trans. Tom 
Conley and Melissa McMuhan, in Discourse 20:3 (Fall 1998): 223).  This degree of mobility at the level 
of the problem, as well as the role of Bergson for both Deleuze and for Cage, will be significant in the 
chapters to come. 
117 Cage, Silence, 9. Cage later removes morphology from his list of fundamental variables, but advances 
in electronic technology perhaps justify its inclusion, as opposed to being reduced to a combination of 
frequency and timbre. 
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concerned with an actualisation of given sounds from the condition of the problematic 
field of sound-space. The plane of all possible musical sounds is as such an immanent 
and continuous one, wherein any sound can be seamlessly transformed into another 
through a change to any or all variables, with no qualitative distinction imposed on the 
difference between one sound and another and no principle for determining the sense of 
a sound that are external to the sound itself.118 
 
A model similar to this is used in Cage’s 1951 work Music of Changes, famously 
composed using two compositional techniques with which Cage became closely 
associated – the use of charts and the employment of the I Ching, the Chinese ‘Book of 
Changes’.119 The use of chance as a compositional practice is key and will be addressed 
in chapter four, but it is not of immediate concern here – it suffices to know that it is 
used so as to resist the imposition of intentional compositional decisions in the piece and 
on sound more generally. Due to the great complexity of Music of Changes it will be 
useful to first look to Cage’s first use of these techniques, in the Concerto for Prepared 
Piano and Chamber Orchestra (1950-51), to gain some insight into the function of these 
compositional devices.120 In this piece, while the piano part of the first movement was 
freely composed much as in Cage’s prepared piano works of the 1940s, for the 
orchestral second movement Cage constructed a chart of fourteen columns and sixteen 
rows, with each row indicating a different instrument and each column indicating a 
different sound or sound aggregate, specifically defined and weighted depending on the 
corresponding row. An additional chart was constructed representing the eight-by-eight 
configuration of the I Ching, with its cells featuring different simple instructions 
indicating simple moves across to be taken across the chart of instruments and sonorities 
(such as ‘two cells down, three cells right’). Cage would then toss coins and consult the 
I Ching to determine his choice of cell in his second chart, and sequence the sound 
                                                 
118 The relation between Cage’s use of variables and that found in European serialism will be important 
throughout the coming chapters. 
119 Our reading of Music of Changes here is selectively oriented towards developing an understanding of 
sound-space within a compositional practice – other aspects of its composition and performance will be 
addressed in chapters three and four particularly. 
120 The use of sound charts originates slightly earlier, in 1950’s Sixteen Dances – more on this in our 
fourth chapter. 
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selections of the first chart accordingly.121 
 
As such we have the use of charts and chance procedures to give sequence to sounds 
without the intention of the composer, but ultimately these techniques serve only to 
sequence the pre-determined totality of sound groupings which was itself generated by 
Cage’s compositional decisions regarding the first chart. With the composition of Music 
of Changes Cage appears aware of this shortcoming, and responds by both simplifying 
some aspects of the composition and complexifying others. In terms of simplifying, the 
piece is reduced to one instrument – the piano – and all compositional decisions are 
determined by chance, and by the single chance procedure that is the use of coin tosses 
and the I Ching. In terms of complexifying, the use of charts was multiplied 
dramatically – after determining the work’s temporal structure Cage constructed twenty-
six charts, with eight for sounds (half of the ‘sounds’ being silence), eight for 
amplitudes, eight for durations, one for tempi, and one for superpositions (events 
occurring at any one time). As a result we find, instead of the relatively small number of 
carefully defined sound complexes found in Concerto for Prepared Piano and Chamber 
Orchestra, Cage’s attempt to reduce the sound field to its barest, most fundamental 
variables. The sounds produced as such do not pre-exist their sounding, on account of 
the unpredicted and unpredictable events that take place due to relations drawn between 
independently determined charts. Rather than chance providing a sequencing of pre-
determined sound events, chance creates sound events by combining the twenty-six 
charts in unexpected ways. 
 
There are, however, important questions to be raised here about formalism. By defining 
sound with reference to a sound-space characterized in terms of a completely 
determined field defined by its internal relations, are we not reinstituting formalism on 
another level? What is the status of Cage’s critique of formal tendencies in music in 
relation to both prevailing and expanding formalist understandings of art? At this level it 
raises questions of the problematic Idea as well, particularly regarding the somewhat 
obscure and opaque point that is the constitution of these problematic Ideas themselves. 
                                                 
121 See Pritchett, The Music of John Cage, 60-78. 
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Deleuze refers to problems “emanat[ing] from imperatives of adventure”, referring to 
the throw of the dice, the power of decision which makes us “semi-divine beings” 
playing a divine game.122 It is in this divine game that process and becoming, genesis, is 
instilled into the problem itself, as the encounter with the problem allows the faculties to 
be thought genetically. But how does this occur in an Idea defined by its complete 
determination at the level of the virtual, how can an experimental practice have 
effectivity at the level of problems themselves? How does the problematic Idea resist 
subsumption under a formalist framework? 
 
These are key questions which we will gradually explicate over the coming chapters, but 
to begin it is crucial to consider the thought of Clement Greenberg. The early twentieth 
century saw the development of non-aesthetic and anti-aesthetic approaches, such as 
Duchamp’s notions of aesthetic indifference and anti-retinal art or, closer to the field of 
music (though far from exclusive to it), the noise compositions of the Italian Futurists, 
which resulted in an unprecedented pluralism whereby the notion of a privileged 
aesthetic realm was supplanted by considerations such as cross-disciplinarity and 
political engagement.123 Greenberg, on the contrary, developed – simultaneous with 
Cage’s most significant formulations, from the mid-1940s to the mid-1960s – a renewed 
aestheticism centered on a medium-specific modernism, culminating with the essay 
‘Modernist Painting’. For Greenberg, the beginning of modernism is marked by Kant, as 
“the first to criticize the means of criticism itself”,124 to render criticism immanent. In 
this period Greenberg develops his artistic take on this form of criticism, beginning with 
his early theory of artistic development as ‘purification’, whereby, following Lessing’s 
eighteenth century division of the arts, each art form has principles specific to the 
properties of its materials,125 and the work of modernist art is to reduce the number of 
                                                 
122 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 197-98. 
123 See Hal Foster, “Postmodernism: A Preface,” in Postmodern Culture, ed. Hal Foster (London: Pluto 
Press, 1983), xiii. 
124 Clement Greenberg, “Modernist Painting,” in The Collected Essays and Criticism, Volume 4: 
Modernism with a Vengeance, 1957-1969, ed. John O’Brian (Chicago ; London: University of Chicago 
Press, 1993), 85. 
125 Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Laocoon: An Essay upon the Limits of Painting and Poetry, trans. Ellen 
Frothingham (Mineola, N.Y.: Dover, 2005) – a text written in the mid-eighteenth century but not 
published until 1850. 
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expendable conventions and reduce the medium to its purest form. As Greenberg writes, 
“[i]t seems to be a law of modernism – thus one that applies to almost all art that 
remains truly alive in our time – that the conventions not essential to the viability of a 
medium are discarded as soon as they are recognized”.126 Modernist painting, for 
example, as the essay of that name argues, finds its medium-specificity in the 
“ineluctable flatness” of the canvas,127 that condition which it shared with no other art 
form, and it is this flatness with which the modern painter is to work. By this model the 
broad artworks which utilize non-aesthetic and anti-aesthetic approaches find 
themselves serving merely as a model of confusion between the arts.  
 
Alongside the musical formalism of functional harmony Cage was also working in an 
artistic climate in contention with these ideas, and not in as clear a distinction from them 
as from their traditional musical equivalents. Cage, with his sound-space, appears to 
have constructed an Idea of sound as a five-dimensional multiplicity, dimensions, 
following Deleuze’s definition in Difference and Repetition, being “the variables or co-
ordinates upon which a phenomenon depends”.128 But if Cage has, with Music of 
Changes, engaged in a procedure of refining the art of music, as that art which deals 
with sound, to its simplest elements, then how is this to be distinguished from the 
refined formalism of medium-specific modernism? 
 
 
Experimentation as method – preparing the piano 
 
To begin to respond to this problem, we return again to the question of the shift that 
occurs between Cage’s two ‘Future of Music’ pieces. While few of Cage’s written works 
can be neatly characterized in terms of either intent or function, the two ‘Future of 
Music’ pieces tend more than most towards being theoretical texts, and can be clarified 
by turning to two pieces that tend towards being methodological texts, namely the two 
                                                 
126 Clement Greenberg, “‘American-Type’ Painting,” in Art and Culture: Critical Essays (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1961), 208. 
127 Greenberg, “Modernist Painting,” 87. 
128 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 182. 
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‘Experimental Music’ pieces of the mid-1950s. Here we make a crucial point, however – 
that this method of experimentation is itself only ‘discovered’ by experimentation – and 
in particular by Cage’s compositional practice between 1937 and 1955. Key to this is the 
invention of the prepared piano. The prepared piano was developed, as Cage tells the 
story, in a practical context, through his work with dance pieces – an element of Cage’s 
early practice curiously not discussed in ‘Future of Music: Credo’.129 Cowell, Varèse 
and other experimental composers had by the early 1930s all written pieces for 
percussion ensembles, but in this period percussion’s primary use was as 
accompaniment in modern dance. It was in this context that Cage fully entered into the 
field of composition for percussion, beginning an association with UCLA’s dance school 
in 1937,130 and it is to this context that Cowell would later credit Cage’s increasingly 
well-developed percussion compositions, suggesting that “[c]omposers who work with 
dancers come to know percussion instruments and their possibilities; daily association 
with the problem of rhythm forms their background”.131   
 
Cage would soon form a percussion ensemble at the Cornish School, and it was through 
the practical concerns of this group that the prepared piano was developed. In the 1972 
piece ‘How the Piano Came to be Prepared’, Cage recounts being faced with writing 
music for a dance piece to be held in a hall too small for a percussion ensemble. In this 
period Cage was still writing music in the serial form along with percussion pieces, so 
he attempted to write an appropriate serial piece to be performed on the hall’s piano – an 
attempt which was unsuccessful. Here the tension between Cage’s serial and 
experimental inclinations took a sharp turn towards the latter approach – Cage recalls 
witnessing Henry Cowell’s manual modifications to the inside of the piano while 
studying under him, and already in 1939 Cage had made used of Cowell’s percussive 
‘string piano’ for Imaginary Landscape No. 1, and it is to this technique that Cage turns 
to solve the problem of the dance piece.132 After experimenting with the effects of 
various objects on the piano strings, Cage eventually found that screws and bolts would 
                                                 
129 Cage’s first major discussion of dance is in 1939’s ‘Goal: New Music, New Dance’, in Silence. 
130 Silverman, Begin Again, 27. 
131 Henry Cowell, “Drums along the Pacific,” Modern Music (Nov-Dec 1940): 48. 
132 Cage, Empty Words, 7. 
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remain fixed between the strings and would, through use of the piano’s pedals, produce 
multiple tones. With later compositions items including coins, weather stripping, and 
pieces of rubber were also inserted into the strings, and metal washers and other larger 
items placed on top of the strings. Cage would then carefully map out the placement of 
the preparations, determined by his judgement of the tones:  
 
All the factors of the piano preparations, objects and their positions, were found 
experimentally. They represent a choice determined by taste rather than reasoned 
relations. In most cases, the preparation preceded a composition. In the course of 
writing, however, it was sometimes found desirable to introduce an additional mute.133 
 
The prepared piano was designed as an element of the ‘all-sound’ music towards which 
percussion music was oriented, its primary purpose to allow an individual player to 
perform the role of a percussion ensemble, but the experimental nature of its production 
came to refigure this compositional practice. The sounds produced by the nuts and bolts 
to which Cage first turned are complex, resonant, gong-like tones of varying length, 
reminiscent of gamelan ensembles, and unlike the relative timbral refinement and 
constancy of tone colour integral to the design of the standard piano and the other 
instruments of the classical canon,134 inconsistent. This characteristic is key to prepared 
piano’s role in the development of Cage’s methodology – Cage notes that as his 
prepared piano pieces came to be used in different contexts, with different pianos, 
performed by different players, the sounds are not perfectly recreated: “Instead of the 
possibility of repetition, we are faced in life with the unique qualities and characteristics 
of each occasion”.135 What was intended to produce a multiplication of the sounds 
within the composer’s musical vocabulary ultimately took these sounds out of the 
composer’s grasp. 
 
The culmination of Cage’s experiments with the prepared piano is Sonatas and 
Interludes, twenty short pieces composed between 1946 and 1948. The overall structure 
of the majority of the Sonatas is surprisingly anachronistic – a binary model inherited 
                                                 
133 John Cage, The 25-Year Retrospective, [not on label], 1959, LP. 
134 See Chanan, Musica Practica, 242-43. 
135 Cage, Empty Words, 8. 
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from the early eighteenth century, in which the pieces are split in two with each half 
repeated. This simplicity, however, reflects the increasingly austere and personal route 
the prepared piano had taken Cage, away from the harsh plenitude of his early focus on 
noise. The rhythmic structures of the prepared piano pieces are simpler than Cage’s 
earlier work, but rendered more mobile by the intimacy of the arrangements and 
emphasis on individual sounds, and in the case of Sonatas and Interludes we find simple 
binary and ternary structures within which complex, sometimes fractional structural 
units appear to interpenetrate. This indicates the beginning of an undoing of the solid 
rhythmic structures that had characterized Cage’s work to this point - the fluidity 
allowed by the soloistic nature of the prepared piano makes for a living structure, 
rhythm as ‘grace’ in which elements ebb and flow in relation to each other,136 subtly 
departing from the overall structure of which they are ostensibly part and into an 
internal rhythmic relation between sections. This functions at the level of particular 
sounds also – the simple repetition of these pieces is, due to the nature of the prepared 
piano, not a repetition at all, notes sounding with slight variations in each iteration.137 
 
Cage goes into detail about the generalized compositional methodology he had settled 
upon at this point:  
 
I conceived of the composition as involving structure (the division of whole into parts, 
large and small), method (note to note procedure), materials (sound and silences) and 
form (continuity). The first three, I thought, could be rationally controlled. These pieces 
represent an attempt to compose freely within a controlled structure.138  
 
This division was developed in more detail contemporaneously to the composition of 
the Sonatas and Interludes, in the schematic 1949 article ‘Forerunners of Modern 
Music’ (among the earliest of the post ‘Future of Music: Credo’ texts that Cage deems 
                                                 
136 Pritchett, Music of John Cage, 25. 
137 Sonatas and Interludes also sees one of the first prominent uses of non-Western thought, prior to his 
famed engagement with Zen, in Cage’s work, with Cage foregrounding the concept of rasa, or aesthetic 
emotion, derived from the Indian aesthetics developed by Ananda Coomaraswamy. On this see Kyle 
Gann, No Such Thing as Silence: John Cage’s 4’33” (New Haven ; London: Yale University Press, 2010), 
96, and further discussion in our fourth chapter. The precise connection between the pieces and the nine 
permanent emotions is unclear, but Cage strongly emphasized (particularly in his text written on Sonatas 
and Interludes for his 25 year retrospective concert) the non-teleological tendency of the rasas, but 
nevertheless a general tendency towards tranquility. 
138 Cage, The 25-Year Retrospective. 
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appropriate for the Silence collection). The simplest condition of modern music here is 
that ‘atonality has happened’ – a moment in history has been reached where structural 
harmony has become ambiguous and lost its claim to providing the structuring principle 
of music. This means, says Cage, that the problem of the modern composer is to “supply 
another structural means”139 – something that twelve-tone row composition fails at, as it 
concerns only note-to-note procedures rather than a compositional whole and parts, and 
which Satie and Webern succeed at, by basing structure on lengths of time. Cage’s claim 
here is a more technical development of the ‘Future of Music: Credo’ statement that the 
modern composer does not deal with the steps of chromatic pitch but with the whole 
field of sound. Cage asserts, anticipating the idea of sound-space, that as the material of 
music is sound, that sound’s characteristics are pitch, timbre, loudness, and duration, and 
that the “opposite and necessary coexistent of sound is silence” to which pitch, timbre 
and loudness have no bearing, it is duration that is the ‘correct’ structuring principle of 
music. Structure is rhythmic, and rhythm concerns the relationships between lengths of 
time.140 This allows the other characteristics of sound to be manipulated for what Cage 
terms “formal (expressive)” purposes. 
 
At the end of the series of works across the 1940s we find that the prepared piano has 
inaugurated the development of an ‘experimental’ methodology that is distinctly Cage’s, 
and it is under these terms that he, in the 1950s, rehabilitates the term, it having fallen 
out of favour among composers of modern music after the 1930s. Experimental, as 
defined before, concerns actions performed without knowledge of the outcome, 
implying the understanding that the composer cannot have full control over the sound 
environment. This notion can be derived from the use of the prepared piano in two 
respects – in the ambiguity it brings about with regards to the composer’s control of the 
sound, and in the representational shift that occurs by stripping the piano of most of its 
tonal qualities while still writing in traditional notation – that rather than notes on the 
page representing the sounds of the piece, they rather represent the actions to be 
performed in order to produce the sounds, taking us another step away from the 
                                                 
139 Cage, Silence, 63. 
140 Ibid., 64. 
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authority of the composer.  
 
These concerns seem to take us a step away from formalism, and a step away from 
sound-space as an adequate ground for the practice of an experimental music. There 
appears to have been a shift in the ontological status of sound, opening it away from its 
status as problematic Idea. This is difficult to understand if we are to take Cage at his 
word and locate his visit to the anechoic chamber as being the point where his practice 
becomes experimental properly speaking, both in terms of the gradual erasure of 
formalist elements and of those formalist elements which may persist even after this 
‘epiphany’. Indeed, in ‘Experimental Music: Doctrine’, Cage credits magnetic tape and 
the prepared piano alike with producing sound in such a manner as to disrupt habit and 
introduce the unknown,141 and as such Cage’s crediting the anechoic chamber visit with 
the qualities of an epiphany, and a break with the past, seems peculiar. This is 
emphasized further still in his 1948 article ‘A Composer’s Confessions’ – excluded from 
the collection Silence, in this piece Cage discusses his idea for a piece named ‘Silent 
Prayer’, planned as three or four-and-a-half minutes of silence to be distributed by the 
muzak company.142 Here Cage’s claims are explicitly political – his aim is to disrupt the 
pacifying comfort that muzak normally provides in places of mass consumption such as 
shopping centres. The anechoic chamber story downplays these moments in Cage’s path 
which anticipate and set the grounds for his theoretical and practical developments to 
come, perhaps overdetermining his work and thought and diminishing the proliferation 
of factors which play into its unfolding, and complicate developing any understanding 
of the historical and conceptual constitution of his work.  
 
Over the coming chapters we will attempt to extract Cage from this overdetermined 
bind, to follow his practice as it develops, through its own immanent logic and in 
relation to broader artistic, musical, and cultural historical contexts, and think anew the 
development of Cage’s experimental practice. Coming off of the determination of sound 
as the problem of music, seen to be in some tension with a more practically realized 
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142 John Cage, “A Composer’s Confessions,” in John Cage: Writer, 43. 
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musical process, our next chapter will more closely situate the practical and theoretical 
status of sound as it develops through musical and artistic practices of the twentieth 
century. In so doing we will explore how this implicates musical experimentation in a 
phenomenological grounding, a relation which will deepen the terms of our Deleuzian 
transcendental critique via Husserl and likewise deepen our understanding of 
experimentation, but also produce a new layer of problems. 
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Music and the development of sound as object 
 
In the previous chapter we outlined the emergence of a twentieth century practice of 
experimental music which can be interpreted as performing a transcendental critique on 
the history of Western classical music, enacted through a rejection of the governing 
formal rules of functional harmony. We see attempts, from Schoenberg onto Cage, to 
reinscribe sound into the understanding of music, without subordinating it to harmony, 
but in so doing we find that this does not yet distinguish a practice of experimental 
music from formal aesthetics, rather revealing points of intersection with a broader 
philosophical and artistic lineage of formalism. From this standpoint the anti-formalism 
of Cage’s experimental music and the formalism of a Greenbergian medium-specific 
modernism are difficult to disentangle, but once we consider the passage of the practice 
of Cage’s musical experimentation, a series of tensions and points of departure from this 
impasse begin to emerge. Through this the practice’s formal certainties and its 
immanence to the field of music appear to begin to fray, to come into contact with other 
fields and take on a problematization which becomes unbound from its initial 
conditions.  
 
In the next two chapters we will investigate how the concept of sound, as it develops 
within and without the borders of musical practice, is developed and transformed 
through twentieth century musical and artistic practices, so as to better understand the 
contours of this relation and to more accurately situate experimental music, Cagean and 
otherwise, alongside and against the formalist models such as that of medium-specific 
modernism. By exploring this through the implication of the development of musical 
and artistic experimentation with phenomenology, specifically that of Husserl and 
Merleau-Ponty, this will also help us deepen our understanding the precise status of 
Deleuze’s transcendental critique. First, this chapter will look in more detail at the 
specific form of music as a sonic practice, how this notion transforms the idea of 
‘music’, and how it both comes to overlap with but also go against the grain of theories 
of medium-specificity, and ultimately point towards – and beyond – the reinvigoration 
of cross-disciplinary practices we see developing going into the 1960s. 
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While our previous chapter indicated the degree of sufficiency to the development of 
Cage’s practice through an immanent critique of the tradition of Western classical 
music, the development of the problem of sound asks that we turn back and consider an 
undercurrent to this musical trajectory, an overlapping and entangled history in which 
music takes on a question asked from its outside. This chapter will focus on a lineage of 
early-to-mid twentieth century musical practices which increasingly try to clarify the 
conceptual status of sound and create a musical practice adequate to it. Through early 
developments from Debussy and the Italian Futurists, the shift of emphasis from the 
undoing of harmony to an opening to sound quickly raises the question of a connection 
to extra-musical elements, and, in particular, through the notion of non-representational 
artistic approaches, to painting and the other art forms. The development of ideas 
pertaining to a medium-specificity of music in line with a wider artistic trajectory come 
into particular focus through the work of Edgard Varèse, whose terming of music as the 
‘organization of sound’ attempts to rid music of any conventions not necessary to its 
articulation as an art form dealing with the medium of sound. 
 
This turn is often characterized as a turn to noise, the admission of noise as non-musical 
sound into music and a connection with a wider avant-garde. This understanding 
broadens the critical and theoretical moves of our previous chapter and has provided the 
impetus for much illuminating work,143 but in so doing can increasingly deviate from 
the original problems posed, leaving critical questions unanswered. Here we suggest that 
the problems posed are given particular clarity in the field of music through the 
development, as Cage noted, of sound reproduction technologies, and it is the 
constellation of musical practices making use of such technologies in Europe from the 
1940s onwards which this chapter will primarily investigate. Central again is the notion 
                                                 
143 For instance, Kahn, Noise, Water, Meat; Attali, Noise: A Political Economy of Music; Alex Ross, The 
Rest is Noise: Listening to the Twentieth Century (London: Harper Perennial, 2007); Paul Hegarty, 
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of experimentation – here we will focus on Pierre Schaeffer’s notion of ‘experimental 
music’ through his development of musique concrète, unfolding parallel to that of Cage 
and likewise in relation, both sympathetic and antagonistic, internal and external, to 
practices of serialism. 
 
By temporarily shifting away from Cage and turning to Schaeffer we hope to clarify the 
musical and theoretical status of those aspects of Cage’s understanding of 
experimentation that are left in some ways obscure through a focus on Cage alone, and 
particularly by the mythologization of his anechoic chamber experience at the expense 
of mapping a practice in process. By considering the music theoretical struggles taking 
place in Europe surrounding early electronic research in music, the historical and 
practical significance of routes taken with regards to musical experimentation will 
become clearer. Likewise, as Schaeffer was a voluminous technical theorist in a way 
Cage ultimately came to resist, the broader theoretical questions regarding musical 
experimentation can be pinpointed more precisely, particularly with regards to how the 
musical questions under discussion are, implicitly or explicitly, entrenched in a 
phenomenological problematic which must be taken into account to understand the 
status of musical experimentation. 
 
With Schaeffer we find a transformation of musical practice enacted through the early 
twentieth century’s most thorough development of a concept of sound, in the sound 
object, and by tracing his experimental engagement with sound through his practical and 
theoretical armory of sound reproduction technologies, philosophy, science, poetry and 
more, we will see how many of the fundamental problems of experimental music 
practice – for instance, of its relation to technology, of composer-performer-listener 
relations, of the theme of developing a ‘language’ appropriate to music, be it notation (a 
theme to which we will return over the coming chapters) or otherwise – develop and 
begin to attain a practical clarity. We will also, however, consider the risks encountered 
in experimental music practice, the impasses and limitations to be encountered within it, 
of the kind which led Schaeffer to ultimately deem his project to develop a new musical 
practice to be a failure. This will relocate the problem of sound and music within a 
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philosophical register, by considering Schaeffer’s 1960s reformulation of his diffuse 
experimental practices through the theoretical grounding of Husserlian phenomenology. 
Philosophically, we will begin to outline more precisely the trajectory of transcendental 
critique which we set up between Kant and Deleuze in the previous chapter, discerning 
in Husserl’s problematization of Kant what will be seen as a crucial moment in the 
unfolding of Deleuze’s own transcendental critique. Musically, we begin to outline a 
notion of music as a distinct conceptually definable practice that is nevertheless not 
closed off to its encounter with sound and other ‘extra-musical’ elements – how can 
‘music’ avoid being a sovereign, unifying arbiter of the field of sound while still 
maintaining some kind of determinacy as a practice? Both of these aspects together, we 
continue to develop our problem concerning form or structure and experience, 
negotiating the apparent impasse that persists between the two.  
 
Looking at Schaeffer’s Husserlian turn, we will argue that for Schaeffer this leads to a 
shutting down of his experimental process for a fixed method, but in so doing leaves 
open key questions about the function of experimentation. Having found a general 
tendency towards formally defined taxonomical and parametric understandings of sound 
– Cagean sound-space, Schaefferian typo-morphology, or serialist methods of 
dimensional control – we must ask how formal tendencies relate, how, practically and 
theoretically speaking, can they relate, to a processual experimental approach. To begin 
to develop this question we will consider Cage’s own tape music, positing it as part of a 
moment in Cage’s practice which, while situated in distinct connection to the medium-
specific trajectory posed here, nevertheless points towards the artistic conceptual 
transformation of sound moving into the 1960s and in turn to the opening and undoing 
of music as a self-determining discipline. 
 
 
Debussy to Varèse 
 
In his exploration of the role of ambient sound in twentieth century music practices, 
Ocean of Sound, David Toop suggests that the beginning of the musical twentieth 
53 
 
century is located in one moment, at the 1889 Paris Exposition. Here a young Claude 
Debussy encountered a Javanese gamelan orchestra, and here, as the mythologization 
goes,144 heard the possibility of a model of music distinct from that which had 
developed through the Western classical tradition, a model characterized by the lack of 
progression and development across its pieces alien to that of Western classical music, 
and rather driven by elements in combination producing fluctuating, dynamic sheets of 
sound.145 Debussy, as expressed in an 1893 intellectual salon held by Pierre Louÿs, 
sought to repeat this new musical structure in his own compositional practice –  “I 
would like to see, and I will succeed myself in producing, music which is entirely free 
from ‘motifs’, or rather consisting of one continuous ‘motif’ which nothing interrupts 
and which never turns back on itself” – in distinction to that western model of repetition 
we find in Beethoven and hear “exaggerated […] almost to the point of caricature” in 
Wagner.146 Cage will later summarize Debussy’s discovery as a claim that “[a]ny sounds 
in any combination and in any succession are henceforth free to be used in a musical 
continuity”.147 
 
For the Italian Futurists, Debussy’s discovery of a field of sound was not enough, his 
work maintaining too much of a deference towards the musical past.148 As Luigi 
Russolo saw it, the time of the symphony had passed, “we have had enough of them”, 
“and we delight much more in combining in our thoughts the noises of trams, of 
automobile engines, of carriages and brawling crowds, than in hearing again the ‘Eroica’ 
                                                 
144 Debussy’s tendency towards mythologization is reflected in his statement, in a letter to Jacques Durand 
regarding his passion for the sea, that “I have endless memories and, in my opinion, they worth more than 
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people wish above all to conform to the rules, I wish only to render what I can hear.” “Statement of 
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or the “Pastorale’”,149 a sentiment echoing Marinetti’s assertion in ‘The Founding and 
Manifesto of Futurism’ that the roaring automobile is more beautiful than The Victory of 
Samothrace.150 The Italian Futurists took on the noise of war and the electrical age, and 
in particular Italy’s belated but accelerated industrialization, and used it to attempt to 
produce a new medium of performance.151 In Russolo’s writings on noise, collected 
under the name The Art of Noises (including a manifesto of 1913 and a book of 1916), is 
an inventory of what Russolo deems “the most characteristic of the fundamental noises”, 
a curious taxonomy featuring categories such as “Rumbles, Thunderings, Explosions, 
Hissing roars, Bangs, Booms”, “Noises obtained by beating on: metals, woods, skins, 
stones, pottery etc.” and “Voices of animals and people: Shouts, Screams, Shrieks, 
Wails, Hoots, Howls, Death rattles, Sobs”.152 From this the art of noises is extended to a 
compositional and performance practice, for which Russolo built his own noise-making 
machines for concert performance, their names self-explanatory – the Howler, the 
Hummer, the Crackler, the Burster among them.153 
 
In this seemingly everyday collection of sounds, Russolo saw the capacity for an infinite 
degree of movements in rhythm and pitch. To accommodate this, he devised a new 
system of notation. Russolo’s notation, while based on standard notation, simplifies 
rhythmic motion and theoretically does away with the fixed pitch steps of the latter, 
substituting in ‘progressions’ and ‘transformations’.154 This characteristic is reflected in 
the design of his noisemakers, on which a precise and continuous control of pitch was 
possible, indicated in the first English translation of the Italian intonarumori – ‘noise 
tuners’.155  
 
Among those provoked by Russolo’s art of noises were Debussy himself, Satie, and, 
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particularly central to this unfolding of music’s encounter with sound, Varèse.156 Varèse 
has already been mentioned in our previous chapter, as part of a generalized 
transcendental critique of the history of music that constitutes a founding element of 
‘experimental music’ broadly speaking, but the tension we find between this critique of 
art theoretical formalisms and the relation between Cage – and experimental music 
practice in a wider sense – and medium-specific modernism requires us to turn to the 
question of music’s ‘medium-specificity’ as an art of sound, a question we find first 
given precise form by Varèse. 
 
For Varèse, like Debussy, attendance of a Paris Exposition, in this case that of 1900, 
proved crucial in his musical development. It appears, however, that the concert 
performances there left little impact on the seventeen-year-old Varèse, but the scientific 
and technological exhibitions present sparked a line of research beginning over the next 
several years.157 Varèse would also befriend Russolo, but would later strongly criticize 
his work, and attempt in his own practice to leave behind the literalism that limits the 
Futurist exploration of noise, derived from their noise machines being designed to 
imitate the everyday sounds of industrial society – indeed, sounds which would in some 
sense soon come to be dated by their association with obsolete technologies.158 
 
In 1917, four years after Russolo’s ‘The Art of Noises’, Varèse berated the Italian 
Futurists for “merely reproduc[ing] the vibrations of our daily life only in their 
                                                 
156 Kahn, Noise, Water, Meat, 56. 
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superficial and distressing aspect”.159 In this context, Varèse’s friend and biographer 
Fernand Ouellette is quick to distance Varèse’s practice from that of Russolo: “It is a 
mistake to link Varèse’s researches in any way with Russolo’s. Although he was a friend 
of the man, he could not accept the noise-artist. Their conceptions were on two very 
different levels and could never have come together”.160 Oullette’s reading, however, 
belies both a shared initial impetus and connections in solutions offered despite the 
distinctly different problematizations between the two, and as such obscures the precise 
move Varèse makes. Louise Varèse, a translator of French poetry and Edgard’s wife, 
indicates that early in the latter’s career he had much in common with both Russolo and 
Marinetti, and was “in enthusiastic accord with many of the tenets proclaimed by 
Marinetti in his Le Futurisme”.161 This is reflected in Varèse adapting some of Russolo’s 
noisemaker designs for his own compositions (and naming one such device the 
Russolofono), in a division of noisemaking devices similar to that employed by Russolo 
in the piece Ionisation, and in the use of sirens in early works such as Amériques, 
Ionisation, and Hyperprism. Indeed, in Hyperprism we find a moment of unconscious 
representation – Varèse was puzzled to hear audience laughter on the sounding of a 
particular C sharp during its first performance, only later realising he had imitated a 
siren sound often heard on the rivers of New York City.162 
 
However, in using sirens Varèse attempted not, as some contemporary critics suggested, 
a simple sound painting, but rather “the portrayal of a mood”.163 The use of devices 
outside of the standard orchestral configuration was intended not as a representation of 
the everyday but rather as an alien element in the expressive device of orchestra, an 
expansion towards sounds unknown to orchestral music through technological means. “I 
refuse to submit myself only to sounds that have already been heard. What I am looking 
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for are new technical mediums which can lend themselves to every expression of 
thought and can keep up with thought”.164 The representational characteristic in Varèse’s 
work is, then, indicative of a legacy from Russolo carrying over, but also, and more 
significantly, of the negative imprint of this step still present in Varèse’s limited attempts 
to reformulate the question of sound – as he states in the 1939 piece ‘Music as an Art-
Science’, “I need an entirely new medium of expression: a sound-producing machine 
(not a sound-reproducing one)”.165 Varèse appeared frustrated by the failure of the tools 
available to him to realize his ideas – he deemed the symphonic orchestra cumbersome, 
an “éléphant hydropique”, hence his exploration of the jazz ensemble, “un tigre”,166 and 
his work with percussion – and his eventual work with early tape music techniques 
came after a period of fifteen years in which only a handful of minor pieces were 
composed. 
 
Varèse came to term his work as “organized sound”,167 largely abandoning the 
traditional compositional concerns of pitch, melody, and form, and terming himself not a 
composer or a musician but rather a “worker in rhythms, frequencies, and intensities”.168 
Distinct from the Italian Futurists, from an early point Varèse understood sound as a 
complex and multi-faceted entity in its own right, and from this understanding attempted 
to formulate a new language of music drawing not only from its past but from the 
vocabulary and conceptual armory of the sciences – particularly acoustics, and 
especially the work of Helmholtz,169 but also crystallography, chemistry, geology, and 
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more, oriented towards making music an art which could match the advances in the 
visual arts.170 
 
With Varèse, then, we see an inaugural moment in defining music as a medium-specific 
art whose medium is sound. Music had in the past valued its unique self-determination 
and singular expressivity as an art form – for example the romantic idea of absolute 
music, or Walter Pater’s 1873 claim that it is only in music that form and matter are 
indistinguishable,171 but the passage in the early twentieth century of, first, as discussed 
in the previous chapter, the bringing into question of functional harmony, and second 
(entangled but in some respects distinct), the musical foregrounding of sound itself, 
brings to light this ideal characteristic in relation to the other arts. Likewise, the painter 
Wassily Kandinsky saw in music a model of nonrepresentational art, but one which 
music as practiced had significantly failed to realize. This is reflected in a quite sudden 
shift in his attitude towards Wagner. In the 1911 piece ‘Whither the “New” Art?’ 
Kandinsky celebrates Wagner’s direct use of sound, the heroes of his operas having a 
relation to sound not merely formal, whereby the sound indicates not a name, but rather 
the leitmotif being a sounding, the hero expressing sonically rather than sound 
representing the hero.172  
 
However, by the 1912 pieces ‘On Stage Composition’ and Concerning the Spiritual in 
Art, this position has shifted – Wagner is associated with program music and the 
leitmotif becomes no longer a sounding but rather an association, an identification, an 
“obstinate recurrence” which in its repetition evokes nothing but familiarity and 
recognition.173 In the earlier text, Kandinsky indicates a relationship between sound and 
the external world of nature, but by the following year this relation has been superseded 
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by the notion of ‘inner sound’ or ‘inner note’,174 a value internal to sound and not only 
independent of the distinct language of external nature, but degraded by attempts to 
conjoin the two.175 Modern art music – Debussy standing as an exemplar176 – has 
attained an expressiveness “outwardly unfettered by nature”, while painting remains 
“almost exclusively concerned with the reproduction of natural forms and 
phenomena”.177 For Kandinsky it is the task of the painter to “know herself”, without 
recourse to the representation of nature. 
 
Here we can return to Greenberg’s 1960 essay, ‘Modernist Painting’. In outlining 
modernist painting’s “stressing the ineluctable flatness of the surface”,178 Greenberg 
argues that the moment of self-criticism of which Kandinsky is part is not precisely that 
which is necessary to the modernist move of painting. Kandinsky is among those 
painters who, Greenberg suggests, have deemed abstractness, the non-figurative, to be 
the key moment in painting’s critique of modernist art, while Greenberg suggests that 
this is merely one aspect of painting’s divestment of its qualities from those of sculpture, 
of which representation itself is but an epiphenomenon. Insofar as, for example, 
elements of representation in painting separate it from its two-dimensional pictorial 
space, the problem is not of representation as such, but of the suggestion of three-
dimensional space which is proper to sculpture. Kandinsky indeed stands in contrast to 
Greenberg insofar as he locates his practice within an increasing overlapping of the arts 
– suggesting that “the arts are encroaching one upon another”.179 However, the 
distinction between a generalized critique of representation and the development of 
medium-specific practices is one which, in his painterly deployment of an idealized 
notion of musical creation, Kandinsky seems already to recognize to a degree. It is not 
precisely the anti-representational character of music which is key, but, more 
fundamentally, it is music’s exemplary understanding of its own specific formal 
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characteristics, holding, unlike the other arts, a certain notion of its material to be used 
as is appropriate to its qualities. 
 
We see, then, that the opening of the field of music to sound immediately implicates 
itself in wider theoretical currents concerning the formal status of art in general and the 
individual arts in particular. At this point it is important to take a step back and relocate 
this problem within the terms of musical practice and its relation to a specifically 
musical tradition. We will return to the question of the arts more broadly speaking in our 
next chapter, after first looking more closely at this formal, aesthetic, and practical 
entanglement of sound and experimental music through the most comprehensive theorist 
of the relation, Pierre Schaeffer. 
 
 
Origins of musique concrète 
 
These practices, Varèse through Cowell and beyond, act as a partial spark for a series of 
new explorations of the field of sound emerging at the turn 1950s, not limited to the 
work ongoing in the United States. In Germany, the Westdeutscher Rundfunk studios 
were established in 1951 under the directorship of Herbert Eimert, and a research 
programme towards the development of ‘elektronische Musik’ using early sound 
manipulation technologies was initiated, with similar centres founded in Italy and the 
Netherlands.180 As Reginald Smith Brindle notes, these musical practices were generally 
composed in the manner of traditional music, developed in the mind of the composer 
and scored, with the realization in sound coming last of all.181 Contemporaneously in 
France, however, the Groupe de Recherche de Musique Concrète (GRMC, later 
renamed the Groupe de Recherches Musicales, GRM) was founded by Pierre Schaeffer 
and Pierre Henry in 1951 in order to explore a field of music from the precise origins of 
a developing context of new technologies of audio recording and sound manipulation, 
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rather than through pre-existing musical ideas. Schaeffer would come to see Varèse as 
“our sole great man, and the only precursor anyway”,182 insofar as Varèse concerned 
himself precisely with the material of sound, and insofar as this positioned music as 
attempting to follow the path of the plastic arts in “say[ing] good-bye to any 
resemblances, any known words, any notes, any conventional figures”,183 in stripping 
down to a simplicity of form with no representation to be interpreted.184 With Varèse’s 
work, many of the principles of a practice realigning the relation between sound and 
music, and the consequent new image of music, that carries on into the GRMC are to be 
found – the use of new electronic technologies as an opening of the musical field, 
connections forged between music and the still relatively young science of acoustics, 
and an acknowledgment of the inadequacy of musical notation to new musical practices 
among others. 
 
While the GRMC was the first organization to be formally invested in the development 
of musique concrète, Schaeffer, through his work at Radiodiffusion-Télévision 
Française from the 1930s, made use of early examples of such technologies to explore 
sound through the earlier groupings of Studio d’Essai (1942-46, founded as a centre for 
the French Resistance) and Club d’Essai (1946-60), of which the GRMC was part.185 
Under this series of organizational umbrellas Schaeffer worked to develop a practice, 
overlapping composition and scientific investigation, centered on taking sound, and, 
more precisely, individual sounds, as objects of study.186 While Schaeffer’s earliest 
recordings date to 1942,187 it was not until 1948 that the development of the new 
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musical practice that would be named musique concrète began to coalesce. Schaeffer’s 
journals of the time, as collected in the 1952 text In Search of a Concrete Music, 
document the development of both a practice and a theory of musique concrète, 
underscored by what Brian Kane terms an “improvisational ontology”,188 a process of 
formalization concerning music, sound, composition and listening. 
 
The earliest entries in Schaeffer’s journal concern his unsteady and hesitant gathering of 
sounds for a proposed “symphony of noises”,189 before what appears as a moment of 
epiphany – when the attack (the initial part of a sound before it falls to a sustained level, 
such as the striking of percussive instruments or the plucking of strings) of a bell sound 
is removed, “the bell becomes an oboe sound”.190 This is quickly presented by Schaeffer 
as the genesis of his new line of enquiry, or more specifically, as a discovery, an 
invention the nature of which is not year clear but which serves as the grounding for 
musique concrète: 
 
Where does the invention come from? When did it occur? I reply unhesitatingly: when I 
interfered with the sound of the bells. Separating the sound from the attack was the 
generative act. The whole of concrete music was contained in embryo in this inherently 
creative act with sound material.191  
 
While this ‘interference’ is primary, it is nevertheless part of a musical practice which 
“seek[s] direct contact with sound material”,192 and at this stage we can see the germ of 
Schaeffer’s reorientation of traditional musical understandings of the relationship 
between subject and object. The composer, the listener, and the composer as listener – 
as one who acts on sound as it is received – all begin to enter into a new relation with 
the musical object that is sound.  
 
Shortly afterwards, while in the process of composing his first pieces from this basis, 
Schaeffer shifts from his earlier speculative notion of a ‘concrete music’ to beginning to 
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give form to the specific musical practice that is musique concrète. As written on the 
15th of May 1948, less than one month after his discovery of the bell sound stripped of 
its attack: 
 
I have coined the term Musique Concrète for this commitment to compose with materials 
taken from ‘given’ experimental sound in order to emphasize our dependence, no longer 
on preconceived sound abstractions, but on sound fragments that exist in reality and that 
are considered as discrete and complete sound objects, even if and above all when they do 
not fit in with the elementary definitions of music theory.193 
 
From this basis Schaeffer, with some haste, produced his first series of compositions, 
which were performed publicly in June of 1948 under the title Cinq études de bruits. 
These five pieces were composed for phonograph, and constructed from slowed down 
and speeded up recordings of both musical (e.g. piano) and non-musical (e.g. train) 
sounds. As Schaeffer details in his journals of this period, his discovery of procedures 
regarding sound and the development of compositional techniques is at all turns 
entangled with the capacities of the technologies available to him – primarily that of the 
turntable, but also the mixing desk’s potentiometers.194 Ultimately, the basic 
compositional techniques in the earliest formalizations of musique concrète are guided 
by the specific functions of the given technologies of the recording studio – the closed 
groove loops, speed variations, reversals and removals made possible by the turntable, 
the combination of sounds and reshaping of a sound’s dynamic outline through the 
mixing desk, the use of reverberation, particularly to ‘fuse’ sounds together, and the 
elimination or enhancement of frequencies using filters. 
 
The presentation of the ‘Concert de bruits’ saw Schaeffer clarify further, and for the first 
time in public, his use of the term musique concrète, defining it at this point as music 
reached from an “inverse path”, making clear his adversarial stance towards the classical 
tradition, “set[ting] out from sound data instead of notation”.195 The bruits of the title 
makes reference to Russolo’s Art of Noises,196 but by terming the pieces “attempts at” 
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musique concrète Schaeffer, as Cage did before him, moves to reframe the question of 
that which has been considered noise, to reclaim it under the territory of music and shift 
from a question of noise to a “method of musical composition”. 
 
 
Experimental method and the critique of abstract music 
 
At this point it will be useful to step back and consider, outside of this historical 
trajectory, the methodology at work in Schaeffer’s practice, and specifically how 
Schaeffer’s understanding of experimentation and its critical relation to musical tradition 
relates to and connects with that of Cage. The practice of experimentation, and of the 
experiment, is found across the span of Schaeffer’s writings and attains a formal status 
when the GRMC becomes the GRM in 1958. While the GRMC’s research area was the 
specific field of musique concrète, the GRM (the ‘R’ now standing for the plural 
Recherches) took its field to be that of ‘experimental music’ broadly speaking, musique 
concrète now standing as “the starting point of a more general procedure”,197 a 
procedure towards the development of an international avant-garde under which projects 
of musique concrète, electronic music, tape music, and ‘exotic music’198 could be 
considered under a common orientation towards musical materials.199  
 
Prior to this generalization, however, an understanding of the experiment more 
specifically aligned to a mobile methodology appears in Schaeffer’s journal entries. In 
one of his earliest entries, Schaeffer describes what it would mean for a musical 
experiment to ‘pay off’ – only “if it gives rise immediately to experimentation”. The 
experiment attains a kind of success when it sets into motion, or continues, a practical 
process. Schaeffer, like Cage, saw such an experimental drive in Schoenberg’s 
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compositional practice, with dodecaphonic music offering an early engagement with 
some of the problems that later experimental practices would raise in a more radical 
manner, namely the absolute rejection of a certain kind of musical language (namely, 
functional harmony) but also, more implicitly, a kindling of a concern with the sound 
object.200 Schoenberg’s practice, suggests Schaeffer, used principles as means only for 
research paths, rules applied towards unknown outcome, an act “in keeping with an 
instinct that is still obscure, although we can discern its resources”201 – that is to say, 
following our understanding in the previous chapter, the problem is distinct but obscure, 
an approach has been established but its solutions are not determined in advance of the 
experiment. This experimental trajectory is one which later serialist composers would 
fail to live up to – rather we find in later serialism a school of composers who, says 
Schaeffer quoting Luc-André Marcel, “demand miracles at set times”.202 
 
It is this critique from which the term musique concrète stems – a concrete music 
standing in opposition to abstract music, or a priori music.203 In 1953 Schaeffer 
produced a text titled ‘Vers une musique expérimentale’, to be included in a special 
issue of the journal Revue musicale, edited by Schaeffer and set to coincide with the 
GRMC’s First International Decade of Experimental Music event.204 Here Schaeffer 
develops his critique of serialism: 
 
In reality, the prison had no bars. Why twelve notes when electronic music has introduced 
so many more? Why series of notes when a series of sonic objects is so much more 
interesting? Why the anachronistic use of an orchestra whose instruments are handled 
with such obvious anti-naturalness by Webern and his imitators? And above all, why limit 
the horizon of our research to the means, usages and concepts of a music after all linked to 
a geography and a history; certainly an admirable music but still no more than the 
Occidental music of the last few centuries.205 
 
For Schaeffer serialism marked what he would later call a “total grip of abstract 
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intelligence on both the subjectivity of the composers and over sound material”,206 
marking a culmination of the history of classical music’s development of a one-way 
movement of musical creation, from abstract concept and notation towards concrete 
performance with a representational relation to that abstraction – that is to say, as with 
Cage’s understanding, a history in which the composer’s authority is final, where there 
can be nothing unexpected or unplanned in rendering the piece concrete. The 
instrumental beginnings of music had served to complicate this passage from abstract to 
concrete, with the sounding of the instrument serving as a concreteness in the service of 
abstraction and intimating a reciprocity between the two, but serialism and its 
increasingly refined methods of controlling musical material reduces music to the “by-
product of a game of parameters”.207 
 
Schaeffer’s explicit critique here is largely a contemporary rather than a historical one, 
but its basis is the extent to which contemporary music, particularly that of the serialist 
school and its adoption of concrète techniques through elektronische Musik, has only 
taken music theory’s abstraction of music from its sonic source in sound to a higher 
level yet. For Schaeffer, elektronische Musik presented a school of concrete music 
practice in distinct opposition to that of the GRM/C, as a kind of extension of the 
conceptual basis of the laws of harmony, at the expense of experience properly 
speaking, i.e. real experience versus possible experience. Here the GRM/C is rightly 
speaking experimental, standing for “empiricism in construction, which essentially 
relies on the instinctive ear”, with elektronische Musik on the other hand being 
concerned with the application of “arbitrarily preconceived schemas to concrete 
matter”.208 This distinction is borne out (in less polemical terms) through Herbert 
Eimert’s presentation of his notion of electronic music in Schaeffer’s same edited 
collection in which ‘Vers une musique expérimentale’ was published. In this piece 
Eimert argues that “[i]t is meaningless to speak of electronic music unless the central 
processes involved are musical processes, that is, unless all essential decisions 
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concerning form and sound are taken from musical points of view”209 – here Eimert and 
Schaeffer would be agreed, but with differing perspectives on what would constitute the 
“musical point of view”.  
 
Key to Schaeffer’s rejection of the techniques of elektronische Musik is the insistence on 
what Schaeffer sees as an evolution of Western music rather than a substantive break 
and creation of a new music. For Eimert, with the introduction of new sonic materials 
into music came a demand to discover the “tonality laws of electronic music”, 
technology standing as a neutral means to continue the unfolding of a long tradition. 
With Schaeffer we have already seen the beginnings of a complex feedback loop 
between composer-as-listener and sound objects which structures the basis of musical 
composition, but for Eimert, and for Boulez, at bottom there persists a priority of the 
composer, neutrally utilizing technology and sound for the development of a 
predetermined compositional programme. For Schaeffer, on the contrary, a demand for 
experimentation in music and the availability of new technological means provides an 
exceedingly rare opportunity to produce a break with the musical past.  
 
Indeed, in Schaeffer’s eyes music had developed since Bach without a “real revolution”, 
and several centuries had passed exploring the terrain opened up by the development of 
equal temperament.210 The radicality of Schaeffer’s experimental approach is his 
absolute refusal of the notion that this long history of the development of a complex 
musical language could be adequate to the new form of music emerging through the use 
of electronic technologies – traditional music, as noted in Schaeffer’s list of ironic 
‘facts’ about music to be minimized by experimental practice, is “contained in the 
symbols of the solfège”, while experimental music is concerned with “those sonorities 
which, being too complex and new, escape such a system of notation”.211 This is not to 
say that musique concrète and Schaeffer’s musical theory and methodology in general 
rejects abstraction in the realm of music – as Boulez and Stockhausen among others 
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suggested, criticizing the ‘empiricism’ and ‘anarchy’ of concrete procedures212 – but 
rather that Schaeffer sees an increasing need to redefine the relation between the abstract 
and the concrete. The radicality of Schaeffer’s gesture towards the inadequacy of 
traditional notation is exceeded still by his resistance to applying any new language with 
excessive haste, but a desire to reach a degree of formal practicability, a model of 
deciphering sound objects,213 emerges across his early journals, and ends with a 
preliminary attempt at a vocabulary towards a theory of concrete music. The 
experimental approach, then, comes down to approaching sound without a preordained 
understanding of the language of music, and is resistant towards new languages and 
forms ossifying into bare abstractions, but what emerges across Schaeffer’s journals and 
into the early 1950s is a picture of experimental music that is ultimately not antithetical 
to the notion of musical language. 
 
While a resistance to the fixing of musique concrète persists even afterwards, it appears 
that a gradual shift in Schaeffer’s approach to experimentation is being indicated here, 
whereby ‘experimental’ seems to take on a different sense, and away from prior 
resonances with Cage’s perspective, to one now internal to the specific practice of 
musique concrète. By 1957, in his ‘Lettre à Albert Richard’, Schaeffer’s notion of the 
experimental appears to have moved away from a plurality of complementary practices 
under the banner of experimental music,214 towards rather a “synthesis of different 
efforts”,215 but a lack of appreciation for those musical practices taking place outside of 
the GRMC is hinted at in the ‘Vers une musique expérimentale’ text, where Schaeffer is 
critical of both the serialism which had been his target for several years but also, it 
appears, of Cage’s prepared piano and his recent turn to chance216 – “[t]he Americans, 
dynamic and naïve, put their pianos out of gear and apply to composition (somewhat 
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rashly) the laws of probability”217 – and to international practices of electroacoustic and 
electronic music, such as, but not restricted to, elektronische Musik.   
 
Amidst these discussions, Schaeffer locates what he determines to be four common 
points uniting experimental research practices. There is a certain degree of broadness to 
these points, remarking on the opening up of limited practices (such as the use of 
classical notation) and the necessity of general but largely undefined rethinking of the 
roles and relations between composer, performer, listener, and society, akin to Cage’s 
comments in his 1974 ‘Future of Music’. There are, however, also ‘common points’ 
which appear to be specific to the practice and theorization of musique concrète. The 
first of these common points refers to a calling into the question of the notion of the 
instrument: 
 
Sound can no longer be characterized by its causal element, it has to be characterized by 
the effect only. Hence it must be classed according to its particular morphology, rather 
than according to instrumental provenance. It must be considered in itself. The best proof 
of this: once the most interesting sonorities produced by the new techniques have been 
recorded on tape, it is impossible to say how, and by what ensemble of procedures or 
instruments, they have been produced.218 
 
Schaeffer’s approach reveals a distinctly formal side, concerned with the internal 
structure of sound. This gives it some correspondence with the Cagean sound-space, but 
less so with those aspects of Cage’s work, and that of others, which slip outside of this 
formal categorization, with the work of those who utilize new technologies in service of 
new sounds but nevertheless seek to maintain some relation, however obscure, between 
sound and its production, and indeed from an early stage attempt to forge new sound-
outside relations rather than, more broadly, music-outside relations. We find, therefore, a 
tension between a plurality of practices being endorsed and a specific research 
programme being prioritized. The idea of an international avant-garde appears as 
something of a projection of the grounds of musique concrète – and indeed, when 
musique concrète is later determined to become more of a historical term than an 
ongoing musical practice, its replacement in ‘experimental music’ loses its syncretic 
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qualities and begins to operate under the terms previously applied to musique 
concrète.219 
 
The shift here appears quite distinct – from a pluralistic experimental procedure with a 
small number of broad initial critical points towards a hardened, foreclosed practice. 
Across this period there are hints towards Schaeffer’s increasingly formalized 
theoretical positions regarding sound, the point at which the sound object, the nebulous 
problem circulating through the early journals, becomes a discrete theoretical object, the 
sound object, and through which the status of Schaeffer’s experimental practice appears 
to undergo a significant shift. 
 
 
The sound object and the formalization of experimentation 
 
Alongside the production of a compositional approach and the refinement of an 
institutional scientific research programme, a third element crucial to grounding the 
overarching practice of musique concrète is the development of a theory of sound and of 
listening appropriate to the aesthetic and scientific redistribution of the sonic field taking 
place.220 Increasingly central in this theoretical project is the notion of the ‘sound 
object’. The term ‘object’ is present in Schaeffer’s theorizations from their tentative 
earliest stages – noting, for instance, in only the third entry of his 1948 journal, that he 
had “started to collect objects” for use in his ‘symphony of noises’221 – but its formal 
figuration becomes increasingly evident in the essayistic texts published in the third part 
of In Search of a Concrete Music, written in 1952. 
 
Here Schaeffer begins to explicate more deeply his critique of ‘abstract music’, arguing 
that classical music theory operates on a relation between two subjects – namely, the 
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composer and the listener – and that the zone between the two, where the score or 
performance as something objective “independent of the subjects who have composed 
or who will hear”,222 remains undertheorized. By not attending to this zone, music 
theory, argues Schaeffer, presents only “the rules of a completely fabricated art”, its 
analyses of structure pertaining not to structure properly (i.e. objectively) speaking, but 
rather only to “customary ways of packaging sound ensembles”223 – in terms of the 
aforementioned critique of abstract music, the parameter-based approach organizing 
sound based on distinct music theoretical and acoustical categories which do not in fact 
pertain to the structure of sounds themselves. The implication here is that an 
intersubjective relation between composer and listener is posited but is rendered 
incoherent by a failure to consider the “gap”, “a no-man’s-land where nobody 
ventures”224 between the two, where the musical object properly speaking lies, and to 
which Schaeffer directs his investigation. 
 
Having set out this field of enquiry, Schaeffer, in a chapter entitled ‘From the Object to 
Language’, locates his starting point for exploring it by quoting from Paul Valéry:  
 
Looking at this seashell, in which I seem to see evidence of ‘construction’ and, as it were, 
the work of a hand not operating by ‘chance,’ I wonder: Who made it? […] But soon my 
question changes. It penetrates further into the recesses of my simplicity, and now I strive 
to find out how we know that a given object is or is not made by a man?225 
 
The theme of the seashell appears early in Schaeffer’s project, in the 1944 radio essay 
La coquille à planètes.226 In this piece Schaeffer intends to turn the “obvious analogy” 
between the seashell and the ear “inside out and outside in”, to complicate the relation 
between the shell, the equally shell-like form of the loudspeaker, and the ear of the 
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listener beyond an equivalence bound up in unaltered transmission – a neglect of the 
listening ear in favour of a focus on the loudspeaker. The act of listening to the seashell 
itself undermines the passive, everyday form of behaviour associated with listening to 
radio transmissions. Schaeffer expands on this theme in a text from the same year, ‘Sur 
l’expression radiophonique’. Here he presents the childhood experience with the 
seashell as almost an epiphany in the vein of Cage’s experience in the anechoic 
chamber. The standard scientific stance on the shell, as Schaeffer posits it, reduces the 
‘ocean’ sound the listener hears when putting the shell on his or her ear to a form of 
equivalence, the shell drawing the listener’s attention only to the circulation of blood in 
the ear.227 The simple act of listening to the seashell, however, brings to mind a more 
profound resonance between the circuit of ear, shell, body, world, something reducible 
to neither only subjective experience nor only objective fact. 
 
Schaeffer’s 1952 reading of Valéry’s ‘Man and the Sea Shell’ closes in on this question 
further – by positing a dynamic between an in some sense mysterious object and the 
possibility of its making, Schaeffer begins to develop the implications for the 
subjectivity of listening, the objectivity of sound, and the relation between the two. 
Many aspects of Schaeffer’s reading appear quite obscure, so it will be useful to first 
turn to Valéry. Valéry’s text concerns the reaction of the mind to its encounter with 
natural forms, less so the “common disorder of perceptible things” than to “privileged 
objects”, “a crystal, a flower” and, the focus of the following pages, “a sea shell”.228 For 
Valéry these kinds of objects compel us to think on account of a fundamental tension 
between our understanding of them as formed objects, structured objects that we could 
conceive of making, and an irrecoverable mystery behind the forces of their 
formation.229 As Schaeffer interprets this there is, in this compulsion to think, a sense of 
the object having a voice, an expression of a tensile relation between the disparate 
                                                 
227Pierre Schaeffer, Machines à communiquer: volume 1, Genèse des simulacres, (Paris, Éditions des 
Seuil, 1970), 90. While this understanding of the shell-ear relation was, and remains, a common one, it 
had already been the case for several decades that scientific understanding was closer to Schaeffer’s 
perspective and took environmental resonance to be the key to the sounds of the shell. See Stefan 
Helmreich, “Seashell Sound,” in Cabinet 48 (Winter 2012/13), accessed 18/09/2015 - 
http://www.cabinetmagazine.org/issues/48/helmreich.php. 
228 Valéry, “Man and the Sea Shell,” 112. 
229 Ibid., 113. 
73 
 
realms of the mind and the outside world – “the miracle of concrete music, which I am 
trying to get across to my interlocutor, is that in the course of experimentation, things 
begin to speak by themselves, as if they were bringing a message from a world unknown 
to us and outside us”.230 There is an increasing interest in precisely the objectivity of the 
object – against any notion of the sound object as merely a “human phenomenon”.231 
 
Schaeffer suggests that Valéry here lays out two mindsets with regards to an object (the 
comparison between seashells and sound objects is, says Schaeffer, “perfectly 
adequate”232), dependent on whether or not the observer is a specialist in the objects in 
question. To the uninitiated, the object is a mystery, striking them as unexpected, 
unforeseeable by the imagination. To the informed mind, on the contrary, the object is 
seen as something which holds a certain form, despite its complexity a certain 
understanding of its existence, of how it could be made, is approached. This element of 
the unexpected and unforeseeable, however, appears only as one moment in Valéry’s 
text, and Schaeffer’s emphasis on it is telling with regards to the broad scope of his 
argument. Schaeffer here is aligned with what in Valéry leads Gaston Bachelard to 
describe the latter as “essentially Cartesian”,233 namely a geometric form of clear and 
distinct understanding of the objects we perceive. For Bachelard the ambiguity in 
Valéry’s thought, between the “original vortex”234 of life that is responsible for 
formation and beyond human understanding, and the Cartesian belief that “all genuine 
knowledge reduces itself to what one sees and what one has power over”,235 ultimately 
settles on the latter – the concern with formation, of genesis, serves only to precede what 
Bachelard calls a “museum of forms”, not valuable in itself but rather opening a path, 
however endless, towards a systematic understanding of the mind.  
 
Here we see an immediate alignment between Schaeffer and the Cartesian image of 
thought outlined in our previous chapter, but more must be extracted from this 
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understanding of the sound object as object. Schaeffer ties this into the question of 
language by turning again to his critique of abstract music, through a comparison 
between the seashell and the marble. Against the complexity of seashells, marbles 
represent the units – notes – of classical music, their commonality and simplicity 
allowing for their easy organization – “in piles, in staggered rows, in nice rhythmical 
series” – while seashells prove “too complicated and disparate” for this kind of ordering. 
This apparent simplicity of the note relies on what Schaeffer terms “musical rhetoric” – 
namely the fact that classical music has a language, and more precisely, suggests 
Schaeffer, a prose language. Following Valéry, the question of language does not arise 
immediately on the encounter with the object, and, says Schaeffer, “we would do well to 
stop here for the time being”.236 Schaeffer posits a tension between the a decisive 
listening subject, “the importance of considering music in its subjective reality”,237 and a 
kind of autonomy of sound which appears to elude any simple categorization, 
reminiscent of Cage’s ‘discovery’ of a subjective inadequacy in the face of unintentional 
sound: 
 
the object forces us to listen to it, not by reference, but just as it is, in all the reality of its 
substance. As it doesn’t say much, and certainly not what we would like it to say, once 
we have heard it, it makes us fall silent. In this silence we perceive new disturbances.238 
 
What had been construed as musical listening, then, is in fact no real kind of listening at 
all. 
 
As Schaeffer has seen it there have traditionally been two poles of critique in the study 
of music and sound, the first, on the side of the subject, a linguistic, relativistic 
conventionalism, the second, on the side of the object, a scientism239 – both tendencies 
at play in serialism and in particular its electronic manifestations. For Schaeffer the 
complexity of the sound object demands not a prose language but a poetics,240 the form 
of which is not yet known to us but which can begin to emerge once the sound object 
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has become “a proper subject for inquiry, that is, for analysis and experimentation”,241 
and it is through this that Schaeffer believes, in a telling remark anticipating the 
direction ahead, that the “intrinsic” rather than conventional relation between subject 
and object can be discovered.242 
 
After mapping out a research programme towards a musical poetics in opposition to 
either linguistic or scientistic formulations of music and sound, the closing pages of In 
Search of a Concrete Music come as a surprise. Schaeffer begins his ‘Outline of a 
Concrete Music Theory’ with ‘Twenty-five initial words for a vocabulary’ – a glossary 
of simply-defined features and procedures of any concrete music, from ‘extract’ to ‘cell’ 
to ‘montage’. This is then supplemented with an acoustical account of the characteristics 
of the sound object, mapping out in great detail its various wave characteristics 
projected onto a musical structure of harmony, melody, and dynamics. There is, perhaps, 
something of a tactical and tentative aspect to this, a juxtaposition of two types of 
taxonomy such that their tensions reveal something of the space between the two, but 
there seems also a closure of possibilities, which will come to be articulated through the 
search for this “intrinsic” relation. 
 
Phenomenological grounding 
 
After the period of intense experimental productivity from 1948 to 1953, Schaeffer 
published little for a period of over a decade, until his extensive Traité des objets 
musicaux in 1966, followed by 1967’s Solfège de l’objet sonore, a book and illustrative 
set of recordings compiled with fellow GRM member Guy Reibel. In these texts 
Schaeffer seeks to give a detailed theoretical grounding for a new musical practice, 
borne of the experimental process that took place over the turn of the 1950s. While In 
Search of a Concrete Music ends with surprising certainty, there nevertheless appear 
several theoretical paths which could have been taken by Schaeffer. One such path 
appears to be characterized by Schaeffer’s reading of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, an aspect 
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emphasized by readers including Michel Chion in his authorized Guide des objets 
sonores.243  
 
It is not clear whether Schaeffer had directly encountered phenomenology at the time of 
In Search of a Concrete Music, and many of the themes he finds in Valéry he later 
recasts in entirely Husserlian terms, but there are hints of Merleau-Pontyan approach 
and, as Makis Solomos notes, it was most likely Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of 
Perception244 that introduced Schaeffer (as it did many others of his generation) to 
phenomenology.245 This aspect of Schaeffer’s thought can be heard in numerous 
passages in his early writings, the connection to Merleau-Ponty yet known or not, 
particularly through his references to the primordial and bodily aspect of hearing246 – 
where he speaks of how “instruments of flesh, irrigated by our blood, maintained by the 
sweat of our brow, are capable of a symbolism of sensations more strange than the 
symbolism of language”,247 or his discussion of a “whole body involved in the stimuli of 
his ear”, of “muscular states of mind” which cannot be captured by “rational rhythm”.248 
Indeed, there appears at points in the texts of the 1950s to be a fledgling materialist 
rationalism of sorts, a fleshly suturing of listening subject and sound object through 
which understanding can occur.  
 
While these resonances with Merleau-Ponty indeed persist throughout the Traité, here, 
however, we will follow Brian Kane in arguing that the fundamental theoretical 
grounding for Schaeffer’s late theory of the sound object comes through Husserlian 
phenomenology, and later suggest that this move closes off aspects of what could have 
been a Merleau-Pontyan understanding of the sound object. While the intimations of a 
distinctly phenomenological project, be it Merleau-Pontyan or Husserlian, are present in 
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the early writings, albeit still suffused with the experimental and critical outcomes 
developed through the early journals, by the time of the Traité Schaeffer had developed 
a theory grounded on a single procedure with a specifically Husserlian origin, namely 
the acousmatic reduction.249 
 
With the acousmatic reduction Schaeffer brings together two terms of philosophical 
origin, ‘acousmatic’ derived from a group of Pythagoras’ disciples, the akousmatikoi, 
and ‘reduction’ from Husserlian phenomenology. The Neoplatonist philosopher 
Iamblichus presents the most detailed early depiction of the practices of the 
akousmatikoi in his De vita pythagorica, recounting their practice of listening to 
Pythagoras’ teachings while he himself remained hidden from view behind a veil. The 
presentation was intended to separate the spoken presentation of the teachings from their 
accompanying physical demonstrations, which the akousmatikoi understood to impose 
an external order on the auditions as spoken.250 The use of the term by Schaeffer draws 
from but also elaborates on this original account.251 Michel Chion, in his authorized 
guide to Schaeffer’s Traité des Objets Musicaux, notes that from the Greek term the 
word ‘acousmatique’ transferred into French, as an adjective meaning “indicating a 
noise which is heard without the causes from which it originates being seen”.252 It 
remained little used, however, until Schaeffer and author Jérôme Peignot adopted it to 
describe the listening situation with which musique concrète is concerned.  
 
                                                 
249 While there are some who dismiss the theoretical integrity of Schaeffer’s thought – as in Bastien 
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The historical situation brought about by sound recording and reproduction technologies 
allowed for an expanded recognition of the acousmatic situation, an opening to a form 
of listening which, Schaeffer suggests, is not new (for it is the same listening situation as 
that of the akousmatikoi), and not uncommon, but which had not yet been theorized – as 
Schaeffer notes, “once, the apparatus was a curtain; today, the radio and methods of 
reproduction place us, modern listeners to an invisible voice, under similar 
circumstances”.253 Sound transmitted through radio provides an initial step in bringing 
about awareness of the possibility of listening being directed towards sounds with no 
known cause, and the capacity to alter sound electronically and eliminate their anecdotal 
implications expands the acousmatic situation out towards a generalized acousmatic 
experience, whereby technology renders possible a separation of the senses, or more 
specifically an isolation of sound broadly speaking from the audiovisual complex to 
which it belonged, and orients listeners towards a way of hearing concerned with 
“giving oneself over entirely and exclusively to listening”254 – a type of listening which 
Schaeffer will term ‘reduced listening’. 
 
This indicates one aspect of the necessity of viewing Husserlian phenomenology, rather 
than any other approach, as fundamental to Schaeffer’s theory. The acousmatic situation 
in itself does not imply any particular reading – there is a specificity to Schaeffer’s 
interpretation and extrapolation of the acousmatic situation which does not allow for the 
easy conflation of the acousmatic experience and reduced listening often found in 
readings of Schaeffer.255 For Schaeffer this connection cannot be taken as a given – 
while the acousmatic situation in which sounds are separated from their sources creates 
the conditions for acousmatic experiences, the Pythagorean veil as a tool for isolating 
and exploring the world of sound is not in itself adequate – as Schaeffer says, 
“Pythagoras’ curtain is not enough to discourage our curiosity about causes to which we 
are instinctively, almost irresistibly drawn”256 – so their connection must be theorized 
otherwise. Reduced listening, then, takes place as an intentional procedure oriented 
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towards understanding the formal characteristics of the kinds of experiences that the 
acousmatic situation renders possible but not necessary.  
 
From this stems the necessity of a disengagement from what Husserl terms the “natural 
attitude” – the belief that there is a “factually existing” world “out there”,257 that things 
in the world, from physical objects to logical laws,258 exist independently of us – so as 
to allow for the experience of perception itself to be grasped  
 
at the same time as the object which it presents to me. And then I realize that it is in my 
experience that the transcendence [of the object in relation to the changing flux of the 
different ways it is perceived] is constituted.259  
 
By separating hearing from the other sensory modalities Schaeffer extends the 
Husserlian ‘anti-natural’ step, taking it as necessary for reifying the sonic effect as 
object rather than event and as such for understanding sound-in-itself – disregarding the 
physical causation of a given sound so as to posit the sonic effect as an autonomous 
object. We have come to understand various characteristics of the sound object as 
progressively and improvisationally determined by Schaeffer through his experimental 
research, characterized in the passage from sound fragments drawn from a whole to 
objects considered as “discrete and complete” in themselves,260 but it is ultimately 
Husserlian phenomenology which provides the tools for a formal and systematic 
definition.  
 
For Schaeffer the reduction allows for an approach which takes an intermediary position 
between two extreme poles in the theorization of sound, namely the natural attitude of 
an objective science of acoustics and, again, the subjective projection of music theory 
onto sound matter. As Kane presents this move, “[l]istening becomes a sphere of 
investigation containing its own immanent logic, structure, and objectivity”.261 In this 
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respect the theoretical grounding of Schaeffer’s early writings, namely his critique of 
abstract music – developed in In Search of a Concrete Music through a series of 
intuitive and experimental leaps drawing from a number of conceptual sources is – is 
given an ontological status through which it can be recast in a Husserlian context. The 
critique of abstract music, from a starting point of positing it as an abandonment of 
music’s concrete grounding and instantiation in favour of a formal theoretical 
framework, is positioned to echo Husserl’s transcendental critique of the Kantian 
deduction of the transcendental categories we find in Logical Investigations. Husserl 
here argues that Kant’s deduction fails to adequately account for the “deep difference 
between intuition and signification”,262 and as such that the categories cannot serve as 
the condition of intuition as intended.  
 
More precisely, for Husserl there is, derived from the Kantian critical project, a general 
confusion regarding the distinction between intuiting and thinking, which results in a 
misunderstanding of the distinctions between not only intuition and signification, but in 
turn between sensuous and categorial intuition, inadequate and adequate intuition, and 
individual intuition and universal intuition. Kant’s inquiries lean heavily towards 
explaining both terms of these pairings through the latter aspect, emphasizing the logical 
function of intuition at the expense of “pre-logical objectivation”, that is to say, the 
manner in which objects are given to intuition. This givenness, on the contrary, stands as 
a conditioned part of the critical apparatus which is nevertheless taken as conditioning. 
This enquiry into givenness was also at the root of Schaeffer’s objection to music theory 
and is borne out earlier in his reading of Valéry – the seashell was representative of a 
kind of objective givenness which could not be thought solely through a pre-given 
critical apparatus such as that of music theory – and as such we begin to see a more 
precise theoretical alignment between Schaeffer and Husserl’s procedure of 
transcendental critique with regards to music theory and Kant, respectively, and that laid 
out through Cage and Deleuze in our previous chapter. 
 
Husserl’s critique of Kant turns on the same problem as that of Deleuze, and through 
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this Husserl plays a significant role in the articulation of Deleuze’s transcendental 
empiricism, particularly in its projection from Difference and Repetition into The Logic 
of Sense, insofar as Husserlian phenomenology stages an attempt to recast 
transcendental philosophy without a denigration of experience or the matching of a 
conditioned to its condition. Setting Schaeffer’s response to abstract music in this light 
clarifies the structural connections between his critique, his practice, and his theory, in 
the latter instance particularly in his formulation of the sound object. In chapter 15 of 
the Traité, entitled ‘The Reduction of the Object’, Schaeffer makes explicit this adoption 
of phenomenology as a means to theorize his development of the sound object, and turns 
to Husserl in order to determine the conditions for the recognition of the object’s very 
objectivity, insofar as the object sustains a unified existence underneath the stream of 
lived particulars. Writing of the ‘transcendence of the object’, Schaeffer moves through 
Husserl in order to ask a question which formalizes his many paths of enquiry with 
regards to the sound object – “What are the conditions which permit the recognition, for 
us and for others, of objectivity?”263 
 
Schaeffer begins this exposition by considering a “well-known passage” from Husserl’s 
Ideas, in which Husserl considers the relation between a table and its perception. In this 
passage Husserl discusses viewing a table, walking around it, seeing it from different 
positions in space, throughout which “I have continually the consciousness of this one 
identical table as factually existing ‘in person’ and remaining quite unchanged”264 – a 
self-identicality of the table which persists despite changing perceptions, even periods of 
no perception such as during the closing of one’s eyes. Perception, says Husserl, is a 
“continuous flux”, despite the perceived thing remaining the same. It is for this reason 
that the perceived thing, the object, “and all its parts, aspects, and phases”, is considered 
‘transcendent’ to perception. Schaeffer’s notion of the ‘transcendence of the object’ 
follows precisely – the intended object is not found immanent to the stream of 
perceptual states which Husserl will call adumbrations, but rather in an act of synthetic 
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constitution. As Schaeffer describes it, again following the terminology of Husserl, “the 
object perceived is no longer the cause of my perception. It is ‘the correlate’”.265 
 
Here Schaeffer and Husserl pose the (sound) object as a response to those approaches 
which posit a simple isomorphic or causal relation between subject and object, the 
object neither as given stimulus nor categorization. In this vein, Husserl’s development 
of his critique of Kant after Logical Investigations centered precisely on a displacement 
of the question of self-givenness, in which it is not the object that is self-given, but 
rather a fundamental form of consciousness itself – it is the transcendental ego, as 
absolute consciousness, which is self-given to itself, and which in turn makes possible 
the givenness of objects. Against the natural attitude of a world ‘out there’, what the 
phenomenological reduction attempts to reveal is the nature of objects as correlates of 
consciousness – that is to say, what stands as transcendent to consciousness in the 
natural attitude becomes, as a correlate of consciousness, immanent-to-consciousness, 
and a detached transcendence is redefined as transcendence-in-immanence, allowing us 
what Husserl deems the only route towards “an objectively valid knowledge of 
something transcendent”.266 The transcendence of the object then pertains, for Schaeffer 
as for Husserl, to its status as reducible to neither its objectivity nor its subjective 
perception, but to its ambiguity as “an objectivity linked to a subjectivity”.267 
 
After the phenomenological reduction, then, the object of knowledge is no longer an 
external object, but rather what Husserl comes to term the noematic correlate. This 
offers, to return to Husserl’s critique of Kant, a means of gaining knowledge of an object 
without falling into a state of infinite regress, in the form of an oscillation without 
adequate relation between the relation between subject and object. This can also be 
understood as the paradox of sense, whereupon sense can only exist in its own sphere 
and as such will only coincide with itself, as it can never, as described in Deleuze’s 
consideration of the ‘paradox of regress’,268 coincide with the transcendent object – 
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were the two to coincide we would again find a point of presumed identity between 
condition and conditioned. The noematic correlate, on the contrary, provides a point 
between the immanent subject and the transcendent object such that understanding can 
occur through immanence-in-transcendence, with the particular subject-object relation 
being replaced by what Husserl calls the noema.  
 
As such the noema is neither subject or object, but rather takes a neutral position with 
regards to both – it is only productive insofar as it serves as an expression of sense that 
does not fall into regress. As Husserl notes, in a passage quoted multiple times by 
Deleuze, “its productivity, its noematic service, exhausts itself in expression”.269 
Through the phenomenological reduction there is a shift from causal relations towards 
what Deleuze terms “double causality”,270 by which the object is not reduced to either 
subjective or objective operations but understood through its immanence to the field of 
sense – “sense is the characteristic discovery of transcendental philosophy”.271 For this 
reason Deleuze asks if in phenomenology we have, in the terminology of The Logic of 
Sense, a “rigorous science of surface effects”,272 phenomenology deployed as that which 
in a transcendental empiricism withholds foreclosure into either subjective or objective 
realm. 
 
However, Husserlian phenomenology ultimately does not satisfy Deleuze, and one 
aspect of why is a fundamental question which appears to remain undeveloped in our 
discussion of Husserl and Schaeffer so far – why, after all, are we discussing objects? 
Schaeffer comes to this term in a seemingly improvisational and somewhat arbitrary 
manner in the course of his musical experimentation, yet by the time of the Traité is has 
become a seemingly ontologically grounding. Indicated here is the strongest marker of 
why Schaeffer’s theory in the Traité is specifically Husserlian, and where the 
distinctness of Schaeffer’s formulation of the relation between the acousmatic situation, 
acousmatic experience, and reduced listening lies. While acousmatic experience could 
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have been thought of otherwise, Schaeffer makes the move to bind together a theory of 
acousmatic experience with a theory of the sound object precisely by supplementing the 
original acousmatic reduction with what Husserl terms the eidetic reduction.273 
 
The eidetic reduction is used to bring to the fore precisely ‘the objectivity of the object’, 
a reality grounded in the fact that “it endures through these changes”274 – grounding the 
object as object, the object in its objectivity. For Husserl, the eidetic reduction starts 
with the arbitrary selection of an object and extraction of it from its context to act as “a 
point of departure for the production of an infinitely open multiplicity of variations”.275 
In imagining these variations through the technique of ‘imaginative free variation’, 
argues Husserl, it becomes “evident that a unity runs through this multiplicity” – that 
“an invariant is necessarily retained”. Husserl uses the table again as an example of this 
procedure – we start with the perception of a table and consider how this perceptual 
object could be different – in shape, in colour – through which we come to understand 
that which is invariable in its objectivity – that is, its essence as an object.276 
 
The act of imaginative free variation also indicates an important aspect of the initial 
bracketing of the world – there is no meaningful distinction to be found between 
perception and imagination. In this we see the basis of Schaeffer’s solution to the 
tension between subject and object that has run through his theorizations of sound and 
listening – no longer is there a question of a subject’s distortion of external reality, nor 
of a subjective fiction imposed on the outside world, but rather “hearing itself becomes 
the origin of the phenomenon to study”.277 Schaeffer demonstrates this by taking 
examples of recorded sounds and altering it by various electronic means – that is, 
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producing variations – through which, Schaeffer suggests, the listener will nevertheless 
hear one and the same sound object, its essence present across the variations. 
 
 
Critique and consequences of the phenomenological sound object 
 
With this the characteristics of the sound object, threaded through Schaeffer’s 
theoretical development with varying degrees of obscurity, become more precise. A 
sound object is neither a piece of empirical data, nor is it a subjective fiction – it is 
rather, aligned with Husserl’s noema, an ideal object possessing invariant features which 
are identified through synthetic mental acts which, by imagining it in variation, 
discloses that which is essential. Elements of the precise operation of the sound object as 
noema, however, remain unclear. As Paul Ricoeur notes in his influential Husserl: An 
Analysis of His Phenomenology, the noema’s relation is intended to constitute a “sense-
intending-a-being”, in relation to the central question of Husserl in Ideas I of, quoting 
Ricoeur, “bringing the theme of sense-giving (Sinngebung) into coincidence with the 
theme of self-givenness (Selbstgegebenheit)”.278 This is to say, the place of the noema is 
to come into coincidence with the self-givenness of an object at the same time as it 
comes into coincidence with a self-given consciousness, or, using Schaeffer’s terms, 
how the listener and sound as perceived can have a relation amounting to a single 
procedure of identifying the sound object. How this coincidence can take place remains 
ambiguous throughout Husserl’s writings, with two leading strands of interpretation 
with regards to the noema, which, adopting Hubert Dreyfus’ terminology, can be named 
‘concept theory’ and ‘percept theory’.279 Put simply, concept theory, to which 
interpreters including David Woodruff Smith subscribe, argues that the meaning of 
noema falls within the linguistic sphere280 – a hypothesis which takes the noema away 
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from the world and towards its abstract, conceptual understanding, as the content of a 
positing consciousness rather than an actual object in the world,281 and as such opens 
Husserl again to the threat of the paradox of regress. Percept theory, on the other hand, 
most prominently put forward by Aron Gurwitsch, places the noema on the side of the 
perceptual object, but ultimately at the expense of the validity of the transcendental ego 
itself (“there is no place in the body of phenomenological doctrines for the pure or 
transcendental ego”). Instead, the structural unity of the perceived thing receives 
primacy, demanding a redefinition of the role of consciousness.282 
 
While the two cannot strictly be separated, it is the concept theory understanding which 
provides the basis for Deleuze’s rejection of the phenomenological method. While 
phenomenology provides an exemplary articulation of the operations of the field of 
sense, the genetic conditions of this field remain elusive, ultimately settling back into 
the common sense of the transcendental ego rather than rightly speaking the genitive 
production of a transcendental field.283 As Ricoeur argues, with the eidetic reduction the 
notion of origin “no longer signifies historico-causal genesis but rather grounding”.284 
For Dreyfus it is only the concept theory interpretation which remains faithful to 
Husserl’s project, a reading we can extend to Schaeffer – their respective projects 
concern a grounding of objective understanding, antithetical to the epistemologically 
ungrounded nominalism of objects implicit in percept theory. Indeed, despite tendencies 
in either direction in Husserl’s thought, his ultimate orientation is always towards 
perception being constituted by a self-constituting consciousness,285 but if we accept 
concept theory then Husserl’s attempt to avoid a Kantian epistemological regress 
through the neutrality of the noema cannot be accounted for. Insofar as Husserl and 
Schaeffer are positing concept theories, they risk succumbing to the same problems as 
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their respective points of critical departure – namely Kant and classical music theory. 
What we would like to suggest, however, is that the concept theory reading occludes a 
fundamental problematic which animates Husserl’s and Schaeffer’s projects, and that in 
their respective works a more subtle distinction emerges from an ultimately irreducible 
tension between concept and percept interpretations of the noema and sound object, 
respectively. This will allow us to more precisely locate the philosophical and musical 
problematics being explored, and situate Husserl and Schaeffer within these unfolding 
explorations.286 
 
In Schaeffer’s case, the tensions between concept and percept, essentialism and 
nominalism, music and noise and so on eventually, as he sees it, overwhelm his project. 
Interviewed shortly before his death, Schaeffer argues that music “has to find a 
compromise and an evasion at the same time” with regards to its two sources of sounds, 
namely noises and instruments.287 The former are circumscribed by their association 
with the moments of the everyday, the latter by the weight of music theory, and neither 
attain an adequate level of objectivity – a tension which, in another contemporary 
interview, Schaeffer is resigned to deeming irresolvable, musique concrète never 
attaining the status of music: “It took me forty years to conclude that nothing is possible 
outside Do-Re-Mi […] In other words, I wasted my life”.288 
 
Despite Schaeffer’s own rejection of the musical value of his project, a quite different 
interpretation is possible. Brian Kane argues that the sound object, contrary to 
Schaeffer’s claims and his aspirations for musique concrète as a whole, fits perfectly 
adequately under the terms of music theory. The sound object, says Kane, “re-inscribes 
                                                 
286 An interesting route of enquiry here comes through the notion that Valéry could perhaps be understood 
as a kind of percept theorist phenomenologist. Jacques Bouveresse’s reading of Valéry’s Cartesianism 
indicates a more subtle distinction which is obscured in the path Schaeffer takes, namely that Valéry’s 
‘system’ is one in which the mind is only understandable in transformations – see Jacques Bouveresse, 
“Philosophy from an Antiphilosopher: Paul Valéry,” in Critical Inquiry 21:2 (Winter, 1995):  379. The 
turn to concept theory is ultimately a turn to language, a turn which was being resisted in the engagement 
with Valéry. As such the interest in Valéry indicates an interest in this more unstable form of rationalism, 
one which gives primacy to the voice of its object, but which is somewhat buried under the Husserlian 
model. 
287 Quoted in Kahn, Noise, Water, Meat, 110. 
288 Ibid. 
88 
 
the ideality that was previously attached to the note”.289 Following a concept theory 
reading of Schaeffer, the sound object is oriented away from its materiality, heard in 
sounds but distinguishable from them in their sounding, and towards an ideal stability 
grounding a method of compositional intentionality.290 With the sound object musical 
material is not produced but rather, like the note of music theory, preexists and presents 
itself to compositional intentionality.291 As such Kane argues that Schaeffer is, far from 
breaking with the history of functional harmony and starting with music anew, in fact 
reinserting himself into an unbroken “lineage of musical phantasmagoria”, regrounding 
it as an attempt to give it the ideality of form which Pater or Kandinsky would ascribe to 
its romantic model.292 
 
We have an image of music still tied up in the kind of conceptual formalism that moved 
through Rameau, Kant, and Greenberg – see Douglas Kahn’s argument that the moves 
of Russolo, of Varèse, of Schaeffer, and of Cage alike ‘liberate’ sound only to bring an 
increasingly greater span of it under the conceptual rubric of ‘music’,293 an inclusivity 
which renders it ever more exclusive in its functioning as a medium-specific art form.294 
How, then, do we make sense of Schaeffer’s declaration of the musical failure of his 
project? Moreso, how do we account for those comments on and critiques of musique 
concrète which find an ineliminable extra-musical element in its use of ‘found’ rather 
than synthesized sounds, from Roger Maren, whose 1955 outlining the different 
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approaches to tape music since its international spread suggests that in Schaeffer’s work 
the remnant of referentiality gives us “closer to cubist poetry than to music”,295 to 
Boulez and Stockhausen criticizing musique concrète on what they present as its own 
terms for the persistence of anecdotal connotations in its sounds?296 
 
Schaeffer’s own claim that “nothing is possible outside Do-Re-Mi” is a claim that there 
can be no break with music theory of the sort that Schaeffer had attempted – that the 
language of traditional music theory is the language of music. A nascent element of this 
is indicated in Schaeffer’s early reaction to Stockhausen’s concrete pieces – in these 
pieces Schaeffer saw “two faces”, one an orientation towards the future, whereby 
musique concrète had begun to form a new musical language entirely distinct from that 
of traditional music theory, and one an act of violence towards the past, as part of a 
general serialist relation to functional harmony which was solely destructive and which 
denied “a past I believe everlasting (that is, the reality of the scale)”.297 Schaeffer’s 
‘failure’ is therefore a paradoxical one – a failure to create a new language which is 
adequately ‘musical’ while nevertheless being entirely dissociated with music theory 
past. The ideal language to which Schaeffer was aspiring becomes obscured under an 
essentialized notion of ‘music’. 
 
A peculiar couplet of theoretical reversals take place in Schaeffer’s project. First, the 
practical development of the concept of the sound object through diverse means leads 
more widely to a redistribution of the sonic field and to modes of orienting listening, 
before being retroactively justified by its outcome, in the notion of the acousmatic 
reduction. Second, an experimental trajectory is taken away from the field of music 
through the figure of sound, only to turn back to the starting point and recoil in despair 
when it is found that this starting point cannot accommodate where this experimentation 
with regards to sound has taken music. The relation between sound and source comes to 
                                                 
295 Kahn, Noise, Water, Meat, 114. 
296 Ibid., 112. 
297 In the same late interview in which he denounces his work Schaeffer turns to Lévi-Strauss to claim for 
an essential structural nature to music, seemingly accepting Lévi-Strauss’s critique of musique concrète 
found in The Raw and the Cooked – more in this our fourth chapter. 
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bind these reversals. While a concern with this relation permeates the early writings in 
various forms, and the kinds of sounds appropriate to musique concrète is a persisting 
concern for Schaeffer throughout this period (for instance in the question of whether the 
noise of buffers is not “first and foremost anecdotal, and thus antimusical”298), it is not 
until the phenomenological justification of the Traité that this question is given formal 
specificity.  
 
Schaeffer defends his retroactive phenomenological theorization of his practice by 
suggesting that  
 
[f]or years we often done phenomenology without knowing it, which is better, after all, 
than to speak of phenomenology without practicing it. It is only after the event that we 
recognized in Edmund Husserl’s heroically rigorous definition the conception of the 
object that our research is premised upon.299 
 
To this extent, as we have suggested, a level of circularity enters the process, it becomes 
grounded in itself, opening up again to contestation at the level of transcendental 
critique. From here we can consider two overlapping issues which comprise the 
‘compromise and evasion’ which Schaeffer felt with regards to music – first, the role of 
technology in the development of a practice of musique concrète, and second, the 
selection of suitable sonic materials for musique concrète.  
 
As discussed earlier, the composition of Schaeffer’s Études de bruits was entangled with 
the capacities of the radiophonic technology of the time. In this process, which led to the 
development of the theory of the acousmatic, Schaeffer increasingly sought to erase the 
referentiality of sound, as indicated by his escalating frustration – “wasted time, failures, 
exhaustion”300 – as he documents trying to find sounds and a model of combination 
appropriate to musique concrète. This is the proscribed role of technology even from an 
early stage – to detach sounds from their context, to isolate them and make them 
repeatable, to help determine, through a process of experimentation and listening, how 
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300 Schaeffer, In Search of a Concrete Music, 93. 
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sound events can become the objects of music.301 Much of this frustration stemmed 
from what Schaeffer considered the limited capacities of the technology available to him 
– while Pierre Henry, as current GRM director Daniel Teruggi notes, appeared to see the 
limitations of the machinery and the accidents caused by its unpredictable operations as 
a spark for invention, Schaeffer was from an early stage more inclined to view these 
qualities as rendering it inadequate to the realization of his ideas.302 While Henry 
worked closely with the technologies at hand, all of their contingencies intact, Schaeffer 
inclined more towards promoting the construction of new machines to render his 
operations on sound simpler.303 The divide between Schaeffer and Henry in this respect 
reflects a consistent question central to the early practices of the GRM, regarding the 
role of the composer and his or her relation to sound.304 
 
Schaeffer’s perspective on sound synthesis and early synthesizer technology is telling 
here. For Schaeffer the electronic synthesis of sounds, at least in its early form, and 
carrying into the use of computers in music, was antithetical to the practice of musique 
concrète and its exploration of the raw material of sound objects. Schaeffer took the 
synthesis of sound to imply parametric control – the composer would decide the value 
of various sound variables in advance, adding another level of compositional 
predetermination of sound on top of those of music theory more widely speaking. This 
model of the synthesis erased the role of listening, and indeed Schaeffer and the GRM 
would develop their own sound synthesis technologies based on typo-morphological 
principles, that is, such that the global whole of the sound as an object can be varied and 
controlled over time.305 Synthesized sound has, for Schaeffer, two twinned problems – it 
                                                 
301 Daniel Teruggi, “Technology and musique concrète: the technical developments of the Groupe de 
Recherches Musicales and their implication in musical composition,” in Organised Sound 12:3 
(December 2007): 213. 
302 Schaeffer, In Search of a Concrete Music, 94. 
303 Hence the creation of new technologies specifically purposed towards the creation of musique 
concrète, such as the keyboard phonogéne, slide phonogéne, tape recorder and spatialization desk 
(Palombini, “Pierre Schaeffer, 1953: Towards an Experimental Music,” 542). 
304 See Marc Battier, “What the GRM brought to music: from musique concrète to acousmatic music,” in 
Organised Sound 12:3 (December 2007): 189-202. 
305 Teruggi, “Technology and musique concrète: the technical developments of the Groupe de Recherches 
Musicales and their implication in musical composition,” 220. It is notable that the ASDR (attack-sustain-
decay-release) envelope function found on modern synthesizers, developed in 1965 by Vladimir 
Ussachevksy working with Robert Moog, is precisely a morphological device, even if not necessarily 
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is at once both all too subjective all too empirical, the synthesizer is generally not a tool 
appropriate to the production of musique concrète as its design is, for Schaeffer, 
perpetuating the subject-object divides he diagnoses as inherent to the tradition of 
classical music. 
 
Schaeffer’s persisting hesitance towards purely synthesized music, however, reflects a 
key feature of the sound object – that it is not to be created but to be discovered, 
uncovered, and if compositional intention is in play at the beginning of this process then 
already the capacity for the sound object to speak for itself is compromised.306 This 
technological ambivalence is clarified by considering again Schaeffer’s use of the 
Pythagorean akousmatikoi. The technological advances of radiophony and other music 
and sound technologies are important in the discovery of the concept of the acousmatic, 
but this discovery is a rediscovery, one which the akousmatikoi had, per Schaeffer’s 
account, known before. There is no specificity to any given technological apparatus, 
which rather only offer a path towards understanding that which was already essential to 
the sound object – the fact that certain technologies reveal this to us is attributable to 
these qualities of the sound object, not to individual technological devices themselves. 
The neutrality of Boulez’s and Eimert’s view of technology, as a pliable corrective to 
meet the composer’s wishes, finds itself repeated in Schaeffer.307 We saw this too, in a 
more limited form, with the childhood discovery of the sound of the seashell, and that in 
the early stages of the development of musique concrète of the sound stripped of its 
attack. 
 
Common to these is what we can term the application of myth, as an explanatory 
principle, through which all chains of events are given sense. Cage’s anechoic chamber 
experience could equally fit here – that by which the unfolding of an experimental 
                                                 
used as such (Trevor Pinch and Frank Trocco, Analog Days: The Invention and Impact of the Moog 
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306 Carlos Palombini’s argument for a strongly Heideggerian aspect to Schaeffer’s views on technology 
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Schaeffer: Pierre Schaeffer’s Arts-Relais, Walter Benjamin’s technische Reproduzierbarkeit and Martin 
Heidegger’s Ge-stell,” in Organised Sound 3:1 (April 1998): 35-43.  
307 Palombini, “Pierre Schaeffer, 1953: Towards an Experimental Music,” 555. 
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practice is given retroactive and foreclosed sense. Deleuze’s complex and contradictory 
take on myth is of interest here. In ‘The Simulacrum and Ancient Philosophy’ Deleuze 
poses an opposition between Nature and myth, where myth, on a trajectory taking in the 
origins of language, conventions of law and justice, and the development of war among 
much more, is the expression of a “false infinite”308 and the force of the negative, a 
principle of totality and closure, opposed to the pluralism and affirmation associated 
with Nature, Naturalism being that by which the speculative object and the practical 
object of philosophy coincide.309 On the other hand we have, in the text ‘Desert Islands’, 
another side of myth, as the basis for “beginning anew”, the ingenious interpretation of 
that which is no longer understood,310 or of T. E. Lawrence’s projection of his own 
mythic image, “an image that is always stitched together, patched up, continually 
growing along the way, to the point where it becomes fabulous”.311 The myth that has a 
degree of obscurity to it persists as a source of invention, but with this comes a risk of 
closure, the assertion of a false totality rather than the application of an expansive 
diagram. We do not wish to draw any conclusions on this point yet, but this 
understanding of myth and its relation to the formalization of experimental processes 
and practices should remain in mind as we move on. 
 
In following Schaeffer’s experimental practice we have seen a number of resonances 
and structural connections between the development, through Schoenberg-Cage, of 
experimental music as an immanent procedure on the tradition of music, and hence 
between Cage and Schaeffer of the conceptual development of sound under a musical 
rubric, allied through, and to, a post-Kantian opening of transcendental critique. The two 
trajectories appear to conjoin, reaching their theoretical culminations in Cage’s sound-
space and Schaeffer’s typo-morphology of sound objects, where we find a process of 
experimentation slowed and formalized through a taxonomical, scientistic demarcation 
of the field of sound which ultimately formally encapsulates both the full field of sound 
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and of music. From this point we return to the notion of practice, and specifically, now 
that the theoretical terms of experimental music and sound have been developed and 
contextualized, to Cage’s practice, to that of it which appears to exceed its formal, 
modernist setting in ways which in our previous chapter were obscure but can now be 
approached with more certainty. 
 
 
Tape music beyond Schaeffer – the reopening of sound 
 
In some distinction from Cage’s early remarks, in ‘Future of Music: Credo’, of 
reclaiming noise into the territory of music, Cage would later reproach Schaeffer for his 
approach to sound proving all too musical.  
 
When I spoke about Schaeffer, I said that noises had not been liberated but had been 
reintegrated into a new kind of harmony and counterpoint. If that were the case, that 
should mean that we had only changed prisons!312 
 
While the procedures that Cage developed for and around Music of Changes, including 
the ‘gamut’ techniques which developed into various taxonomies of sound including the 
‘all-consuming’ sound space, provided the basis for a relatively stable period in Cage’s 
compositional practice, there are nevertheless subtle shifts across this period which 
distinguish Cage’s more formalized practices from the strong and rigid formalization of 
Schaeffer, and which reflect a wider processual movement in the deployment of an 
experimental methodology. Key in highlighting this moment’s place in Cage’s work is 
his own work for tape, particularly his second such piece (after Imaginary Landscape 
No. 5 (1952), which comprised of sounds from 42 jazz phonograph records), 1952’s 
Williams Mix.  
 
The charts method of composing Music of Changes was used with minor variations for 
several other pieces in 1951-52, including Water Music and Imaginary Landscape No. 4, 
and with these chart-derived pieces Cage was making use of his taxonomy of sounds to 
                                                 
312 John Cage, For the Birds: In Conversation with Daniel Charles (London ; New York: Marion Boyars, 
1976), 230. 
95 
 
open the conditions for their sounding. In the instance of Imaginary Landscape No. 4, 
its instrumentation of twelve radios suggests cacophony, but the detailed use of volume 
controls in the charts ensure a subtlety, sparseness, and thinness to its performance, 
allowing individual sounds to occupy space and come into intricate but accommodating 
contact with other sounds. As Cage stated, “it was certainly not […] a rabble-rouser”.313 
While the sounds the radio produces are of course not predetermined, there is 
nevertheless, in this instance, like in that of Music of Changes, a certain limitation or 
predetermination of what the piece can sonically contain, the kind of soundings that can 
occur in performance, written into it at its point of origin – even, at the most expanded 
level, of concerning sounds as related to sound-space exclusively. 
 
Williams Mix, however, appears to present a different sonic space. Part of the series 
‘Project for Music for Magnetic Tape’, or, ‘Project: Sound’,314 Williams Mix’s sonic 
material comprises approximately 600 sound recordings on magnetic tape, cut together 
by Cage with the assistance of Earle Brown, Bebe and Louis Barron, David Tudor, Ben 
Johnston, and others.315 The collection of source materials is split into perhaps Cage’s 
most detailed taxonomy of sound yet. The sounds of Williams Mix are split first into six 
categories – ‘city sounds’, ‘country sounds’, ‘electronic sounds’, ‘manually produced 
sounds, including the literature of music’, ‘wind-produced sounds, including songs’, and 
‘small sounds requiring amplification to be heard with the others’316 – then, alluding to 
the characteristics of the sound-space, further categorized by whether their frequency, 
amplitude, and timbre, respectively, are ‘controlled’ or ‘variable’. Sounds are then 
taxonomically designated for use in the score based upon these variables. 
 
The composition itself was then produced through chance and chart procedures 
modified only slightly from those of Music of Changes, resulting in not a score per se, 
but rather what Cage would call, in the detailed description of the process found in his 
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correspondence with Boulez, a “dress-maker’s pattern”,317 mapping out the cutting and 
splicing of pieces of magnetic tape. The result is a ‘score’ some 193 pages long, for a 
piece little over four minutes in length. 
 
Some of Cage’s rhetoric regarding the use of magnetic tape is very similar to that we 
find from Schaeffer – in the notes for his 1958 25-year retrospective Cage presents tape 
splicing as a means to “heighten the unique element of individual sounds, releasing their 
delicacy, strength, and special characteristics”,318 but in several aspects Williams Mix is 
quite different from Schaeffer’s notion of musique concrète composition. Cage exhibits 
no interest in the careful, composerly control of sound we find in Schaeffer – the 
manipulations of sounds are minimal and strictly speaking more oriented towards the 
tape itself rather than the sounds they hold, and there is no explicit attempt to 
differentiate between sound-as-sourced and ‘sound objects’. Indeed, there appears to be 
little specificity as tape music to Williams Mix – structurally it differs little from Cage’s 
other chart-derived pieces. We find in it, however, a number of hints towards a new 
configuration of ideas being developed within the short moment of formal stability that 
was Cage’s chart pieces, where a renewed, accelerated sense of process comes to the 
fore. From a compositional perspective, there is the use of graphical and other non-
standard notation and an ever-increasing relinquishing of compositional control of the 
sonic materials used. From a performance perspective, the most significant shifts are 
those shared with musique concrète practice – an increased shift from the orchestral 
form, no requirement for trained virtuosity, a technological repeatability – though in this 
Cage comes to pinpoint an exemplary case of a more general dissatisfaction of his, 
insofar as despite the implementation of chance at many levels, the performed piece 
itself, as sound on tape, is still in many respects a fixed object. Across these two we see 
also a collectivity of construction, and a shift from the artistic emphases which would be 
common in the early development of electronic music – a construction process grounded 
not in the individual trained musician but rather in a team of what are effectively 
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engineers.  
 
It is significant that the taxonomy of sounds used here does not aim to be totalizing with 
regards to the field of sound, but rather indicates disparate groupings not reducible to 
each other nor to any overarching category. Between them there are different degrees of 
referentiality and non-referentiality – from the highly referential and anecdotal to 
entirely unidentifiable synthesized sounds – and at times heavy tape manipulation is 
used to introduce “complete transformation of the original materials to create new ones” 
– that is to say, there is no commitment to the integrity of the original sound as an 
object. From the perspective of the listener, we find that the predetermination of sonic 
material is as such superseded by its presentation – an erratic and frantic blurring of the 
textual and the sensate, with moments of recognition usually brief and quickly 
supplanted by a new sound at the moment of their recognition. Unlike the discarding of 
the inessential in medium-specific modernism and many forms of abstraction, or an 
investigation into an independent, locatable sound object as sound-in-itself or otherwise, 
we find a richly and densely textured landscape, a number of codes of referentiality and 
non-referentiality, models of organization, and ways of sounding present at once and 
moving across the piece. 
 
In these features that distinguish Cage’s engagement with tape music from Schaeffer’s 
we find nascent forms of the indeterminacy that will be central to the development of 
Cage’s compositional process over the remainder of the decade, and an opening into the 
wider set of art practices that emerge with startling rapidity at the turn of the 1960s. This 
does not stand to supersede Schaeffer’s work however, nor to cement his place in a 
unified formalist lineage of music. It is crucial to see how Schaeffer is at once a kind of 
theoretical culmination of a lineage of music which Cage too is within and without, and 
also a key part of formulating the problematic that will take music and sound into the 
context of 1960s art and beyond. We find much to credit in Schaeffer’s experimental 
movement through the problematic fields of sound and music – a refiguration of the 
composer-listener relation and a displacement of the sovereign authority of the 
composer, a rethinking of the role of performance and instrumentality, a perspective on 
98 
 
technology that, however compromised by later theoretical assumptions, attempts to cut 
a path between compositional intention and technological determinism, and likewise a 
notion of sound which attempts to undo the impasses, regresses, and essentialisms of 
compositional and empirical models, a model for a collective musical practice within an 
institutional setting, and more. 
 
We also find important questions left open in the impasses Schaeffer reaches himself. 
The carefulness and thoroughness of Schaeffer’s experimentation, from its earliest 
stages favouring precise studies within specific frameworks,319 provides an important 
counter to the exploratory looseness associated with the notion of ‘experimental music’ 
which caused many composers to dismiss it until its revival by Schaeffer and Cage in 
particular. In slowly seeking a new language and a robust institutional basis for 
experimental practice to operate through,320 Schaeffer offers a study of how moments of 
stability, elements of organization, can be present within experimental, process-oriented 
practices, Cage’s and elsewhere. In Schaeffer’s case we can see what is produced if an 
experimental practice is thought of as process of formalization but also what is excluded 
when the process slows to a stop – experimental practice as a transcendental empiricism, 
suffused with the risks and impasses that linger in any methodology of transcendental 
grounding.  
 
In Schaeffer’s case we find, as Carlos Palombini suggests, a distinction between an early 
process in which contradictions in practice were accepted, understood indeed a necessity 
of the process, and a later phase when contradiction is merely an accidental element to 
occasionally be tolerated for facilitating a later moment of unity.321 This reflects also the 
shift we see from the diffuse experimentation of the turn of the 1950s to the 
phenomenologically grounded theory of the Traité – in the early period Schaeffer finds a 
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productively overdetermined model of research through engagement with music, 
technology, poetry, philosophy, acoustics, radiophonics, and beyond, and while tensions 
arise through excessive leaning on scientism here, the elevation of poetry there, stasis 
here and unfettered flows there, Schaeffer’s mode of countering these tensions is not to 
work with and through it, to derive a procedure to account for tensions, but to see them 
as a flaw and reduce them to an anxious paralysis under the stable ground of a single 
theoretical model. As such when Schaeffer continues to find a constitutive ambiguity in 
the sound object and in musique concrète practice in general he is neither able to resolve 
it nor willing to work with it – hence in his eyes the ultimate ‘failure’ of his project.  
 
Cage’s own moment of formal stability in his work with charts is highly productive, but 
remarkably short – from Concerto for Prepared Piano and Chamber Orchestra to 4’33” 
in eighteen months. The question of how Cage’s process of formalization becomes 
concrete enough to open the space for a moment of great productivity but resists 
cementing its formal properties, or undoes its formal properties through its process and 
practice, is crucial – how does Cage avoid that to which Schaeffer succumbs? Central 
here will be the overdetermined and forked path of critique that give Cage his diffuse 
and mutating theoretical tools, in contrast to Schaeffer’s retroactive decision to locate 
his critique within a distinctly phenomenological realm. By working through this 
moment of formalization and its undoing we will begin to clarify the precise conceptual 
moves that take place within a shared critical trajectory, and to understand the 
distinctions that gradually but with increasing significance come into place. Our next 
chapter will develop this question by considering the theoretical status of the increasing 
openness, to the other arts and to ‘life’, of Cage’s thought, and how this relates to the 
constellation of diverse artistic practices that follow Cage from the 1950s into the 1960s 
as well as to the status of an experimental practice of music. 
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Sound, music, and art after Cage 
 
Through the context of an understanding of Cage’s musical trajectory which would align 
him with the Schaefferian reassertion of a “lineage of musical phantasmagoria”, 
regrounded in an ideal listener and essentialised notions of music, sound, and listening, 
this chapter will engage with Cage’s relation to artistic practices contemporary to his 
compositional developments, and begin to consider the relation between these practices 
broadly speaking and Cage’s practice characterized as a musical practice. In Schaeffer’s 
case the reification of the figure of music comes explicitly via phenomenology, and here 
we will map how Cage’s thought regarding sound, music, and listening, particularly as 
oriented through the anechoic chamber narrative, is itself implicated in such a 
phenomenological grounding, and consider the concomitant problems posed. It is this 
phenomenological grounding which will also project the ‘other’ side of Cage – that is, 
his position within the art practices of the 1960s which will later be termed 
‘postmodern’ – towards the risk of an unchecked nominalism. To understand this 
reading of Cage and of his artistic context, we will begin to address the status of sound 
and silence in Cage’s work by extending the philosophical and musical-artistic 
transcendental critique through Merleau-Ponty. This will function through two paths – 
first in terms of the relation of a Cagean silence to a philosophical ‘invisible’, 
explicating the theoretical implications of the anechoic chamber narrative, and second 
through a consideration of the use of a certain Merleau-Ponty in theorizing the artistic 
breaks and transitions which followed Cage through the 1960s. 
 
The fundamental connections between these two seemingly disparate forks in Cagean 
artistic practice will be mapped by considering the interconnection between the pieces 
that Cage’s stay at Black Mountain College made possible, primarily the 
aforementioned Williams Mix as well as here Black Mountain Piece (1952) and 4’33” 
(1952), and the theoretical movement in Cage’s work that these pieces were part of. In 
these pieces we find the development of a new group of concerns for Cage’s work – 
centered around the shift from art object to process, and with it the introduction of 
elements of indeterminate performance, the foregrounding of the listener, with the 
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introduction of ‘theatre’ as an involvement of music with its outside, an interest in 
everyday life, the foregrounding of the specific situation of a performance, an increasing 
resistance towards imposition of controls, including the control of the score on the 
performer, and so on.  
 
That these shifts take place ‘alongside’, or within, the more specifically musical practice 
Cage had developed up to the late 1940s is considered problematic in some critical 
readings of Cage, and the source of the forked path. There appears to be a tension, as 
there was with Schaeffer, between ‘music’ as a determining term for any orientation 
towards sound, and an openness through which any organizational schema is to be 
resisted. By considering the relation of theoretical and practical reciprocity that takes 
place between Cage and the artists and art movements ‘influenced’ by him, as part of a 
process of the development of his own compositional practice, we will begin to outline 
how these seemingly disparate elements operate together in Cage’s practice, mapping 
the movement of Cage’s work and thought through both its internal development and in 
terms of external relations and context. We will begin to argue for an understanding of 
Cage in which rather than being posed in a dichotomy between a kind of musical 
modernism and an artistic postmodernism, there is rather a more complex set of 
relations, contexts, and practices of experimentation constituting a rich Cagean musical 
and artistic process. In particular we will follow a subtle but distinct shift in the 
conceptual understanding of sound, and the implications of such an understanding – 
when sound shifts from the object of music to a conceptually mobile aspect of more 
diverse artistic practices, to the extent that these practices can take the conceptual 
developments produced by an engagement with sound and implement them in artistic 
environments in which sound has no role, can, and should, any specificity of sound or a 
practice of music be maintained? 
 
 
Black Mountain College 
 
In particular two performances of August 1952 mark out the terrain Cage will traverse 
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over the coming decade and form the shape of the wider artistic engagement with Cage 
that takes place into the 1960s, namely Black Mountain Piece322 and 4’33”. Black 
Mountain Piece took place during Cage’s second summer, after that of 1948, resident at 
the Black Mountain College in North Carolina. In Cage’s first spell at Black Mountain, 
his primary contribution was his class on ‘Structure of Music’,323 in which he detailed 
his theorization of what he then deemed the four basic elements of musical works – 
structure, form, method, and material.324 In this period the work is defined through a 
dualistic relation between structure and content. Structure, understood temporally, is the 
minimal condition for both sounds and silences still existing (here those two terms still 
distinct, silence as the absence of sound), and allowing for the distinction between the 
musical piece and ‘nonbeing’ – structure as a partitioning of piece into separate parts 
which together make a whole, rendering the piece as a discrete object.325 Form, method, 
and material together constitute content. We will see the general deviation from this 
theme across this chapter, and contextualize it musically in our next chapter.  
 
In his 1952 Black Mountain visit, by contrast, Cage steered away from teaching music 
entirely, his activities centering instead on organizing the construction of Williams 
Mix,326 hosting a reading of Huang-Po’s Doctrine of Universal Mind, and, alongside 
Cunningham and David Tudor, putting together Black Mountain Piece.327 In his notion 
of ‘theatre’, which he would later say applied to all of his post-Black Mountain 
works,328 Cage drew on his recent engagement with the writings of Antonin Artaud, 
particularly The Theatre and Its Double.329 Cage’s initial reading of Artaud is in 
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confluence with the path his works had been taking regarding sounds for the previous 
decade – that the relations between things “spring up naturally rather than being 
imposed by any abstraction on an ‘artist’s’ part”,330 without external determining 
structures such as harmony. The extension of this beyond the realm of music had already 
been practiced in a dance context, through Cunningham’s interest in “assembling 
heterogeneous facts that can remain without interrelationships”,331 but through Artaud’s 
notion of theatre Cage saw the opportunity to broaden it further still, to a situation 
making use of everything, “gestures, sounds, words, screams, light, darkness”332 – 
where not only dance and music but all the arts could operate equally. The performance 
would take place in the dining hall at Black Mountain College, and Cage attempted to 
follow Artaud’s instructions for the organization of the theatre location closely. Where 
Artaud noted that 
 
the public will be seated in the middle of the room, on the ground floor, on mobile 
chairs which will allow them to follow the spectacle which will take place all around 
them. In effect, the absence of a stage in the usual sense of the word will provide for the 
deployment of the action in the four corners of the room.333 
 
Cage in turn would split the audience into four triangles directed towards the empty 
centre of the room, with actions occurring from the corners, from above, and in the gaps. 
Following Artaud, “the spectator is in the center and the spectacle surrounds him”.334  
 
In terms of temporal structure it would adhere to the format we will later discuss as 
detailed in ‘Lecture on Nothing’ – in terms of a ‘meta-structure’, a designation of 
compartments of time within the forty-five minute whole of the piece with, unlike the 
dualism of the previous musical schema, no determinate relation between structure and 
                                                 
him through Boulez (Cage, The Boulez-Cage Correspondence, 96), but had independently been inspired 
by Julian Beck and Judith Malina’s use of Artaud in their Living Theatre Productions company 
(Silverman, Begin Again, 97). 
330 Cage, The Boulez-Cage Correspondence, 96. 
331 Cage, For the Birds, 164. 
332 Artaud, The Theatre and Its Double, 12. 
333 Ibid., 96. 
334 Ibid., 81. “[T]he action wasn’t supposed to occur in the centre, but everywhere around the audience” 
(Cage, For the Birds, 165). 
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content.335 Of the elements of the piece, then, there is no comprehensive account, but 
among those known to have been present included readings performed from ladders, 
Rauschenberg paintings hanging from the rafters, projections, Cunningham dancing 
around and through the audience, Tudor playing piano and/or radio, records played from 
an old phonograph, and a performance of a musical work using Lou Harrison’s 
collection of Asian instruments. Cage here treated each element as he had begun to treat 
sounds in his music – as individual elements coexisting in one space. 
 
Black Mountain Piece appears at first as an oddity, a displacement from Cage’s 
compositional trajectory which had been heavily, if not entirely, posited in terms of its 
immanence to a critical musical tradition, into an artistic situation in which ‘music’ has 
no apparent formal, determining status. Cage had been closely associated with 
prominent figures in modern art since his move to New York in 1942336 and had long 
seen a relation between his work and that ongoing in modern art, but, unlike the case of 
an ever-increasing use of South Asian and then East Asian philosophy, it had left little 
explicit mark in neither his compositions nor his theoretical texts and lectures to this 
point. However, traced biographically, we can see that Cage’s connections between 
disciplinary boundaries had taken place through a series of institutional and social 
moves – through the Cornish School and its insistence, even at the height of medium-
specific modernism, on the interdependence of the arts, and where Cage begun his 
association with Cunningham, onto Mills College and Chicago’s School of Design and 
an engagement with Laszlo Moholy-Nagy,337 onto the associations he made in his early 
period in New York – with Max Ernst, Peggy Guggenheim, loosely Marcel Duchamp 
(they would not meet regularly until later), MOMA.338 This series of connections 
remained largely subterranean until reaching this dramatic point of clarity with Cage’s 
second spell at Black Mountain. 
                                                 
335 See also Michael Kirby, Happenings: An Illustrated Anthology (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1965), 
31. 
336 Silverman, Begin Again, 53. 
337 Ibid., 36. In a 1941 application to find funding for a Center for Experimental Music in Chicago, Cage 
suggested that his work was “a counterpart in music of the work in visual arts conducted at the School of 
Design” (Ibid., 44). 
338 Ibid., 48, 50. 
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Cage’s rearticulation of the activities at Black Mountain while again outside of its 
context of extended multi-disciplinarity will help us begin to bring to the surface the 
function of the subterranean impact of modern art on Cage’s practice. This takes place 
through the composition and performance of 4’33”, taking place almost immediately 
after Cage’s Black Mountain residency. The simplicity of its original score is well 
known – Cage used chance means to determine three parts of fixed length (echoing 
sonata form) totalling four minutes and thirty-three seconds, with the notation (in 
standard form) indicating no notes to be played by the performer339 – hence, the ‘silent’ 
piece. Its first performance was held in late August 1952 at the Maverick Concert Hall, 
near Woodstock, New York. The theatre is open-air, situated in woodland with seats 
outside as well as in. 4’33” was preceded in the programme by Cage’s own Water Music 
– another heavily theatrical piece with written instructions and ‘instrumentation’ 
including a duck whistle, a bowl of water, a radio, and a deck of cards – a series of short 
pieces by Morton Feldman, Earle Brown, and Christian Wolff, and Boulez’s Premier 
Sonata, and followed by Cowell’s The Banshee.340  
 
For the performance itself, David Tudor took his seat at the piano, closed the keyboard 
lid, looked at a stopwatch and indicated the change in movements by opening and again 
closing the lid, attempting to make as little sound as possible in so doing, and, after four 
minutes and thirty-three seconds had passed, marked the end of the piece by standing to 
receive applause. As such the piece is ‘silence’, but as a call to listen to one’s 
surroundings – emphasized by the forest setting, an environment filled with sound. Here 
Cage’s anechoic chamber visit and the theoretical consequences he took from it are 
placed into a musical setting – the composer does not have a determining role in the 
‘content’ of the piece, and the compositional structure does not have a determining 
relation to the sound content. As such the focus shifts from composer to listener, as an 
individual site of audition within a sonic environment – an opening to a world of sound 
                                                 
339 John Cage, I-VI (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), 20-21. 
340 Kostelanetz, John Cage, figure 21. For more on this account see, for example, Gann, No Such Thing As 
Silence, 1-8. 
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perhaps invisible to them under the terms of either the unfocused nature of everyday 
listening or the determined and intentional structure of traditional musical listening.  
 
While the programme placed 4’33” alongside the work by Cage’s musical 
contemporaries as well as in a historical context – The Banshee being composed in 
1925, and, as a piece played on the open strings of the piano, an instance of one of the 
sources of Cage’s earlier prepared piano works – 4’33” can appear to arrive before its 
time, anticipating many of the compositional shifts Cage will enact over the coming 
decade. In particular it takes many of Cage’s recent theoretical and spiritual interests and 
lays out various markers for the rest of the music and art under discussion here – a 
concern for a blurring of inside and outside (in several respects – the layout of the 
concert hall, the status of what is internal and external to the piece, and to music in 
general), an artistic interest in the everyday, an emphasis on a plurality of perspectives 
and so on. It also, like the Black Mountain Piece, marks a departure from the figure of 
Cage-as-composer which would not be reprised to nearly the same extent until the 
following decade. Cage’s work across the rest of the 1950s, despite the use of chance 
and later indeterminacy, would nevertheless be distinctly within the realm of musical 
composition, as disciplined and carefully constructed pieces. There are, however, more 
subtle shifts that occur across this period, in which the boldest gestures of Black 
Mountain Piece and 4’33” can be seen as being reinscribed into Cage’s ongoing 
compositional practice. 
 
Key to understanding the shift that occurs in this moment of Cage’s musical practice, 
and how it operates across the decade and into the artistic practices of those following 
Cage through the 1960s, is his engagement with the painter Robert Rauschenberg. When 
later interviewed Cage would credit Rauschenberg’s White Paintings with pushing him 
into composing 4’33”, saying that he had to follow Rauschenberg’s lead “otherwise I’m 
lagging, otherwise music is lagging”,341 and would often cite the importance of 
Rauschenberg’s work for his own, often with a great deference, noting that “[t]he white 
                                                 
341 Kostelanetz, Conversing with Cage, 71. 
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paintings came first; my silent piece came later”.342 However, as the premise of Silent 
Prayer indicated, Cage had already fostered the idea of a silent piece before being aware 
of Rauschenberg’s White Paintings,343 and although one which is ideologically and 
conceptually quite different from 4’33”, it is even at this point silence considered not 
merely in terms of an absence of sound, but rather as having a character of its own – in 
the case of Silent Prayer, a distinctly social character. Cage perhaps diminishes the 
reciprocity of his theoretical relation to Rauschenberg, and in so doing diminishes the 
extent to which a distinct shift in Cage’s understanding of silence is already taking place 
in this period, one which augurs the move from silence as standing equally with sound 
in compositional structure to silence as unintentional sound. This passage can be 
followed through the late 1940s and reaches a point of clarity with 1950’s ‘Lecture on 
Nothing’. 
 
 
Lecture on Nothing, Lecture on Something 
 
Composed following the rhythmic structural rules of Cage’s musical works of the 
period, the text of ‘Lecture on Nothing’ foregrounds Cage’s burgeoning interest in East 
Asian philosophy344 and indicates a change in his understanding of structure, musical 
and otherwise. Here the shift in the concept of silence – a turning point that many 
commentators, and Cage himself, mark with his later anechoic chamber visit – begins to 
be marked through a reevaluation of the distinction between silence and sound, oriented 
through the Zen tendency to dissolve dualisms. Against a thorough distinction between 
sounds (or, in the case of this spoken and written piece, words) and silences, the two 
                                                 
342 Cage, Silence, 98. 
343 Despite the great number of conflicting accounts regarding the timing of Cage and Rauschenberg’s 
relationship, Silent Prayer pre-dating it seems certain (see Kahn, Noise, Water, Meat, 168). Cage and 
Cunningham both claim to have met Rauschenberg at Black Mountain in 1948 (Kostelanetz, Conversing 
with Cage, 186, although Cage’s quote, which many commentaries cite, is ambiguous as to who it is 
referring to; Merce Cunningham, The Dancer and the Dance: In Conversation with Jacqueline 
Lesschaeve (New York: Marion Boyars, 1985), 55), though this chronology is disputed, with the 
suggestion that their first meeting came in New York shortly after Cage first encountered Rauschenberg’s 
work in spring of 1951 (Gann, No Such Thing as Silence, 111). 
344 In distinction from the South Asian philosophy that ran through his texts and pieces of the late 1940s, 
which we will touch on in our next chapter. 
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begin to enter into a new relation of relation and interpenetration. This occurs through a 
new role for structure in Cage’s compositional practice.  
 
In his early work Cage used his concept of rhythmic structure as an intentionally applied 
device to render the structural divisions of the piece appropriate to the materials being 
used, aligning closely to a medium-specific perspective by organizing sound through 
only its most fundamental characteristic, that of duration. While silences are present 
from Cage’s earliest works, the equal value of sounds and silences seems to come to 
prominence, and likewise the division between them to obscure, alongside Cage’s 
interest in his readings of Coomaraswamy and Meister Eckhart. In ‘Forerunners of 
Modern Music’, published in 1949, Cage extends the characteristics of the musical work 
found in ‘Defense of Satie’ and refigures structure such that it has no particular formal 
implications, rather constituting an emptiness in which events can occur – for instance, 
in an example Cage uses, an event such as fire or the performance of a piece of music 
can “occur accidentally or freely without explicit recognition of an all-embracing order, 
but nevertheless, necessarily within that order.”345 With structure unbound from any 
particular relation to sound materials, Cage can make the concluding claim that “[a]ny 
sounds […] are natural and conceivable within a rhythmic structure which equally 
embraces silence”.346 
 
‘Lecture on Nothing’ develops these ideas on structure both musically and, through an 
increasing element of Zen philosophy, conceptually.347 Cage gives numerous analogies 
for the function of structure – as “an empty glass into which at any moment anything 
may be poured”,348 for example – but through the piece itself being structured according 
to these principles, an aspect which the text repeatedly brings to attention, there is 
likewise the intention to experience rather than simply hear about structure. With this 
model of structure Cage can redefine his notion of form not through the decision of the 
composer, selecting what is and what is not to be considered important, but as 
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determined by a continuity in which “each moment is absolute, alive and significant”,349 
and structure as only that within which these moments can attain some form of 
recognition – “Structure without life is dead. But life without structure is unseen. Pure 
life expresses itself within and through structure”.350 Insofar as the composer 
relinquishes control over the structuring of sound materials, structure becomes 
something which gives sense to events in the world which are essentially indifferent to 
this structuring mechanism, as a natural event will be understood to take place within a 
division of seconds, minutes, days, weeks, without its characteristics as an event being 
determined by this structural understanding. “[A]n idea may occur in this talk I have no 
idea whether one will or not. If one does, let it. Regard it as something seen 
momentarily, as though from a window while traveling”.351 As such ‘Lecture on 
Nothing’ acts as a passage towards Cage’s famous demand to ‘let sounds be 
themselves’, itself tied into the theatrical aspect which will come to be implemented 
through this structural model. In turn, we see already a different understanding of 
silence, not as an absence of sound but as somehow bound up with it – “there are 
silences and the words make help make the silences”.352 
 
These ideas attain greater clarity in ‘Lecture on Something’, written in 1951 or 1952. 
Ostensibly a piece on Morton Feldman, who along with Cage, Earle Brown, and 
Christian Wolff would be part of what was termed the ‘New York School’ of 
composers,353 in this text Cage will elaborate on the integration of art and everyday life 
hinted at in ‘Lecture on Nothing’, saying of composition that it is “of the utmost 
importance not to make a thing”, that is, an artistic object, a work, and that the composer 
should rather let “something be just something, finitely something”.354 This resistance to 
the status of the musical work as object points towards the increasing focus on process, 
though it is not yet quite described in this sense – the status of what music is if it is not 
an object is not yet entirely clear. As in ‘Lecture on Nothing’, there is a call not to have 
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structure be a determining imposition on artistic materials, but, as we saw with 
Schaeffer’s early formulations of the sound object in our previous chapter, to rather try 
to allow the materials to speak for themselves. The composer who wishes to ‘make’ 
objects rather than accepting finite somethings is separating art from life – a crucial 
theme here in nascent form which will be threaded through the rest of Cage’s life. The 
composer who accepts what happens can posit art as “a sort of experimental station in 
which one tries out living”.355 This form of acceptance is again associated with silence – 
with the claim that “[t]he nothing that goes on is what Feldman speaks of when he 
speaks of being submerged in silence”,356 nothing here as that which is without 
“beginning middle or meaning or ending”, those terms coming from a “sense of self 
which separates itself from what it considers to be the rest of life”.357 Already here 
silence, ‘nothing’, has taken on many of the characteristics which will be posited of it as 
a consequence of the subsequent anechoic chamber visit – as something omnipresent but 
to which we as listeners are often deaf, as something which resists being subsumed 
under organizational structures, as a point of transit between inside and outside. 
 
Cage will again resist taking credit for these ideas, associating them strongly with the 
visual arts:  
 
just as formerly when starting to be ab-stract artists referred to musical practices to 
show that what they were doing was valid, so nowadays, musicians, to explain what 
they are doing, say, ‘See, the painters and sculptors have been doing it for quite some 
time’.358  
 
However, with these developments in Cage’s thought in mind, we can see here that the 
conceptual relationship between Cage and Rauschenberg was evidently more reciprocal 
than Cage tended to indicate. Cage’s 1961 article ‘On Robert Rauschenberg, Artist, and 
His Work’ offered Cage’s theoretical perspective on Rauschenberg’s work,359 and in 
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357 Ibid., 134. 
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particular his monochromes, which Cage will give significant credit for his own 
compositional developments – the White Paintings, famously described as “airports for 
the lights, shadows, and particles”,360 are posed as opening the question of art’s 
integration of its outside, of the everyday. However, we have seen these ideas in nascent 
form before in ‘Lecture on Nothing’, and it seems likely that Cage first encountered 
Rauschenberg’s monochromes between that lecture and ‘Lecture on Something’. The 
deeper historical roots of Cage’s interpretation of Rauschenberg’s White Paintings, and 
the consequent significance of this interpretation, must be seen as deriving from Cage’s 
ongoing theoretical and practical process as well as from Rauschenberg’s own 
understanding.361  
 
In his discussion of the White Paintings, Cage appears to be drawing from the 
impression Moholy-Nagy left on him beginning in 1940.362 A particular influence cited 
by Cage was Moholy-Nagy’s The New Vision,363 in which Moholy-Nagy offers a 
discussion of Kazimir Malevich’s own white painting, White on White. Here Moholy-
Nagy pays little attention to the white square on the surface of the canvas, preferring 
instead to describe the painting as a “projection screen”, “which constituted an ideal 
plane for kinetic light and shadow effects which, originating in the surroundings, would 
fall upon it”.364 As Branden W. Joseph notes, by drawing on this interpretation Cage 
goes through Moholy-Nagy to place Rauschenberg in opposition to the Greenbergian 
end-point of modernist painting as founded upon the self-reflexive flatness of the 
canvas. In his assessment of the monochrome canvases of Rauschenberg as well as Yves 
Klein, Ad Reinhardt and others, Greenberg remarks that in his first encounter with the 
paintings they looked “familiar and slick”, a taming of the near-monochrome paintings 
                                                 
University Press, 1993), 38). 
360 Cage, Silence, 102. 
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of Rollin Crampton.365 For Greenberg, Rauschenberg’s monochromes did not so much 
take as their object the flatness of the canvas as offer a rote declaration of their existence 
as art by being seen as “limited in extension and different from a wall” – marking an 
origin for later critiques of minimal art from a medium-specific modernist perspective. 
In Cage’s interpretation, on the contrary, and no doubt as a kind of rejoinder to the 
medium-specific discourse, this rote declaration brings with it a constellation of new 
artistic questions, where what the White Paintings indicate, on the contrary, is less a 
concern with the flatness of the surface in itself as a reflectivity of the surface, by which 
the painting makes manifest its place in the room. The art object is not to be taken a 
fixed object but as something involved in and inseparable its surroundings, with all of 
the contingencies implied – Cage interpreting Rauschenberg’s work in reciprocal 
development with his own at the beginning of the 1950s. Over the decade Cage would 
contend with these ideas in various ways, in particular through the development of the 
chance operations which we will consider in our next chapter, but this shifting pattern in 
Cage’s musical thought with regards to the relation to art and everyday life is manifest 
most directly towards the close of the decade, with his development of a formal notion 
of performative indeterminacy. 
 
 
Indeterminacy and ‘The Cage Class’ 
 
The impact of Black Mountain Piece is seen most strongly not as a direct consequence 
of that performance itself but rather through the work of the participants in Cage’s 
classes on Experimental Composition at the New School for Social Research, 
particularly those of his summer 1958 class. Cage’s class description termed it a “course 
in musical composition with technical, musicological, and philosophical aspects”, based 
not on conventional musical studies of pitch but rather the other parameters of sound-
space, “duration, timbre, amplitude and morphology”, and which would consider 
contemporary music post-Webern and in the light of “present developments in magnetic 
                                                 
365 Clement Greenberg, “Recentness of Sculpture,” in Minimal Art: A Critical Anthology, ed. Gregory 
Battcock (Berkeley ; Los Angeles ; London: University of California Press, 1995), 180-81. 
114 
 
tape”.366 Among these participants were Allan Kaprow, Dick Higgins, George Brecht, 
Jackson Mac Low, and Al Hansen, artists who were responsible for developing a series 
of ‘theatrical’ artistic models from the late 1950s onwards, particularly through 
Kaprow’s ‘happenings’ (the Black Mountain Piece would later be described as the first 
happening) and the activities of the Fluxus group. There are two tendencies to be 
avoided here, however – the first, to view Cage as a mere transitional point for the 
revival of a historical avant-garde,367 and so diminish the specificity of his close 
engagement (despite their ultimate divergences) with this group of artists; the second, to 
have Cage stand as an overdetermining singular figure in a diverse network of practices.  
 
Regarding the latter point, it cannot be said that Cage is the sole determining factor for 
the performative indeterminacy that threads through the work of his New School 
students. Cage would later flatly states that it was during his time teaching at the New 
School that he found himself “shifting from object to process”,368 or, perhaps better, 
towards a more refined understanding of what it could mean to move away from the 
object and the work, the notion of process capturing some of what is implied in this 
move. While nascent forms of compositional and performative indeterminacy are 
present in the key texts and pieces of the early 1950s, at this juncture its movement 
appears to accelerate and reach a more refined understanding, with it being in 
September of 1958, just a month after the completion of the summer 1958 Experimental 
Composition class, that Cage would present a formal outline of a compositional practice 
which would incorporate indeterminacy.369 These lectures, however, remain more 
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focused on musical concerns than the work of his students, and can be seen as 
constituting something of a return to music, a rearticulation of the broader ideas of 
‘Lecture on Nothing’ and ‘Lecture on Something’, several years earlier, within terms 
immanent to Cage’s compositional process. 
 
Notable in these lectures is the primacy of a music theoretical elaboration of the new 
concept of structure which is developed in broader terms in ‘Lecture on Nothing’ and 
‘Lecture on Something’. Referring to the composition of Sonatas and Interludes, Cage 
notes that here structure “was a division of actual time by conventional means” and 
within this the method “was that of considered improvisation”.370 Here the materials are 
chosen by taste, “as one chooses shells while walking along a beach”.371 With rhythmic 
structure, unlike in the pitch structure of tonal music, there is no necessary 
determination of materials by their structuring element, and as such the intentional 
decision regarding structure is rendered unnecessary – hence the chance determination 
of structure come Music of Changes.372 In rendering structure unintentional and 
‘indeterminate’ (albeit not in the formal sense which will be outlined in the following 
lecture), the piece is opened to the admission of sounds which are not determined by 
musical intention – which at this point in Cage’s thought now more clearly those of 
‘silence’, as unintentional ambient sounds rather than time lapsed between sounds. Here 
Cage summarizes the model of composition which this notion of structure commands, 
albeit in a manner which poses something of a tension between an ontology of sound 
and an epistemology or phenomenology of listening, to which we will turn later – as “a 
composing of sounds within a universe predicated upon the sounds themselves rather 
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than upon the mind which can envisage their coming into being”.373 Here Cage exhibits 
the resistance towards making a ‘thing’ of the composition we found earlier in ‘Lecture 
on Something’, and instead poses compositions as “not preconceived objects, and to 
approach them as objects is to utterly miss occasions for experience”.374 We see, then, 
an immanent compositional process taking place by which intentional structuring 
becomes unnecessary – and without an overdetermining role being ascribed to the 
nevertheless significant impact of Cage’s anechoic chamber experience or the impact of 
Zen philosophy. 
 
Applying the notion of chance-derived structure is not in itself enough to bring about 
this claim for the musical performance resisting classification as an object, however. In 
the second lecture of this series, ‘Indeterminacy’, Cage returns to Music of Changes and 
positions it as “essentially conventional to European music” insofar as it is presented as 
an object,375 a musical work – the compositional use of chance “identifies the composer 
with no matter what eventuality”, but the score itself is fully determinate and allows the 
performer no equivalent – the performer is controlled by the score. While chance is 
directed to remove intentional compositional authority at the level of the score, another 
procedure is required to remove the authority and finality of the score with regards to 
performance. This procedure will be indeterminacy.  
 
Cage had been experimenting with graphical notation and other alternative forms of 
scoring and notation across the 1950s – the second score of 4’33” where space indicates 
duration, dropping “all notion of meter”,376 visually reminiscent of Rauschenberg’s 
White Paintings; Music for Piano’s (1952) composition based on imperfections on the 
notation paper; the use of graph paper and a point-drawing system in Music for Carillon 
(1952) and elsewhere other means of presenting a visual representation of the 
parameters of sound-space. In this respect graphical notation was used to allow for the 
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possibility of any sound, to “recognize that sounds did truly exist in a field”.377 
However, there is a sudden refinement of this method coinciding with the 1958 
Experimental Composition class and intended to loosen the hold of the score on the 
performer, an early stage of which is marked by the vast plurality of notational schemes 
used in Concert for Piano and Orchestra (1958) and by the time of the ‘Indeterminacy’ 
lecture Cage has come to strongly associate indeterminacy of performance with his new 
notational method making use of transparencies.378  
 
Cage’s transparency method appeared around the time of his Experimental Composition 
class and would be used in several pieces of this period, including the Variations pieces, 
Cartridge Music, and Fontana Mix.379 The scoring is derived from sections of Concert 
for Piano and Orchestra, particularly the CC section of its Solo for Piano, which 
follows the pattern found through the 1950s of using alternative scoring methods to 
represent the variables of sound, in this instance through four curving lines, one each for 
frequency, amplitude, timbre, and duration. These lines intersect with slanted straight 
lines which represent time-spans, and through this combination the sounds to be 
produced can be determined by the performer.380 With Fontana Mix, a piece for tape, 
this basic structure is maintained, but rather than as a fixed object the score is a number 
of transparent sheets with score items printed on them, including curved lines 
representing variables, a rectangular grid, a straight line, and points acting as an 
organizing principle when the sheets are overlaid by the performer. This served also as 
the basis for the Variations pieces, and the flexibility of this procedure with regards to 
the sounding possibilities is vast – while previous scores, fixed on paper, had necessarily 
inserted some delimitation of the sound field, the transparency method provided a 
remarkably flexible formal tool, and with these pieces each performance reframed the 
sound field anew – “the universe in which the action is to take place is not 
preconceived”, a comprehensive departure from musical notation, Cage arguing that 
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“[t]he notation of Variations departs from music and imitates the physical reality”.381 
 
It is notable that with the transparency method, and in general Cage’s notion of 
indeterminate composition at this point, the score still appears to a significant extent to 
delimit the moment of performance as it had previously done. While the performer has 
an involvement in the construction of the score, Cage is clear that they are nevertheless 
commanded by a strong degree of determination at the level of final score, so as to allow 
the performer to  
 
let go of his feelings, his taste, his automatism, his sense of the universal, not attaching 
himself to this or that, leaving by his performance no traces, providing by his actions no 
interruption to the fluency of nature. The performer simply does what is to be done, not 
splitting his mind in two, not separating it from his body, which is kept ready for direct 
and instantaneous contact with his instrument.382 
 
The requirement here is to avoid an arbitrariness of performance which is present when 
the degree of indeterminacy is too high, arbitrariness not as chance but the intrusion of 
intentional decision and the reintroduction of the individual ego into music. The extent 
to which Cage’s indeterminate scores still contain a high degree of determination at the 
level of performance is indicative of the process he was still working through, as shown 
by his later reflection on a certain strictness that still adheres in graphical notation.383 As 
such the status of the performer’s freedom at the level of the performance itself, rather 
than the construction of the score, is still unclear, as is the extent to which the form of 
the work as object has shifted towards process. We will return to this precise question of 
the score and performance in our fifth chapter, but for now we must work through some 
of the tensions this notion of indeterminacy has produced. 
 
 
Critical perspectives on Cage 
 
While Cage’s chance procedures had some impact on the students in his Experimental 
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Composition class and others following, it is this notion of indeterminacy that proved 
most central, in part through a persisting connection between indeterminacy and scoring, 
and the bringing into question of the status of the score. First, however, we will see also 
that the students who ‘followed’ Cage and helped define key strands of artistic practice 
through the 1960s often break with and transform Cage in significant and critical ways. 
Outwardly the happenings of Kaprow could appear to share the most similarities with 
Black Mountain Piece – often chaotic, noisy, overwhelmingly multisensory – but 
Kaprow, alongside Dick Higgins and Al Hansen, would be among the students of Cage 
who would resist Cage’s refusal of individual intention through the use of chance, and 
rather maintain a form of authorial risk within theatrical pieces of indeterminate 
performance.384 For this reason Cage would ultimately distance his form of ‘theatre’ 
from that of Kaprow and Higgins in particular, which Cage saw as producing again a 
kind of artistic object which could not tolerate any external intervention interfering with 
the realization of the artistic ideal, even if that ideal is not itself entirely determinate.385 
Cage associates this with the Renaissance work – as “the expression of an idea or a 
feeling that an individual has”, disavowing the possibility that served as what Cage saw 
as the basis of the emergence of the happening and of indeterminacy, namely that 
anything can happen rather than merely that what the artist preconceived.386 Cage sees 
an artistic authoritarianism present in this approach, saying of the directed approach of 
Kaprow’s Eighteen Happenings in Six Parts that art’s political content “doesn’t include 
policemen”.387 
 
This critique, however, will be inverted in later critiques of Cage, precisely insofar as 
the abnegation of decision through chance is posed as reinforcing a form of authority. In 
her 1981 piece ‘Looking Myself in the Mouth’, choreographer, dancer, and filmmaker 
Yvonne Rainer looks back at and critiques an overdetermining influence of Cagean 
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principles, or rather his “abdication” of any principle of “importance or significance”,388 
in her conceptual self-understanding over two decades of work. For Rainer, Cage’s 
refusal of any kind of allowance for signification leads towards a nonsignifying practice 
“existing in a realm of pure idea, anterior to language – without mind, without desire, 
without differentiation, without finitude”.389 By subverting meaning on principle and 
denying, as Rainer sees it, the constitution of any new form of meaning, the Cagean art 
practice is left producing only “an impenetrable web of undifferentiated events”,390 and 
a passivity which deflects the question of power uniformly, in so doing denying the 
possibility of ‘retelling’ the narratives with which it is trying to break.391 From this 
Rainer concludes that Cage’s practice constitutes an “abandonment, an appeal to a 
Higher Authority”.392 We see this not only in the broad political sense to which Rainer is 
generally referring, but in more specific instances – in Cage denying himself a 
constitutive role in the theoretical discourse surrounding Rauschenberg and hence the 
impetus for his own musical direction, or in the degree of perceptive certainty that is 
instilled in Cage’s anechoic chamber experience by his deferral to the sound engineer 
regarding the two sounds he could hear. In the latter case, to some extent perceptual 
ambiguity is not allowed to remain ambiguous or to rewrite itself in a new order of 
sense determined by his own interpretation or otherwise, but is rather only reabsorbed 
into the predetermined scientific understanding. This raises key questions looking ahead 
– what is the phenomenological and epistemological status of Cage’s perceptions in the 
anechoic chamber? How does this relate to a critical and active practice of 
experimentation? 
 
Douglas Kahn echoes this critique and aligns it with his theory of a lineage of twentieth 
century musical practices which subsume an ever-greater field of sound into the 
unifying code that is ‘music’, a lineage which, as we saw in our second chapter, Kahn 
poses as culminating with Cage. The expansion of the field of accepted sounds reaches 
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its final stage with Cage’s sound-space, taken as a totalizing field – an aspect of Cage’s 
work which remains heavily steeped in a certain modernism, implicated in questions of 
medium-specificity and formalism, with Benjamin Piekut describing the “modernist 
impulse” of separating sound into its component parts,393 as well as the modernist 
heritage of the notion of ‘field’ itself. For Kahn, Cage, like Schaeffer, overlooked “the 
degree to which he was lodged within Western art music” and in turn “how willing he 
was to carry further its processes of exclusion and reduction with respect to sound in 
general”.394 With the line between sound or noise and music erased, we are led, Kahn 
suggests, towards an emancipatory endgame – if everything is open, we are left with “no 
more means to materially regenerate music”395 – every possible musical gesture is 
implied already in its expanded sound field. 
 
Furthermore, and crucial to the artistic procedures made with and through Cage, Kahn 
posits Cage’s anechoic chamber experience as bringing about a key conceptual shift 
alongside this notion of sound – as conjoining the principle of all sound, as the opening 
of music to the entirety of the sound field, to always sound. It is not only that all sound 
is permissible in music, but that this world of sound is inescapable, it suffuses every 
moment. With regards to music, the opening to the everyday, of inside to outside, is 
posed less as an opening than it is a reclamation of outside to inside – if every moment 
is saturated with sound, intentional and unintentional, and if in Cage we have an artistic 
model of incorporating this outside into the inside, there is no longer any point of 
discernment. Here it concerns a totalizing musical gesture, but from another perspective, 
that of the listening subject, this likewise portends to the passivity which Rainer locates 
in Cage’s thought. As Kahn elaborates, we find Cage distinguished from that American 
art of the 1940s that drew on Surrealism, Freud and Jung as a means of tapping the 
unconscious, insofar as Cage was “less interested in getting the ego out of the way to 
enable the unconscious to come out into the world than in removing the ego so more of 
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the world could get in unobstructed.”396  
 
For Kahn, like Rainer, Cage’s openness and its refusal to serve a critical function sees it 
only reinforce the structural terms of the status quo. Cage “explicitly sought to subvert 
tactics based in human centeredness, yet all he did was shift the center from one of 
utterance to one of audition”397 – Cage reverses into a reinforcement of a form of 
subjectivity posited as being under critique. Cage’s shift “entailed a production of music 
through the sonicity of audition [rather than utterance] while retaining all other features 
of Western art music”.398 The notion of an ideal listener, silenced, extracted from the 
social realm, and oriented towards the adequate understanding of its musical object, is, 
as James H. Johnson among others have argued, firmly entangled with the emergence of 
the bourgeois subject and is key to the development of Western classical music’s 
conceptualization as a self-determining art form.399 As Kahn sees it, 4’33” is an 
extension of this decorum of silencing, asked not only of the listener but also of the 
performer.400 Cage’s silencing is universalized, as a gesture once restricted to the concert 
hall becomes, through the conjunction of all-sound and always-sound, a generalized 
social command. 
 
Suggested in this is what Kahn sees as Cage’s major political failing – in this project of 
absolute emancipation through listening, we are required to silence. Noise as a field of 
tension – as a fundamental element of social or ecological relations – is muted, and in its 
place comes a totalizing impetus for a kind of harmony and organization under new, but 
ultimately retrogressive, forms of the subject. Letting sounds be themselves, as Paul 
Hegarty argues, still finds itself concerned with forms of framing and locating, opening 
an ethics of listening where passivity reverses into a totalitarian form of activity – the 
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‘Higher Authority’, to use Rainer’s term, to which Cage appeals is for Kahn ultimately 
those social, cultural, and political structures which insist while Cage demands an 
impossible ideal listener. 
 
While Cage’s work into and across the 1960s purports to take social issues as its focus, 
and we have followed the introduction of these concerns into Cage’s thought, Kahn does 
not see this shift as bearing an equivalent conceptual move in his understanding of 
sound,401 a claim Benjamin Piekut will reiterate by claiming that Cage’s understanding 
of sound remains always a modernist understanding, where there persists an absolute 
distinction between the objective world of sound and social contingencies.402 Insofar as 
Cage’s wider concerns are not separated from his musical concerns, and are mapped 
onto what is posed as an unchanging understanding of sound, we will find notions such 
as the social, the cultural, or the ‘everyday’ being essentialized and flattened.  
 
Rainer’s and Kahn’s critiques of Cage are powerful, but act on one image of Cage’s 
thought, most notably in Kahn’s case oriented around the experience of the anechoic 
chamber. In so doing they perhaps obscure some key contextual and theoretical 
questions in both the reception of Cage and in Cage’s own practical trajectory. How are 
we to understand the tensions between simultaneous gestures of openness and gestures 
of closure regarding the field of music and the listening subject? How do such broad and 
seemingly universal claims relate to a practice under transformation and mutation, to an 
experimental practice without fixed ground or telos? To develop these questions we will 
consider how elements of these critiques of Cage are present already, but articulated on 
a more immanent basis, in how the group of artists following Cage define themselves in 
the early 1960s, reaching a particular theoretical focus, and reconnecting our discussion 
to the concerns of our previous chapter, through phenomenology. 
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Passages from Cage and the North American reception of phenomenology 
 
While Fluxus, unlike Kaprow and ultimately Rainer, was generally more attuned to 
Cage’s aversion to control, there are nevertheless important practical and theoretical 
distinctions to be found.403 One of the key performance techniques to emerge from 
Cage’s Experimental Composition class, and which was central to Fluxus, is that of the 
event score, also known as the text score and instruction piece, among other terms. 
Often credited to Brecht,404 there are in fact nascent forms of the event score being 
produced throughout the 1950s – Yoko Ono’s Secret Piece, dated summer 1953, which 
instructs the performer to play a single note with the accompaniment of “The woods 
from 5 a.m. to 8.a.m. in summer” being one such instance.405 
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As Michael Nyman describes the distinction between Fluxus and Cage, “[w]hile Cage 
invokes the total, unpredictable configuration, permanent flux, and seems (theoretically) 
not interested in the quality of individual things, Brecht isolates the single, observed 
occurrence and projects it into a performance activity”.406 This interest in the total 
configuration indicates that which is still ‘modernist’ in Cage’s work, that which Kahn 
and Piekut will separate from his social concerns, that of the all-encompassing sound 
field, and for instance his persisting grounding of his notion of sound in variables. While 
the Experimental Composition class grounded itself in the terminology of Cage’s sound-
space, of sound as a field, its results go quickly beyond this, and while sound is still 
operative in many event scores it is perhaps in how these pieces depart from Cage’s 
sonic field that we find the strongest point of differentiation. 
 
With event scores we find smaller sound worlds, with no nod towards totality, a 
consequence of which is a plurality of understandings of sound. In, for instance, Ono’s 
Tape Piece scores, the performer is asked to “Take the sound of the stone aging” (Tape 
Piece I), to “Take the sound of the room breathing” at different points of the day (Tape 
Piece II), and to “Take a tape of the sound of snow falling […] Do not listen to the tape. 
Cut it and use it as strings to tie gifts with” (Tape Piece III).407 All of these intimate a 
kind of ‘silence’ aligned with a Cagean wish to see the everyday penetrate art, a textual 
form of scoring utilized precisely to incorporate the everyday into the performance as 
Cage had insisted music must since the beginning of the 1950s, but these silences 
articulate themselves differently – many silences, none of which pertain to the Cagean 
notion of the parametric sound-space, but rather locate themselves in different durations 
and personal and social spaces. Likewise La Monte Young poses his practice against 
what Brandon LaBelle calls Cage’s “extravagant confusion” with his ‘Theatre of the 
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Singular Event’.408 Through this he will come to divest his pieces of the necessity of 
sonic content entirely, but nevertheless imply a context of sound through his own 
practice and the labeling as Composition. Composition 1960 #7 features notation (a 
perfect fifth) and the instruction “to be held for a long time”, while Composition 1960 
#10 instructs simply “Draw a straight line and follow it” – in many respects the same 
command but divested of its specific musical content and opened to new contexts, sonic 
or otherwise.409 
 
One significant element here is the indication that the paths that diverge from Cage in 
some respects converge on a theoretical moment that appears to efface sonic materiality 
for discourse.410 Of particular importance for understanding the theoretical basis of this 
shift is the work of Robert Morris. As Annette Michelson argued, Cage’s challenge to 
modernism was key to Morris’ project, as it was for others – that Cage cleared a space 
for “an infinitely wider field of operations” against modernist prescriptiveness and the 
confines of medium-specificity, as an opening to the “vast found object” that is the 
world at large.411  
 
In 1960 Morris entered into correspondence with Cage, in which Morris echoed much of 
Cage’s principles and terminology – the elimination of artistic authority, a shift from 
expression to reception, and an interest in Cage’s ‘no-continuity’ as developed in 
‘Lecture on Something’.412 By the following year, however, Morris had moved to 
distinguish his work from Cage’s, particularly in terms of how society and culture were 
to be related to artistic practice. Where Cage would seem to seek to eliminate all 
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structures that police the border between art and life, and against an apparently Cagean 
ideal of a listener whose structures of listening equate to the structures of sound, Morris 
would make central again the question of individual consciousness, positioned as a 
subjective transgression of power structures, articulated through a dynamic between an 
ideal understanding (Husserlian adumbration) and a temporally and spatially situated 
contingency of perception.413 Crucial here is the early North American reception of the 
phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty – his Phenomenology of Perception was first 
translated into English in 1958, with the essay on painting ‘Eye and Mind’ following in 
1964,414 and Michelson herself played a key role in introducing Merleau-Ponty’s 
thought to North American artistic discourse, having attended his Collège de France 
lectures in the 1950s.415 This guided Morris in the development of his self-theorization, 
with his 1966 texts ‘Notes on Sculpture’ and ‘Notes on Sculpture, Part 2’416 guiding the 
discourse that came to surround minimal art specifically and the widening field of art 
practices in the 1960s more generally.417 
 
It is on this basis that Morris marks a passage between the first grouping of post-Cagean 
art practices and minimal art, significant here because it is in the context of minimal art 
that the critical debates which come to characterize 1960s art come into focus, with an 
key early text following Morris being Michael Fried’s ‘Art and Objecthood’ (1967). 
Fried’s piece stages a confrontation between modernist art and minimal art, particularly 
that of Morris, Donald Judd and Tony Smith, the latter of which he describes as 
‘literalist’ art, wherein art “amounts to nothing other than a plea for a new genre of 
theatre, and theatre is now the negation of art”.418 Fried’s approach to this is through the 
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notion of the object and objecthood, or more precisely minimal art’s reduction of the 
work of art to mere object – as Greenberg would say of Rauschenberg, minimal art is 
read as art but only at maximum proximity to non-art, or simple objecthood. While the 
modernist artwork is autonomous with regards to its surroundings, the ‘literalist’ 
artwork is taken as striving towards the point of indiscernibility. 
 
For Fried a key aspect of art as theatre is its insertion of the viewer into the situation – 
that it is concerned with the “actual circumstances in which the beholder encounters the 
literalist work”.419 As such the paradigmatic notion of literalism as theatricality is a 
‘preoccupation’ with time – specifically, Fried posits, time as experienced.420 For Fried, 
following Greenberg, the modernist work is not experienced durationally. The ‘literalist’ 
preoccupation with time 
 
marks a profound difference between literalist work and modernist painting and 
sculpture. It is as though one’s experience of the latter has no duration – not because one 
in fact experiences a picture by Noland or Olitski or a sculpture by David Smith or Caro 
in no time at all, but because at every moment the work itself is wholly manifest […] It 
is this continuous and entire presentness, amounting, as it were, to the perpetual creation 
of itself, that one experiences as a kind of instantaneousness: as though if only one were 
infinitely more acute, a single infinitely brief instant would be long enough to see 
everything, to experience the work in all its depth and fullness, to be forever convinced 
by it.421 
 
In literalist art, rather than this immediate understanding of the art object we have 
“above all the endlessness, or objectlessness, of the approach or on-rush or 
perspective”422 – the experience of time as it passes, citing Tony Smith’s account of 
driving on the New Jersey Turnpike (which could equally be said of Cage’s reference to 
driving through Kansas in ‘Lecture on Nothing’). It is this that replaces the status of the 
art object, and as such Fried’s concern is less with the ‘objecthood’ of minimal art pieces 
as such than it is with this insertion of temporality. 
 
Fried’s descriptions of art-as-theatre’s divergence from modernist art are largely 
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accurate, but exclude the specific critical positions taken to justify the move – that is, in 
Cage’s terms, how and why move from object to process takes place. In Morris’ case 
this will take place through the specific character of his ‘phenomenology’ and its 
relation to minimal art as a ‘public mode’ of sculpture,423 and in this respect we can see, 
first via Michelson, how Morris’ ‘phenomenology’ is most closely associated with that 
of Merleau-Ponty.424 As Michelson presents the relation, Morris and Merleau-Ponty are 
alike understanding knowing as “the body’s functioning in a given environment”.425 
Rosalind Krauss will elaborate on this in her discussion of Richard Serra, arguing that a 
necessity of reading minimal art through Merleau-Pontyan phenomenology is the 
recognition that perceptual data always pertains to “the meanings that things present to a 
given point of view”,426 that is, the recognition that phenomenological space is 
inextricably implicated with experiential time and the concomitant host of cultural, 
social, and historical relations. 
 
As Krauss discusses Morris’ 1965 (Untitled) L-beams, a piece in which two or three l-
shaped fiberglass beams are placed in the gallery space,  
 
No matter how clearly we understand that the three Ls are identical, it is impossible […] 
to really perceive them as the same. The experienced shape of the individual sections 
depends, obviously, upon the orientation of the Ls to the space they share with our 
bodies.427 
 
Here lies the critical basis of Morris’ rejection of Greenbergian modernism – that Morris 
rejects the very possibility of experience an art object in its full instantaneous 
presentness, as Merleau-Ponty rejects the Husserlian notion of the object and the 
objectivity of geometric space.428 On the contrary, Morris posits a situated 
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phenomenology to argue that the intimacy of the viewer with the art work derives from 
a figure/ground relation constituting “those aspects of apprehension that are not 
coexistent with the visual field but rather the result of the experience of the visual 
field”,429 an “expanded situation”430 whereby the space of the work now includes viewer 
and context. In experiencing the artwork the viewer should be “more aware than before 
that he himself is establishing relationships as he apprehends the object from varying 
positions and under varying conditions”.431 
 
 
Space reconsidered 
 
While Morris posits his phenomenological move as a divergence from Cage, there are 
important respects in which this theoretical shift is not so easily distinguishable from 
Cage’s thought, and which will allow us to discern some tensions which persist in such 
phenomenological approaches – both in Cage, particularly a Cage read through the 
primacy of the anechoic chamber experience, and of post-Cagean art more generally. 
This line of enquiry begins by delving more deeply into the understanding of space that 
lies behind Morris’ phenomenological shift, since, as we have seen, there is equally in 
Cage, binding together 4’33” and Black Mountain Piece, a rethinking of the notion of 
space – indeed, Cage would later say that what distinguishes ‘neo-Dada’ from earlier 
Dada is the involvement of space.432 This draws us likewise back towards the 
transcendental critique outlined in our first chapter and refined via Husserl and 
Schaeffer in our second chapter, that enacted towards Kant and formalist aesthetics by 
Deleuze and Cage respectively. The question of space, as understood by both Cage and 
Deleuze, develops through an engagement with Henri Bergson, and gives a new 
inflection to those moves made by Schaeffer and Husserl as well as those of the artists 
following Cage. 
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In Creative Evolution, Bergson suggests that for Kant “space is given as a ready-made 
form of our perceptive faculty”,433 suggesting a kind of pre-established harmony 
between our mind and the things of the world, a notion which Kant himself sought to 
avoid. For Bergson this problem can be traced back to an excluded possibility in Kant’s 
consideration of the nature of space – for Kant, Bergson suggests, in the relationship 
between subject and world “either the mind is determined by things, or things are 
determined by the mind, or between the mind and things we must suppose a mysterious 
agreement”.434 What has been excluded here, Bergson suggests, is the possibility that 
“intellect and matter have progressively adapted themselves one to the other in order to 
attain at last a common form”435 – Kant’s possibilities cannot admit the notion of 
“degrees in spatiality”436 and as such cannot admit a genesis of space which is 
intertwined with but ultimately independent of our knowledge of it. Under Kant’s 
understanding, however, we find a feature that Deleuze would later locate as a 
traditional cornerstone of transcendental philosophy, namely that “the conditions of the 
real object of knowledge must be the same as the conditions of knowledge”437 – that is 
to say, a necessary isomorphism between the structure of knowledge and the structure of 
the object must hold, leading to, Deleuze will suggest, a situation where being cannot be 
thought without being understood as “either an undifferentiated ground […] an abyss 
without differences […] or a supremely individuated Being and an intensely 
personalized Form”.438  
 
This echoes the transcendental critique we have followed already, this particular aspect 
especially through Maimon, but the distinctness of Bergson’s response will be crucial 
moving on – a response posed as a reinterrogation of the concept of space underlying 
this theory. Bergson suggests that space operates in Kant as a necessary a priori 
representation, an inert ground prior to the objects inhabiting it which serves as the 
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medium for any interactions between these elements.439 These objects are discrete in 
nature, and as the space in which they inhere is homogeneous and inert the relations 
between objects is thus characterized entirely in terms of its exteriority to the objects 
themselves. While Kant, as Bergson notes, sought to give science a relative character 
and reduce the metaphysics on which it lies to a minimum, Bergson suggests that in 
relying on this model of space, both in terms of space itself and isomorphically as a 
faculty of establishing relations, Kant “attributed an extra-intellectual origin to the terms 
between which relations are established”.440 As this extra-intellectual origin is “either 
coextensive with intellect or less extensive than intellect”,441 no tracing of the genesis of 
this extra-intellectual form is possible. 
 
This critique of Kant’s conceptualization of space stands as one of the starting points for 
characterizing Bergson’s philosophy of difference. Deleuze’s engagement with Bergson 
spans the entirety of his writings, and it is in two early pieces on Bergson that the 
conception of difference that becomes central to Deleuze’s later work begins to emerge. 
In ‘Bergson’s Conception of Difference’ Deleuze argues that with Bergson we find that 
the task of philosophy must be to conceive of differences in nature rather than simple 
spatio-temporal difference; that is, conceiving of the nature of difference as difference in 
itself rather than difference as one thing’s perceivable distinction from another thing. 
The latter is a difference founded upon “contradiction, alterity and negation”442 as 
opposed to the wholly internal difference of the former. While Bergson’s route out of 
this mode of thinking is an emphasis on duration as a distinct temporal mode of thought 
in opposition to spatial thinking, Deleuze and later Deleuze & Guattari appear to 
reformulate this reading in terms of the underlying geometries of different forms of 
spatiality.  
 
Kantian space is characterized as homogeneous and atomistic – that is, corresponding to 
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Euclidean geometry. Bergson, on the contrary, was able to work with models of 
geometry which were not available to Kant, particularly that which followed Bernhard 
Riemann. Central to Bergson’s project is what can be characterized as the reevaluation 
of how entities relate in Euclidean terms versus this relation in Riemannian terms.443 
While the Euclidean perspective opens the road for developing the analytic tools that 
came to be fundamental to scientific discovery, insofar as it offers objects open to 
immediate and distinct study and opens a mode of thought defined by discontinuity and 
spatiality, Deleuze associates this distinction with Bergson’s project to think the two 
“halves” of the absolute adequately, in terms of a thought of a post-Euclidean 
Newtonian science and a kind of post-Riemannian metaphysics.444 With the extension of 
Bergson through Riemannian geometry Deleuze has the tools to think a form of 
interpenetrative multiplicity defined by continuity and temporality, and a spatiality that 
does not act as a universal measure which predetermines the characteristics of that 
which occupies it – in this respect crucial for the development of the problematic Idea 
and likewise, looking ahead, the smooth space of A Thousand Plateaus.445 
 
The influence of Bergson on Cage’s understanding of space is felt in Cage’s 1961 
lecture ‘Where Are We Going? And What Are We Doing?’, where Cage suggests that 
the space being explored by experimental music is “limitless and without qualitative 
differentiation but with a multiplicity of differences”.446 As Branden W. Joseph notes, 
Cage’s use of the term ‘multiplicity’ appears to draw explicitly from Bergson, oriented 
as with Bergson towards resisting false unities and totalities, with Cage noting that his 
use of charts for Music of Changes was so as to “understand thoroughly all of the 
qualities that act to produce multiplicity”.447 Cage’s initial reception of Bergson appears 
to have roughly coincided with the ‘founding moment’ that was Cage’s anechoic 
chamber visit,448 and, furthermore, the parallels between Cage’s recounting of that visit 
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and a thought experiment outlined by Bergson in Creative Evolution’s ‘The Idea of 
“Nothing”‘, with which Cage was familiar, are striking, and allow us to begin to 
elaborate a connection between the ‘nothing’ and silence of Cage’s theoretical 
development from the early 1950s on and his shifting understanding of space. In this 
thought experiment, Bergson envisions closing off his senses so as to imagine nothing:  
 
I am going to close my eyes, stop my ears, extinguish one by one the sensations that 
come to me from the outer world […] all my perceptions vanish, the material universe 
sinks into silence and the night […] I subsist, however, and cannot help myself 
subsisting. I am still there, with the organic sensations with come to me from the surface 
and from the interior of my body, with the recollections which my past perceptions have 
left behind them – nay, with the impression, most positive and full, of the void I have 
just made about me.449 
 
Bergson’s account of this thought experiment stands to reject the notion that 
‘nothingness’ has an ontological status, that a confusion occurs when we attempt to 
discover the object of ‘nothing’ and find another object in its place. As such it would 
appear that upon visiting the anechoic chamber Cage saw the opportunity to transport 
this generalized critique of negation into the specific realm of sound – indeed, Cage’s 
claim that “there is no such thing as silence” is prefigured by Bergson’s claim that “there 
is no absolute void in nature”,450 and just as Cage’s claim underlies a deeper point about 
the exercise of sound and the listening subject, so Bergson’s claim has more subtle 
ontological and epistemological implications. The confusion that occurs when we 
attempt to locate the object of ‘nothing’ is acted out in Bergson’s discussion of order and 
disorder, and it is with this that we find Cage’s most prominent reference to Bergson – in 
1957’s ‘Experimental Music’ Cage refers precisely to the spatial organization of new 
music, suggesting that it is better heard, contrary to the standard orchestral model, when 
the sound sources (performers or loudspeakers) are separated in space, as new music is 
concerned not with harmonious blending but rather “with the coexistence of dissimilars, 
and the central points where fusion occurs are many: the ears of the listeners wherever 
they are. This disharmony, to paraphrase Bergson’s statement about order, is simply a 
harmony to which many are unaccustomed” – and hence the move “[t]owards 
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theatre”.451 Black Mountain Piece and 4’33” both articulate this notion, perhaps 
emphasizing different aspect – the former placing an emphasis on the plurality of 
sounding voices, the latter on a uniquely perspectival relation to a given sound space. 
 
This notion of disorder is also discussed in Creative Evolution, when Bergson considers 
what it would mean to say that a room we have entered is disordered. We have two types 
of order, Bergson suggests – one which concerns the way in which a methodical person 
would will the objects to be ordered, and one which is derived from the efficient causes 
which have caused each object to be where it is. While the second type of order is 
‘perfect’ and its orderliness cannot be doubted, the first is that order which is of interest 
to us in our everyday lives, and when the first order cannot “express the presence of the 
second as a function of the first, instead of expressing it, so to speak, as a function of 
itself”,452 the second order is judged to be a form of disorder. Underlying this quotidian 
example we see a return to the fundamental questions of space considered earlier – we 
have on one hand a type of order which corresponds to the organizing subject, with an 
ultimately homogeneous conception of space determined by Euclidean geometry, and on 
the other hand a space not reducible to this formulation, which does not adhere to an 
isomorphism between subject and experience. With both 4’33” and Black Mountain 
Piece we find perceiving subjects whose perception is not an adequate total 
representation of the situation at hand, not as an arbitrary limitation but as a 
consequence of the coexistence of individuals in space and time without any general 
organizing schema under which to understand them. In this we can discern what for 
Bergson and Cage alike stands as the characteristics of two different types of space and 
the types of multiplicity to which they correspond – one space proper to discontinuous, 
numerical multiplicities, and the other to continuous, virtual multiplicities, those 
multiplicities in which we find a life not reducible to representation. 
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Cage and two Merleau-Pontys 
 
This rethinking of space allows us project forward into Merleau-Ponty and to his North 
American reception, for which we will turn to ‘Eye and Mind’, marking an extension of 
the thought of Phenomenology of Perception and pointing towards the reformulation of 
phenomenology that will take place with the unfinished The Visible and the Invisible 
project. The theme of ‘Eye and Mind’ is one that echoes writings of Bergson – that 
scientific thinking, if not science itself, has illegitimately detached its concerns from 
questions of metaphysics in favour of a mode of thinking which considers itself master 
and manipulator of the world, where the opaqueness of the world before us is lost in 
favour of an absolute autonomy of science. As with Bergson this question comes to be 
addressed in terms of conceptualizations of space, and a core argument of ‘Eye and 
Mind’ is that we find in modern painting, starting with Cézanne, a rethinking of space 
through a turn away from the techniques of geometrical perspective, and a reformulation 
of space contrary to the Cartesian notion wherein “[s]pace remains absolutely in itself, 
everywhere equal to itself, homogeneous; its dimensions, for example, are by definition 
interchangeable”.453 Following Merleau-Ponty’s reading, with Cézanne we find a 
depiction of space not as defined by the kind of static model we have previously 
described as Euclidean, but in terms of “the sketch of the genesis of things”.454 This 
concerns specifically a re-reading of the concept of depth – where for Descartes, whose 
artistic writings focus on brass etchings, depth was seen through the perspectival 
addition of a third dimension, in painters such as Cézanne and Klee depth concerns 
colour, through which a space is formed in which objects interpenetrate, rather than 
having the distinctness of objects in Euclidean space.455 Depth, in this model of spatial 
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thinking, is not an element of a model of representation, of a “merely ‘physical-optical’ 
relation with the world”,456 but rather it is a “primordial ground”, an intensive field 
through which the other dimensions, those which are visible, can generate.457 
 
In ‘Eye and Mind’ Merleau-Ponty appears to make a sharp distinction between 
disciplines – from the writer and the philosopher there is a demand for “opinions and 
advice”, they find themselves unable to hold the world at bay in its opaqueness; music 
stands as the other extreme, where its turbulence is too great, too far from the 
designatable realm of the writer and the philosopher to offer us anything but a sketch of 
Being. It is only the painter, suggests Merleau-Ponty, who can draw from the opaque 
wildness of Being and make it visible.458 In this we begin to hear hints towards Merleau-
Ponty’s final, unfinished project, The Visible and the Invisible, not translated until 1968 
but giving a greater theoretical depth to the concerns already laid out in ‘Eye and Mind’. 
The question of the specificity of painting turns back towards the original question of 
science and attempts to reframe phenomenology and ontology through a subject acting 
in a domain wholly distinct from that of the scientist, in the exemplary form of the 
painter. In this formulation we have a subject not like that of a transcendental subject 
whose isomorphism with what it experiences offers the promise of pure understanding, 
but a subject caught up in the world, a moving body participating in a world which is no 
longer ‘outside’ as it was. The human body acts as a peculiar crossover, simultaneously 
seeing and visible, not like the purity of thought which “never thinks anything except by 
assimilating it, constituting it, transforming it into thought”, but rather “a self by 
confusion, narcissism […] a self, therefore, that is caught up in things, having a front 
and a back, a past and a future”.459 The painter is the one who, caught up in this network 
of seeing and seen, touching and touched, reaches to the depth of these distinctions and 
makes visible their genesis on the canvas, makes visible “what profane vision believes 
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to be invisible”460 such that rather than seeing only the painter and painting we gain an 
insight into the “inspiration and expiration” of Being itself, without Being losing its 
opaqueness. Depth stands or “my participation in a Being without restriction” – neither 
restriction by a particular perspective or a distinct separation of one thing from 
another.461 
 
We see here a basis for much of the spatial, temporal, and perspectival phenomenology 
that orients the critical understanding of minimal art, here not so neatly detached from a 
Cagean project, and this leaves us in a position to begin a closer philosophical analysis 
of what is at stake in and between Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze’s projects, and in turn to 
begin to clarify Cage’s theoretical position. While Merleau-Ponty downplays the 
significance of music in ‘Eye and Mind’, this position allows us to begin to inquire more 
closely into the specific ontological status of music and sonority. In The Visible and the 
Invisible Merleau-Ponty makes use of the term ‘sonorous being’ a small number of 
times in a largely undeveloped manner, but it appears to echo his reference to music in 
‘Eye and Mind’ insofar as it refers to an especially primordial sort of Being, one in 
which the immediate coincidence of Being with itself, a theme he develops through the 
figure of the flesh, is particularly evident. This conceptualization resembles a belief 
about the distinction between sound and vision which is common in some theoretical 
areas still, namely that while the phenomenological relation to the visual field is always 
one of distance, with regards to sound we, the perceiver, are always already immersed in 
it – the suggestion being that the sonorous experience is an immediate one contrary to 
the mediated experience found in vision.  
 
We begin to see in this formulation a distinction between music and painting which will 
carry through previously discussed critical interpretations of Cage, and from which 
Cage’s practice itself cannot be immediately extricated, where painting operates on a 
perspectival, partial, mobile series of relations, whereas music and sound are 
characterized through immediacy, conceptual stability and so on, raising again many of 
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the questions we came to through Schaeffer and Husserl. Through Merleau-Ponty we 
can develop the status of two forks in Cagean art practice, one which maintains the 
centrality of music, sound, and silence, and one which distributes these terms across a 
wider artistic and social field. 
 
 
Merleau-Ponty and the flesh 
 
In his final, incomplete project The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty’s goal is the 
ontologization of phenomenology, or the construction of a phenomenological ontology. 
This takes the form of a critique of phenomenology, with Husserlian phenomenology a 
particular target, that is also an extension of its method, taking as primary not 
consciousness and that which presents itself to consciousness, but rather the “vortex” 
which on one hand is schematized by the act of consciousness, and on the other 
produces the contingent spatializations and temporalizations that make consciousness 
possible.462 To be more precise – in the first working note for The Visible and the 
Invisible, four key aspects of the nascent project are raised – first, “the necessity of a 
return to ontology” specifically an ontology of “wild” or “brute” Being; second, “the 
subject-object question”; third, “the question of inter-subjectivity”; and fourth, “the 
question of Nature”.463  The first and second of these are immediately intertwined and 
indicate our relation to a musical Cage, silence, and the history of the listening subject. 
The return to ontology here comes in the guise of a form of thinking which will seek to 
replace the transcendental subject and its division of subject and object464 by showing 
how already implied in these divisions is a unified notion of Being, an undivided Being 
found behind the dualisms fundamental to modern philosophical thought.465 With Cage 
this overcoming of dualisms is often attributed to Zen thought, but we see here how it is 
equally implicated in a post-Bergsonian understanding of subject, object, and space.  
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In this notion is entailed a questioning of Merleau-Ponty’s own phenomenological 
project to date, which likewise serves as a critique of phenomenology more generally. 
Merleau-Ponty noted that the problems posed his own Phenomenology of Perception 
were rendered “insoluble” by its starting point of a distinction between consciousness 
and object,466 and that in turn the new ontological phenomenology must first strive to 
explain how these distinctions emerge from the world of uncultivated and preobjective 
Being, yet also remain, in another sense, within it – and, as such, dispel the notion of an 
absolute distinction between the relations of the transcendental and the empirical, or of 
the ontological and the ontic.467 What the project of The Visible and the Invisible 
amounts to, then, is to show the visible, as we understand it, can only be explained in 
terms of an invisible which renders the visible itself visible,468 an invisible beyond our 
perceiving selves which serves as a transcendental substructure of visibility itself – “our 
construction […] makes us rediscover this world of silence”.469 
 
While Cage is clear in not permitting any notion of the transcendental, we find a close 
affinity between this and previously discussed notions of silence and nothing – if 
‘sonorous being’470 is the invisible when it is in its closest point of contact with the 
visible, the question is if it can stand for a ‘silence’ which serves to undo the boundary 
between listener and world. If silence becomes a transcendental ground, what is its 
status in Cage’s practice and that of those who follow him? If this is aligned wholly with 
a modernist, music-oriented Cage who utilizes the notion of a sound-space as a sole 
organizing principle of music, a problematic silence / invisible to be made audible / 
visible, then how are those readings of Merleau-Ponty which are part of an artistic 
gesture rejecting modernist grounds to orient themselves in relation to this Merleau-
Ponty? 
 
Central to Merleau-Ponty’s project, and allowing us to more precisely connect its 
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problematic to the problematic under investigation here, is the question of difference – 
here posed as how two sides of a distinction relate and of the concepts of difference and 
identity that hold between these paired terms. In this we see how the problematic is 
produced from the kind of phenomenological enquiry we found in Husserl and 
Schaeffer – Merleau-Ponty’s project seeks to reach an understanding of the relation 
between immanent subject and transcendent object. Insofar as The Visible and the 
Invisible stands as a response to the Husserlian project of phenomenology, then, it takes 
the form of another kind of transcendental critique, much in the way that Husserl’s 
project can be read as a form of transcendental critique aimed at Kant – both methods, 
as with Cage’s and Schaeffer’s respective methods with regards to Western music 
theory, start with the assertion that a conditioned object or concept is presupposed as a 
model for its own conditions. At the root of Merleau-Ponty’s critique of Husserl is 
precisely the tension between concept theory and percept theory readings discussed in 
our previous chapter. For Merleau-Ponty, Husserl’s phenomenological reduction 
assumes that an originary division between self and world can be posited 
unproblematically. Below this distinction, however, there lies a more fundamental 
problem of the world, namely that “everything resides within the world”,471 it is all there 
– that is to say, there is an experience of the world that lies before any thought about the 
world, an originary coincidence between world and self that is effaced in the 
phenomenological reduction. As such, Merleau-Ponty’s transcendental critique of 
Husserl parallels Husserl’s of Kant not only in diagnosing an unanalyzed 
presupposition, but in showing how this presupposition results in a gap between terms 
which cannot be reconciled starting from that presupposition. 
 
This critique of the Husserlian phenomenological reduction is found in an early section 
of The Visible and the Invisible drafted before Merleau-Ponty’s death, entitled 
‘Interrogation and Intuition’. Positing the history of philosophy as electing certain 
beings, including that of consciousness, to separate itself from its fundamental theme, 
“the umbilical bond that binds it always to Being”,472 Merleau-Ponty argues that even 
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the most solid of mental certainties, every instantiation of what separates the mind from 
the world, are bound up in “the fabric of one sole Being”.473 Husserl’s noema, on the 
contrary, not only transforms the ‘external’ world into something it is not, but by 
rendering the relation instantiated by the noema as that between sense and object it also 
distorts the subject-object relation, rendering the subject – and here Merleau-Ponty leans 
towards interpreting the noema in terms of the aforementioned concept theory – as 
thought alone rather than as being enmeshed in an experience prior to thought, 
irrevocably interiorizing its relationship to the object.474 Indeed Merleau-Ponty’s 
extended project can be viewed as an attempt to find what lies between nature and 
noema,475 and in his earlier work the response to the question, in its nascent form, is 
expressed in the terms of an immediacy in the relation between object and sensation.476 
By the time of The Visible and the Invisible, however he comes to consider sensation 
itself to be among the philosophical terms separating philosophy from Being. The move 
in The Visible and the Invisible, on the contrary, is to seek that which lies behind any 
characterization of subjective experience, and that form of Being in which the subject is 
only one being among others – that is, the invisible behind the visible. 
 
If we are moving from a philosophy concerned with the relations between a 
transcendental subject and its object towards an ontology prior to this dualistic relation, 
what, then, remains such that this philosophy can still be named a phenomenology? As 
Henri Maldiney poses this problem, while the matter of an openness to the world 
becomes primary to Merleau-Ponty in his final writings, this openness is still situated in 
the task of constituting a new phenomenology of perception.477 Indeed, the question of 
phenomenology, argues Maldiney, would be short-circuited were it not to take into 
account the question of the invisible,478 and it is on the premise that perception – the 
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visible – is itself drawn from and situated in the invisible that Merleau-Ponty seeks to 
unfold the manner in which this relationship articulates itself, to consider how 
perceiving is encroached upon by that which is perceived. Merleau-Ponty’s ontological 
move remains a phenomenology, then, on the basis that it is remains primarily 
concerned with the conditions of perception, even insofar as these conditions must come 
to decentre the perceiving subject as such. This is why it is ‘last phenomenology’ – it 
pertains to a discussion of perception that is as far removed from the primacy of 
perception as possible.  
 
It is on this basis that Merleau-Ponty introduces the figure of the flesh. The flesh stands 
for an immediate coincidence of Being with itself, prior to any distinction between 
subject and object or other conceptual divides. It is the “thickness” of the flesh that 
allows the communication between the seer and the thing, insofar as at a deeper level 
both sides of the divide are possessed by the flesh.479 Being itself, then, is always 
expressed in terms of reversibility, reciprocity, circularity and so on, insofar as any 
given act of perceiving is doubled by an act of being perceived,480 and vice versa, of self 
in contact with self, the body insofar as it is the ‘sensitive sensible’. This reversibility, 
however, is always incomplete – within it is entailed a separation, a divergence within 
being itself, or, a difference which stands as the condition for identity.481 In this sense 
there appears to be a tension within the concept of the flesh – while standing as a 
difference which serves as a condition for identity, it also maintains a form of identity 
insofar as it coincides with itself and makes the distinction between self and world 
possible.  
 
Here there emerges a divide in the Merleau-Ponty scholarship paralleling that between 
concept theory and percept theory in the Husserl scholarship, and which would find our 
understanding of Cage, like that of Schaeffer, split into two halves which are difficult to 
reconcile, indicated well in the anechoic chamber account. On one hand we have a 
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situated, perspectival phenomenology which appears to have little critical capacity. On 
the other, a universalized ontology imposing itself upon any other approach. The point 
where these spill into each other is where Kahn will locate the tensions and impasses of 
Cage’s thought. If we are to accept the path of Merleau-Ponty’s thought, those artistic 
paths following from Cage cannot be distinguished from this question either – the flesh 
is a necessary ontological counterpart to a perspectival engagement with the world.  
 
M. C. Dillon argues that for Merleau-Ponty the flesh’s reversibility avoids a return to 
identity as it consists in a doubling of difference rather than a doubling of the same – 
“shaking hands with the other is not the same as shaking hands with myself”.482 This 
entails, however, that the flesh is to be understood in terms of transcendence,483 or as a 
fundamental exteriority to itself,484 and as such Merleau-Ponty must abandon the 
phenomenological transcendental project of accounting for transcendence on the basis 
of an immanent subjectivity. As Jeffrey Bell notes, however, there appears to be a self-
undermining element within Dillon’s reading of Merleau-Ponty – what this 
transcendence stands in relation to cannot be a pure ontology of transcendent difference, 
but rather it presupposes a “germ of mineness”485 which difference can stand against, an 
irreducible and immanent subjectivity which remains at the centre of Merleau-Ponty’s 
enquiry.486 Without this germ of mineness, Merleau-Ponty’s ontology would turn 
towards an unchecked nominalism, difference redoubling difference endlessly, beyond 
any capacity for sense. 
 
The other strand of interpretations of the flesh and in turn of Merleau-Ponty’s 
transcendental project is represented by Claude Lefort, who argues that the flesh, while 
immanent, again reduces difference to identity – emphasizing the sense of the flesh in 
which it is no more than a mirror relation, in which our relation to the world is itself a 
mirror of our relation to our own bodies,487 Lefort argues that Merleau-Ponty as such 
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reduces transcendence to immanence and, like Husserl, cannot account for the world 
without reducing it to the self, finding another ‘tamed’ world where wild Being was 
sought.488 The “fundamental narcissism”489 which resounds through the subject of both 
‘Eye and Mind’ and The Visible and the Invisible means that Being is rendered as 
reducible to the kind of isomorphism we saw Bergson critique in Kant, whereby a 
harmonious end to the seer-seen distinction is ultimately located and supported by 
Being. 
 
At this point we have reached the same impasse with Merleau-Ponty as we had with 
Husserl – of an immanence in which world is reduced to self, or of a transcendence in 
which self is reduced to world. Their shared attempts at putting forward a transcendental 
critique in order to address the divide between immanent subject and transcendent 
object first close the divide and institute a new sense of contact between its terms, but 
only to end with a reconstitution of the problem of transcendence within different terms. 
To reach beyond this impasse it will be useful to return to Ricoeur’s reading of Husserl. 
Ricoeur argues that Husserlian transcendental philosophy must always be in the goal of 
following the object – intentional acts are acts only insofar as they are directed at a 
specific object – and that as such Husserl is ultimately interested in the unity and 
stability of consciousness rather than its inventiveness.490 It is in this stability and unity 
of the transcendental ego that Merleau-Ponty locates the presupposed conditioned which 
he can submit to a transcendental critique, but Merleau-Ponty’s late philosophy in turn 
appears to have a point of seemingly asserted but unqualified unity – that of Being itself. 
Speaking of the relation between seer and its object as he moves towards the 
development of the concept of the flesh, Merleau-Ponty makes the assertion that it is “as 
though [the seer] were in a relation of pre-established harmony with [the object]”.491 
What is implied in this “as though”? While Merleau-Ponty is putting the question of 
pre-established harmony aside, he nevertheless accepts that an equivalent of it must be 
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found for his transcendental project to move on.  
 
It is in overlooking this uninterrogated principle of Merleau-Ponty’s late project that 
Dillon sees fit to assert a fundamental difference of the flesh and as such to claim that 
Merleau-Ponty can no longer be pursuing a transcendental project – the result of this 
principle, however, is that the flesh is said to be of Being,492 a Being defined by identity, 
and as such all difference is effaced under “the unity [...] the cohesion of one sole Being 
from one end to the other”.493 Husserl and Merleau-Ponty alike find their transcendental 
projects, as enquiries into the fundamental difference between subject and object, cut 
short by the reassertion of a form of identity. 
 
How do these tensions within phenomenological enquiry and understanding map onto 
the musical and artistic practices under discussion?  With Cage it is not immediately 
clear, but the distinction between Schaeffer and minimal art guides us forward. While 
with Schaeffer the failure to elude the terms of structuring identities led to his 
pronouncement of the failure of his project, with minimal art we see a quite different 
response, namely the reinscription of anti-formalist practices into a formalist 
framework. Morris uses the term ‘phenomenological formalism’ to retroactively 
describe the sense in which in his work the audience’s perceptual approach plays a role 
in determining the work’s structure,494 and this idea of structuring is given a refined 
formal ground in Rosalind Krauss’ notion of the ‘expanded field’ of sculpture. From 
minimal art Krauss tracks a path leading to an understanding of ‘postmodern’ art as a 
practice “no longer organized around the definition of a given medium on the grounds 
of material, or, for that matter, the perception of the material”, but rather “through the 
universe of terms that are felt to be in opposition within a cultural situation”.495 
However, rather than resulting in the groundless flow of terms that this implies – 
something to which Morris was also resistant, suggesting that art becomes part of the 
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“cultural infrastructure of forming itself that […] culminates in the technology of 
industrial production”,496 part of the central cultural task of “control of energy and 
processing of information”497 – Krauss inscribes this into a new formal schema of 
‘sculpture in the expanded field’, providing a means of careful analysis for the 
modernist field that is ‘sculpture’ after the apparent undoing of that field via 
phenomenological enquiry. 
 
While Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology provided the basis for an understanding of 
sculpture in which viewer plurality and uncertainty could be accommodated, the critical 
tools of formalism reassert structural certainty at another level – as Éric Alliez describes 
this relation in terms which will become clearer over the coming two chapters, there is a 
recovery of the anti-aesthetic into a modernism, “formal qualities grasping hold of a 
new and superior phenomenology”.498 This understanding provides a powerful analytic 
tool, but at the expense of being able to account for the historical and practical 
complexity of the emergence of such a schema in the first place – this formalization is 
always a retroactive gesture, capturing nothing of the artistic practice in process.499 
 
 
Beyond phenomenology 
 
Through phenomenology we appear to find the same impasses and points of tension, 
between nominalism and formalism, between understandings of the subject and object, 
repeated from a wide number of perspectives. To understand these divergent 
phenomenological interpretations of and interactions with art and music, and their 
limitations, we can turn again to Deleuze, and his own reading of phenomenology, 
particularly here through his reading of Foucault, extending our discussion of the 
critique of representation from our first chapter.  
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In maintaining a subjective sense of to perceive and to be perceived, Merleau-Ponty’s 
notion of the idea in relation to its origin is in a sense epiphenomenal – it, following 
Deleuze & Guattari’s argument, traverses immanence, transcendently sitting between 
poles that are not part of the flow of material immanence itself, rather than remaining 
describable in the originary terms of wild Being. This entails a phenomenological 
disposition wherein the lived body-as-subject remains central to the phenomenological 
project at the expense of ontology per se, that ontology can only be discussed insofar as 
it is the “a priori materials”500 both determining and transcending the 
perceiving/perceived dyad of the lived.  
 
Connected with Deleuze’s reading of phenomenology, Foucault’s problematization of 
the question of identity allows us to look more closely at the origin of this problem. In 
The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault notes that his aim with regards to the history 
of thought had been to “cleanse it of all transcendental narcissism”,501 freeing it from the 
question of a “lost origin” that reveals the “transcendental moment” – that figure which 
explains the difference between subject and object. Suggesting that Kant, Husserl, and 
Merleau-Ponty try to find this origin in rational mechanics, mathematical idealities, and 
the meanings of the perceived world respectively, for Foucault the project of thought 
can no longer be concerned with such an originary points. As such we can read 
Foucault’s project as another form of transcendental critique, but one which is 
fundamentally at odds with the phenomenological project, insofar as these returns to 
identity are constituted by a return to the foundational subject-object divide.  
 
The problem of transcendence that grounds the phenomenological transcendental 
critique – of seeking the identifiable conditions behind the transcendent difference 
between subject and object – is, in a Foucauldian transcendental critique, redirected 
towards an enquiry into the conditions of identity. In Deleuze’s rearticulation of 
Foucault’s debt to and response to phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty’s task of stepping 
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beyond intentionality is articulated through the “fold of Being”,502 expressed through the 
flesh, but then amounts to a refounding of intentionality and its operations. It is with this 
re-identification of Being that allows us to characterize Merleau-Ponty’s project in terms 
of a refounding of intentionality, in the sense of generating a space which allows contact 
between an essentially unified inside and outside.  
 
It is important to clarify some points implicit within our discussion of the 
phenomenological transcendental critique and the Foucauldian-Deleuzian step beyond 
it, and in turn how this refigures our understanding of the phenomenological/ontological 
tension present in Cage’s thought. First, why does Merleau-Ponty, in seeking a 
fundamental ontology, remain committed to the question of transcendence, and in turn 
ultimately require of his project the assertion of a unity of Being? This question brings 
us back to the root of Merleau-Ponty’s late project as described by Maldiney – that, 
despite its articulation in ontological terms, Merleau-Ponty remains within his long-term 
project of seeking to develop a phenomenology of perception. As what is ultimately 
‘real’ for Merleau-Ponty is that which can be perceived, the phenomenological poles of 
the subject and its object remain, even if in a radically reworked manner. As Maldiney 
notes, our subjective position is always one of arrival, the subject reconstituted in terms 
of its relation to Being503 – there is always a retroactive reinscription of formal 
properties onto a process.504 Merleau-Ponty’s project, even at its furthest ontological 
reach, always requires a return to the question of subject and object, and his step 
towards an ontology is always hindered by this starting point which is also an end point. 
This necessity presents itself in a contrary form also – it is in requiring a subject-object 
divide that a requirement for an identifiable condition emerges, and consequently the 
anchor of the subject-object divide demands a leap towards identity. As such, the 
illegitimately unified Being we find in Merleau-Ponty emerges for the same reasons as 
does the illegitimately unified transcendental ego of Husserl – without this identity the 
stability of the subject-object divide could not be maintained.  
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It is in this sense that Lefort can claim that Merleau-Ponty already tames wild Being, 
and Deleuze can claim that phenomenology is “too pacifying”505 – all dynamism, 
process, experimentation, is reduced under the operations of subject-object relations. In 
these terms, for Deleuze and Foucault alike the transcendental critiques enacted by both 
Husserl and Merleau-Ponty are moves in the right direction, but ultimately both too little 
and too far. Both thinkers seek to answer the problem of unrecognized difference which 
stifled the philosophy preceding them, but both come to again efface difference under 
the terms of identity, closing one gap to open another. Their philosophical operations are 
both not deep enough, not reaching the heart of transcendental difference, and too deep, 
overstepping difference-in-itself to formulate another kind of identity on top of it – as 
Éric Alliez argues, from its starting point of the consciousness-object distinction, 
phenomenological ontology is necessarily a naïve form of ontology, amounting to a 
revival of thinking the “divine absolute”,506 one in which the subject-object relation 
demands an attempt to “immediately seize the thing in itself” and which in turn “falls 
back on subjectivity”.507 
 
In Husserl, in Schaeffer, in Merleau-Ponty, and in Cage, insofar as their projects are 
understood as transcendental projects, we have elements of dissonance running through 
them, a tendency towards a regrounding in essential identity, elements of difference 
identified only to be again tamed. However, Cage is distinct from these other figures in 
that, despite Kahn’s claim of his ‘silencing’ procedure within the field of music, he does 
not attempt to quieten these elements – instead both are present equally. Kahn posits this 
as the parallel unfolding of two incongruous projects, but across our next two chapters 
we will move to account for the inseparable interrelation of these two aspects of Cage’s 
thought and work through again foregrounding precisely his experimental practice of 
composition. 
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On the other side of the artistic formalism to which we have seen ostensibly 
experimental phenomenological approaches return is an artistic nominalism by which no 
formal determining factor can be posited outside of the individual work of art itself. As 
Thierry de Duve elaborates from Duchamp’s term ‘pictorial nominalism’, the effect of 
nominalism was that making art had become defined by an “impossibility of the 
making”, insofar as the artwork is unable to meaningfully assert itself in relation to any 
unifying notion of ‘painting’ and as such must individually and arbitrarily stake its claim 
to the concept of ‘painting’.508 For Duve this marks a shift in the understanding of art 
from the ‘specific’ to the ‘generic’, by which generic art “only adds up to the singular 
cases so that you have so named in judging them”.509 Peter Osborne claims that Deleuze 
& Guattari’s critique of structuralism “broadly corresponds to what Adorno diagnosed as 
the increasing nominalism of artistic production”510 – albeit as “an embrace of the 
entropic crisis of art-critical categorization”, and that this in turn relocates art criticism 
in an ontology of sensation as “a new version of more traditional categories”511 – in this 
Deleuze & Guattari would be again reiterating the conceptual tensions and oscillations 
found in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty’s attempts to reformulate the question of 
difference. Despite a certain version of Deleuze & Guattari’s work proving 
accommodating to post-conceptual artistic pluralism (as in Osborne’s claim that “a 
shallow version of Deleuze-Guattarian aesthetics has become hegemonic in some 
British art schools”), we find, in contrast, an equivalent to a resistance towards 
“unchecked aesthetic nominalism” through a strong critique of conceptual art in the 
closing pages of What is Philosophy?, their final collaborative work.  
 
After noting that despite its pretext conceptual art, like abstract art, creates sensations 
and not concepts, Deleuze & Guattari then question after all its capacity to do so – it is 
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“not at all clear that [conceptual art] leads either to the sensation or to the concept”. 
Conceptual art is understood as a generalization of materials whereby sensation is 
“reproducible to infinity”, but in so being is reduced to its “dictionary definition” – 
conceptual art as an art which takes place on linguistic terms. This in turn places the 
weight of deciding whether or not the art work is an art work on the “opinion” of the 
viewer, and as such puts conceptual art at the risk (if not necessity) of merely 
reproducing the doxa of the everyday, unchanged through the artistic procedure.512 Art 
becomes an exchange of information devoid of sensation. As Stephen Zepke posits this 
critique, Deleuze & Guattari reject conceptual strategies because “their Duchampian 
negations of sensation de-ontologise aesthetics by turning aesthetic practice into the 
production and exploration of a linguistically defined concept whose materialisation is 
either secondary or redundant”.513 
 
Running through this critique of conceptual art is, again, Deleuze’s late engagement 
with phenomenology, particularly the phenomenology of art. Deleuze & Guattari argue 
that “[p]henomenology needs art as logic needs science […] The lived turns the concept 
into nothing more than an empirical opinion as psychosocial type”.514 The 
phenomenological subject can deal with nothing but opinion.515 Phenomenology itself 
recognises this, and so it turns to art to expand its understanding – to deal with sensation 
properly speaking, rather than to reduce it to the known. Phenomenology’s solution to 
this, for Deleuze & Guattari, comes precisely in the concept of the flesh – that which is 
“freed from the lived body, the perceived world, and the intentionality of one toward the 
other that is still too tied to experience”516 – hence Merleau-Ponty’s used of the flesh as 
the figure of an ontology. Here, Deleuze & Guattari suggest that the flesh is “too 
tender”517 – lacking in a framework, it tends all too closely to a chaos518 which is 
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resisted only by the insertion of a religious moment.519 Without this framework, the 
phenomenology of art in general reaches the points of impasse and irresoluble tension 
we have located in Husserl and Schaeffer in one sense and in Merleau-Ponty and the 
artistic and critical development of a certain Cage in another. It is on one hand caught in 
chaos, a blind and deaf artistic nominalism, and on the other as ultimately fixed, inert, 
the exchange of information immanent to an essential and arbitrating transcendental 
subject. 
 
All of these questions will be addressed in greater detail in our fifth chapter, but to guide 
us into our next chapter we will note that this critical gesture from Deleuze & Guattari is 
not unique to What is Philosophy?, and can be found in another form directed towards 
Cage himself in A Thousand Plateaus, as Deleuze & Guattari make reference to the 
prepared piano in their discussion of a musical context for their concept of the ‘black 
hole’. While initially celebrating the possibilities of sonic variation offered by 
synthesized electronic music (their primary source for this being Varèse, more on which 
later), Deleuze & Guattari warn of the dangers involved in the extremes of this radical 
production of heterogeneity, in an excess of richness, suggesting that rather than 
“rendering sonorous” we may end up with a scribble in which all force is effaced. Of 
this excess, of “opening music to all events, all irruptions”, Deleuze & Guattari suggest 
that “one ends up reproducing a scrambling that prevents any event from happening. All 
one has left is a resonance chamber well on the way to forming a black hole”.520  
 
The reason for this critique applying to the prepared piano is not so much the open-
ended nature of the field of sound it is operating within, but rather what Deleuze & 
Guattari perceive as a certain lack of discipline and focus towards the musical 
engagement with this field. It is the elements which we have described as nascent 
aspects of indeterminacy which Deleuze & Guattari are ultimately claiming put the 
consistency of the musical process at risk – the element of unfettered randomness in the 
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kinds of sounds that the prepared piano will produce. As such the critique seems more 
apt to the direction that Cage’s work will take once his method of composition 
incorporates chance and performative indeterminacy than it is to the relatively ‘sober’ 
construct of the prepared piano. It is these methods that produce an artistic practice open 
to “all events”, leading towards the generalization of materials and elevated status of the 
viewer (or listener) which Deleuze & Guattari will criticize in conceptual art. 
 
This raises a series of key questions. How do Cage and those who took part in his 
Experimental Composition class move so quickly from a musical study of an expanded 
field of sound to an open artistic situation in which a pluralized notion of sound plays 
only one part? More importantly, how can this be termed to be part of one and the same 
artistic practice, rather than as an opening to all events which in fact dissolved that 
process and left only an inert exchange of information? And how do we countenance 
Cage working at once within this generic artistic field and also within an increasingly 
totalizing and essentializing field of music, without determining these to be either an 
oscillation in his work or two distinct practices which have at some point lost the 
reciprocity which once defined them? Cage’s carefulness and hesitation regarding 
different uses of the score, even if the terms of this carefulness are not yet clear, reflect 
him holding reservations similar to those Deleuze & Guattari have to conceptual art, 
even in the period before the spread of the works that would be associated with that 
term. However, he will nevertheless attempt to incorporate the artistic insights of his 
students into his own works, and to recapitulate and regenerate his musical practice after 
it is rendered ‘generic’. To work through these questions we will take a step back and 
consider more the theoretical, practical, and historical specificity of the musical moves 
that took Cage to this position of openness. Central to this enquiry will be the most 
fundamental aspect of Cage’s mature compositional practice, chance, understood not 
only as a procedural method but through its distinct ontological status. This will begin to 
guide us through the impasses we have located here.  
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Series, Structure, Chance 
 
Chance is a crucial entry point into the questions posed at the close of our previous 
chapter as it is at the root of Cage’s engagement with Marcel Duchamp, and through 
Duchamp implicated in Deleuze & Guattari’s critique of conceptual art, but is also a key 
part of a series of enquiries in the field of music across the 1950s. Furthermore, we also 
find a notion of chance central to Deleuze’s critical relation to the history of philosophy, 
and indeed to his own thought. Mapping the relation between these two uses of chance 
will help us develop our critical intervention between the practices of Deleuze and Cage. 
We will begin by considering the relation between Cage and Duchamp – looking at how 
Duchamp developed an understanding of chance as a rejection of any axiomatizing 
principle for art, and continuing our investigation into how Cage carried this through his 
own compositional practice, in particular through his use of chance procedures as a 
means of answering the questions that the trajectory of twentieth century music posed 
with regards to traditional musical problems such as structure and expression.  
 
With this we will turn to address a broader and more contextual understanding of chance 
in music, particularly through Pierre Boulez’s rejection of Cagean chance and his own 
serialist interpretation of chance through Stéphane Mallarmé. Here the serialist practice 
becomes associated with both Umberto Eco’s notion of the open work and Lévi-
Straussian structuralism, posed as opposing understandings of the structural qualities of 
the serialist work. That Boulez, for instance, continues to compose ultimately closed 
works indicates the tensions and points of blockage we find in the theoretical 
articulation of the ‘openness’ of the series, and its relations to chance and structure. This 
bind, we will argue, results in a tension in the understanding of serialism whereby 
against the ‘openness’ of the series and its incorporation of chance elements we find a 
taming of chance in the name of a renewed formalism, whereby chance removes the 
relation implied in intentional, individual, personalized expression but only by also 
erasing the musical problem to which expression refers. In beginning to respond to this 
problem we gesture towards a renewed discussion of impersonal expression and forms 
of relation in our final chapter. 
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We will begin to address these questions through Deleuze’s conjoining of series and 
structure in his articulation of structuralism, outlined in the short essay ‘How Do We 
Recognize Structuralism?’ and realized in both Difference and Repetition and, our 
primary focus here, The Logic of Sense. Here we will go through the Lacanian 
understanding of the series in terms of the symbolic, as a combinatorial chain which 
gives a foreclosed and retroactive interpretive order to the events that make it up. We 
will indicate how, in another moment of Deleuze’s transcendental critique, The Logic of 
Sense drives this logic of serialization and structuration to its limits, and begins to undo 
it through the notion of the ‘ideal game’, integral to the musical problem regarding 
chance and openness, as an affirmation of the whole of chance rather than the limited 
degree of chance for which the bind of series and structure allows. Moving through 
Badiou’s critique of Deleuze and here in particular his understanding of chance, we will 
develop more closely how this affirmation of the whole of chance relates to the 
structural logic under discussion. 
 
This, we will suggest, sheds light on Cage’s procedural use of chance and the kind of 
combinatorial logic produced by the use of the I Ching, as a thorough resistance towards 
interpretive closures in favour of experimentation, process and mutability. We find a 
similar function for the Duchamp-Mallarmé conjunction in Cage as we do with the 
Nietzsche-Mallarmé conjunction in Deleuze, in that chance can be both affirmed in its 
fullness and bound to its material expression, whereby both strive to resist the 
inevitability of the apparent abolition of chance by the throw of the dice, the 
determinism that can be retrojected onto chance – at once an affirmation of the whole of 
chance and “a process of learning or experimentation”.521 In Deleuze’s case, we will 
argue, how this operates, or, better, how it is practiced, is not immediately evident, as 
the apparatus of The Logic of Sense still appears to bind us to a logic of structure, where 
the articulation of practice and process, through the ‘structuralist hero’ and figures such 
as Artaud, remains obscure. With this we introduce Guattari and the concept of the 
machine, which serves an auto-critical function within the terms of The Logic of Sense, 
                                                 
521 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 199. 
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whereby the persistence of structure is a persistence of interpretation against a more 
thoroughly experimental and practical machinic perspective, and enacts the shift 
towards the more thorough repudiation of structure in Deleuze & Guattari’s 
collaborative works, to be addressed in our final chapter, where we will develop our 
Cagean notion of experimentation in its fullest. 
 
 
Cage and Duchamp 
 
The theoretical specificity of Cage’s relation to Duchamp can be unclear. While Cage 
would say that for him “more than any other artist of this century [Duchamp] is the one 
who changed my life”, he would also claim to not understand his work,522 and while 
Cage had known Duchamp since around 1942 (through Peggy Guggenheim and Max 
Ernst523), they would not become close until the mid-1960s. Even then Cage remained 
reluctant to ask Duchamp questions about his work – or, up to a point, to discuss it 
himself, hence Cage’s plexigram piece, and first full-scale visual work, Not Wanting to 
Say Anything About Marcel. We find a clue in a curious phrase – “The effect of 
Duchamp’s work was to so change my way of seeing that I became in my way a 
duchamp unto myself”.524 Here there is intimated a relation to tradition neither as 
rejection nor as imitation but perhaps, as we have discussed, as problematization, as a 
reclamation of the past towards the future – as Sylvère Lotringer puts it, Cage “always 
experienced the past in the future tense – as a futur anterieur – and reclaimed this 
experience as his own”.525 
 
Key to this is precisely Cage’s failure to understand Duchamp, that for Cage Duchamp 
was among the few artists of the early-twentieth century, along with Joyce and Satie, to 
have “resisted the march of understanding” – it is, for instance, Duchamp alone among 
the pre-war artistic avant-garde whose work avoided subsumption into the general 
                                                 
522 Cage, X, 53. 
523 Silverman, Begin Again, 53. 
524 Cage, X, 53. 
525 Sylvère Lotringer, “Becoming Duchamp,” in Tout-fait: The Marcel Duchamp Studies Online Journal 
1:2 (May 2000), accessed 23/09/2015 http://www.toutfait.com/issues/issue_2/Articles/lotringer.html. 
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category of ‘art’, who “remained unacceptable as art”526 – a gesture which Cage is 
trying to renew in his own blurring of the lines between art and life, and the opening of 
art to life. Cage points towards the basis of this relation, recounting a meeting with 
Duchamp in the late 1950s – “I laughed and said: The year I was born you were doing 
what I’m doing now, chance operations. Duchamp smiled and said: I must have been 
fifty years ahead of my time”527 – a relation seen, most explicitly, in Duchamp’s own 
chance music compositions – 1913’s Erratum Musical, for instance, composed by 
drawing notes from a hat at random.528 . 
 
While Cage claims that the neo-avant-garde’s distinction from the pre-war avant-garde 
was the former’s introduction of a concern with space, there is nevertheless a gesture 
towards the uniquely neo-avant-garde spatio-temporalization of art already to be found 
in Duchamp. Herbert Molderings brings into focus how Duchamp had, like Bergson and 
other contemporaries, taken a key interest in the broader consequences of non-Euclidean 
geometry, and in particular as a key aspect of his understanding of the relation between 
art and chance.529 Duchamp would describe his piece 3 Standard Stoppages as “a 
humorous application of Riemann’s post-Euclidean geometry”,530 a notion he associated 
with the chance production of forms, casting ‘pataphysical doubt’ on the postulate that a 
straight line is the shortest distance between two points. Duchamp’s knowledge of 
Riemann appears to have come from his reading of Henri Poincaré, but Duchamp’s own 
distinct brand and usage of non-Euclidean geometry is less, as Linda Henderson posits 
                                                 
526 Kostelanetz, Conversing with Cage, 182. There is some contrast here with Thierry de Duve’s 
understanding of Duchamp inaugurating a ‘generic’ understanding of art. 
527 Ibid. 
528 See Lotringer, “Becoming Duchamp”, and Michael Betancourt, “Chance Operations/Limiting 
Frameworks: Sensitive Dependence on Initial Conditions,” in Tout-fait: The Marcel Duchamp Studies 
Online Journal 2:4 (January 2002), accessed 23/09/2015 http://toutfait.com/chance-operations-limiting-
frameworks-sensitive-dependence-on-initial-conditions/. 
529 Lotringer discusses Duchamp’s speculative 1934 note for a “Musical Sculpture. Sounds lasting and 
leaving from different places and forming a sounding sculpture that lasts,” (“Becoming Duchamp”), 
providing an interesting point of connection not only between Duchamp and the art of the early 1960s but 
also beyond, to the development and formalization of sound art. However it is not clear why he ascribes to 
this note, which Cage received from Duchamp in the late 1960s, significance in Cage’s renunciation of his 
self-identification as ‘percussion composer’, a moment in Cage’s practice he had long left behind. 
530 Quoted in Herbert Molderings, Duchamp and the Aesthetics of Chance: Art as Experiment, trans. John 
Brogden (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 83. 
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it, “the purest expression of Non-Euclidean geometry in twentieth century art”,531 than it 
is opposed to any and all axiomatic concepts, ultimately opposed to Poincaré and any 
notion of scientism in favour of something more like Édouard Le Roy’s nominalism – 
Poincaré’s conventionalism overdriven to a point of antiscientism and skepticism.532 
 
While Poincaré’s association between Le Roy and the philosophical doctrine of 
nominalism is aimed critically, it appears to be from this debate that Duchamp derives 
his term ‘pictorial nominalism’. As such it aims to subtract from art, as Le Roy did from 
science, any claim to truth, attempting to instead realize the “game-like nature of life” – 
“We should not strive for absolutes, don’t make truth of the rules, recognize that we play 
the game according to rules as we see them now”.533 With this notion of the ‘game’, a 
‘playful physics’ concerned with an ‘irrational’ approach,534 enters the question of 
chance, as Duchamp saw in chance a means of enacting this irrational play: 
 
The idea of ‘chance’, which many people were thinking about at the time, struck me too 
[…] Pure chance interested me as a way of going against logical reality: to put 
something on a canvas, on a bit of paper, to associate the idea of a perpendicular thread 
a meter long falling from the height of one meter onto a horizontal plane, making its 
own deformation. This amused me.535 
 
Chance here refuses generalization, convention, and metaphor in favour of a kind of 
radical individualism – as Octavio Paz describes it, “Duchamp’s intention is to get rid 
forever of the ‘possibility of recognizing or identifying any two things as being like each 
other’: the only laws that interest him are the laws of exception, which apply only for 
one case and for one occasion only”,536 an extension of Le Roy’s rejection of scientific 
knowledge into a rejection of artistic or aesthetic knowledge, and beyond.  
 
                                                 
531 Linda Henderson, The Fourth Dimension and Non-Euclidean Geometry in Modern Art (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1983), 131. 
532 Molderings, Duchamp and the Aesthetics of Chance, 100. 
533 Quoted in ibid., 111. 
534 Ibid., 113. 
535 Pierre Cabanne, Dialogues with Marcel Duchamp, trans. Ron Padgett (New York: Viking Press, 1971), 
46-47. 
536 Octavio Paz, Marcel Duchamp: Appearance Stripped Bare, trans. Rachel Phillips and Donald Gardner 
(New York: Arcade, 1990), 15-16. See also Molderings, Duchamp and the Aesthetics of Chance, 124-25. 
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On this basis Cabanne associates Duchamp’s “renunciation of all aesthetics”537 with a 
methodical doubt central to his French heritage (a kind of Cartesianism passing through 
Poincaré, Le Roy, Valéry...), but there are further distinctions to be made. For instance, 
of Alfred Jarry’s claim for pataphysics as a “science of the particular”538 – for Duchamp, 
Jarry’s work, and Dada in general, stood too much as a negation, substituting unreason 
for reason. Duchamp’s claim, on the other hand, was to “show man the limited space of 
his reason”,539 rather than simply replacing it with another axiomatic. As Molderings 
describes it, Duchamp’s art is “the kind of art that asks questions, not the kind of art that 
ridicules because it already knows the answers”540 – there is not a replacement of one 
law by another, but an attempt to put ‘strain’ on any set of laws whatsoever, to indicate 
their instability. For Duchamp then the application or allowance of chance is at bottom a 
questioning of all certainty. Exceeding the later ‘Cézanne’s Doubt’ of Merleau-Ponty – 
where doubt nevertheless interpenetrates with knowledge – Duchamp finds via non-
Euclidean geometry a more thorough ungrounding. Chance in Duchamp is already 
implicated with a refusal to distinguish between ‘life’ and ‘art’ insofar as its place in the 
denial of axiomatic groundings brings into question how such divisions can occur, how 
nominal objects equally traverse the boundaries of what is understood as ‘art’ and ‘life’ 
(and ‘science’, and...) and bring the basic validity of such boundaries into question. 
Duchamp’s chance is tied up to a notion of the possible not restricted to the probable or 
the pre-existing, but rather concerns change, the “passage from one to the other”.541 
 
Cage turns directly to Duchamp in his allusive 1964 text ‘26 Statements Re Duchamp’. 
In one of the most evocative of the statements (of which there are not 26, but rather 
twenty), Cage states “The rest of them were artists, Duchamp collects dust”.542 Here 
Cage suggests a sense in which Duchamp had been forgotten in that which has become 
‘art history’, unlike his peers integrated into it, but in turn associates Duchamp’s work 
                                                 
537 Cabanne, Dialogues with Marcel Duchamp, 42. 
538 Alfred Jarry, Exploits and Opinions of Doctor Faustroll, Pataphysician: A NeoScientific Novel, trans. 
Simon Watson Taylor (Boston: Exact Chance, 1996), 21. 
539 Quoted in Molderings, Duchamp and the Aesthetics of Chance, 128. 
540 Ibid., 129. 
541 Quoted in Molderings, Duchamp and the Aesthetics of Chance, 131. 
542 Cage, A Year from Monday, 70. 
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with the removal of boundaries between art and life for which Rauschenberg’s White 
Paintings were credited –  Cage is most likely alluding here to Man Ray’s Dust 
Breeding, a detail photograph of dust settled on Duchamp’s Large Glass, ascribing to 
Large Glass the openness to its environment Cage would later emphasize in 
Rauschenberg’s White Paintings.543 Equally of Large Glass itself Cage would appreciate 
its accommodation of changes of light, its decentering of focus, and its openness to 
material change and contingency – in short the blurring of the distinction between art 
and life he finds in it.544 
 
There is, however, also here perhaps a modest critique of Duchamp. Contrary to the 
Duchamp who himself would diminish the status of art and the artist, Cage posits the 
notion that “everything seen – every object, that is, plus the process of looking at it – is 
a Duchamp”. “He simply found that object, gave it his name. What then did he do? He 
found that object, gave it his name. Identification. What then shall we do? Shall we call 
it by his name or by its name? It’s not a question of names”.545 Here Cage appears to 
allude to two aspects of his theoretical relationship to Duchamp – the first, a question of 
not repeating Duchamp, not merely again finding the object which Duchamp has 
already named, while in some respect still having faith in his practice, again the path by 
which Cage “became in my way a duchamp unto myself”; the second, an amplification 
of that in Duchamp which resists authorial control, to the extent of conjoining art and 
life without the axiomatizing ground that is the artist’s signature. 
 
Cage’s own relation to this notion is complex, as, after all, a composer with pieces 
credited (and copyrighted) to his name,546 but it guides us into understanding Cage’s use 
of chance, and in particular his specific use of a much more thoroughgoing and 
systematic use of chance than we find in Duchamp (or, perhaps, in any Western artist 
                                                 
543 See Joseph, Random Order, 33-41. 
544 Kostelanetz, Conversing with Cage, 186. Etant Donnés, on the contrary, is the reverse of this – hence 
Cage, while resisting criticism, claims not to understand. 
545 Cage, A Year from Monday, 71. 
546 See not only the amusing aside of Peters Edition suing the composers of another ‘silent’ piece on 
account of its similarity to 4’33” (see Gann, No Such Thing as Silence, 205), but also the much more 
concrete role of the relationship that holds between composers and performers – see our next chapter. 
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before him). First, however, a step back to retrace a more immanent route – the musical 
context within which this concern with chance arises. 
 
 
Chance and composition 
 
One aspect of the specific musical problem Cage turns to chance to contend with is that 
of expressivity, central to common music theoretical understandings of the functioning 
of a musical work, and to the understanding of musical works beyond those strong 
formalist interpretations which ground the work in an understanding of conventional 
bonds and structural relations internal to the work itself.547 Cage initially appeared to 
find in the prepared piano a means for expressivity beyond that of any compositional 
form he had used before, a character described in terms of ‘Grace and Clarity’ in the 
1944 article of that name.548 Here ‘grace’ pertains to the expressive content of a piece 
and ‘clarity’ to its rhythmic structure, at once setting the terms for the quadripartite 
division of ‘Defense of Satie’ and anticipating the refined simplicity of his early 1950s 
lectures. The Sonatas and Interludes appear to be understood largely under these terms, 
albeit supplemented by Coomaraswamy’s teachings, which were first mentioned in the 
1946 article ‘The East in the West’.549 Cage would describe these pieces as “fully 
expressive works”,550 with expression here having particular relation to the ‘nine 
permanent emotions’, or rasas, of the Indian tradition,551 those being the heroic, the 
erotic, the wondrous, sorrow, the odious, the furious, the terrible, the mirthful, and, that 
to which Cage suggested all others tended, the tranquil.552  
 
The success of these pieces, however, nevertheless coincided with an increasingly 
                                                 
547 See the Schenkerian high formalism which renders all expression and rhetoric as “surface irrelevances” 
(McClary, afterword to Attali, Noise, 151). Jean-Jacques Nattiez posits formalism precisely as a reaction 
against models founded on musical expressivity (Nattiez, Music and Discourse, 108-09). 
548 In Cage, Silence, 89-93. 
549 “There is, I believe, a similarity also between Western medieval music and the Oriental. In other fields 
than music, Dr. Ananda K Coomaraswamy has discussed such a relation.” Cage, John Cage: Writer, 24. 
550 Cage, For the Birds, 104. 
551 Kostelanetz, Conversing with Cage, 67. 
552 Cage, For the Birds, 103. 
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fundamental doubt for Cage, a feeling that his works as developed through an intuitive 
method within broad rhythmic structures were no longer being understood as he wished 
them to be. Of 1944’s The Perilous Night, for example, Cage remarked 
 
I had poured a great deal of emotion into the piece, and obviously I wasn’t 
communicating this at all. Or else, I thought, if I were communicating, then all artists 
must be speaking a different language, and thus speaking only for themselves. The 
whole musical situation struck me more and more as a Tower of Babel.553 
 
Cage had over the previous decade experimentally redeveloped a language of musical 
expressivity through an ever-intensifying questioning of traditional models of 
expression, but at this point he appears to come ungrounded – without recourse to the 
conventional features of classical music, what can serve as an axiom for expressivity? 
Cage’s move, as indicated previously in relation his engagement with Zen, is to distance 
himself from the question of expression entirely – not to reject it, but to subtract it from 
the compositional procedure, to resist the compositional temptation to impose meaning 
and elicit specific emotions – a resistance to composition as communication.554 
 
As such Cage’s questioning of expressivity coincides with the emergence of his new 
thinking of form, outside of the earlier distinction between grace and clarity. Cage 
ascribes a directly compositional character to his shift from the expressive notion of the 
rasa, noting that it was in using charts and diagrams to form sound aggregates for 1950’s 
Sixteen Dances that he came to the conclusion that the sounds themselves were 
sufficient, and no expressive effort was required.555 There appears to be an 
argumentative leap here, but it is made clearer if the specific context of Cage’s use of 
the rasa is clarified. In ‘Defense of Satie’, for example, delivered at his 1948 Black 
Mountain visit, Cage elaborates and extends on the themes similar to those of ‘Grace 
and Clarity’, emphasizing structure and ascribing to content no longer expressivity but a 
kind of groundlessness with which the modern composer must contend – if the 
composer is not merely to be subject to the standards of given aesthetics, how is his or 
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her work to be understood?  
 
This question is in many respects typically modernist, as is the request for “an art that is 
paradoxical in that it reflects both unanimity of thought and originality of thought”,556 
which we will later hear echoed by Boulez, but its relation to Cage’s engagement with 
Indian aesthetics brings again into focus a developing factor in Cage’s thought. A 
concern with the essential, the archetypal, is key to Coomaraswamy’s thought – as Kyle 
Gann notes, he would be criticized for his outright rejection of modernity and what was 
perceived as a call to a return to preindustrial forms of living, and affirms a view of art 
as a heavily contextualized cultural practice, and in some respect useful within this 
context, often insofar as it represents fundamental cultural questions.557 For 
Coomaraswamy, the aesthetic significance of the rasas was found in their permanence, 
in opposition to ‘transient’ moods which if primary render the work ‘sentimental’.558  
 
This is clearly at odds with the orientation of Cage’s concern with the new and his de-
essentializing of composition, both projected and contemporary. What was useful for 
Cage, however, is that insofar as the rasas maintain permanence, there is not strictly 
speaking a causal relationship between their presence in a piece of music and their being 
felt in a listener, and no efficient communication of an emotion (or anything else) to be 
expressed. As David Patterson describes Cage’s “creative misreading” of 
Coomaraswamy, Cage maintains the basic structure and elements but ascribes to it a 
different motivation559 – in this instance a structure of a depersonalized form of 
expression in which the composer does not make demands of the music of the listener, 
and in which the listener is not beholden to the music, nor vice-versa.560 The use of the 
rasa as an expressive medium already anticipates the shift away from a compositional 
                                                 
556 Kostelanetz, John Cage, 78. 
557 Gann, No Such Thing as Silence, 90. 
558 Ibid., 95. 
559 David Patterson, “The Picture That is Not in the Colors: Cage, Coomaraswamy, and the Impact of 
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560 Relatedly, one of Cage’s most persisting tropes, that of art imitating nature in its manner of operation, 
is drawn from Coomaraswamy, likewise via an unfaithful reading – more on this in our next chapter. 
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focus on communication, anticipating the sound-space as the objective field of music in 
distinction from the search for musical mediums of subjective expression. 
 
It is from this vantage point that the diagramming of sound units, first used in the charts 
of Sixteen Dances, allows Cage to see sound, unbound from the structures implied in 
standard notation, as something not requiring of a compositional, expressive hand 
guiding it, as something which quite adequately contains its own capacities of 
expression – that it “does not view itself as thought, as ought, as needing another sound 
for its elucidation”.561 As such it is in this context that Cage sees the opportunity to 
distance himself from the compositional process by using chance procedures, insofar as 
the hand of the composer introduces something Cage deemed increasingly unnecessary 
to a practice focused on letting sounds be themselves. The theoretical tendencies chance 
exemplifies, then, are at once an extension of premises present already in Cage’s work, 
and serve to resolve the impasses Cage found through working with these premises.  
 
Despite this seemingly continuous unfolding, chance nevertheless appears in a single 
moment – when Cage received a copy of the Chinese Oracular book the I Ching from 
Christian Wolff while Cage was in the process of writing Concerto for Prepared Piano 
and Chamber Orchestra,562 and immediately put it to use in the composition of the third 
movement of that piece (as we have discussed in chapter one). While the use of the I 
Ching specifically was not necessarily integral to Cage’s implementation of chance, it is 
worth nevertheless considering its status in the development of Cage’s chance 
procedures, insofar as the choice of the I Ching rather than any number of other chance 
procedures both informs and indicates the intentions of Cage’s use of chance. The text 
of the I Ching itself is structured as sixty-four line arrangements (hexagrams) with 
accompanying texts, and can be consulted on personal questions by selecting a 
hexagram through a series of fifty-fifty operations (such as the toss of a coin). That 
Cage attempted to follow this procedure closely, albeit with some idiosyncratic points of 
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usage,563 does not so much represent an acceptance of the holistic philosophy underlying 
it – Cage would later note that “it’s impossible to naively believe in Zen in the middle of 
the twentieth century”564 – but rather indicates the importance he ascribed to abdicating 
himself from compositional responsibility for his choices. It is not so much that the I 
Ching has a privileged role in revealing nature in its manner of operation as that human 
intention will always mask this process, and as such it is used as a mechanism of chance 
rather than strictly as an oracular text: 
 
I use chance operations instead of operating according to my likes and dislikes. I use my 
work to change myself and I accept what the chance operations say. The I Ching says 
that if you don’t accept the chance operations you have no right to use them. Which is 
very clear, so that’s what I do.565 
 
However, there are nevertheless significant theoretical confluences. As Richard Wilhelm 
writes in his introduction to his translation of the book, the hexagram that is selected 
through chance procedures is not posited as reflecting the future or a given state of 
affairs, but rather concern “changing transitional states”, and so act to centre attention 
on “not representations of things as such but of their tendencies in movement”.566 For 
Cage chance, and particularly the kind of chance operations the I Ching allowed for, is 
used to escape fixed understandings and towards finding a moment of the world in 
process – more on which later. 
 
Furthermore, Marc Jensen draws a visual and structural connection between not only 
Cage’s sound charts and the hexagram chart found in the I Ching, but likewise between 
the latter and Schoenberg’s tone-row matrices.567 Jensen’s claim that Cage had derived 
his charts from those of the I Ching appears suspect, as Cage’s retelling as well as with 
other corroborative sources suggest he had been making use of sound charts before he 
had received the I Ching, but it is nevertheless of note that Cage’s particular adaptation 
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of the I Ching rendered it amenable to a serial form of composition – and aligned with 
what we have previously described as the persisting modernist element in Cage’s 
practice, the concept of sound-space. This points us towards an aspect of Cage’s use of 
chance that is not reducible to the impact of Duchamp or of Eastern philosophy, and 
which orients us again towards the specifically musical questions with which Cage was 
dealing, and indeed towards the serialist adaptation of its own version of chance 
following (and in direct opposition to) Cage – theoretical and musical trajectories which 
cannot be separated from the other great artistic progenitor of chance at the turn of and 
into the twentieth century, Stéphane Mallarmé. 
 
 
Chance and serialism 
 
Cage draws together Mallarmé and Duchamp, in a most opaque manner, in his ‘26 
Statements Re Duchamp’ – “Duchamp Mallarmé?”.568 Duchamp noted the 1914 
publication in book form of Mallarmé’s 1897 poem Un coup de dés jamais n’abolira le 
hasard, ‘A throw of the dice will never abolish chance’, with its famous closing line 
“Every Thought is a Throw of the Dice”,569 to be significant for his own serious 
engagement with the notion of chance.570 While much of the specific articulation of this 
relation remains obscure, what is clear is that Duchamp followed Mallarmé in his belief 
that in the artistic articulation of chance we could find an element which eluded rational 
categorization. In Mallarmé we can see this in the typographical distinctness of Un coup 
de dés, with the use of multiple typefaces, blank space, and other techniques disrupting 
the notion of textual space as a linear, sequential structure. 
 
Mallarmé described the spaces in his texts as musical, noting that “[i]t is the white 
spaces that give me the most trouble! They have the value of silences in music. It is they 
that create the dream, the ineffable”.571 Here Un coup de dés anticipates Mallarmé’s 
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ideal Livre, where the page would resemble the musical score, “a scattered design of 
commas or periods and their secondary combinations, imitating, nakedly, melody”,572 
and reading is a gesture beginning with seeing this score for the first time, in all of its 
mystery.573 As such, for Mallarmé poetry is connected to music not so much by 
technical relations between rhythm, meter and so on, but rather, as with the visual artists 
discussed in our second chapter, as moving towards a ‘purity’ of music, unbound by 
narratives, emotions, and so on, what Mallarmé deemed a particularly French 
confrontation with the German notion of absolute music – as Kate van Orden describes 
the relation, “the semiology of absolute music involved a type of hasard that made its 
signs impossible to decode in rational terms”.574 
 
This indicates another aspect of the developing nominalism of the artwork, leading 
towards Duchamp – the artwork shorn of reference to any external regulatory principles, 
where referential meaning as a matter of conventionalized chance is “vanquished word 
by word” (convention is produced through chance, but the recognition or 
implementation of chance undoes it)575 and the work becomes governed only by its own 
internal laws. In Mallarmé’s case there is, however, still a confrontation with the work 
of referentiality, implying a foregrounding of the reader as contingent interpreter 
through what Duchamp would term the gap between “the unexpressed but intended and 
the unintentionally expressed”576 – albeit where, for Mallarmé, poetry is a gesture 
towards releasing language from its bond to the world, a breaking of the link between 
word and world towards the void.577 There is a notable shift in the ‘ground’ of this 
                                                 
572 Ibid., 108. 
573 Ibid., 107. 
574 Kate van Orden, “On the Side of Poetry and Chaos: Mallarméan Hasard and Twentieth-Century 
Music,” in Meetings with Mallarmé in Contemporary French Culture, ed. Michael Temple (Exeter: Exeter 
University Press, 1998), 162. Debussy again is key here, as in Boulez’s claim that with L’Après-midi d’un 
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(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1956), 33. 
576 Tomkins, Duchamp: A Biography, 396 
577 See Gerald L. Bruns, Modern Poetry and the Idea of Language: A Critical and Historical Study (New 
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974), chapter four, ‘Mallarmé: The Transcendence of Language 
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process, however, notably coming through a move away from the Mallarméan 
understanding of the throw of the dice as the symbolic articulation of a transcendent 
Ideal. In its place, for Duchamp and many others in the twentieth century, is chance as 
“a marvelous expression of your subconscious”.578 While Paz claims that Mallarmé and 
Duchamp alike see chance as a “manifestation of the absolute”,579 Duchamp’s interest in 
the individual sub/unconscious and the incongruous meetings between heterogeneous 
groundings (hence his association of chance with humour) appear to distinguish it from 
the solemn significance of Mallarmé.580 
 
From this perspective we see an aspect where Cage tends somewhat closer to Mallarmé 
than he does Duchamp – the question is less of the ‘intentional gap’ Duchamp speaks of 
than its death and disappearance in the formulation of a poetics of chance. In Cage, as 
noted from the critical perspective of Kahn and Rainer in our previous chapter, there is 
little apparent concern with the unconscious, and through sound-space a gesture towards 
the fully internal articulation of the work, sound as problematic Idea connecting to the 
Mallarméan transcendent Ideal. However Cage cannot be seen to subscribe so easily to 
either of these poles of Duchamp or Mallarmé, since, as we have seen, the passage of 
Cage’s practice exceeds the boundaries of the formal schema implied by the sound-
space, with Cage formulating instead a notion of chance which dissolves both self and 
any possibility of a transcendent Ideal in favour of nothing but flux – taking together 
that which is most groundless in Duchamp and that which is most depersonalized in 
Mallarmé. The manner in which Cage is consequently working between and through the 
two, however, for now remains obscure. To begin to develop how Cage articulates this 
passage we will now consider how these notions of chance also passed into serialism. 
 
With Boulez we find the deepest and most prolonged musical engagement with 
Mallarmé, in particular through his two decades of work on Pli selon pli, drawing from 
                                                 
578 Tomkins, Duchamp: A Biography, 132 
579 Quoted in Molderings, Duchamp and the Aesthetics of Chance, 129. 
580 For all of his lightness of touch there is little ‘humour’ to be found in Cage’s compositions, though it 
occasionally, as we will see later, plays a part in his texts and interviews. 
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Mallarmé’s poetry.581 It is in 1957 that Boulez publishes his essay ‘Alea’ and begins 
work on Pli selon pli, both following the publication of Schérer’s ‘Le Livre’ de 
Mallarmé. In their correspondence, Cage indicated to Boulez that he had followed 
Boulez and taken an interest in Mallarmé alongside his interest in Artaud,582 and 
associated Mallarmé with his own interest in chance – an interest which Cage credits as 
ending Boulez’s interest in corresponding with him. In Scherer’s Livre publication Cage 
saw an affirmation that Mallarmé “accorded primacy to chance”583 in a manner inimical 
to Boulez’s compositional practice – Boulez, on the contrary, saw this text as confirming 
that his own aleatoric ideals were “identical with those that Mallarmé had pursued and 
formulated but never had the time to explore to the full”,584 finding in Mallarmé an 
‘obsession’ with formal purity585 and seeing in the organization of his texts “a fusion of 
both meaning and sound, in an extreme concentration of language”. 
 
‘Alea’ then is Boulez’s formulation of the allowance and application of chance into his 
own compositional procedures, distinctly in opposition to the use of chance by an albeit 
unnamed Cage and his New York peers, referring instead to this “chance through 
inadvertence”586 as a preoccupation of “several composers of our generation”.587 This 
notion of chance is the target of Boulez’s characteristically stinging attacks, saying of 
chance that its most elementary application “would lie in the adoption of a philosophy 
tinged with Orientalism that masks a basic weakness in compositional technique; it 
would be a protection against the asphyxia of invention, the resort to a more subtle 
poison that destroys every last embryo of craftsmanship”.588  
                                                 
581 On the Mallarmé-Boulez relation, see Dominique Jameux, Pierre Boulez, trans. Susan Bradshaw 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Ivanka Stoïanova, Geste-text-musique (Paris: Union 
générale d’éditions, 1978), chapter five ‘Boulez et Mallarmé’. 
582 Cage, The Boulez-Cage Correspondence, 96. 
583 Cage, For the Birds, 180-81. 
584 Pierre Boulez, Orientations: Collected Writings, ed. Jean-Jacques Nattiez, trans. Martin Cooper 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 147. 
585 Ibid., 175. No one has been more taken by this formalism than Quentin Meillassoux, whose The 
Number and the Siren posits and unfolds a numerical code hidden in the text of Un coup de dés (Quentin 
Meillassoux, The Number and the Siren: A Decipherment of Mallarmé’s Coup de dés, trans. Robin 
Mackay (London: Urbanomic, 2012). 
586 Pierre Boulez, “Alea,” trans. David Noakes and Paul Jacobs, in Perspectives of New Music 3:1 
(Autumn – Winter, 1964): 44. 
587 Ibid., 42. 
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Equally lacking, however, is what Boulez calls “chance by automatism” – namely the 
total serialism of his Darmstadt peers, which had for Boulez, echoing Schaeffer’s earlier 
critique, locked itself into “a statistical display”, wherein extremes of parametric control 
led to composition as “schematization”, a “fetishism for numbers, leading to pure and 
simple failure”.589 In addition to this there is also a shift to ‘arbitrariness’, particularly in 
an imprecision of notation, passing an unacceptable degree of choice over to the 
interpreter (this would refer to both the use of graphic notation by aforementioned 
American composers but also perhaps more pointedly to shifts occurring in 
Stockhausen’s work). For Boulez all of these implementations of chance amount to an 
abnegation of choice on the part of the composer – passing it over to uncontrolled 
probability, to numerical determinism, or to the performer. 
 
Boulez, however, nevertheless appears to appreciate the impetus behind these 
approaches, regarding his contemporary musical universe as one in which it has become 
progressively explicit that it is logical to look for notions of form which remain open, 
and as such to accommodate the irrational into a rigorous compositional method, to 
“absorb” chance, “tame these potentialities and force them to render an account” rather 
than to allowing them in unadorned by compositional decision. Boulez’s techniques are 
various – developing an interplay of serialism’s “chance by automatism” with a more 
subjective compositional approach, which itself introduces chance elements of a 
different order; or setting parameters within which an interpreter can choose, for 
example, the tempo of a passage.590 In so doing “we reopen the creative circuit to the 
interpreter” – as Cage said of the fixed work in his own Darmstadt lectures, the aleatory 
work is for Boulez limited if it is only to maintain the role of the performer as “an 
interpreter-robot of terrifying precision”.591 
 
Boulez closes this text by quoting from Mallarmé’s Igitur – “In short, in an act 
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involving chance, it is always chance that accomplishes its own Idea by asserting or 
denying itself. Negation and affirmation come to nought in the face of its existence. It 
contains the Absurd – implies it, but in a latent state, and prevents it from existing: and 
this makes it possible for the Infinite to be”.592 Here, however, there is an indication of 
why Boulez would ultimately abandon most of the bolder speculations put forward in 
‘Alea’, finding in an excess of interpretive freedom only problems – “where you have 
thirty or forty people and you give them all some choice, you may be sure that there will 
be very many mistakes. Really, it’s not worth the game”.593 Boulez appears quite 
unwilling to allow chance to “[accomplish] its own Idea by asserting or denying itself”, 
maintaining a compositional practice centered on the work, quite distinct from that of 
Mallarmé. Where Boulez’s ideal of the aleatory work is still distinctly a work – 
maintaining a “logic of development” and “an over-all sense of direction”, and saying of 
the aleatory piece that “[w]e have respected the ‘finished’ aspect of the Occidental work, 
its closed cycle, but we have introduced the ‘chance’ of the Oriental work, its open 
development”594 – as we have seen with Mallarmé this kind of completeness is inimical 
to the acceptance of chance, and “all chance must be banished from the modern work, 
and cannot be feigned there”.595 
 
This leads to a curious quality in those works of Boulez which attempt to incorporate his 
aleatory elements. His Third Sonata, for instance, bears at first glance a formal likeness 
to Un coup de dés – as variable sequences around a ‘constellation’596 – but, as Heinz-
Klaus Metzger notes, it appears the opposite of Boulez’s definition of an ‘aleatory’ 
work, as it is not so much a work whose course is defined as a whole but whose 
                                                 
592 Ibid. 
593 Quoted in Orden, “On the Side of Poetry and Chaos: Mallarméan Hasard and Twentieth-Century 
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individual details depend on chance, as it is a whole as a result of chance, the individual 
details determined.597 In this it is much like Stockhausen’s Klavierstücke XI, subject to 
Cage’s criticism in his lectures on indeterminacy, that it is less a piece accommodating 
the indeterminate impact of chance than it is a number of perfectly determinate and 
whole pieces. As Daniel Charles will describe the Third Sonata, “there is, at bottom, no 
change from one performance to the next; the form is only shattered and reconstituted, 
as in a kaleidoscope”.598 
 
The particular form of control that governed Boulez’s ‘controlled chance’ is a guide to 
his understanding of chance – that for Boulez “the musical text should contain 
inherently this ‘chance’ of the interpreter”, that the kind of performative chance 
occurrence for which Boulez allows is wholly internal to the score. This is where his 
separation from Cage, in the early 1950s moving increasingly far from the ‘unanimity’ 
of expression he still referred to in the late 1940s towards a plurality of modes and 
relations, is more precisely articulated. The key to ‘Alea’ is less Boulez’s embrace of 
chance than it is a reaffirmation of the series, after the failures of total serialism, as the 
basis for a modern rethinking of musical form, the series being especially adaptable not 
only to the inclusion of chance in composition, but to an evolution of form “that will 
rebelliously refuse to permit its own repetition”,599 towards 
 
the possibility of adapting to composition the notion of the series itself, by which I mean 
the possibility of endowing the structure with the more general notion of permutation – 
a permutation with limits that are strictly defined by the restriction of the powers 
imposed upon it by its self-determination.600 
 
that is to say, the series is that form which accounts for the necessity of chance – 
including chance as subjective compositional choice – without undoing the work’s 
capacity for internal consistency. 
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Key here also is Boulez’s commitment to a form of musical evolution – Daniel Charles 
describes Boulez’s “concern over loyalty to the Western heritage developed to the 
highest degree”,601 to which he would oppose Cage, whose early-1960s reputation in 
France saw him portrayed as “blindly deny[ing], or seem[ing] to deny, all historicity, all 
relationships to contemporary musical ‘evolution’”.602 Following Boulez’s premise that 
“the history of music is that of its structures”,603 ‘Alea’ is an assertion that the structure 
of modern music is the open determination that the series allows. The persisting appeal 
of the logic of the series is that it offers the possibility of resisting pre-existing forms 
while maintaining a rigorous musical formalism – Boulez – “To retain their validity, 
speculations must be integrated into a systematic whole”,604 “the fundamental question: 
the founding of musical systems upon exclusively musical criteria”.605 As Charles 
argues, the openness of the work is in service of making it less aleatory, to render it 
more of “an object in itself”,606 without, for example, the network of external semantic 
implications that the use of recognizable words and terms implies in Un coup de dés, the 
questions of expression common to musical analysis, or the network of artistic, 
philosophical, and social connections Cage was increasingly drawing on. 
 
Coming in the late 1950s and into the 1960s, these musical refinements of the notion of 
structure become increasingly implicated in theoretical structuralism.607 Boulez makes 
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175 
 
this connection directly, citing the structuralist theory of Lévi-Strauss in claiming that in 
music “there is no opposition between form and content”, drawing on Lévi-Strauss’ 
notion of structure and the structural disposition of local structures.608 As 
macrostructural form is derived from microstructural combinations, a consequence is 
that musical form cannot be justified with reference to older, pre-existing frameworks, 
as these themselves refer to a musical discourse external to that of the modern work. 
This is the basis of Boulez’s critique of Schoenberg in his famous polemical essay 
‘Schoenberg is Dead’. Here Boulez states that among the (many) incompatible and 
inadequate aspects of Schoenberg’s dodecaphony is the use of series within an otherwise 
traditional compositional schema – “[t]he preclassic or classic forms ruling most of the 
architectures have no historic link to the dodecaphonic discovery” 609 – and following 
Webern in particular argues that the possibilities opened up by the series require in turn 
a reformulation at every level, not merely the ‘tone row’ of Schoenberg’s series. The 
twelve-tone series ascribes ‘absolute value’ to pitch, while Boulez’s post-Webernian 
reaffirmation of the series attempts to ascribe functional value to every element of the 
composition.  
 
Boulez’s exemplary instance of this is perhaps Structures Ia, which, as Reginald Smith 
Brindle describes,  
 
has been composed with devices which ensure that a twelve-note series not only 
determines all the note-successions of the music but also the duration of every note. 
Furthermore, the series itself determines not only the order in which the forty-eight 
serial variants are used but also the order of duration-series derived from them. The 
dynamics and modes of attacks have also been devised from the same sources. In all 
other parameters the composer had freedom of choice, to varying degrees, though he 
adopted (perhaps deliberately) abstract plans which limited his scope for free action.610 
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While with this piece we tend towards the total serialism which Boulez would criticize 
in ‘Alea’, it remains that the critique of Schoenberg is an endorsement of formal purity – 
of a resistance towards compositional and organizational frameworks external to the 
given piece. Boulez’s insistence on approaching the piece on an immanent structural 
basis alone persists throughout his theoretical writings. 
 
 
Structure and series 
 
The association between serialism and structuralism is not so neat, however, and we 
must work through the tensions found in the articulation of their relation in order to 
more precisely address the questions of chance and openness that brought us here. 
Against the tendency, in Boulez and others, to associate serialism with structuralism, 
Lévi-Strauss would in the ‘Overture’ to The Raw and the Cooked criticize both serialism 
and musique concrète, and claim that their respective uses of the term ‘structure’ bore 
only superficial relation to that of structuralism properly speaking, albeit with the two 
musical approaches being mistaken in different respects. While for Lévi-Strauss 
serialism and musique concrète have similar goals, their approach is from different ends: 
 
Whatever the gulf between musique concrète and serial music in respect of intelligence, 
the question arises whether both are not deceived by the utopian ideal of the day: one 
concentrates on matter; the other on form; but both are trying to construct a system of 
signs on a single level of articulation.611 
 
That is to say, of the two necessary levels of articulation of a language, serialism 
concerns itself solely with form, musique concrète with content. As such, in Lévi-
Strauss’ reading of them – and ‘reading’ here is the appropriate term, as, while referring 
to the writings of Boulez and Schaeffer, little reference is made to their musical works 
nor to any of their colleagues – neither approach fulfils the requirement of forming a 
new musical language. In the case of musique concrète Lévi-Strauss suggests that it has 
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found it impossible to determine relations between sounds, “intoxicated with the illusion 
that it is saying something; in fact, it is floundering in non-significance”.612 With 
serialism, we have a more “subtle grammar and syntax” at work, but nevertheless 
having dissembled the field of tonality it has left itself, in the series, only the most 
minimal and most deprived degree of organization. 
 
In contrast to this is Umberto Eco’s notion of the ‘open work’, taking serialist and post-
serialist works, along with Mallarmé’s Livre, as exemplary cases in conceptualizing a 
notion of the modern work of art as a work which “prevents a single sense from 
imposing itself at the very outset of a receptive process”,613 resisting the notion of a 
centre or point of convergence which serves as a final point of interpretation.614 In light 
of Lévi-Strauss’ critique of serialism Eco would return to these questions again in 
‘Series and Structure’. Here Eco agrees with Lévi-Strauss that a superficial connection 
has been drawn between serialism and structuralism, and defines three aspects of their 
distinction. First, there is structuralism’s requirement of a “pre-established code shared 
by both the addresser and the addressee” in opposition to serialism’s questioning of the 
code with every message. Second is structuralism’s basis on two axes of the double 
articulation of language versus serialism’s polyvalence which challenges the ‘Cartesian’ 
bidimensional ground of articulation. Third is structuralism’s hypothesis that every code 
is based on a more fundamental code, in opposition to serialism’s identification of 
historical codes in order to question them, a fundamental resistance towards any Ur-
code in favour of the production of wholly new forms of communication.615 The 
ultimate conclusion of this split is that “the aim of structural thought is to discover, 
whereas that of serial thought is to produce”.616  
 
The series, for Eco, produces a structure of sorts, but a structure which is at once open 
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and polyvalent – by using the series to develop a notion of generative structure, even in 
the midst of a strong critique of (Lévi-Straussian) structuralism, Eco nevertheless urges 
some theoretical connection between the two, between the “open-structured 
(structurelles) realities” of serial thought and the “structural (structurales) laws” of 
structuralism,617 to consider how structuralism618 provides the method within semiotics 
of articulating these moments of structuration, even if at a local rather than global level. 
As Edward Campbell terms this relation: 
 
the series would no longer negate structure but would instead be the expression of a 
historical, self-questioning structure. For this to happen it would be necessary to find an 
articulatory level that would facilitate understanding of ‘serial thought’ in terms of 
‘structural thought’.619  
 
While Lévi-Strauss’ critique of musique concrète and moreso serialism is at times 
puzzlingly at odds with the indicated resonances between these compositional practices 
and theoretical structuralism,620 we nevertheless see here aspects of a musical 
problematic which has carried through our discussion, as in Schaeffer’s mournful late 
dismissal of his own work on these very terms. The serial method only makes questions 
of structural understanding even more central, the key question for serialism and of the 
‘open work’ being how a structural methodology is to be defined without amounting to a 
foreclosure of the openness of the work. We have seen that the openness of Boulez’s 
works can appear in service of a different model of closure, perhaps even more absolute 
than that of the classical model, where questions of referentiality and expressivity can 
still be applied,621 and in a music theoretical context a difficulty in finding this 
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‘articulatory level’ has persisted into current debates. 
 
This takes us again to the question of nominalism, which has received particular 
attention in the serialist context through Theodor Adorno, for whom “[i]f musical 
nominalism, the annulment of all recurring formulae, is thought through to the end, 
differentiation tumbles”.622 While deviation from convention held weight in the terms of 
tonal music, with the end of tonality and the commencement of an ultimate musical 
nominalism differentiation has lost its power, and becomes merely juxtaposition and 
resemblance.623 In the twelve-tone work the emancipation of dissonance comes at the 
expense of movement, creating what Adorno terms a ‘static’ music,624 and consequently 
the novelty of the individual note becomes homogeneous, what Wim Mertens calls a 
“predominance of variation [that] excludes any real change.625 As such, while for 
Adorno Schoenberg is successful in “winning back freedom for mankind”626 in 
reflecting an irrecuperable division between material and structure which mirrors the 
alienation of the subject from society, the loss in nuance and variety leads to a near-
instantaneous “reversal into unfreedom”.627 
 
A refined formalism such of that of Boulez is one response to this problem of musical 
nominalism, as we saw in our previous chapter regarding the formalism of the 
‘expanded field’ and artistic nominalism. However, these musical formalist responses, in 
common with the perspectives of much musicology and analytic philosophy of music, 
have left music, compared to other arts and social phenomena, relatively little-discussed 
in cultural theory.628 These questions were also addressed internal to the mid-century 
avant-garde. In ‘The Historical Reality of Music Today’, Luigi Nono’s polemic aimed 
at, among others, his Darmstadt colleagues – Stockhausen in particular but Boulez 
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included – Nono accuses them of a failure to 
 
integrate an artistico-cultural phenomenon in its historical context, neither in relation to 
its participation in present reality and its efficacy over it, nor in relation to its capacity to 
project into the future, but exclusively in itself and for itself, as its own end, and only in 
relation to the precise instant in which it manifests itself.629  
 
Nono would also criticize Cage from a somewhat different perspective, largely aligned 
with Boulez’s earlier critique, describing his work as “profoundly reactionary”, and 
indeterminacy a “superficial idea of liberty and constraint”. While endorsing the use of 
some elements of chance, Nono follows Boulez in arguing that “to replace artistic 
determinism by chance is possible and attractive only to the composer who is unable to 
make decisions”. In both instances it is again a kind of nominalism that is the topic of 
critique – on one hand, an ahistorical and passive Cagean practice producing indistinct 
objects, on the other a post-serialist hyper-formalism which articulates itself on a fully 
interior level, with no connection to an outside.  
 
In the latter instance, this kind of autonomy of the work of art is not, for Nono, that as it 
is understood by Adorno, as always immersed in a negative dialectical relationship with 
its place in commodity culture. For Adorno it is this relation that constitutes the success 
of the autonomous work of art, the authentic expression of music, as “portray[ing] 
within its own structure the social antinomies which are also responsible for its own 
isolation”630 – the autonomous work of art, in order to be autonomous, must offer a kind 
of distanced reflection of its culture, a relationship expressed in the contradictory 
assertion that “art perceived strictly aesthetically is art aesthetically misperceived”.631 
This is not a reservation about the autonomy of art that Boulez appears to share, hence 
Nono’s critique – for Boulez art achieves autonomy insofar as it bears no relation to 
commodity culture, and as such in Boulez’s thinking there is little of Adorno’s 
pessimism regarding the very possibility of a work of art being truly successful, being 
                                                 
629 Luigi Nono, “The Historical Reality of Music Today,” in The Score 27 (Jul 1960): 41-45. 
630 Theodor W. Adorno, “On the Fetish-Character in Music and the Regression of Listening,” in Essays on 
Music, trans. Susan H. Gillespie, ed. Richard Leppert (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 
393. 
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judged as it is only by its own criteria.632 From this perspective Boulez, interviewed by 
Foucault in 1983, sets up a strong distinction between stylistic pluralism and what he 
saw as the rightful hierarchies of fine art, asserting that a necessary consequence of this 
pluralism was the simple reduction of aesthetic value to commercial value: 
 
Ah! Pluralism! There’s nothing like it for curing incomprehension […] Everything is 
good, nothing is bad; there aren’t any values, but everyone is happy, This discourse, as 
liberating as it may wish to be, reinforces, on the contrary, the ghettos, comforts one’s 
clear conscience for being in a ghetto, especially if from time to time one tours the 
ghettos of others. The economy is there to remind us, in case we get lost in this bland 
utopia: there are musics which bring in money and exist for commercial profit; there are 
musics that cost something, whose very concept has nothing to do with profit. No 
liberalism will erase this distinction.633 
 
This comment takes place precisely in the midst of the academic decline, particularly in 
North America, of the dominance of serial and post-serial music, making way for the 
increasing institutional acceptance of a diffuse group of musics that could roughly be 
termed post-Cagean, with increasing prominence for Cage himself, his peers including 
Wolff and Feldman, and other approaches such minimalism, electronic and electro-
acoustic music, and the multi-disciplinary forms following those discussed in our 
previous chapter. In Cage’s terms, we are drawn again to the question of the relation 
between art and life – how the blurring of the line between the two is to be articulated if 
it is not the acceptance of a groundlessness which would merely be a passive acceptance 
of the given. The openness and connectivity implied by serial and chance operations 
stands in a necessary but endlessly thorny relationship with formal, structural analysis, 
and the question of whether Cagean chance is a method for divesting composition of 
serious engagement with this constellation of problems regarding series and structure 
remains open. To address this question we will consider more closely the status of the 
theoretical project of structuralism and how this bears on the relation between series and 
structure. 
 
 
                                                 
632 See Andy Hamilton, Aesthetics and Music (London: Continuum, 2007), 176. 
633 Michel Foucault and Pierre Boulez, “Contemporary Music and the Public,” in Perspectives of New 
Music 24:1 (Fall-Winter, 1985): 6-12. 
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Recognizing structuralism 
 
Eco, in his engagement with structuralism in La Struttura Assente, seems to efface the 
bind between series and structure already at work in many versions of structuralism. 
Published in 1971, the arguments of ‘Series and Structure’ perhaps suppress the passage 
of structuralist activity since the early 1960s and define contemporary structuralism in 
exclusive relation to a moment in Lévi-Strauss’ work, and with this obscures the 
significance of theoretical structuralism as a problematic unity and its bind with the arts 
which he credits as operating with the serial logic of the open work.  
 
As Étienne Balibar describes the theoretical practices grouped together as structuralism, 
the ‘primacy’ of structure common to these models of analysis comes only through a 
generalized rejection of the reduction of structure to any single epistemological 
model.634 Against Eco’s insistence on the Ur-code of structuralism, here it is rather a 
practice of “immanent externality […] in opposition to foundational, ontological, or 
apophantic styles of philosophy”, and as Balibar terms the structure of structuralist 
discourses, it is never ‘first-degree’ structure, as “a totality or system of parts submitted 
to a law of discreteness, difference, or variation and invariance”, but rather always a 
‘second-position’ structure, that is, it uses these ‘laws’ in the second degree – such that 
terms like the subject are constituted rather than constituting.635 Indeed, Balibar puts 
forward the possibility of what has been known as poststructuralism being understood as 
move from a ‘structuralism of structures’ to a ‘structuralism without structures’,636 
concerned with their indeterminacy or immanent negation rather than what Eco would 
term the ‘absent’ structure – that “structuralism in its strongest sense is already 
poststructuralism”.637 
 
Balibar marks Deleuze’s essay ‘How Do We Recognize Structuralism?’ as diagnosing “a 
                                                 
634 Étienne Balibar, “Structuralism: A Destitution of the Subject?,” trans. James Swenson, in differences: A 
Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 14:1 (2003): 3. 
635 Ibid., 14-15. 
636 Ibid., 11. 
637 Ibid. See also Patrice Maniglier, “The Structuralist Legacy,” in After Poststructuralism: Transitions 
and Transformations, ed. Rosi Braidotti (Durham: Acumen Publishing, 2010) – Maniglier’s perspective is 
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183 
 
first turning point in the structuralist trajectory, indeed, to contribute to that turn”.638 
This text, written in 1967 but not published until 1973, brings into focus how Difference 
and Repetition and The Logic of Sense are both, more explicitly in the latter but equally 
significantly in the former,639 marked by Deleuze’s engagement with structuralism, and 
clarifies the relation between these two works, which within Deleuze’s terms are 
themselves structuralist, structuralism here as inseparable from “a new transcendental 
philosophy”.640 Here Deleuze already makes explicit the questions Eco would later raise 
about the relation between the “open-structured realities” of serial thought and the 
“structural laws” of structuralism, positing series and structure as being intractably 
connected in the production of sense. 
 
Deleuze posits seven criteria for structuralism, put briefly – 1. ‘the symbolic’, as a 
refusal of a dialectic between real and imaginary641 – the key structuralist gesture of 
producing a model of analysis which denies both any immediacy of an uncoverable 
reality or the privileging of the individual human imagination. 2. ‘Local or positional’, 
concerning the relational nature of structure, structural space as pure spatium which 
shifts the notion of subject away from a concrete individual occupying spaces to 
subjects as places within structures.642 In Balibar’s terms, here the structuralist move is 
not only (though it is not entirely distinct from) a Kojèvian-Hegelian lost completeness 
of the subject, but more precisely a notion of the subject which is defined impersonally, 
by its position in the structural relation between aleatory signifying chains.643 3. ‘The 
differential and the singular’ and 4. ‘the differenciator, differenciation’, elaborating the 
emergence of structure as comprised of an axis of reciprocally determined differential 
elements and a corresponding axis of the distribution of singular points.644 5. ‘Serial’, 
that form of organization which allows for movement.645 6. ‘The empty square’, or 
                                                 
638 Balibar, “Structuralism: A Destitution of the Subject?,” 2. 
639 See, for instance, Deleuze’s claim that ‘structuralism’ (in quotation marks, perhaps marking already a 
deviation from a common understanding) “seems to us the only means by which a genetic method can 
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640 Deleuze, Desert Islands, 174. 
641 Ibid., 171. 
642 Ibid., 174. 
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paradoxical object, the element of the structure which imparts a general character to it 
without ever being explicitly expressed,646 and the obscure ‘final criteria’, 7. ‘from the 
subject to practice’, a futural aspect concerning a praxis which can concern itself with 
what Foucault terms “structural ‘mutations’”, or, via Althusser, “forms of transition”.647 
Here we will elaborate on this structuralism by continuing our focus on the serial, on the 
fifth criterion, and move towards considering the final, of a movement towards practice. 
 
In this text structuralism takes an initial linguistic framing, with a structural approach 
concerning that which is structured like a language, as capable of communicating.648 
Against a dialectic of the real and the imaginary Deleuze will here emphasize the 
symbolic, that which in The Logic of Sense Deleuze will term sense,649 which arises 
from an encounter between two heterogeneous systems. In elaborating this point 
Deleuze binds together structure and series via Lacan, for who “the symbolic as element 
of the structure constitutes the principle of a genesis: structure is incarnated in realities 
and images according to determinable series”.650 Quickly distinguished from any kind of 
formalism – “for structure is not at all defined by an autonomy of the whole, by a 
preeminence of the whole over its parts, by a Gestalt which would operate in the real 
and in perception”651 – on this understanding structure is composed of a minimum of 
two series, as one symbolic series linked to another, and to understand how the symbolic 
operates within a territory accounts for only half of its structure, with structure only 
filled out through the resonance that extends between different series in different 
territories: 
 
The determination of a structure occurs not only through a choice of basic symbolic 
elements and the differential relations into which they enter, nor merely through a 
distribution of the singular points which correspond to them. The determination also 
occurs through the constitution of a second series, at least, that maintains complex 
relations with the first. And if the structure defines a problematic field, a field of 
problems, it is in the sense that the nature of the problem reveals its proper objectivity in 
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this serial constitution, which sometimes makes structuralism seem close to music.652 
 
In this respect the series animates what would otherwise be a static structure, through 
the displacement that occurs between two series. For this idea, and its elaboration with 
regards to the empty square, Deleuze cites Lacan’s ‘Seminar on “The Purloined Letter”’, 
indicating how the structure of Poe’s story ‘The Purloined Letter’ comprises the play of 
two series in relation, the “slippages”653 between the two via the object = x that traverses 
them without being present in either. Prior to considering this relation, however, it is 
worth considering how it is conditioned by serialization, for which we will look at 
Lacan’s account of serialization here in some detail. In this seminar Lacan presents a 
relatively simple model of the possible operation of a language, one which appears to 
have more in common with mathematical combinatorics, prior to the levels of 
complexity, redundancy, contingency and so on that natural languages produce.654 Here 
Lacan’s concern is with understanding first the autonomous functioning of such 
structures and second the means by which they can instigate conditions of possibility or 
impossibility. The latter aspect will involve how a set of rules or laws – linguistically 
speaking, a syntax – can be derived from the specificities of a language’s constitution 
rather than derived from any given pre-existing reality from which it is ciphered.655 
 
Lacan begins this discussion with chance – the toss of a coin. A series of, say, nine coin 
tosses can in one respect be described in terms of the absolute independence of each 
toss, as with the independence of the note in the tone-row of dodecaphonic compositions 
– each toss, assuming neutral conditions, equally has a fifty-fifty chance of producing 
heads, so that even if the first eight tosses produce eight heads results, the improbability 
of this given does not impact on the fifty-fifty chance of the ninth toss and the highly 
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improbable outcome of nine heads results. What is most significant in the process of 
structuring a series, then, is when tosses are linked, and the manner by which they are 
linked. Lacan gives an example of a means of grouping tosses – where heads is + and 
tails is -, a first group, noted by 1, determined by constancy (+ + + & - - -), a second, 
noted by 2, determined by dissymmetry, that is a toss being either preceded or followed 
by two of its opposite, and third, noted by 3, determined by alternation (+ - + & - + -).656 
This can then be applied to overlapping groups within the series – i.e. grouping together 
tosses 1, 2, and 3, tosses 2, 3, and 4, and so on. Each grouping can then be sequentially 
categorized. An example: 
 
+ + + - + + - - + - 
    1 2 3 2 2 2 2 3 
 
This example of a series of coin tosses, distributed entirely by chance, indicates how 
even at a simple level657 serialization begins to apply interpretive conditions to the 
elements in a series, and how the structural method of ciphering event can apply laws to 
an event which were did not pre-exist this ciphering. Upon expanding this structure, we 
find that once a syntax is instantiated, there is a necessary repetition of interpretive 
patterns, whereby certain categories cannot immediately follow certain others. At higher 
levels of complexity, the conditioned repetition of the series becomes essentially 
autonomous, oblivious to the individual singularities which constitute it, with a high 
degree of categorial conditioning foreclosing unexpected deviations. 
 
In an appendix to Écrits Lacan alludes to the consequences this has for chance with 
reference to Mallarmé, through what he calls “the only absolute statement” – that “no 
roll of the dice in the signifier will ever abolish chance”, as “chance exists only within a 
linguistic determination, no matter how we consider it, whether in combination with 
automatism or encounter”.658 This notion is developed in Seminar XI, ‘The Four 
                                                 
656 Ibid., 35, 47n21. 
657 Lacan argues that the unconscious requires at least a “quadripartite structure”, e.g. Ibid., 653. 
658 Ibid., 758. See also Malcolm Bowie, “Lacan and Mallarmé: Theory as Word-Play,” in Meetings with 
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Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis’. Here Lacan develops these notions of 
‘automatism’ and ‘encounter’ through the Aristotelian concepts of automaton and tuché. 
Automaton amounts to the repetition of the symbolic order, the “insistence of the 
signs”,659 by which chance is paradoxically elaborated under pre-given conditions. 
Tuché, on the other hand, concerns “the encounter with the real”,660 beyond the 
automaton, with that which has somehow been unassimilable into the symbolic (e.g. the 
analysand coming to terms with trauma). However, even this encounter, which in Alain 
Badiou’s reading is the place of Mallarméan chance properly speaking,661 appears to be 
at once unbound from assimilation to the logic of the symbolic but nevertheless 
inextricably implicated in the repetition of the signifier, in its absence from the symbolic 
somehow marked by the signifier.662 It is to this extent that for Lacan chance, even 
chance as an encounter with the prelinguistic real, is nevertheless marked with and 
defined by a linguistic determination, and in this sense that, per Lacan’s famous phrase, 
“the letter always arrives at its destination”.663 Even that which was most contingent in a 
process is retroactively ascribed absolute necessity – reinscription in the symbolic order 
renders the contingency of arrival as the necessity of destination. 
 
 
Deleuze and chance 
 
In ‘How Do We Recognize Structuralism?’ Deleuze appears to align himself with this 
notion of chance – “accidents do not at all happen to a structure from the outside. On the 
contrary, it is a matter of an ‘immanent’ tendency, of ideal events that are part of the 
structure itself, and that symbolically affect its empty square or subject”.664 While 
Deleuze has often been positioned in strong opposition to Lacan across his writings, 
with for instance Dorothea Olkowski describing his “radical disruption” of Lacan’s 
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reading of ‘The Purloined Letter’ and his “subversion of Lacan and the symbolic”,665 in 
order to follow Deleuze’s problematization of Lacanian structuralism and ultimately, 
with Guattari, of his own structuralism, it is important to consider where their projects 
meet. The Logic of Sense opens primarily concerning itself with the pure surface of 
sense, through Carroll’s play with language, the paradoxes of sense and nonsense, and 
so on. The interest in nonsense – as coextensive with sense,666 nonsense as not the 
absence of sense but as non-sense, the field of sense without the demands of the 
specificities of denotation, manifestation, and signification – indicates why it is that 
Husserlian phenomenology, as described in our second chapter, can appear as a possible 
“science of surface effects”, insofar as the neutrality of the noema extracts sense from 
the truth or falsehood of any given statement,667 but also why it ultimately fails in this 
regard, with the transcendental ego reaffirming an order of common sense, Urdoxa.668 
While Merleau-Pontyan phenomenology no doubt diminishes the problem of the 
transcendental ego by introducing something of a transcendental field to 
phenomenology through an ontology of the flesh, this indicates also, however, a deeper 
problem at the heart of The Logic of Sense, another level of nonsense beyond that of 
Carroll, in which the impasse of Merleau-Pontyan phenomenology we located in our 
third chapter finds a corresponding point in structuralism, namely that of the arrival – of 
the subject reconstituted in terms of its relation to Being or of the letter at its destination. 
 
While initially the apparatus of The Logic of Sense differs little from that of ‘How Do 
We Recognize Structuralism?’, with an almost identical account of serialization in the 
sixth series of The Logic of Sense and the eighth series, ‘of Structure’, reiterating much 
of what is elaborated in the earlier text,669 a notable contrast appears moving from the 
                                                 
665 Dorothea Olkowski, Gilles Deleuze and the Ruin of Representation (Berkeley: University of California 
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ninth series, ‘of the Problematic’ with its reference to the “unique event”,670 into the 
tenth series, ‘of the Ideal Game’. In ‘How Do We Recognize Structuralism?’ Deleuze 
too refers to Mallarmé, naming the throw of the dice as the “very manifesto of 
structuralism”671, and compares this more broadly to the game – the Carrollian word-
game but also games more generally. Here chess is described as among the “noblest 
games” insofar as it consists in the organization of a combinatory system beyond the 
real extension of the chess board into a vast imaginary extension.672 In The Logic of 
Sense, on the other hand, we find, still drawing on Carroll but now also Borges and 
Mallarmé, a distinction between what Deleuze terms ‘known games’ and the ideal game. 
Known games, either of skill or of chance, have four key principles – 1. There a set of 
rules pre-existing the playing of the game. 2. These rules determine hypotheses of loss 
and gain which divide and apportion chance. 3. These hypotheses organize the game 
into a plurality of “really and numerically distinct” throws, each bringing about a fixed 
distribution, and 4. the consequence of the throws is are determined as victory or 
defeat.673 These games “retain chance only at certain points”, other aspects determined 
mechanically or by ‘skill’ as the “art of causality”. This notion of the game, says 
Deleuze, is always appealing to another model to define its own order, be it moral, 
economic, or otherwise.  
 
The ideal game, on the contrary, is ‘pure’, irreducible to other principles, its own 
distinctly more obscure principles being 1. There will be no prior rules, and each play 
determines its own rules. 2. Throws are no longer distinctly made to divide and 
apportion chance, but rather each affirms the whole of chance. 3. While each play is a 
series, i.e. a distribution of singularities, they do not divide a closed space but rather are 
distributed in the open space of the unique cast, and 4. this game has no reality as such 
                                                 
sense, signified is any thing which may be defined on the basis of the distinction that a certain aspect of 
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671 Deleuze, Desert Islands, 175. 
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but is rather the reality of thought.674 Deleuze terms this kind of game “Mallarmé’s 
game”, regarding his Livre, as defined by mobility, interchangeability, displacement – 
fragments elaborating the play of chance in its wholeness. Here Deleuze introduces that 
which brings about a kind of break in the heart of The Logic of Sense, an “event for all 
events”, a “unique cast from which all throws are qualitatively distinguished”675 
circulating across but irreducible to any serial or structural articulation. 
 
It is the paradoxical relation between necessity and contingency in Lacan’s notion of 
chance which appeals to Badiou, who suggests that Lacan “never confounds the 
algorithm of the chain and the flat combination of the terms”,676 that is, the 
combinatorial logic of symbolic series in relation to the real events constituting it, or, the 
fundamental gap between the symbolic and the real – such that the two nevertheless 
being bound comes through a ‘maximal’ algebra, “to the point of effectively being its 
own border”. The ‘real’ terms never suffice to justify their position in a series, but 
neither is the series extricable from its real constitution. This relation Badiou describes 
in terms of law – “What interests Lacan is less the law than the illegal, chance-like 
principle of determination that puts the law into effect”,677 such that there is a 
reciprocity between a necessary symbolic order and the ‘illegal’ transgression of it 
through the encounter with the real. While Deleuze’s notion of structure in The Logic of 
Sense, as with that of ‘How Do We Recognize Structuralism?’, could be characterized 
under these terms, it is the introduction of these notion of the “unique throw”, the 
affirmation of the whole of chance, that drives a key aspect of Badiou’s critique of 
Deleuze in Deleuze: The Clamor of Being, a critique it will be useful to pass through to 
better understand the specificity of the shift that takes place in The Logic of Sense.  
 
Per Badiou’s reading there are three essential characteristics to the Deleuzian dice-throw 
– it is unique, it is an affirmation of the “whole of chance each time”,678 or “all of 
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chance in a single moment”,679 and it is the same dice-throw that recurs in each outcome 
– binding chance to the eternal return of the same. Badiou’s argument, in short, is, first, 
that Deleuze’s notion of chance effaces numerically distinct occurrences of chance, 
reducing their plurality to a totalizing monism, and, second, that this leads to a kind of 
quietism, a solemn – or worse, joyful – acceptance of a status quo in which the subject 
cannot assert itself as an actor – “At no time can we be the source of what we think or 
do. Everything always comes from afar, and further: everything is always already there 
within the One’s infinite and inhuman resource”.680 In another sense, Badiou’s argument 
is that by affirming the whole of chance Deleuze is effectively effacing any positive 
sense of the serial and structural, as anything more than merely epiphenomenal, as “only 
superficial stampings or simulacra of the Great Cast”.681 
 
Insofar as chance pertains to an “ontologically unique throw”682 the plurality of events 
is, for Badiou, “purely formal” – “there is only one event, which is, as it were, the event 
of the One”.683 Badiou’s argument is that Deleuze’s affirmation of the ‘whole’ of chance 
ultimately negates individual instances of chance, that it is an affirmation of chance 
which does not have the necessity to implicate itself again in the symbolic, that 
individual instances only elude a merely analogical relationship to the one or whole 
through an infinitesimalization which nevertheless in the end reduces them to that very 
one. The Deleuzian plurality would come in the serial form of what Badiou termed a 
“flat combination of terms”. As such while Badiou claims that he is not imposing a 
probabilistic model of chance on the Deleuzian model – accepting that refuting a 
probabilistic account of the eternal return is of “the utmost importance” to Deleuze684 – 
it is difficult to see how Deleuzian chance is not at the very least subject to the same 
criticisms as probabilistic chance. Following our previous account of serialization, 
Badiou’s claim is that the categorial organization that the process of serialization 
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produces is ultimately irrelevant to Deleuze, that each toss of the coin or throw of the 
dice is equivalent in its chance result and hence in the end reducible to the one. Badiou’s 
claim that he does not believe in any of the possible interpretations of eternal return (of 
the same, the status of Deleuze’s notion of eternal return of difference going 
unaddressed) – as Parmenidean (as permanence of the one), cosmological (as law of the 
same imposed on chaos), probabilistic (as “an equilibrium arising at the infinity of a 
series”), or what he calls the Nietzschean-Deleuzian sense (“affirmation of all chance in 
a single moment”)685 obscures the very close connection, if not conflation, that Badiou 
draws between the latter two interpretations.  
 
While Deleuze locates his notion of the throw of the dice in Mallarmé, Badiou will 
oppose his own Mallarméan understanding of chance against what he presents as 
Deleuze’s Nietzschean understanding. Badiou’s claim that “[a]bsolutely no compromise 
is possible between Deleuze’s vitalism and Mallarmé’s subtractive ontology”686 is 
aligned with what Badiou somewhat puzzlingly sees as a “strongly critical” perspective 
on Mallarmé in Difference and Repetition but against the “attempts at annexation” we 
find in Foucault and The Fold. As Badiou summarizes the divide, for Nietzsche-
Deleuze “Chance comes forth from the Infinite, which has been affirmed”, for 
Mallarmé-Badiou “the Infinite issues from Chance, which has been denied”. For Badiou 
this means that each evental dice throw is formally speaking the same but ontologically 
speaking absolutely distinct,687 definitively irreducible and ungroupable to any One – of 
Badiou’s Mallarmé, “being qua being is only the multiple-composition of the void, 
except that it follows from the event alone that there can be truths of this void or empty 
ground”688 – chance as a discontinuous exception. As Ray Brassier succinctly describes 
the distinction, “in place of what he considers to be Deleuze’s transcendent ontological 
disjunction between a qualitative realm of virtual intensity and a quantitative domain of 
actual extensity, Badiou substitutes the immanent phase shift between the inconsistent, 
unpresentable multiplicity of being as ontological void, and its consistent presentation 
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as a multiple-in-situation”.689 Of Deleuze, Badiou says that this solution “concedes too 
much to the negative”. 
 
 
Cage and series 
 
This critique will be familiar, echoing as it does the two poles of criticism we found 
oriented towards Cage’s procedural use of chance and indeterminacy – as an abnegation 
of subjective choice (Rainer, Boulez) and as a pseudo-mystical (or outright mystical) 
affirmation of an infinite fullness (Kahn, Piekut), the latter at the expense of any 
reformulation of questions of subjective practice with regards to an effective rather than 
merely epiphenomenal symbolic realm. The serial work, despite its association with 
Eco’s ‘open’ work, in its most significant articulations took on a kind of structural 
regrounding – in Schoenberg with the persistence of traditional forms, in Boulez with a 
hyper-formalism where the (‘Occidental’) closure of the work reinscribes the 
(‘Oriental’) chance element in the terms of a closed structural analysis. Thus the 
questions – are Cage and Deleuze alike in formulating a notion of chance that abnegates 
decision? Does this preclude them from making the necessary engagement with 
questions proper to contending with the increasing nominalism of musical composition 
and the decentering of the subject that serialism and structuralism respectively 
announce? 
 
Our consideration of this question centres on the notion of interpretation. Cage, while 
composing the last work he would term ‘serial’ in the 1930s, would turn to discussing 
series in relation as an instance of chance at work, in a story from ‘Indeterminacy’ we 
will quote here in full: 
 
A crowded bus on the point of leaving Manchester for Stockport was found by its 
conductress to have one too many standees. She therefore asked, “Who was the last 
person to get on the bus?” No one said a word. Declaring that the bus would not leave 
until the extra passenger was put off, she went and fetched the driver, who also asked, 
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“All right, who was the last person to get on the bus?” Again there was a public silence. 
So the two went to find an inspector. He asked, “Who was the last person to get 
on the bus?” No one spoke. He then announced that he would fetch a policeman. While 
the conductress, driver, and inspector were away looking for a policeman, a little man 
came up to the bus stop and asked, “Is this the bus to Stockport?” Hearing that it was, he 
got on. A few minutes later the three returned accompanied by a policeman. He asked, 
“What seems to be the trouble? Who was the last person to get on the bus?” The little 
man said, “I was.” The policeman said, “All right, get off.” All the people on the bus 
burst into laughter. The conductress, thinking they were laughing at her, burst into tears 
and said she refused to make the trip to Stockport. The inspector then arranged for 
another conductress to take over. She, seeing the little man standing at the bus stop, 
said, “What are you doing there?” He said, “I’m waiting to go to Stockport.” She said, 
“Well, this is the bus to Stockport. Are you getting on or not?”690 
 
Cage here offers an ironic take on the disruption of a commonsensical shared reality by 
the incongruous conjunction between independent series. The policeman, original 
conductress, ‘little man’, and replacement conductress have heterogeneous 
understandings of the field in which they are placed, and the confusion between these 
independent but interacting lines does not appear to arrive at ‘destination’, that is, any 
interpretation which offers retrospective understanding of the contingent meeting, but 
ends only with diffuse laughter.691 
 
In some respects the interpretive meaningfulness of this situation is foreclosed in the 
figure of the other bus passengers, aware of the series of the other actors running 
alongside each other without a common point being reached, and indeed that of the 
reader, who equally has a distanced view allowing for a comprehensive interpretation of 
the situation. Another degree of complexity is added, however, by the context of the 
story within the piece ‘Indeterminacy’. As described in Cage’s preface to the version of 
‘Indeterminacy’ found in Silence, its composition consisted simply of Cage listing 
stories and anecdotes he could remember, his own as well as those from friends and 
from books, and writing them in no particular order. Further still there is the 
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performance of the piece, as represented in the studio recording of it on the Folkways 
label (one of the few such recordings of his pieces that Cage would attend to), under the 
title Indeterminacy: New Aspect of Form in Instrumental and Electronic Music. In this 
recording Cage’s recitation of ninety minute-long short stories is accompanied by David 
Tudor playing sections from Concerto for Piano and Orchestra and noise elements from 
a tape realization of Fontana Mix.692 With no determined relation between Cage’s 
recitation and the music, there are many moments in the recording when Cage’s speech 
falls deep into the sound mix, his words lost, despite which Cage continues to read. In 
the liner notes to the release Cage compares this to the visual experience of “seeing 
someone across the street, and then not being able to see him because a truck passes in 
between”.693 
 
The notion of a determinable, interpretable whole that is ‘Indeterminacy’ is also 
disrupted through its presentation in Silence, where the texts that constitute it are not all 
gathered together, but rather some are positioned following other pieces, with no visible 
determining logic to the choices. Cage’s intention with this gesture, however, is not to 
eliminate connections, between words, sounds, and other series entirely, but rather to 
indicate a complexity to their relations that is not reducible to any one explanatory 
principle, or one perspective – of  
 
putting the stories together in an unplanned way […] to suggest that all things – stories, 
incidental sounds from the environment, and, by extension, beings – are related, and 
that this complexity is more evident when it is not oversimplified by an idea of 
relationship in in person’s mind.694 
 
For Cage there is a richness of relation between things if the move of a final 
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interpretation of these relations, a ‘destination’, is resisted, to allow for a more diffuse 
and plural notion of relationality to come into place, to open things up to ‘chance’ 
relations the terms of which are not determined in advance of their happening. As Cage 
renders this point in the context of performance, there is no need for any determining 
agreement between performers – “Patterns, repetitions, and variations will arise and 
disappear”.695 As Cage later describes the application of chance to text works, “[t]he 
mechanism of the I Ching […] is a utility. Applied to / letters and aggregates of letters, 
it / brings about a language that can be / enjoyed without being understood”.696 
 
The purpose here is less to rule out acts of interpretation and the determination of 
relations a priori than it is to recognize how these moments are constituted as partial 
understandings in an open field of possible connections. Here chance reveals itself as a 
profusion of possible paths which are united by the binding function of what Deleuze in 
Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense will call ‘destiny’, not as an inviolable 
deterministic connection between the present and the past but as an affirmation of the 
contingency and conjunction that forged given relations:  
 
it implies between successive presents non-localisable connections, actions at a distance, 
systems of replay, resonance and echoes, objective chances, signs, signals and roles 
which transcend spatial locations and temporal successions.697 
 
This aspect of Cage’s use of chance is emphasized by N. Katherine Hayles through the 
terms of the series, stressing that the progressive chain of a series is not continuous but 
rather conjunctive698 – there is no means for understanding a series in terms of a wholly 
internal causality, retroactive or otherwise, but this need not produce the kind of 
effacement of the specific articulation of the series we see in Badiou’s critique of 
Deleuze or in Rainer’s of Cage. As Hayles describes the experience of reading Cage’s 
Mureau (1971-72), a text piece with strong visual similarities to Un coup de dés,  
 
                                                 
695 Cage, Silence, 15. 
696 John Cage, M: Writings ‘67-’72 (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1973), 215. 
697 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 83. 
698 N. Katherine Hayles, “Chance Operations: Cagean Paradox and Contemporary Science,” in John 
Cage: Composed in America, ed. Marjorie Perloff and Charles Junkerman (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1994), 228. 
197 
 
the reader struggles to correlate differences so that they become significant, until finally 
the mind is swamped with the enormity of the task and comes to rest. At this point the 
text can begin to function like a Zen koan, releasing the initiate from the circle of her 
assumptions by posing a question that cannot be answered unless she is willing to 
relinquish the primacy of human intention.699 
 
Here, then, we see a practical manifestation of the kind of chance operation as distinct 
from intentional choice that Cage found appealing in the I Ching, not as a diffusion of 
the series but as a different understanding of it, by which the complexity of its 
constitution and hence its fundamental contingency and uncertainty, rather than the 
necessity forced upon it by interpretation, is emphasized – “Chance expresses itself 
through the profusion of possible paths and the emergence of one, intention by 
rigorously adhering to the indicated worldline until it has crystallized into existence 
through painstaking operations”.700  
 
It is not surprising, then, that Rocco Gangle notes the affinities between the elaboration 
of what he calls ‘combinatorial divination’, like that found in the use of the I Ching, and 
Deleuze’s use of chance in The Logic of Sense in particular but also in Difference and 
Repetition. As Gangle interprets such divinatory practices, the ‘soothsaying’ aspect 
ascribed to them – that by which individual casts are intended to map onto a specific 
future event – is less important than what he terms the ‘spiritual’ or ‘contemplative’ 
element of the cast, oriented not so much towards determining a currently unknown 
future as it is to its bearing within the series of throws itself.701 As Gangle notes, the 
resonances that the cast enacts are immanent to the series itself, not as a mapping but as 
a process of open determination. By being bound to the series each cast can be both an 
affirmation of the whole of chance and be indexed to a material context, but this 
material context is itself attributable to the cast. The cast is then both actual and virtual, 
pertaining to both an indefinite past of the series and the incalculable future.702 
Describing this in the context of practices of combinatorial divination itself, Gangle 
argues they “do not remain simply closed in on themselves, but communicate a priori 
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with the self-differentiating, virtual ‘whole’ of chance, and a posteriori with the 
practices of other traditions and systems”.703  
 
Here we see what Cage gets from his conjunction “Duchamp Mallarmé?” that would 
not have been derived from either alone. From Mallarmé, an impersonality where 
Duchamp still runs against questions of the individual – it is notable that Duchamp was 
drawn more to Jules Laforgue than to Mallarmé, concerned less with convention being 
undone towards an ideality of form than of the persisting weight of convention on 
subjective life, interrupting at every moment704 – from Duchamp, a material bond which 
insists on openness and relationality, however opaque. Where Boulez finds in Mallarmé 
a profound and rigorous formalism through the removal of all convention and gestures 
of expression, for Cage chance enacts the unpredictable unfolding of a material 
situation, an intrinsic relation to life, but a ‘life’ quite distinct from the concern with the 
unconscious we see motivating aspects of Duchamp’s work. 
 
This bond between chance and the still effective existence of series is indicated in 
Difference and Repetition, where Deleuze’s response to the question of what it means to 
“affirm the whole of chance, every time, in a single time?” is immediate, and starkly 
contrasts Badiou’s reading 
 
This affirmation takes place to the degree that the disparates which emanate from a 
throw begin to resonate, thereby forming a problem. The whole of chance is then indeed 
in each throw, even though this be partial, and it is there in a single time even though the 
combination produced is the object of a progressive determination.705 
 
The singular throw is as such not at all negated by its relation to an affirmation of the 
whole of chance, but rather this affirmation can only take place insofar as it implicates 
itself in a process of serialization and problematization.  
 
Many have responded convincingly to the details of Badiou’s argument. Catherine 
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Cazenave, for instance, traces the origin of Deleuze’s concern with chance to Nietzsche 
and Philosophy and tracks it through to his mature reading of Mallarmé, wherein 
Deleuze, as Badiou rightly notes, distances himself from any concern with the void and 
the “preponderance of negative values” in Un coup de dés, but does so by conjoining a 
Nietzschean affirmationism with a distinctly Mallarméan logic of chance706 – in this 
respect the Nietzsche-Mallarmé conjunction functions for Deleuze as the Duchamp-
Mallarmé conjunction does for Cage. More generally, commentators including John 
Protevi and James Williams have argued against Badiou through a foregrounding of the 
concept of intensity, understood to its fullest extent not so much as virtual, nor as actual, 
but through its quasi-causal capacities constituting in some respects a third ontological 
level, one which allows for a detailed understanding of the passage between virtual and 
actual and vice-versa without a reduction to the virtual which Badiou diagnoses, or at 
the level of Badiou’s reading of Deleuzian (and Bergsonian) multiplicity.707 Jon Roffe’s 
careful dissection of Badiou’s reading of Deleuze also adds much to these arguments.708 
While Protevi, Williams, Roffe, and others provide convincing counters to many of 
Badiou’s arguments in terms immanent to the philosophical apparatus of Difference and 
Repetition and The Logic of Sense, it nevertheless appears that an internal justification 
was not entirely satisfactory, long in advance of Badiou’s critique, for Deleuze himself. 
Likewise, these defences make Deleuze’s auto-problematization that takes place through 
and with Guattari more difficult to track, and obscures some of the key questions in the 
fractured unfolding of The Logic of Sense – in what theoretical direction does this 
affirmation of the whole of chance point? 
 
 
Towards the machine 
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The gradual shift gestured at in ‘of the Ideal Game’ is completed with a startling break 
at the close of the thirteenth series, ‘of the Schizophrenic and the Little Girl’, as Deleuze 
introduces the convulsive ‘Body without Organs’ of an Artaud who “is alone in having 
been an absolute depth in literature”,709 against whom Carroll’s play on the surface 
appears superficial – “We would not give a page of Artaud for all of Carroll”. At the end 
of a Carrollian theory of sense and non-sense is a demand to discover a method of 
genesis, of the production of sense rather than merely adequation to a state of affairs. 
From this moment Deleuze shifts his concern to the “dynamic genesis” of language, 
from its primary order of prelinguistic sounds from the depths of the body, through to 
the tertiary arrangement as propositions, via the secondary order of the surface of sense 
itself as the condition for the movement between the two710 – “What renders language 
possible is that which separates sounds from bodies and organizes them into 
propositions, freeing them for the expressive function”.711 Here is where our previous 
critique of phenomenology coincides with a critique of structuralism, where Carroll’s 
non-sense operates entirely on the secondary organization of sense, remaining within its 
already-given terms and enacting a play within these, within a form of common sense. 
 
What are these depths we find in Artaud? Here we can see the figure of Artaud here is 
taking up what in ‘How Do We Recognize Structuralism?’ is referred to, speaking of the 
final criteria of structuralism, ‘From the Subject to Practice’, as the “structuralist hero”, 
a “resistant and creative force”, “neither God nor man, neither personal nor universal, it 
is without an identity, made up of non-personal individuations and pre-individual 
singularities. It assures the break-up of a structure affected by excess or deficiency”.712 
The structuralist hero is posited as the site of a practice which does not succumb to the 
symbolic given, judged on its power to mutate structure, to enact transformations 
resisting analogy to that which has gone before, judged, by the subsequent logic of the 
ideal game, “on its power to cause relations to vary and to redistribute singularities, 
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always casting another throw of the dice”.713 
 
In the apparatus of The Logic of Sense we, that is, those of us who are not, in Sylvère 
Lotringer’s terms ‘Mad Like Artaud’,714 do not appear have any real access to the 
primary order of language, as it seems associated with an unrefined and uncontrolled 
madness. Per Deleuze’s description, Artaud “is alone in having been an absolute depth 
in literature, and in having discovered a vital body and the prodigious language of this 
body. As he says, he discovered them through suffering. He explored the infra-sense, 
which is still unknown today”715 – a uniqueness Artaud indeed would corroborate, with 
his description of himself, in the 1925 text ‘Here is Someone...’, as “the man who’s best 
felt the astounding disorder of his language in its relation to his thought. I am the man 
who has best charted his inmost self, his most imperceptible slitherings”.716 Nietzsche 
too is one who “saw a new way of exploring the depth”, but again the question of depths 
is addressed with hesitation, warning of Nietzsche as one who “perished in his own 
manner”.717 
 
There is across these discussions at once the reluctance to remain on the surface, but a 
deep danger in the plunge into the depths, and a questioning of philosophy’s capacity to 
in any case contend with these questions, of the “ridiculousness of the thinker”,718 even 
regarding the questions of sense with which philosophy has most directly concerned 
itself: 
 
What is left for the abstract thinker once she has given advice of wisdom and 
distinction? Well then, are we to speak always about Bousquet’s wound, about 
Fitzgerald’s and Lowry’s alcoholism, Nietzsche and Artaud’s madness while remaining 
on the shore? Are we to become the professionals who give talks on these topics? Are 
we to take up collections and create special journal issues? Or should we go a short way 
further to see for ourselves, to be a little alcoholic, a little mad, a little suicidal, a little of 
a guerilla – just enough to extend the crack, but not enough to deepen it irremediably? 
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Wherever we turn, everything seems dismal. Indeed, how are we to stay at the surface 
without staying on the shore?719 
 
Even accounting for the function of intensity, of the combinatorial serial logics at work, 
the bind between surface and depth appears uneasy, a swing between on the surface 
mere semantics and in the depths utter madness. There appears to be something captured 
in Badiou’s argument which Deleuze himself had already found somehow unsatisfying, 
that the affirmation of the whole of chance was indeed in some respects an abnegation 
of the thought and praxis to which as a philosopher Deleuze felt committed. 
 
With the invocation of the Body without Organs the Lacanian auto-critique enacted in 
The Logic of Sense escapes its anchor, and the Lacanian real as a solely negatively-
defined psychosis, as exclusion from the symbolic, is upturned, Deleuze taking this 
madness as a practice in the form of not so much an erasure of the structural subject as it 
is the production of a nomad subject.720 The figure of Artaud, however, is invoked not 
so much for a reformulation of structure than as something which appears to be resisting 
structure altogether. Insofar as we continue to discuss structure, it appears to remain 
within Lacan’s terms – the accident, chance, remaining immanent to structure in the 
obscure ‘practice’ of the structuralist hero, a symbolic which persists as closed in its 
retrospective, interpretive function. The status of the singularity before it enters into a 
sense-producing process of serialization and problematization or structuration remains 
obscure. Does this commit us to accepting Badiou’s thesis, that there is in Deleuze 
ultimately the affirmation of a One at the expense of any effectivity of structural 
articulation? 
 
Antonio Negri contends that even if we find in Difference and Repetition and The Logic 
of Sense a fully realized structuralist conceptual apparatus, even if through a purified 
structuralism Deleuze puts to rest the “transcendental philosophy in the 
phenomenological tradition” and “that empiricist logic which […] considers perception 
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to be the only means of knowing”, we are still left asking – where does creation take 
place, where does agency take place, where is the ‘structuralist hero’?721 As Negri 
argues, the encounter with Guattari is key – it is through Guattari that the significance of 
the break that occurs in the structural apparatus of The Logic of Sense, by which it is 
pushed to and beyond its limits of functionality, is fully articulated. 
 
In ‘Machine and Structure’, Guattari’s review of The Logic of Sense which brought him 
and Deleuze into contact, Guattari agrees with the first two of Deleuze’s three minimum 
conditions for the determination of structure – that “There must be at least two 
heterogeneous series, one of which is defined as the signifier and the other as the 
signified” and that “Each of these series is made up of terms that exist only through their 
relationship with one another”722 – but the third condition, that “two heterogeneous 
series converge towards a paradoxical element, which is their ‘differentiator’”723, 
Guattari will ascribe to the order of the machine.724 We have already seen that for the 
Deleuze of The Logic of Sense this third condition already has an elusive position within 
the relation between series and structure – it is “the principle of the emission of 
singularities”, it “belongs to both series at once and never ceases to circulate throughout 
them”, and it is through this elusiveness (as empty square) that it provides the functional 
ground for structure, associated with the throw of the dice, the plunge into the depths. 
For Guattari this third condition, regarding “the exchange or substitution of 
particularities”, the level at which singularities are characterized by a non-substitutable 
and non-exchangeable nature,725 is to be understood through the machine, as work, 
production, the “heart of desire”.726 
 
What we find then in the notion of the machine is a level of articulation that is not 
structural, and merely semantic, but nor is it abyssal, a plunge into madness. For 
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Guattari this concept allows for the detachment of production from the still-
representational and retrospectively interpretive character of the signifier-signified 
relation towards a form of production as experimental practice.727 That the structuralist 
hero is still only seen to act at the level of structure produces a point of obscurity in its 
practice, that “accidents do not at all happen to a structure from the outside. On the 
contrary, it is a matter of an ‘immanent’ tendency, of ideal events that are part of the 
structure itself, and that symbolically affect its empty square or subject”728 skews 
closely to a foreclosure of the symbolic, the letter always reaching its destination. As 
Guattari says of group phantasy, “[a]ny change is precluded, and can be seen only 
between structural levels. Essentially, no break is any longer accepted”729 – a status quo 
which the differenciating factor resists and pushes against, but in an all-too-obscure way 
if it is still understood at the level of structure. 
 
The gesture here, then, is to unbind the singularity from a strictly structural 
understanding, but still with a degree of determination – to free the productive element 
from its exclusive understanding under the terms of structure as a retrospective 
interpretation or a semantic communication. The distinction is posited precisely to 
emphasize that which is productive and operational in the relation between singularity 
and structure, to “make it easier to identify the particular positions of subjectivity in 
relation to events and to history”730. It acts to displace any semblance of the dissociation 
between the affirmation of the whole of chance and the understanding of its articulation 
through structure that Badiou sees in the theoretical apparatus of The Logic of Sense, 
and instead associates this affirmation, as the basis of a machinic theory, immediately 
with a revolutionary practice  
 
We may say of revolution, of the revolutionary period, that this is when the machine 
represents social subjectivity for the structure […] The common denominator of 
writings of this kind in history would be the opening up of a pure signifying space 
where the machine would represent the subject for another machine. But one can no 
longer then say of history, as the site of the unconscious, that it is ‘structured like a 
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language’ except in that there is no possible written form of such a language.731 
 
Guattari’s reading of The Logic of Sense is thus not so much a critique as it is an attempt 
to push its theoretical apparatus to and beyond its limits, a critique already internal to 
The Logic of Sense in a limited form – a problematic reading, or transcendental critique, 
of Deleuze himself, whereby that of Deleuze’s work which through its structural 
apparatus is still operating within what Deleuze would later term psychoanalysis’ 
“automatic interpretation machine” is broken apart to “set a whole field of 
experimentation, of personal or group experimentation, against the interpretive activities 
of psychoanalysis”.732 
 
This clarifies much about the status of experimentation and guides us into our final 
articulation of the question of experimental practice. We see that in our understanding of 
experimentation, The Logic of Sense is a more experimental text than Difference and 
Repetition – Difference and Repetition’s philosophical apparatus is dauntingly robust 
and resistant to moments of unexpected interference, but with The Logic of Sense on the 
contrary we find a text that experiments with its own philosophical architecture to the 
point where this architecture can no longer sustain itself. In this we find, in an auto-
critical form, precisely the transcendental critique or problematic reading we have traced 
through Deleuze’s engagement with the philosophical tradition, and which likewise we 
have found in Cage’s trajectory regarding the history of music and of art. With this we 
can return to our starting point, to the problematic understanding of the Idea and of 
music and sound. With this questioning of the experimental efficacy of a structural 
definition of the problem, and an increasing opposition between experimentation and 
interpretation, what are the consequences for our initial understanding of music as an 
experimental practice regarding the problematic Idea of sound? 
  
                                                 
731 Ibid., 117-18. 
732 Deleuze, “Five Propositions on Psychoanalysis,” in Desert Islands, 276. 
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Rhythm, sound, performance 
 
Across the preceding three chapters we have mapped the singular and contextual 
unfolding of the practices of experimentation developed by Cage and Deleuze, in Cage’s 
case through the status of sound in experimental practices of music and in Deleuze’s 
case through a transcendental critique within the philosophical climate of 
phenomenology and structuralism, working through these respective problematics at 
their points of historical and theoretical conjunction and conflict. In the previous chapter 
we saw how through the procedural use and ontological understanding of chance the 
status of experimentation comes to be clarified, our enquiry increasingly becoming 
posed on the opposition between experimentation and interpretation. 
 
From here our discussion can return to the terms set out in our first chapter – to the 
problematic understanding of music and sound. We will consider how the trajectory of 
Cage’s practice we have mapped through the 1950s and 1960s brings into focus and 
mutates how music is conceptualized as a problem – how questions of the conceptual 
understanding of sound, the relation between composer, score, performer, and listener, 
and the opening of music to the other arts and of art to life, demand a reevaluation of 
how the very problem of the problem is to be understood. This will be developed by 
considering how Cage’s practice both welcomes understanding through the problematic 
Idea and provides an indication of the limitations of this understanding, with the 
tensions and impasses of this approach anticipating the renewal of these questions 
through the critique of structuralism and emphasis on becoming found in Deleuze & 
Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus.  
 
In order to understand the conceptual mutations Deleuze’s thought undergoes we will 
take his Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation as a key point connecting the two 
periods and aspects of his thought, helping us articulate how the shifts between them 
occur. From here we can develop a series of musical-philosophical concepts operating 
across Deleuze’s and Cage’s work, focusing particularly on the concepts of rhythm and 
modulation. Setting off from the resituating of the question of sound through post-
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Cagean musical practices found in musical minimalism, we will investigate how in 
Cage’s own late return to a more specifically musical domain we find a rich 
experimental practice encapsulating and carefully articulating the consequences of a 
broad constellation of musical, artistic, theoretical, and social encounters, articulated 
through a machinic theory of modulatory rhythm. 
 
 
Notation, structure, and interpretation 
 
The increasing formalization of harmony, as discussed in our first chapter, runs 
conjoined with a shift in the status of the interpretation of the score. In early forms of 
notation (such as that developed in fifteenth century Italy) the score provided a skeleton 
of the performance, but much in the way of a choice or improvisational freedom was left 
to the director and to the performers, and while this space of freedom has little in the 
way of a precise methodological grounding, it is understood that there is no necessary 
split between the unity of the work and the individuality of different performers.733 It is 
only in the nineteenth century that the identification between the musical work and the 
score becomes absolute, and the score takes on a position of decisive authority with 
regards to performative decisions. Almost immediately there are counter-arguments to 
this – as with Herder’s discussion of music as an ‘energetic’ art, concerned with activity 
rather than product734 – but this understanding has weighed heavily on the techniques of 
musical analysis since, up to the Schenkerian deep structural harmony we have seen 
dominating musicological practices.735 
 
We have likewise seen already the implications this authority of the score has for 
                                                 
733 Chanan, Musica Practica, 70. 
734 See for instance Johann Gottfried Herder, “Critical Forests, or Reflections on the Art and Science of 
the Beautiful: First Grove, Dedicated to Mr. Lessing’s Laocoön,” in Selected Writings on Aesthetics, trans. 
and ed. Gregory Moore (Princeton: Priceton University Press, 2006), 140 and passim. The romantic 
emphasis on forces (see for example Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of 
Letters, trans. Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967) is key to 
the trajectory Deleuze & Guattari map from classicism to romanticism and onto the modern (Deleuze & 
Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 338-343). 
735 McCreless, “Formalism, Fair and Foul”. 
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listening. Nicholas Cook, for example, poses “musicological listening” as a listening 
which “involves the co-ordination of what is heard with some scheme of representation 
that is adapted to the purpose in hand”.736 Cook regards the listener’s experience as 
immersive with regards to the piece, but through a form of listening that can be broken 
by ‘external’ sources – be it visual distraction or the playing of a ‘wrong’ note which 
makes the listener aware of a performer rather than of only the immanent unity of the 
piece. Here there is as a structural analogy between score, performance, and reception, 
and, as the score is primary, the performance and the listening experience are both acts 
of interpretation. By this understanding those elements which deviate from the path set 
out by the score are, unlike with the limited freedom of earlier models, deemed not 
merely to take on the risk of disorder but to be inarticulate, impossible to accommodate 
to the analytical understanding of the piece. 
 
In the (analytic) philosophy of music this authority of the score has seen performance 
often understood in terms of a split between nominalists like Nelson Goodman, who 
hold strictly to a performance acting as a precise parallel to the written score, the failure 
to do so requiring it be understood as a distinct piece, and ‘Platonists’ like Peter Kivy, 
who allow for an element of imperfection in a performance, but nevertheless assert that 
it can be judged in terms of adherence to an original score, the allowance of 
imperfections with regards to its ideal form taking place through expert interpretation.737 
Common with musicological understandings, both of these approaches ground their 
analysis on discontinuous, discrete, and unambiguous terms of notation linked to a 
notion of performance defined in terms of structural resemblance to the score.  
 
Goodman’s assessment of Cage in Languages of Art clarifies the relation of this 
approach to our discussion here. In this reading, Goodman looks at section BB of Cage’s 
Concerto for Piano and Orchestra, Solo for Piano, also a source for Cage’s Variations 
                                                 
736 Nicholas Cook, Music, Imagination, and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 154. 
737 See for example Peter Kivy, Music Alone: Philosophical Reflections on the Purely Musical Experience 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990). The relation between this ‘Platonism’ and Deleuze’s 
‘overturning’ of Platonism could be an interesting line of enquiry (see, among other sources, ‘Plato and 
the Simulacrum’ in Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 253-265). 
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scores, as discussed in our third chapter. Goodman’s concern with this section concerns 
its iterability as a work – that on account of a lack of semantic and syntactic detail at the 
level of the score we may find ourselves with performances which have no evident 
character of unity, no clear point of resemblance conjoining them to the original 
score.738 With insufficient differentiation at the level of the score we are left, says 
Goodman, with no basis for determining a performance to be a “true copy” of the piece, 
and as such this method of scoring does not qualify as notational. This follows the 
commonly-held notion that, as Carl Dahlhaus terms it, a ‘composition’ is fixed with 
regards to its performability and persists as an aesthetic object communicated towards 
the listener, so insofar this ground of identity cannot be found between performances, 
the work does not rightly qualify as a work.739 
 
Leaving any general comment on the conservatism of these approaches aside, these 
tendencies and the figures of grounding they make use of – a structural certainty of the 
score, an isomorphism between each element of the process, the possibility of 
unhindered communication to an expert listener – nevertheless persist into strands of the 
avant-garde, as we have seen through Schaeffer’s and Cage’s confrontations with 
serialist and post-serialist composition. Cultural musicology has done much to shift 
musical understanding away from what Lydia Goehr has termed, in the Kantian sense, 
this ‘regulative’ notion of the work,740 but while the “pragmatic, cultural” approach 
towards alternative forms of notation by cultural musicologists has done much to unbind 
musical analysis from these strictures,741 it is perhaps at the expense of conceptual and 
functional analyses at the level of detail for which more restrictive fields of study 
proved conducive. How, then, are we to formulate a conceptual understanding of 
notation that accommodates Cage’s emerging musical thematics, of indeterminacy, 
                                                 
738 “[W]ithout some stipulation of minimal significant units of angle and distance, syntactic differentiation 
is wanting” (Goodman, Languages of Art, 188). 
739 See, for instance, Carl Dahlhaus, “Qu’est-ce que l’improvisation musicale?,” trans. Marion Siéfert and 
Lucille Lisack, in Tracés: Revue de Sciences humaines 18 (2010), accessed 25/09/2015 
http://traces.revues.org/4597. 
740 See Lydia Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay on the Philosophy of Music 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 102-106. 
741 See Virginia Anderson, “The Beginning of Happiness: Approaching Scores in Graphic and Text 
Notation,” in Sound & Score: Essays on Sound, Score and Notation, ed. Paulo de Assis, William Brooks, 
and Kathleen Coessens (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2014), 136-37. 
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process, and openness, which are so at odds with the fixed character of notation and 
performance-as-interpretation, without a detrimental reduction in their complexity?  
 
Daniel Charles raises Goodman’s critical remarks in conversation with Cage, to which 
Cage responds that “writing is one thing, performing another, and listening a third; and 
that there is no reason for these three operations to be linked”.742 If they are not ‘linked’, 
what is their relation to be? Deleuze & Guattari can help us understand the conceptual 
stakes of this question. The ‘Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-
Imperceptible...’ plateau of A Thousand Plateaus begins with a discussion of natural 
history – a field that will be crucial to Deleuze & Guattari’s own understanding of and 
theoretical deployment of musical themes. Under the heading ‘Memories of a 
Naturalist’, Deleuze & Guattari turn to series and structure as the ways in which natural 
history has conceived of the relationships between animals. Series here has the specific 
sense of resemblance, “a resembles b, b resembles c, etc” whereby “all of these terms 
conform in varying degrees to a single, eminent term, perfection, or quality as the 
principle behind the series”743 – analogy of proportion. In the case of structure, we speak 
rather of analogy of proportionality, whereby “a is to b as c is to d”. In structural 
understandings there is a denunciation of the imagination, “the establishment of 
resemblances in a series, the imitation pervading the entire series and carrying it to its 
term, and the identification with this final term”, and by Lévi-Strauss it is “no longer a 
question of instituting a serial organization of the imaginary, but instead a symbolic and 
structural order of understanding”.744 This pattern can equally be found in the study of 
music – as we saw in our first chapter, with the diminishment of music as a practice 
inseparable from social, cultural, and religious contexts there is a move to subtract the 
imaginary element of the construction of a series of resemblances aimed towards a 
higher order, positing rather a matter of analogy to hold between performance and score, 
and ultimately between score and a general musical schema (including but not limited to 
                                                 
742 Cage, For the Birds, 129. See also Daniel Charles, “Figuration and Prefiguration: Notes on Some New 
Graphic Notions,” in Writings about John Cage, ed. Richard Kostelanetz (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1993). 
743 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 234. 
744 Ibid., 236. 
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harmony), with any deviations being termed unacceptable aberrations. 
 
Deleuze & Guattari here take structuralism as their target but subtend it to a notion of 
structure which has been progressively determined and applied in a much broader range 
of analytic techniques, none more refined than that of the reciprocity between harmony 
and the score, and the authority of the score which exceeds even its solid ground of 
harmony – as in the persisting serialist and post-serialist reliance on interpretive 
understandings of performance.745 Structure, in this respect, undoes the necessity of a 
higher order that we find in a serial approach, but only to place itself in that role. The 
underlying understanding here is that natural history has only been able to think in terms 
of relationships (between A and B) rather than in terms of production (from A to x).746 
Despite this use of the term production, central to the formulation in Anti-Oedipus of the 
break from structuralism enacted after Deleuze’s confrontation with Guattari,747 there is 
at this point not yet any specific deviation from the critical reformulation of 
structuralism we find in the Deleuze of the late 1960s – it is precisely the radicalization 
of the relation between the open series and the closed structure that we saw as the basis 
for Deleuze’s engagement with structuralism in the previous chapter. 
 
 
Music and the problematic 
 
This reconnects us to our understanding of Cage’s practice as a problematic practice, his 
works as problematic works,748 and we now have the conceptual, practical, and 
historical grounds to elaborate on the questions opened in our first chapter with regards 
                                                 
745 As noted by Georgina Born in her anthropological study of IRCAM, the French institute of 
contemporary classical music founded by Pierre Boulez in 1977, one of the great fissures in the European 
avant-garde came to be between those invested in the notated form – including Boulez – and those who 
felt that the score could not do justice to the sound worlds created by new technologies (Georgina Born, 
Rationalizing Culture: IRCAM, Boulez, and Institutionalization of the Musical Avant-Garde (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1995), 139, 224). 
746 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 234. 
747 For instance, how “everything is production: production of productions, of actions and of passions; 
productions of recording processes, of distributions and of co-ordinates that serve as points of reference; 
productions of consumptions, of sensual pleasures, of anxieties, and of pain”, Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-
Oedipus, 4. 
748 See Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 69. 
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to the Cage of the 1960s, the Cage at the fullest expansion of his experimental trajectory. 
With regards to the problematic Idea, it is not subject to the aforementioned limits of 
serial and structural thinking as posed in A Thousand Plateaus, insofar as there is a 
difference in kind between problems and solutions: 
 
The problem is at once both transcendent and immanent in relation to its solutions. 
Transcendent, because it consists in a system of ideal liaisons or differential relations 
between genetic elements. Immanent, because these liaisons or relations are incarnated 
in the actual relations which do not resemble them and are defined by the field of 
solution.749 
 
If we maintain for now that sound is the problem of music, Cage’s notational 
advancements appear to be moving ever closer to reducing the purely representational 
nature of the score and instead constructing a problematic field to be actualised in 
performance – as Charles describes this act of composition, “[t]o compose is to 
prefigure the figurations not yet in existence, not yet available”.750 This approach 
reaches a point of formal refinement, as we have discussed in our third chapter, with 
Variations II.  
 
Here it is not so much, as in Thomas DeLio’s nevertheless important and helpful 
analysis, that the score of Variations II resists fixing any given structure and rather 
presents the full, open-ended possibility of statistical complexes implicit in the possible 
configuration of the transparencies.751 In DeLio’s understanding the piece would be like 
those open works of Boulez or Stockhausen which Cage would deem still subscribed to 
the work-form, that still in the score there was an element of finality and closure – no 
matter how detailed and nuanced the range of possibilities, the performance is still 
intractably bound to a finally closed fidelity to the score. Rather, as Joe Panzner argues, 
the score could be said to delimit a space of potential, not preordaining the statistical 
field that DeLio sees it as but instead as determining the potential for soundings to be 
actualised in performance.752 Per Panzner’s argument, drawing from the Deleuzian 
                                                 
749 Ibid., 163. 
750 Charles, “Figuration and Prefiguration: Notes on Some New Graphic Notions,” 258. 
751 Thomas DeLio, Circumscribing the Open Universe: Essays on Cage, Feldman, Wolff, Ashley and 
Lucier (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984), 17. 
752 Joseph Edward Panzner, The Process That Is the World: Cage/Deleuze/Events/Performances, PhD 
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problematic Idea, the Cagean transparency score is completely determinate, but only at 
the level of potential, remaining open-ended with regards to its interpretive, 
performative solutions.753 
 
There are, however, complications to this understanding of such scores of Cage’s, and of 
others who use notation as a kind of map of the sound-space of a piece, and they occur 
again at the level of performance and interpretation. Of particular note here is Variations 
II, and the role in its composition and performance played by David Tudor. While 
notationally speaking the piece complexifies the procedure of interpretation, there is 
another level at which the performative practice taking place points to a complicated and 
often contradictory position Cage takes with regards to interpretive freedoms, insofar as 
Cage appears to give Tudor a kind of interpretive freedom – and an intentional freedom 
– he rarely allows elsewhere with his works. Most immediately interesting is how Tudor 
associated the piece intrinsically with his ongoing investigations into musical 
technology, which would eventually lead him away from piano and into exclusively 
electronic music, by binding its performance to his development of the amplified piano. 
This instrument, as Tudor indicated, was conceived specifically towards the six 
parameters of Cage’s score, oriented through a complicated network of microphones and 
phonograph cartridges triggered in numerous ways, the sounding as a whole deriving 
only from the various resonances, feedback loops, and signal interferences of the piano, 
microphones, and cartridges in reciprocal interaction. In some respects this constitutes a 
multiplication of the indeterminate qualities of Cage’s prepared piano, taking 
performative authority away from the pianist and distributing it through a complex 
instrumental assemblage, Tudor noting that he could “only hope to influence” it.754 
 
It is also notable, however, that Tudor would appear to stray from the instructions in the 
                                                 
dissertation: Ohio State University, 2012), 52-69. 
753 Ibid., 43, Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 184-85. 
754 See James Pritchett, “David Tudor as Composer/Performer in Cage’s Variations II,” delivered at The 
Art of David Tudor, Getty Research Institute, 2001. Online text accessed 25/09/2015 
https://www.getty.edu/research/exhibitions_events/events/david_tudor_symposium/pdf/pritchett.pdf. We 
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Iddon, John Cage and David Tudor: Correspondence on Interpretation and Performance. 
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score, devising his own system to convert the measurements of the original score into a 
looser and more open-ended performative model. Tudor would also apply such 
procedures to the score of Winter Music, with the result in that instance being 
‘indeterminate’ performances that were nevertheless almost identical from one to the 
next – a situation Cage was seemingly quite supportive of.755 Cage would not be so 
generous with other performers taking such freedoms. Most famous is the New York 
Philharmonic’s performance of Atlas Eclipticalis, as part of a large public series on ‘The 
Avant-Garde’ organized and conducted by Leonard Bernstein. As Cage recounted the 
performance in a letter to Christian Wolff, the Philharmonic largely refused any 
adherence to the score, rather improvising freely, playing scales, talking to each other, 
quoting other works and so on. Per Cage’s description, “[t]hey acted criminally […] 
They deliberately sabotaged; they killed the piece”.756 This interpretation is 
complicated, however, by other accounts of the performance – noting that among other 
factors were a highly complicated system of amplification that resulted in unpredictable 
and dangerous peaks of volume, and a lack of time allowed for the orchestra to rehearse 
or otherwise engage with the piece. To some extent, it appears that Cage failed to 
account for the kind of demands he and the score made of the performers, and the 
discomfort they had having this imposed upon them – a discomfort with the authority of 
Cage and of the score.757 
 
Also notable are the cases of Julius Eastman and Charlotte Moorman. In 1975 Eastman 
– a gay African-American composer and singer – performed Solo 8 from Song Books, 
following from 0’00” with its sole instruction of “In a situation provided with maximum 
amplification (no feedback), perform a disciplined action”. Eastman’s performance 
consisted in a mock lecture entitled ‘a new system of love’, during which he undressed 
his partner ‘Mr. Charles’ and attempted also to undress his sister, who vocally refused.758 
Cage attended the performance and was reported to be furious, commenting “I’m tired 
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757 See Benjamin Piekut’s detailed account of this performance in chapter one of Experimentalism 
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of people who think that they could do whatever they want with my music!”759 In the 
case of Moorman, her prolonged series of performances for cello of 26’ 1.1499” – a 
piece written to be strenuously difficult, tending towards performative impossibility,760 
hence the amusing factor of its length being determined down to one ten-thousandth of a 
second – would incorporate increasing elements of performance art, such as a 
performance with Nam June Paik in which Paik, stripped to the waist, imitated a cello, 
his back being bowed by Moorman. Of this performance Cage would refer to the 
“liberties taken” with regards to the score,761 later commenting on “the striking thing” of 
“tak[ing] a piece of mine and playing it in a way that didn’t have to do with the piece 
itself”, and in private correspondence describing 26’ 1.1499” as “[t]he one Charlotte 
Moorman has been murdering all along”.762  
 
Marking both Eastman’s and Moorman’s performances is a direct confrontation with 
cultural and social questions in a way Cage would tend to avoid in his compositions.763 
In Moorman’s case there is both a connection to the emerging practices of feminist 
performance art and also the significance of the prominently displayed partially naked 
Asian male body at the height of the Vietnam War,764 in Eastman’s case a public 
engagement with his homosexuality in a way that Cage would never do with his own.765 
Leaving aside the directly political questions regarding Cage’s objections to these 
pieces, there appears to be a conflict between how Cage understood and wished to 
                                                 
759 Rob Haskins, John Cage (London: Reaktion Books, 2012), 120. 
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761 John Cage, “On the Work of Nam June Paik,” in Nam June Paik: Video Time, Video Space, ed. Toni 
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764 See for example Ryan Dohoney, “Charlotte Moorman’s Experimental Performance Practice,” in 
Charlotte Moorman and the Avant-Garde, 1960-1980, ed. Corrine Granoff (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern 
University Press, forthcoming 2016). 
765 See Jonathan Katz, “John Cage’s Queer Silence; or. How to Avoid Making Matters Worse,” in Writings 
through John Cage’s Music, Poetry, and Art, ed. David W. Bernstein and Christopher Hatch (Chicago ; 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 2001) for a close and thoughtful study of the relation between 
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present the blurring of art and everyday life and how it is presented in the developing 
field of performance art. Part of this will come down to, as we have described 
elsewhere, the matter of intention, and Cage’s resistance towards the ego’s place in 
performance, but in important respects this alone is not entirely satisfying. 
 
Moorman, it seems quite clear, started from an attempt to ‘authentically’ interpret 
Cage’s extraordinarily difficult and significantly open piece, and only gradually, over a 
prolonged period of time and many performances, revised her approach to the piece to 
produce something quite different – a close engagement with the work indicated by her 
heavily annotated notation.766 While this produced something unrecognizable, as we 
have seen the different performances of other indeterminate pieces of Cage were 
likewise unrecognizable, attributable to their very nature as problematic compositions. 
The core of Cage’s critique of Moorman, on the contrary, comes down to the liberties 
taken “in favor of actions rather than sound events in time”.767 This points again to the 
tension described in our third chapter between the modernist tendency in Cage, 
exemplified by the variable field that is his sound-space, and his other tendencies and of 
those who followed him, towards openness, mutability, and connectability. 
 
Cage seems unwilling to account for the possibility that Moorman had taken on the 
work anew, as an experimental recasting of the problem itself through a close practical 
engagement with the piece, by which the problem mutated from a largely sonic problem 
into a problem of another order. If the slow and careful determination of a new 
performative problem, from one structure to another, can be deemed invalid on account 
of a failure to remain faithful to the original score, are we not maintaining something of 
what Goehr terms the regulative function of the score even in the problematic work? 
Deleuze remarks in Difference and Repetition that we remain slaves “so long as we do 
not control the problems themselves, so long as we do not possess a right to the 
problems, to a participation in and management of the problems”,768 but here in the 
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understanding of the completely determined problematic Idea, as the field of sound-
space, there appear to persist points of blockage and tension between the problem and 
experimentation properly speaking. Is the problematic Idea, as a regulative, Kantian 
Idea, still implicated in an interpretive schema in opposition to an experimental 
practice? 
 
While Cage certainly puts strain on questions of performative authenticity and freedom, 
there is still an aspect here that is unsatisfying, where the experimental approach slows 
back into a logic of interpretation. We would argue, very far from Goodman, that there 
is perhaps still a degree of determination at the level of the score that sits somewhat 
uneasily with Cage’s theoretical trajectory, that a theoretical and practical tension runs 
through his insistence on the score – even in pieces such as Variations V, performed 
without a score but retroactively scored and paradoxically noting it to be a “Performance 
without score or parts”.769 The case of Tudor’s role in Variations II points, however, in a 
quite different direction, where what seems to be a lack of fidelity to the score is 
allowed to function as a positive, transformative act, where the performer is no longer 
‘slave’ and has his or her own hand in the constitution of the problem – as James 
Pritchett notes, it would “not be out of the question” to call Variations II Tudor’s first 
composition.770 Tudor’s role would appear exemplary of the situation where 
composition and performance are ‘not linked’ but nevertheless enact a relation of some 
kind, performing himself an experimental rather than interpretive function and in so 
doing redefining the problem with which the piece contends. 
 
Here we ask again the question that is raised in the final pages of ‘How Do We 
Recognize Structuralism?’ and echoes through this phase of Deleuze’s work – how are 
we to account for, to enact, the mutation of structure, the transition from one structure to 
another, or from one problem to another? What kind of procedure have the problems of 
music and sound, has the problem of music as sound, undergone in the shift in Cage’s 
practice we have mapped, and how does it guide us through these contradictory points 
                                                 
769 See Fetterman, John Cage’s Theatre Pieces, 130. 
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of closure and disciplined stability – and through the unsatisfying elements, the points of 
inefficiency, we found with Deleuze’s structuralism in the final pages of the previous 
chapter, particularly with regards to the problematic Idea? 
 
 
Sensation and sound as a problem after structure 
 
The problem of sound as developed here can build a crucial bridge between Deleuze’s 
pre- and post-Guattari work, the shape of which was outlined at the close of our 
previous chapter, as it is to Cage’s notion of sound-space that Deleuze & Guattari turn in 
one discussion of the concepts smooth space and the plane of immanence, or plane of 
consistency, in A Thousand Plateaus. This understanding of the plane is presented in 
opposition to the plane of transcendence, or plane of organization, which Deleuze & 
Guattari define through the terms of musical tonality, describing a certain traditional 
form of composition – the Western art music form – in terms of a  
 
developmental or organizational principle does not appear in itself, in a direct relation 
with that which develops or is organized: There is a transcendent compositional 
principle that is not of the nature of sound, that is not “audible” by itself or for itself 771 
 
That is to say, following the musical trajectory mapped out here in our first and second 
chapters especially, musical composition has relied on a principle beyond the sounds 
themselves, a structure which, while not present in the sounds or in their audition, comes 
to define them, comes to give form to the relations between sounds so as to unify their 
heterogeneous qualities under the terms of tonality. The function of the plane of 
transcendence takes place through a form of hylomorphism, in which principles of 
structure come to define the material to which form is given. Opposed to this plane, and 
as such opposed to the hylomorphic theory of form and matter, is the plane of 
immanence. On the plane of immanence we no longer turn to form to characterize that 
which exists on the plane – there are rather “only relations of movement and rest, speed 
and slowness between unformed elements”,772 a kind of activity that takes place without 
                                                 
771 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 266. 
772 Ibid. 
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reference to principles exceeding the activity itself. It is with this plane that the 
twentieth century musics rejecting the authority of harmony have contended, have 
attempted to articulate themselves through, and for Deleuze & Guattari it is indeed Cage 
who “first and most perfectly”773 deploys the fixed plane of sound that will mark the 
musical plane of immanence – fixed not as immobile but as “the absolute state of 
movement as well as of rest, from which all relative speeds and slownesses spring”,774 a 
plane from which these speeds and slownesses are rendered sonorous. 
 
This gives us a clear entry point into following through Deleuze and Deleuze & Guattari 
an analysis of how Cage’s understanding of the problem of sound and music shifts, and 
allows us to return to our earlier passage through the tenth plateau of A Thousand 
Plateaus. In ‘Memories of a Bergsonian’ the still-Deleuzian critique of structuralism of 
‘Memories of a Naturalist’ unfolds into the distinctly Deleuze-Guattari confrontation 
with Deleuze’s own structuralism – that structuralism which is constructed by rendering 
structuralism Bergsonian, that is, by rendering structure virtual. This confrontation takes 
place through the concept of becoming. While affirming a Bergsonian coexistence of 
heterogeneous durations, Deleuze & Guattari reject an evolutionary logic for one of 
‘involution’, resisting both the hereditary telos of evolution and, as Keith Ansell-
Pearson has argued, the “residual humanism and perfectionism” of Bergsonian ‘creative 
evolution’.775 In all of these instances there remains an insistence on fixed terms, de-
emphasizing the precise character of the change that takes place between these terms. 
The logic of becoming, on the other hand, concerns itself with “irreducible dynamisms 
drawing lines of flight”,776 reality here being ascribed to the “block of becoming” rather 
than the terms it passes through – becoming being of the order of the rhizome rather 
than classificatory or genealogical tree,777 rhizomatics as a principle of connection 
between differing kinds of semiotic chains without reduction to the logic of any given 
                                                 
773 Ibid., 267. 
774 Ibid. 
775 Keith Ansell-Pearson, Germinal Life: The Difference and Repetition of Deleuze (Routledge, London: 
1999), 140. 
776 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 237 
777 Ibid., 239. 
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one.778 
 
We see in the final chapter of Deleuze’s Bergsonism that Bergsonian creative evolution 
is bound up with the logic of actualisation we see in Difference and Repetition, whereby, 
following the understanding that a constitutive power of the problem means that the 
construction of an organism is both the stating of and solution to a problem,779 it is 
argued that to create is to actualise, and actualisation is evolution.780 Already this 
understanding is part of what Deleuze terms a critique of evolutionism, which assumes a 
chain of actual entities, hence the virtual construction of the problem. However, per the 
argument of A Thousand Plateaus, the logic of actualisation which serves as the model 
of transcendental empiricism operating in Difference and Repetition and The Logic of 
Sense is itself inadequate. Even the terms of Anti-Oedipus are resisted – the model of 
production is itself not enough, still with the implication of a ‘product’.781 
 
The logic of this passage is not always clear within the terms of the Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia project, but we find a clearer elaboration of the shift in Deleuze’s thought 
through three monographs he published in the 1980s, Foucault, The Fold: Leibniz and 
the Baroque, and Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, all of which can be seen in 
some respects as Deleuze rearticulating the questions of his pre-Guattari work through 
the post-Guattari mutations his thought has undergone, and as such offering a point of 
connection between the two. The focus of our attention here will be Francis Bacon, 
released almost contemporaneously with A Thousand Plateaus. Here the title both 
makes clear a confrontation with Deleuze’s work pre-Guattari – how does a logic of 
sensation relate to a logic of sense? – and offers several clear points of connection 
traversing Deleuze-Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari. One such point we will work towards 
is regarding the Body without Organs (BwO). Introduced in The Logic of Sense and 
                                                 
778 Ibid., 7. 
779 Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 
1991), 7. 
780 Ibid., 98. 
781 This perhaps constitutes a final break with Kant, with Anti-Oedipus’ notion of desire as productive 
being the strongest remaining element of the previous structural Kantianism to be found in Deleuze’s 
thought (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 25). 
222 
 
present in A Thousand Plateaus, in the latter text it takes on a significantly different 
character, as something to be constructed,782 rather than that of the earlier text, where it 
is presented as something tending dangerously close to fully inarticulate chaos. Through 
this we address these key questions – how do we get to this point? What is the passage 
from a problematic logic of actualisation to here? Under these terms how are we to 
understand the problem of sound? 
 
First, on the question of ‘sensation’. This term – first only the term, the precise 
conceptual bond we will have to carefully develop – provides us with a link back to 
Cage. Why did we find in Cage an insistence on the production of sound events rather 
than other kinds of events, resisting the expansive fluidity of other models of 
conceptualism? One significant aspect of this is precisely in the question of sensation, 
on which Cage will most strongly distinguish himself both from Duchamp and from 
conceptual art – what does this imply about their methods of engagement, of 
construction? 
 
There is perhaps a key inversion of Duchamp’s position involved in Cage’s becoming “a 
duchamp unto myself”, determined by Cage’s practice being a musical one. Where 
Duchamp posits a break with a history of visual arts concerned solely with the eye and 
gestures towards conceptuality, Cage’s break is with a history of music which has not 
concerned itself with the ear, a break extracting sound from a conceptuality unconcerned 
with hearing or with other bodily responses to sound.783 As Cage himself described this 
relation, “[a] contradiction between Marcel and myself is that he spoke constantly 
against the retinal aspects of art, whereas I have insisted upon the physicality of sound 
                                                 
782 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, Plateau 6: ‘November 28, 1947: How Do You Make 
Yourself a Body Without Organs?’ 
783 The Western classical tradition and its philosophical readings, in all their diversity, from Rousseau up 
to Adorno, are strongly characterized by a denigration of music’s physicality, by maintaining a distance 
between the sensory-corporeal and the intellectual (see Jeremy Gilbert and Ewan Pearson, Discographies: 
Dance Music, Culture and the Politics of Sound (London: Routledge, 1999), 59.). Deleuze speaks of a 
relation to music by which it “traverses our bodies in profound ways” (Francis Bacon, 54) but also 
associates it with a disembodiment, a loss of materiality, while through painting there is rather a kind of 
discovery of materiality (Ibid., 54-55). Pursuing this notion could be of great interest in future research, 
some possibilities of connection including to the ‘dematerialization’ of the art object in conceptual 
practices or the renewed concern with materiality in contemporary sound studies. 
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and the activity of listening”.784 This is clarified by Cage’s comments on conceptual art, 
first in his series of interviews with Daniel Charles, where Cage has little awareness of 
Joseph Kosuth’s formalization of this notion but is resistant towards the erasure of the 
experiential element of the work entirely, arguing, with reference to his own unexpected 
experience of the eighteen hour long performance of Satie’s Vexations, that to remove 
the aesthetic element is to determine in advance our understanding of the work.785 
Similarly, in a 1971 interview with Alcides Lanza, Cage will resist the claim of his 
‘influence’ on conceptual art, suggesting instead a situation into which he was only one 
of many to fall, but notes that he considers 4’33”, as possible source of his influence on 
conceptual art, to be a “very physical work”.786 Morton Feldman uses this distinction to 
describe Duchamp and Cage as “opposites”,787 but it is perhaps better understood as an 
indicator of how Cage is at the nexus of a number of discourses and practices, with 
musical and visual artistic conceptualism, formalism, and theories of experience being 
articulated in quite distinct and often seemingly contradictory ways. 
 
For Cage, neither the conceptual nor the aesthetic appear to stand as sufficient 
conditions for the work, and their conjoined necessity shifts how each is to be 
understood – a strong notion of conceptual art is a refusal of certain experiences, much 
as a common-sensical understanding of experience has an uninterrogated conceptual 
element which itself only permits for certain kinds of preordained experience. By 
                                                 
784 Kostelanetz, Conversing with Cage, 186. 
785 Cage, For the Birds, 153. For a critique of Kosuth’s ‘strong’ conceptualism see Osborne, Anywhere or 
Not at All, 48-50. 
786 Kostelanetz, Conversing with Cage, 218. 
787 Morton Feldman, “Conversation between Morton Feldman and Walter Zimmermann,” in Morton 
Feldman Essays, ed. Walter Zimmermann (Kerpen, West Germany: Beginner Press, 1985), 235. For 
Feldman, following his understanding of Cage’s inversion of Duchamp, sounds can be understood as 
found objects – “Everything is a found object. I mean, I didn’t invent the major 6th. I didn’t invent the 
minor 7th […] Even something I invent is a found object” (“Darmstadt Lecture,” in Morton Feldman 
Essays, 195), but within this the sonic properties of the ‘found object’ are what pushes at the limits of its 
conceptuality. Relating this to Guattari’s discussion of Duchamp’s Bottlerack could be an interesting line 
to pursue – describing how it “functions as the trigger for a constellation of referential universes engaging 
both intimate reminiscences (the cellar of the house, a certain winter, the rays of light upon spider’s webs, 
adolescent solitude) and connotations of a cultural or economic order – the time when bottles were still 
washed with the aid of a bottle wash…” (Félix Guattari, “Ritornellos and Existential Affects,” trans. J. 
Schiesari and G. Van Den Abeele, in The Guattari Reader, ed. Gary Genosko (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 
164), Guattari’s account has little role to play for sensation, so a sonic found object, irreducibly 
contextualized but also irreducibly sensory, could be an illuminating elaboration on such an outline. 
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working within this nexus Cage is, even at this most conceptual, working precisely to 
maintain a minimum component of sound as something to be experienced without it 
being reduced to merely, in Adorno’s terms, a “slice of empirical reality”,788 to work 
through what conditions our situation as listeners and how this relates to the world of 
sound. 
 
In Francis Bacon Deleuze raises the question of sensation in a similar context, regarding 
artistic abstraction. Anticipating the passage later developed in What is Philosophy?, as 
discussed in the closing pages of our third chapter, Deleuze argues that abstract art and 
figurative art are alike in not attaining sensation, insofar as “they pass through the brain, 
they do not act directly upon the nervous system”.789 This is developed later through a 
distinction between geometric abstraction and abstract expressionism, with geometric 
abstraction being associated with asceticism, leaving aside figuration but also leaping 
over chaos for the “spiritual salvation” of formal certainty in the construction of an 
exclusively optical space,790 while abstract expressionism loses this optical element 
entirely for the manual and tactile (hence ‘action painting’) – it “imposes the hand on 
the eye”791 by producing a catastrophic visual space on which the eye can find no rest. 
While the specificity of these art historical arguments can be disputed, they nevertheless 
point towards the ontological basis of Deleuze’s claim regarding sensation – that neither 
of these practices, on one hand that which undoes figuration in the service of a more 
fundamental form, and on the other no longer this transformation of form but that of 
utter decomposition, can be seen to attain the level of becoming, of what Deleuze will 
here term the “direct action” of sensation, rather being understood in terms of a shift 
from one structure to another. 
 
Of sensation, it is crucial that it be understood as passing between levels, and not in the 
sense of the transformation of form, from one form to another (which abstract and even 
                                                 
788 Theodor W. Adorno, Sound Figures, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1999), 197.  
789 Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, trans. Daniel W. Smith (London ; New York: 
Continuum, 2004), 36. 
790 Ibid., 103. 
791 Ibid., 107. 
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figurative art can and do very well enact), but as experienced, a becoming irreducible to 
the logic of meaning – and the logic of sense – that slips back into the terms of 
representation and resemblance, as discussed in our first chapter – “[s]ensation is what 
is painted. What is painted on the canvas is the body, not insofar as it is represented as 
an object, but insofar as it is experienced as sustaining this sensation”.792 Experienced, 
and experienced through the body, sensation is “the master of deformations, the agent of 
bodily deformations”,793 “the action of invisible forces on the body”.794 Deleuze 
considers a phenomenological explanation for this passage between levels, whereby 
levels of sensation refer to the different sense organs and their ways of referring to each 
other, painting making visible a unity of the senses – but this unity, as we have seen in 
our first chapter with regards to Kant, is made possible only with reference to its pre-
organic constitution, through what we will later see as the power of rhythm, not a pre-
ordained harmony.795 
 
Here is where the passage between these two phases of Deleuze’s thought is clearest, as 
upon its introduction at this moment the BwO appears to bear more resemblance to that 
of The Logic of Sense than that of A Thousand Plateaus, a body no longer defined by its 
organic unity – as Deleuze says, it is less a matter of being without organs as that these 
organs are not ordered in the form of the organism.796 The BwO here is convulsive, 
spasmodic, provisional, the ‘difference of level’ said of sensation revealed as concerning 
the encounter with force that enacts moves not between heterogeneous but 
fundamentally unified organs, as with the phenomenological understanding, but from a 
terrifying indeterminacy to the formation of “temporary and transitory” organs. As such 
this movement between levels concerns what we saw in The Logic of Sense as a plunge 
into the depths, but here already there is a degree of distinction from that understanding. 
Where in The Logic of Sense we were concerned with the obscure passage between the 
disarticulate BwO and determinate structure, here we see degrees of articulation and 
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disarticulation, towards a task of painting – and, we can extend, of practice more 
generally – no longer concerned with structural articulation.  
 
The painter is then faced with the problem of how to act when confronted with the 
canvas, and here the contention with structure we find in The Logic of Sense remains 
important, rearticulated in the relation between the act of painting and figuration. For 
Deleuze the canvas is not blank, but littered with the givens of figuration, preconceived 
clichés and habits of thought and vision, “ready-made perceptions, memories, 
phantasms”797 with which the painter must contend in order to “extract the improbable 
Figure form the set of figurative probabilities”.798 And again, as in the The Logic of 
Sense, the means of beginning is through chance – in the case of painting through what 
Deleuze calls ‘free marks’, made quickly so as to bring out the accident beneath the 
certainties of figuration, a “manipulated chance”799 where a choice is made, the choice 
to throw the dice, which the painter utilizes to pull the painting away from the figuration 
which pre-marks the canvas800 – a problematization of figuration through a practical 
gesture.  
 
This turns us back to the problem of The Logic of Sense – we see the use of chance to 
unbind the act from the probabilistic and interpretive logic of the structural given, but if 
in Francis Bacon we are not concerned with the return to structure, the structural 
rearticulation of the throw of the dice, then how does this chance opening function with 
regards to the technical and material process of composition? Here it is necessary to 
consider the character of sensation itself, namely its “irreducibly synthetic” character.801 
At the most basic level, this synthetic character is derived from the vibratory nature of 
sensation – the ‘first’ synthesis of Deleuze’s recasting of the three syntheses found in 
different forms in, for instance, Difference and Repetition and Anti-Oedipus, here with 
                                                 
797 Ibid., 87. 
798 Ibid., 95. 
799 Ibid., 94. 
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regards to sensation – insofar as even a simple sensation is defined by the ebb and flow 
taking place at the nervous level of the BwO.802  
 
 
The synthesizer and music after Cage 
 
From this fundamental level we can follow Deleuze in enacting a shift to a musical 
register and reconnecting this passage to that of A Thousand Plateaus. At this point the 
role of Guattari’s thought starts to become more pronounced, with the introduction of 
the concept of the diagram, also known as the abstract machine. Guattari would earlier 
refer to the diagrammatic components of an assemblage as relating to the “contingent 
construction of certain components that ‘take on’ specialized functions of transcoding 
and deterritorialization”,803 expressed through “a constant entanglement involving 
heredity, apprenticeship, experimentation, and improvisation”804, indicating its status as 
operating at once in terms of the construction of and through the expressive capacities 
of the BwO, as what Deleuze will later call “the map of relations between forces […] 
which […] acts as a non-unifying immanent cause”.805 In the terms specific to Francis 
Bacon the diagram refers to “the operative set of asignifying and nonrepresentative lines 
and zones, line-strokes and colour-patches”806 beneath the figurative givens of painting, 
and leads us towards a discussion of how it is that sensations are to be related, both 
internal to their diagrammatic articulation and to their expression.  
 
The first option here is the digital, whereby elements are taken to be basic units of code, 
of the kind that renders abstract art as a reduction to elementary formal units.807 This 
pertains to an understanding through serial and structural resemblance – covering 
                                                 
802 Ibid., 45. 
803 Félix Guattari, The Machinic Unconscious: Essays in Schizoanalysis, trans. Taylor Adkins (Los 
Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2011), 146. 
804 Ibid., 148. 
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“certain forms of similitude or analogy: analogy by isomorphism, or analogy by 
produced resemblance”.808 On the other hand, we have the analogical – understood as “a 
language of relations, which consists of expressive movements, paralinguistic signs, 
breaths and screams, and so on”.809 Deleuze acknowledges the obscure nature of this 
distinction, and turns to the question of musical technology to explain – through the 
synthesizer.810 With the digital synthesizer we have an ‘integral’ setup, defined by a 
homogenization of the data received, the adherence to a transcendent code, with the 
filtering of the sound produced by the addition of predetermined formants. In theory, 
additive synthesis, through the summation of simple waves, can produce any sound 
whatsoever, but in practice the production of any degree of sonic richness requires a vast 
amount of source material, with early practitioners spending hundreds of hours creating 
single sounds.811 The analogical (analog) synthesizer, on the other hand, is ‘modular’ 
(more on which later), it establishes an “immediate connection” between heterogeneous 
elements, that is, not subject to a higher code, where on a “field of presence or finite 
plane those moments are all actual and sensible”. At the level of the filter, the analog 
synthesizer is subtractive, meaning that frequencies are removed from the waveform to 
produce different timbral qualities, complexity and richness being produced not by 
increasingly complicated additions but by subtle shifts which enact significant and not 
entirely predictable changes, the “intensive subtractions” that constitute sensible 
movement.812 
 
In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze & Guattari refer to an equivalent notion of the 
analogical synthesizer when discussing the musical transformation undergone at the 
                                                 
808 Ibid., 114-15. 
809 Ibid., 113. 
810 Deleuze’s account draws from Richard Pinhas, whose own articulation of this question can be found in 
the section ‘Le rythme et la modulation synthétique’ of Richard Pinhas, Les larmes de Nietzsche: Deleuze 
et la musique (Paris: Flammarion, 2001). 
811 Aden Evens, Sound Ideas: Music, Machines, and Experience (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota 
Press, 2003), 92-93. In fact digital synthesizers can equally make use of a version of subtractive synthesis, 
although it should be noted that at the time of Deleuze’s writing digital synthesis was a technology still in 
its infancy, with digital synthesizers adequately powerful for any but the most basic synthesis having only 
recently become commercially available (see e.g. Holmes, Electronic and Experimental Music, 165). 
812 Deleuze, Francis Bacon, 116. See also Evens, Sound Ideas, which deals with the question of sound 
synthesis in great detail, beyond this quite simplified distinction. 
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beginning of the twentieth century, as discussed in our second chapter. Here they 
describe a shift after romanticism, whereby the problem of art is “no longer that of the 
beginning” but now “a problem of consistency or consolidation, how to consolidate the 
material, make it consistent, so it can harness unthinkable, invisible, nonsonorous 
forces”– through which we enter into the “the age of the Machine, the immense 
mechanosphere, the plane of cosmicization of forces to be harnessed”. 813 In this move 
Edgard Varèse is “exemplary”, his procedure, in a description drawing in all of the 
elements of analogical synthesis as set out in Francis Bacon, involving 
 
a sound machine (not a machine for reproducing sounds), which molecularizes and 
atomizes, ionizes sound matter, and harnesses a cosmic energy. If this machine must 
have an assemblage, it is the synthesizer. By assembling modules, source elements, and 
elements for treating sound (oscillators, generators, and transformers), by arranging 
microintervals, the synthesizer makes audible the sound process itself, the production of 
that process, and puts us in contact with still other elements beyond sound matter.814 
 
As described in our second chapter, Varèse no doubt pointed the way forward for the 
twentieth century’s working with sound, but was himself caught in technical and 
theoretical impasses – significantly regarding technological limitations but also 
concerning his most productive period predating the fullest articulation of experimental 
questions of notation, compositional authority and the composer-performer-listener 
relation, work stretching and exceeding the disciplinary boundaries of music, and so on 
– more on which later. It is only with Cage that the plane for working with this kind of 
sonic material is fully laid out, but this is a Cage for whom, following the analysis in our 
third chapter, the question very quickly coincides with an opening of the artistic field, 
seemingly not wholly conducive to the kinds of refined sonic concerns Deleuze & 
Guattari seem to be focusing on here. As such it will be useful to relocate Cage in a 
musical terrain, first by considering some passages of a post-Cagean music. 
 
From the early 1960s we see a significant reinscription of Cage’s broadening idea of 
sound back onto a more exclusively sonic and musical terrain through the loose 
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grouping of composers making what would retroactively be termed minimalist music.815 
For these composers, the four key figures perhaps being La Monte Young, transitioning 
out of the Fluxus phase of his work discussed in our third chapter, Terry Riley, Steve 
Reich, and Philip Glass, the emphasis on process, the letting be of sounds, a questioning 
of compositional authority, and a redistribution of the circuit of functions between 
composer, performer, and listener – ultimately, the fullest extraction of the question of 
sound and music from their classical grounding – are taken up again in a more enclosed 
field than the broad multidisciplinary practices that dominated Cage’s work in the 
1960s. 
 
Generally resisting the complexities of serialism,816 musical minimalism favoured the 
simplicity of differentiated repetition and the use of drones.817 Deleuze and Deleuze & 
Guattari cite these composers as exemplary cases of the modern music standing in 
opposition to traditional models of organizing music, citing Reich and Glass when 
noting how 
 
Certain modern musicians oppose the transcendent plan(e) of organization, which is 
said to have dominated all of Western classical music, to the immanent sound plane, 
which is always given along with that to which it gives rise, brings the imperceptible to 
perception, and carries only differential speeds and slownesses in a kind of molecular 
lapping: the work of art must mark seconds, tenths and hundredths of seconds.818 
 
For Deleuze, Reich in particular “wants everything to be perceived in act in music, 
wants the process to be completely understood: therefore his music is the slowest, but 
because it makes us perceive all the differential speeds”819 – a desire Reich makes clear 
                                                 
815 Named following a perceived resemblance to artistic minimalism, and largely outlasting the other 
terms applied to it such as ‘repetitive music’, ‘acoustical art’, and ‘meditative music’ (Mertens, American 
Minimal Music, 11). Michael Nyman and Tom Johnson have both laid claim to coining the term (Kyle 
Gann, “Thankless Attempts at a Definition of Minimalism,” in Audio Culture: Readings in Modern Music, 
ed. Christoph Cox and Daniel Warner (London ; New York: Continuum, 2004), 299). 
816 See Paul Hillier’s introduction to Steve Reich, Writings on Music 1965-2000 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002). 
817 See Evens, Sound Ideas, 50. 
818 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 267. For more on this relation see Béatrice Ramaut-
Chevassus, “Capter des forces : l’exemple des processus répétitifs américains,” in Gilles Deleuze: la 
pensée musique. Ivanka Stoïanova drew a connection between minimalist music and Deleuzian 
philosophy earlier, for example in Geste-texte-musique, 45. 
819 Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues II, 25. 
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in his text ‘Music as a Gradual Process’, writing of his interest in presenting sonic 
processes “extending farther than [we] can hear”,820 which through prolonged 
differentiated repetition are, to use Deleuze & Guattari’s terminology, rendered 
sonorous.821  
 
We find extremely refined instances of these kinds of processes in many of Reich’s early 
works, with for instance Piano Phase (1967) and Violin Phase (1967) combining short 
phrases in seeming unison but drawn apart by small rhythmic shifts or variations in 
tempo, repetition multiplying the order of internal difference.822 Perhaps most 
interesting in this regard are Reich’s earlier pieces for tape, such as Come Out (1966) 
and It’s Gonna Rain (1965). Come Out takes a sample of speech from a young African 
American man wrongfully accused of a murder which took place in the Harlem riot of 
1964, the piece reproducing this speech, isolating and repeating elements, until 
mechanical repetition begins to strip the sounds of their linguistic qualities towards 
vocal inflection and ultimately into deep textural and rhythmic movements, exposing the 
sonic material of speech.823 Through the emphasis in these pieces of a process set in 
motion by the composer rather than the composition as the product of compositional 
intention, Reich sets a notable precedent for a compositional practice which is not as 
invested in the refusal of intention as Cage’s work, but is nevertheless unpredictable and 
indeterminate in significant ways.824 This productive and curiously unclassifiable 
musical moment would not last, however, with by Music for 18 Musicians (1976) a 
remarkable turn to harmonic complexity and towards a revived classicism, using 
elements of his earlier work largely only as techniques within the wider more 
traditionally-defined work. 
 
                                                 
820 Reich, Writings on Music, 35. 
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something is linked to a repetition of an order other than its own that the repetition appears external and 
bare, and the thing itself subject to the categories of generality” (Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 25). 
823 This description drawn from Reich’s own in the notes to his Early Works. 
824 Jean-Jacques Nattiez would say of these compositions that it was possible that they had succeeded 
where Schaeffer did not, in qualifying as musical works while still rendering a fundamental distinction 
between composer and listener unnecessary (though what this would imply for his tripartite semiotic 
schema is left unanswered). Nattiez, Music and Discourse, 101. 
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If Reich’s regrounding of Cage’s ideas in a new musical practice led towards a 
regrounding of traditional musical ideas, we see a comparable if quite distinct trajectory 
through La Monte Young. Young’s interest in drone appears very early in his work, pre-
Fluxus, while still composing pieces by a serial method – 1958’s String Trio being one 
instance of his use of notes and consonances held for periods of several minutes.825 As 
we have seen our third chapter, this carries into his text scores of the turn of the 1960s, 
Composition 1960 #7 bearing only the instruction to hold the notes B and F# “for a long 
time”, but we also see the addition of intrinsically social elements and a broad opening 
to extremes of performative indeterminacy – for instance in Composition 1960 #3’s 
instruction to “announce that everyone [in the audience] may do whatever he wishes for 
the duration of the composition”, or Composition 1960 #10 refinement of the method of 
#7 with the instruction “Draw a straight line and follow it”826 – an instruction that could 
well be taken musically, but equally otherwise, as Nam June Paik did in his Zen for 
Head (1962), performed by dipping his head, hands, and necktie into a bowl of ink and 
tomato juice and pulling himself along a the length of a long sheet of paper.827 
 
More insight into Young’s musical trajectory can be discerned from his ‘Lecture 1960’, 
largely on the topic of the Composition pieces. Here Young follows Cage in a preference 
for letting sounds be themselves, unhindered by structuration or the limits of 
interpretation, stating that “[i]f we are really interested in learning about sounds, it 
seems to me that we should allow the sounds instead of forcing them to be things that 
are mainly pertinent to human existence”.828 For Young, as for Cage, sounds are 
interesting in themselves, not requiring connection to other sounds or things to give 
them interest or render them expressive. It is with this principle in mind that Young 
explored his interest in drone and extremes of both duration and volume, which for 
Young was a route to realizing a desire to “get inside” the sound.829 The precision and 
simplicity of Young’s practice is praised by Deleuze & Guattari, aligned with the 
                                                 
825 Mertens, American Minimal Music, 20-21. 
826 See Young, An Anthology of Chance Operations. 
827 See Kim-Cohen, In the Blink of an Ear, 134. 
828 La Monte Young, “Lecture 1960,” in The Tulane Drama Review 10:2 (Winter, 1965): 80-81. 
829 Ibid., 81. 
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simplicity of the analogical synthesizer rather than the layering of pre-given elements of 
the digital: 
 
It is clear that what is necessary to make sound travel, and to travel around sound, is 
very pure and simple sound, an emission or wave without harmonics (La Monte Young 
has been successful at this). The more rarefied the atmosphere, the more disparate the 
elements you will find. Your synthesis of disparate elements will be all the stronger if 
you proceed with a sober gesture, an act of consistency, capture, or extraction that works 
in a material that is not meager but prodigiously simplified, creatively limited, 
selected.830 
 
Young’s work with sound feeds back into Cage’s own understanding of sound and of his 
own musical practice. Cage would state, as early as 1961, that in hearing Young’s pieces 
he had “utterly different experiences of listening than I’ve had with any other music”, 
and that subsequently he was “able to hear differently than I had ever heard because of 
what he has done”.831 Cage follows through on Young’s notion of ‘getting inside’ the 
sound, noting that through the repetition or continued performance of single sounds he 
was able to recognize in the sound that “what I have all along been thinking was the 
same thing is not the same thing after all, but full of variety”.832 
 
Nevertheless, for Cage this understanding is reached less through Young’s own 
theorization than by what Young’s pieces added to Cage’s own thought – enriching his 
understanding of flux and process to something that sustains even within seemingly 
individual sounds, intensifying the notion of the ‘interiority’ of the sound.833 The key 
distinction in their thought lies perhaps in how Young shifts what it means to get inside 
the sound. For Young this move is an experience of “how each sound was its own world 
and that this world was only similar to our world in that we experienced it through our 
                                                 
830 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 344-45. 
831 Kostelanetz, Conversing with Cage, 215. 
832 Ibid. This is more akin, then, to the articulation of internal variation, internal difference, we find in 
Reich’s tape work, and indicates the care that must be taken in understanding Cage’s interest in sound as 
being with ‘sound-in-itself’ – this has quite different connotations if related to a Bergsonian-Deleuzian 
difference-in-itself than to a Kantian thing-in-itself. 
833 Young would claim that he and Cage “are like opposites which help define each other.” La Monte 
Young, “Interview with Peter Dickinson, New York City, July 2, 1987,” in CageTalk: Dialogues with & 
about John Cage, ed. Peter Dickinson (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2006), 153. 
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own bodies, that is, in our own terms”.834 Rather than a Cagean affirmation of openness 
and interpenetrative multiplicity, Young, in what can be seen as an extreme 
extrapolation of the Fluxus-tinged ‘Theatre of the Singular Event’, reaffirms the 
objecthood of distinctly separable worlds, a distinction that over the following six 
decades Young has projected it into an all-encompassing ethos and world-construction. 
 
As Young’s explorations developed this notion of resonance between sound and body 
comes increasingly through an appeal to a kind of Pythagorean music of the spheres, a 
fundamental and eternal harmony to be rediscovered. As Wim Mertens says of such 
Young pieces as The Tortoise, the discrete performances “are meant to be excerpts of the 
total work that is supposed to continue between performances, which themselves only 
take up the interrupted thread”835 – in Young’s words 
 
Even before the first man moved successively from one frequency to another (melody if 
you like) a pattern for this movement, that is the relationship of the second frequency to 
the first was already predetermined (harmonically) by the overtone structure of the 
fundamental of the first sound. And in the life of the Tortoise the drone is the first 
sound.836 
 
While Young follows Schoenberg, Cage, and others in rejecting harmony as it has been 
understood in European traditions, he nevertheless accepts a more fundamental 
acoustical harmony. It is in this light he also rejects equal temperament, moving towards 
tunings based on pure ratios, arguing that “the harmonic series represents the truth”.837  
 
Young’s early work in exploring these harmonic series came largely through the 
formation of the ‘Theatre of Eternal Music’, along with John Cale, Tony Conrad, and 
Marian Zazeela. Conrad has discussed his time in the Theatre of Eternal Music at 
length, discussing practice sessions of extraordinary length taking place regularly over a 
period of years, in which the players would very gradually find themselves attenuating 
                                                 
834 Young, “Lecture 1960,” 81. 
835 Mertens, American Minimal Music, 29. 
836 See La Monte Young and Marian Zazeela, “Notes on The Theatre of Eternal Music and The Tortoise, 
His Dreams and Journeys” (online document, 2000), accessed 26/09/2015 
http://melafoundation.org/theatre.pdf. 
837 Young quoted in Robert Palmer, “A Father Figure for the Avant-Garde,” in Atlantic 247:5 (May 1981): 
48. 
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to the single tones and intervals on which Young focused.838 For Young, this was 
oriented towards recognizing the cosmic truth of the fundamental unity of harmonic 
ratios – Conrad, on the contrary, saw it as a contingent perceptual retraining effected 
through the group’s interactions through their alternate tuning system.839 Young saw the 
group’s extensive and painstaking practice as a discipline taking them towards the truth 
of the sound, driving the body to recognize something that is within it but obscured by 
the acclimatization to equal temperament and other impure forces, appealing to what 
Aden Evens calls a “naturalized corporeal aesthetics”.840 Indeed Young would even later 
tell Richard Kostelanetz that his own technique and that of his playing partners at the 
time of the Compositions 1960 was not yet good enough – that even at this time the 
performance was to be judged by its adherence to an ideal form,841 rather than through 
any productive relation between the ideal and its practice.842 Conrad would later, in his 
essay ‘Slapping Pythagoras’, a thinly-veiled critique of Young, describe this gesture as 
an effectuation and reinforcement of “the Idealization of number” by substituting “a 
Theology of Number for the pragmatics of counting”,843 that is, substituting a 
transcendent order for a practice. 
 
We see several correspondences to the critiques of Cage discussed in our third chapter – 
in Reich’s case the opening of the field of sound and its relations is reabsorbed back into 
dominant musical models, in Young’s case a series of deeper questions – a concern with 
the singularity of sound leads from an inquisitive, playful, and remarkably open 
conceptualism towards concerns of a submission of the performer and listener alike to a 
                                                 
838 See Tony Conrad, “Inside the Dream Syndicate,” in Film Culture 41 (Summer 1966): 5-8. For many 
years Young refused to disclose the precise frequencies of his tunings, only revealing them after the 
encouragement of Kyle Gann, who discovered the tunings used in Young’s The Well-Tuned Piano through 
painstaking trial and error while writing an analysis of the piece. See Kyle Gann, “La Monte Young’s The 
Well-Tuned Piano,” in Perspectives of New Music 31:1 (Winter 1993): 134-162. 
839 See Joseph, Beyond the Dream Syndicate, 333-34 and passim. 
840 Evens, Sound Ideas, 181n50. 
841 Kostelanetz, The Theatre of Mixed-Means, 205. 
842 For this reason Young would gradually shift towards electronically generated frequencies so as to 
examine the effects of continuous periodic sound waves on listeners, an early instance being Map of 49’s 
Dream, and develop with Zazeela the ‘Dream House’, a permanent audio and visual installation of a room 
filled with one complex chord (see Mertens, American Minimal Music, 30-31). 
843 Tony Conrad, “MINor Premise,” liner notes to Early Minimalism Volume One (Table of the Elements, 
1997, CD), 39. 
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transcendent outside which reinforces harmony at a higher level, of a mystical 
veneration of sound when it is shorn of associations.844 
 
Asked by Daniel Charles whether Young’s concern with these tonal relations marks a 
return to harmony, in replying Cage expresses less concern with the question of 
harmony in itself than with the claim that Young’s extreme care for microtonal relations 
is oriented towards a relation to the listener which “differs, in fact, in every respect from 
the attitude that I have when I make music. My wish is to leave the attention of the 
faculties free; his is to concentrate them”.845 Cage saw less the sobriety of enclosed 
objects that Young gestured towards, but rather, “under a microscope”, that such objects 
contain within them “a veritable world of possibilities and events”.846 Young’s gesture 
towards a unified transcendence through Cage expands outwards, away from the 
‘Theatre of the Singular Event’ towards a plurality of connections. If this is not to 
remain associated with Deleuze & Guattari’s critique of conceptual art, a Cage lacking 
in the sober gesture – we have in Young and Cage quite different understandings of what 
it means to attempt to enter into the insides of sounds, but with concomitant risks – we 
must consider closely what happens to the concept of sound in the historical passage we 
have traced. 
 
 
Rhythm and modulation 
 
From late 1961 into mid 1962 Cage produced a text on immediate consideration quite 
distinct from these topics, a reading of the architectural theory of Le Corbusier, entitled 
‘Rhythm, Etc’. Cage here directs his critique specifically against Le Corbusier’s 
                                                 
844 Young - “Pandit Pran Nath said that when you’re singing and you’re perfectly in tune it’s like meeting 
God. The meaning of this statement is that the concentration is so much to sing perfectly in tune that you 
literally give up your body and go to a higher spiritual state. Sound... Musicians like to think that sound is 
the highest form of meditation, that it takes you the furthest. Certainly, in my experience this is the case. I 
feel through sound I have come closest to God and closest to the understanding of universal structure.” 
(Frank J. Oteri, “La Monte Young and Marian Zazeela at the Dream House: In Conversation with Frank J. 
Oteri,” in NewMusicBox (October 2003), accessed 26/09/2015, 
http://www.newmusicbox.org/article.nmbx?id=2216). 
845 Cage, For the Birds, 149. 
846 Ibid., 150. 
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proportional measuring device intended to see architecture best fit human form, the 
Modulor. While the Modulor is suited to a number of proportional schemes, for Cage 
this form of thinking always amounts to a form of domination, what Cage calls a 
rhythmic police force.847 Having no reason to believe in a necessary proportionality of 
the world, Cage argues that it would be absurd to subject ourselves to the proportions of 
the Modulor. We can see that this text could equally apply to Young – a political kernel 
in Cage’s thought resisting submission to the external domination found in a pre-
determined ‘harmony’. What is problematic about the Modulor is that it operates within 
a pre-given space, defined in terms of similitude and identity – paralleling Deleuze’s 
critique of the digital synthesizer, the reduction to a proportional order dictated by an 
external code. 
 
What can rhythm be if not this kind of proportional device? For Cage, questions of 
rhythm becomes a matter of interest only when it subtracted from such notions of order, 
of organization, when they can be said of open structures rather than of a closed 
proportional relation – “The clutter of the unkempt forest”,848 “no longer any fixed 
structure: just parts in any number, superimposition, and duration” – “the permeation of 
space with sound”.849 It is, moreover, a concern with the fact that “something happens, 
something unexpected”.850 The notion of the synthesizer is important again in helping us 
unfold these claims, insofar as we find in Le Corbusier, and perhaps in Young, a form of 
coding described as digital, against which can again be posed the analogical, Modulor 
versus modulation.  
 
We are now in a better position to consider the status of modulation. With regards to 
Deleuze’s thought, let us begin not with Francis Bacon, but with his 1966 review of 
Gilbert Simondon’s L’individu et sa genèse physico-biologique, in which Deleuze first 
closely engages with Simondon’s work on individuation. Here Deleuze treats a number 
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of concepts which will be found across his later work,851 focused on an understanding of 
individuation not modeled on the completed individual, but rather concerning first the 
process of individuation itself.852 Here Deleuze emphasizes the prior metastable state 
that is the prior condition of individuation, a pre-individual system of disparate levels of 
energy, with individuation an act of resolving the problem of this disparity. As this 
passes into Deleuze’s analysis in Difference and Repetition’s ‘Asymmetrical Synthesis 
of the Sensible’, the concern is with how problems are given to us, by which they are 
sensed through not the common relation of the faculties but their violent disassociated 
relation.853 It is here that through individuation Deleuze unites the differential 
constitution of the problem with its actualisation, construction with expression, in the 
“total notion” of “indi-different/ciation”.854 Individuation accounts for how the 
completed individuals of the actual realm of differenciation are intrinsically attached to 
the pre-individual, virtual reservoir of singularities – the individual is “constructed upon 
a fundamental disparity, and functions on the edges of that disparity as such”, the 
organism as local resolution of disparity.855 
 
There is, however, in the final paragraphs of Deleuze’s 1966 text, a critique of 
Simondon which asks questions of Deleuze’s own use of his thought. Here Deleuze 
turns to Simondon’s “moral vision of the world”, which takes the form of a resistance 
towards the ‘aestheticism’ that seeks to maintain the complete individual “[cut] off from 
the pre-individual reality from which he or she emerged”, in favour of an ethics that 
opens this individual in a move towards the transindividual by rendering “what is 
                                                 
851 The impact of Simondon is perhaps felt particularly in Difference and Repetition’s ‘Asymmetrical 
Synthesis of the Sensible’ chapter, The Logic of Sense’s fifteenth series, ‘of Singularities’, and ‘The 
Geology of Morals’ and ‘Treatise on Nomadology – The War Machine’ in A Thousand Plateaus. Much 
has been written on the relation between Deleuze and Simondon in recent years – of particular importance 
to our reading is Alberto Toscano, The Theatre of Production: Philosophy and Individuation between Kant 
and Deleuze (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), with other insightful readings including Sean 
Bowden “Gilles Deleuze, a Reader of Gilbert Simondon,” in Gilbert Simondon: Being and Technology, 
ed. Arne de Boever, Alex Murray, Jon Roffe and Ashley Woodward (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2012), and Filippo Del Lucchese, “Monstrous Individuation: Deleuze, Simondon, and Relational 
Ontology,” in differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 20:2-3 (2009): 179-193. 
852 Deleuze, Desert Islands, 86 
853 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 226-27. See also our discussion of the role of Kant in Difference 
and Repetition in our first chapter. 
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interior […] also exterior”.856 Deleuze’s concern is that this may reintroduce another 
form of the Self, as an ethical subject, in distinction from the disparate individual 
Simondon’s theory of individuation otherwise works through. Muriel Combes alludes to 
this understanding of Simondon’s ethics when she refers to the implied ‘normative’ 
ethical essence of Simondon’s thought of a ‘having-to-become’,857 whereby Simondon’s 
subject as not so much an individual but rather a wider account of the individual 
spanning its pre-individual structures and its process of individuation.858 
 
The question now is, does Deleuze, despite his critique, integrate a form of this ethical 
subject into his own thought? At points it very much appears so, as in his argument for 
an ethics of intensity – the command “do not explicate oneself (too much)”, as to do so 
would be to cancel out intensity, to make the constitutive power of the problem 
disappear.859 Where for Deleuze does this resistance to an excess of explication take 
place? As Alberto Toscano poses this question, what is the ‘place’ where Deleuze’s 
‘universal ungrounding’ happens?860 In Difference and Repetition it appears to be in the 
experience of the philosopher-individual, here taking a role similar to that of the 
structuralist hero of ‘How Do We Recognize Structuralism?’, the philosopher as a kind 
of ‘expert interpreter’, not of structures as with various notions of the expert listener but 
of the dynamics of preindividual singularities. Discussing this figure in Difference and 
Repetition, Deleuze moves still through a Simondonian register, speaking of a “mobile, 
strangely supple” individuation, defined by intensities in communication and 
envelopment, of preindividual singularities making up multiplicities,861 where we find a 
notion of the individual as the “universal concrete individuality of the thinker or the 
system of the dissolved Self”.862 As Toscano describes this relation, “it is to the extent 
that the thinker makes him or herself into a theatre of individuation, a ‘universal 
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858 See Andrea Bardin, Epistemology and Political Philosophy in Gilbert Simondon: Individuation, 
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individual’, that the intensive movements beneath the representations of difference come 
alive”.863 
 
At this level there remains an uneasy relation to the doubts raised of the thinker in The 
Logic of Sense’s highly ambivalent twenty-second series, and something of a tension 
between the questions of individuation and actualisation which reflects the obscure 
passage between structure and praxis first set out in ‘How Do We Recognize 
Structuralism?’. There appears to be a gap between levels of articulation, whereby in 
theorizing the actual and the virtual in their distinctness the precise character of the 
process of individuation which temporally connects them remains obscure, or even 
tempts a reduction of individuation to actualisation, rather than, as Deleuze makes clear, 
seeing that individuation is that which allows differential relations to actualise.864 For 
Deleuze too the ethics of experimentation may appear as a normative epistemological 
stance, still founded upon a notion of interpretation, however radicalized. 
 
It is notable that in this period Deleuze does not take on the question of modulation in 
his account of and use of Simondon. For Simondon modulation marks the coupling of 
systems, the boundary that produces the energetic exchange of the field.865 Through this 
comes perhaps Simondon’s key ontological term, that of transduction – the energetic 
process by which being goes out of phase with itself, progressively determining in a 
constant state of movement and relation.866 This is a topic Deleuze takes up in a 1979 
Vincennes lecture, the themes of which feed into A Thousand Plateaus. Here Deleuze 
discusses Simondon’s critique of hylomorphism, central to the articulation of the plane 
of immanence in opposition to the plane of transcendence.867 If the hylomorphic model 
is an imposition of form on matter, a mold which shapes matter under its fixed terms, 
the modulator is what Simondon calls a “continuous temporal mold”,868 molding in a 
                                                 
863 Toscano, The Theatre of Production, 200. 
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“continuous and variable manner”869 – by this we see that Le Corbusier’s Modulor does 
not in these terms ‘modulate’, but rather molds. The risk of positing a subject by which 
the process of modulation persists, then, is that this subject takes the form of a mold, an 
interpretive norm by which that which it relates is ordered. 
  
The question of modulation and rhythm is taken up in Francis Bacon, where it also 
provides a closing point to Deleuze’s engagement with and critique of phenomenology, 
deriving as it does from the expanded phenomenologies of Erwin Straus and Henri 
Maldiney. Deleuze notes that late phenomenology of art, such as that of Merleau-Ponty 
or Maldiney, concerns itself not only with sense experience as it relates to a defined 
object, but a distinctness of sensation, the field it marks out and the real effects it has, 
understanding that “I become in the sensation and something happens through the 
sensation, one through the other, one in the other”.870 This passing mention, however, 
somewhat obscures the centrality of Maldiney to how Deleuze develops the relation 
between sensation and rhythm.  
 
First is Straus, who introduces a key distinction which marks a breaking point within 
phenomenology, precisely that between sensation and perception – perception, as 
discussed in our second and third chapters, persisting as the core of the 
phenomenological projects of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, is for Straus secondary, with 
the primacy rather of a form of sensation through which the distinction between subject 
and world begins to emerge – “the sensing subject does not have sensations, but, rather, 
in his sensing he has first himself. In sensory experience there unfolds both the 
becoming of the subject and the happenings of the world”.871 In Straus’ terms 
geographical space is perceptual while the space of the landscape concerns sensation872 
– the geographical space being organized, oriented and preestablished, the landscape 
                                                 
869 Gilles Deleuze, Anti-Oedipe et Mille Plateaux – Cours Vincennes, 27/02/1979, accessed 26/09/2015 
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871 Erwin Straus, The Primary World of Senses: A Vindication of Sensory Experience, trans. Jacob 
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prior to these forms of epistemological demarcation.  
 
This is the starting point for Maldiney’s three ‘moments’ of art, specifically read through 
landscape painting. The first moment concerns a “primordial spatiality which has no 
system of reference, nor coordinates nor point of origin”,873 a “being lost” without the 
points of reference a geographical understanding offers: 
 
[n]o dominant view, no rule of transformation, only our determining the location in 
mutual relation in an oriented ensemble. The term of progression has no meaning in the 
landscape […] our walk is free from the minimum of motor schemes that give our lives, 
through the flow of time, the shape of a history [...] without worry for orientation or 
preestablished measure in the geographic space.874 
 
Cézanne is exemplary here, his landscapes presenting an “iridescent chaos”, “abyss”, 
“catastrophe”.875 The second moment is that of the systolic compression, or contraction, 
into a “stubborn geometry”, in which the moment Straus describes takes place, the 
progressive determination of a subject separating from the world, where “[s]lowly the 
geological strata appear before me … everything falls straight down … I begin to 
separate myself from the landscape, to see it.” Self and world begin to separate towards 
their own poles, but never completely – this second moment is accompanied by a third 
moment, that of a diastolic expansion, again dissolving forms in an “expansive 
irruption”, through which “an aerial, coloured logic abruptly replaces the stubborn 
geometry”.876 
 
The terms of systole and diastole are not distinct as such but rather constitute a “double 
movement”,877 and while often posed as sequential Maldiney notes also their 
simultaneity.878 In this simultaneity we find rhythm – a rhythm of contraction and 
expansion, of perpetual modulation,879 which marks the movement of form in 
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formation.880 Deleuze’s understanding of rhythm in Francis Bacon is precisely this – as 
that which 
 
places in each sensation the levels and domains through which it passes. And this 
rhythm runs through a painting as it runs through a piece of music. It is a diastole-
systole: the world that takes hold of me in closing around me, the self the opens to the 
world and opens the world to itself881 
 
The chance marks of the painter signal the first moment, as “intrusion of another world 
in the visual world of figuration”, the diagram as “indeed a chaos, a catastrophe, but also 
the seed of order or rhythm”.882 
 
That this understanding of rhythm is elaborated with regards to Cézanne is key to 
reconnecting our argument to the musical terms of A Thousand Plateaus. The gestures 
of A Thousand Plateaus no doubt appear grander than those of Francis Bacon – where 
Francis Bacon carefully documents the details of an individual artistic practice, A 
Thousand Plateaus sweeps through a conceptual history of centuries of art in just a few 
pages – but through these connections we can see the complexity of the passage outlined 
in the latter text. Immediately preceding the discussion of music that leads to the 
concept of the synthesizer, Deleuze & Guattari, closely echoing Deleuze’s words in 
Francis Bacon,883 speak of Cézanne as marking the point where painting concerns itself 
fully with capturing forces.884 While here the question of rhythm is not immediately 
clear, having seen its role in Deleuze’s reading of Cézanne and consequently in the 
function of the synthesizer, we see a route into taking on the musical question of 
rhythm, following Cage not as a technique of molding, but of modulation.  
 
On this question of rhythm it is useful to note that when in Francis Bacon Deleuze is at 
his closest to affirming artistic abstraction – in the form of the “purest pictorial 
situation” produced by broad fields of colour in which “the painting becomes truly aerial 
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and attains a maximum of light like the eternity of monochrome time”885 – the term used 
to describe this notion is ‘chronochromie’, named for a piece by the French composer 
Olivier Messiaen. In this piece, eighteen birdsongs – birdsong being key to the concept 
of the refrain in A Thousand Plateaus – performed by stringed instruments are 
juxtaposed. With chronochromie, in Deleuze’s understanding, rhythm is revealed in its 
simplest form, the kind of static experience produced by the most sober engagement 
with materials Deleuze & Guattari celebrate in La Monte Young. This provides us with 
an important connection between the rhythms of painting set out in Francis Bacon and 
the musical question of rhythm, and likewise to a more general ontological 
understanding of rhythm. On this basis it is worth elaborating on Messiaen’s 
understanding of rhythm. 
 
Messiaen is widely regarded as one of the most important contributors to theories of 
rhythm in the classical tradition of the twentieth century, both in his compositions and 
their use of what he calls “several personal rhythmic techniques such as rhythmic 
characters, non-retrogradable rhythms, and symmetrical permutations”886 and in his 
extensive writings, particularly in his multi-volume Traité de rythme, de couleur, et 
d’ornithologie, where we find both analysis of a vast range of historical precedents and 
explication of his own developments. Indeed, it is his innovations with regards to 
rhythm that Messiaen deems his “most far-reaching contribution to Western music”,887 
and in Traité de rythme we find the persistent assertion that a musician can only merit 
that title if he or she is also a ‘rhythmicist’.888 In a 1967 interview with Claude Samuel, 
Messiaen diagnosed what he saw as a neglect of rhythm in the Western classical 
tradition, finding, for example, “harmonic colors, and extraordinary contrapuntal 
craftsmanship” in Bach but naming him among “composers who knew nothing of 
rhythm”.889 This is because ‘rhythm’, in Messiaen’s understanding of it, stands for a 
                                                 
885 Deleuze, Francis Bacon, 148. 
886 Olivier Messiaen, Music and Color: Conversations with Claude Samuel, trans. E. Thomas Glaslow 
(Portland: Amadeus Press, 1994), 21. 
887 Anthony Pole, “Messiaen’s Musical Language: an Introduction,” in The Messiaen Companion, ed. 
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245 
 
characteristic quite distinct from meter, with which it is often equated. Following Edgar 
Willems, Matila Ghyka and others, Messiaen begins his explorations of rhythm by 
distinguishing between rhythm as meter or cadence, where it stands only as 
homogeneous and static measurement, and that which is rhythm properly speaking, 
defined in terms of alternation, propulsion, variation - recurrence never as pure and 
simple repetition but as an irreversible unfolding movement in time.890 
 
The importance of Messiaen’s work to twentieth century classical music is 
immeasurable, both in terms of the influence of his compositions and theoretical 
writings and in the vast number of major figures in twentieth century music, including 
Pierre Boulez, Karlheinz Stockhausen, and Pierre Henry, who studied under Messiaen at 
both the Paris Conservatoire from 1941 to 1978,891 as well as for short periods at the 
Darmstadt new music summer school. We have seen the effects of this throughout – up 
to our discussion here of the mold (as cadence) and modulation, and to Deleuze & 
Guattari’s adoption of Boulez’s related distinctions of smooth and striated, pulsed and 
non-pulsed, striated space and time equated with cadence, that is, rhythm as formal 
metric regularity, as a limitation of movement,892 rhythm properly speaking being 
without measure, concerning how “a fluid occupies a smooth space”.893  
 
Quoted in A Thousand Plateaus, the music theorist Gisèle Brelet notes that the 
juxtaposition between chromatic durations in Messiaen’s work aims to “suggest the idea 
of the relations between the infinitely long durations of the stars and mountains and the 
infinitely short ones of the insects and atoms: a cosmic, elementary power that [...] 
derives above all from the labor of rhythm”.894 There is, however, a troubling 
characteristic to Messiaen’s work that offers an opportunity for a crucial clarification. 
Catherine Pickstock criticizes Deleuze & Guattari for omitting to treat the Catholic faith 
Messiaen deemed crucial to his understanding of rhythm – for Pickstock in not 
                                                 
890 Messiaen, Traité de rythme, 53-54. 
891 See Jean Boivin, “Messiaen’s Teaching at the Paris Conservatoire: A Humanist’s Legacy,” in 
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892 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 363. 
893 Ibid., 364. 
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considering Messiaen’s Catholicism Deleuze & Guattari neglect that his music was 
essentially transcendent, the line of flight as an ascent to heaven, and require either an 
acceptance of this spiritual measure or of a nihilistic fall.895 
 
The tendency in Messiaen to ascend to a unified One is present, but can perhaps be 
isolated from other elements of his thought and practice. When Messiaen is found 
reasserting the cosmic as a spiritual One it is perhaps when he remains within certain 
epistemological and music theoretical frameworks – when, as David Toop argues, he 
still fails to capture that of birdsong which is unpredictable, that which is at or beyond 
the boundaries of human perception, and, moreover, that which is beyond the 
inscriptional capacities of notation896 – Chronochromie, for example, being scored for 
standard notation. Deleuze & Guattari’s account, on the other hand, emphasizes that in 
Messiaen which does not give him a compositional privilege to create music as a 
singular ascent, that which posits the bird and human as equally musical – by which 
“music is not the privilege of human beings: the universe, the cosmos, is made of 
refrains; the question in music is that of a power of deterritorialization permeating 
nature, animals, the elements, and deserts as much as human beings”.897 
 
Something more of the question of rhythm must be elaborated, and at this juncture it is 
important to pinpoint where Deleuze and Deleuze & Guattari break from that which is 
still phenomenological in their understanding of rhythm, that which, as discussed in our 
third chapter, sees phenomenology tend towards a religious moment. Here this question 
of remaining within a single theoretical framework is crucial. The centrality of the BwO 
as that which renders any phenomenological interpretation inadequate is key – by 
emphasizing the BwO Deleuze resists that of this process which relocates its terms in 
                                                 
895 Catherine Pickstock, “God and Meaning in Music: Messiaen and Deleuze,” in Sacred Music 134:4 
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the subject and a self-world distinction, escaping a Kantian regulation, and rather 
foregrounds precisely this notion of rhythm as modulation. In this spirit the 
understanding of rhythm and modulation we find in Francis Bacon is taken to its 
farthest point in A Thousand Plateaus, reformulating the BwO as the plane of 
consistency. The concern is less with a constitution of a self-world distinction, even 
partial and transitory, than it is with understanding the rhythmic relations that take place 
on a plane of consistency. Hence the principle of the rhizome – as a principle of 
connection between differing kinds of semiotic chains without reduction to the logic of 
any given one. 
 
It is in this respect that the concept of modulation allows Deleuze to comprehensively 
overcome the “wrenching duality” of Kantian aesthetics posed in our first chapter,898 
between a theory of possible experience and a theory of real experience. By refusing a 
grounding in the molding capacities of self, subject, or concept, Deleuze finds a theory 
of sensible experience prior to cognitive determination.899 However, there are points 
where Deleuze & Guattari appear not to make this break completely, moments which 
may give us more insight into this problem. There is, for instance, something surprising 
in What is Philosophy? regarding the divisions that are reinstated, particularly between 
the operations of philosophy, science, and art, and the step back towards a problematic 
framework that seems to take place. Here, the resistance towards positing the 
philosophical concept as a given or as pre-formed, and against the adoption of the 
terminology of creativity by the “disciplines of communication”,900 leads Deleuze & 
Guattari to argue that it is self-positing, that it has “an autopoietic characteristic by 
which it is recognized”.901 Here philosophical creation is staged in solely philosophical 
terms, and that which relates the practice of philosophy to those of art and science 
remains somewhat obscure. We find, then, a closure of the concept comparable to the 
                                                 
898 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 260 
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determination of the problematic Idea in Difference and Repetition – “this is really what 
the creation of concepts means: to connect internal, inseparable components to the point 
of closure or saturation so that we can no longer add or withdraw a component without 
changing the nature of the concept”.902 
 
As Keith Ansell-Pearson notes, there appears here to be a reversion to the logic of 
evolution which is rejected in A Thousand Plateaus, and with this, as with the 
problematic Idea, there appears to be little scope for a feedback process, between 
intensity and state of affairs or between the pedagogy of the concept and the pedagogy 
of historical experience.903 It is notable that What is Philosophy? was written differently 
than Deleuze & Guattari’s other collaborative works, the weight of its production more 
heavily on Deleuze,904 and while Guattari’s voice cannot be extracted (although neither 
can it be extracted from even Deleuze’s single-authored works written after his 
encounter with Guattari), there are aspects where this distinction is significant, as with 
the question of autopoiesis. The inclusion of this notion appears to be Guattari’s 
suggestion, but in his own concurrent work, Chaosmosis, he makes reference to it in a 
subtly different manner, whereby the autopoietic character of the machine is inseparable 
from its relation to other machines – it “always depends on exterior elements in order to 
be able to exist as such”.905 Autopoiesis commonly understood – that is, through the 
biological theory of Francisco Varela and Humberto Maturana – defines its ‘auto’ in 
opposition to an allopoietic notion of constitution by external inputs by rendering it an 
exclusively biological concept, distinct from, for example, “social systems, technical 
machines, crystalline systems”.906 For Guattari this is inadequate, and comparable to the 
structuralist dominance of the linguistic signifier. Machinic autopoiesis, on the contrary, 
“maintain[s] diverse types of relations of alterity”,907 not as ‘external’ constitutive 
forces, but as constitutively inseparable from other assemblages at a machinic level. 
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We believe that this latter articulation is crucial to understanding the conceptual passage 
that sound takes across the twentieth century, resisting a return to the enclosed problems 
of medium-specificity, to phenomenological and structuralist interpretation, and to other 
foreclosed and overdetermining fields of understanding. Daniel Charles, discussing the 
work of Xenakis in contrast to that of Boulez, describes the latter as limited by an 
aestheticism which limits his view of history to the history of music, while Xenakis, 
within a broader French lineage appreciative of Cage’s work, “takes as his point of 
departure a view of the history of civilization as such”,908 following a scientific 
abandonment of classical determinism which cannot reground itself in harmony, series, 
sound, or any other fixed notion. This is present already in Varèse, but in a manner 
which may be obscured by an autopoietic understanding, and by the singular point that 
remains in ‘Varèse’ the composer909 – the sound which Varèse is synthesizing cannot be 
synthesized distinct from the other domains Varèse has explored to theorize it, a Varèse 
for whom sound is not defined by pitch relations nor by a reductionist scientism but by a 
complex and malleable exchange between musical concepts, acoustical concepts, and 
concepts across the theoretical and applied sciences, a problematization of sound that is 
intrinsically connective and interpenetrative. How are we to understand this field of 
relations? 
 
 
Refrain and rhythm in Cage’s late work 
 
We would like to suggest that it is through the notion of rhythm that these tensions and 
impasses can be brought into theoretical and practical focus. The central concept here is 
that of the refrain, hence the significance Deleuze of attributes to it – asked of what 
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concepts he and Guattari had invented, it is to the refrain that he turns,910 and elsewhere 
he speaks of it, contrasting with much of What is Philosophy?, as involving the 
“inseparable forces” of affects, percepts, and concepts.911 In The Machinic Unconscious 
Guattari anticipates much of the use of the refrain in A Thousand Plateaus, and helps us 
clarify its use there. Introduced through the theme of a child singing at night, seeking to 
“regain control of events that deterritorialized too quickly for her liking”,912 here 
refrains are “basic rhythms of temporalization”,913 an affirmation of internal cohesion 
but not, as said of capitalistic societies, in the name of purity and an appeal to a 
“machine of autonomous expression, to hierarchized power formations”.914 Rather, the 
more enclosed nature of the refrain, by the extent to which its code is its own, the more 
in touch with the capacities of machinic mutation it is.915 This is insofar as its relations 
are not reducible to a harmonious whole – “seemingly conscious and free, yet prone to 
anguished interrogations or spontaneous blockages preying upon every part of the 
intentional arcs”.916 
 
From the perspective of “concrete machinic assemblages duly situated within the 
cosmos, history, and socius”,917 then, relations cannot be so simple as a form-matter 
distinction, or molding, or harmonious agreement. Take the example used in both The 
Machinic Unconscious and A Thousand Plateaus of the wasp and the orchid. When the 
two meet their encounter produces a ‘surplus-value of code’, by which their 
specialization of internal territorial functions meet and produce a relation that is not 
merely the sum of their codings in totalized form, but rather forms a new assemblage 
combining elements of these codes in new ways918  – hence the territorial refrain serving 
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as the basis for machinic mutation. 
 
The refrain, furthermore, is the assemblage that is sonorous, or “‘dominated’ by 
sound”,919 drawing a territory through “territorial motifs and landscapes”. Music, then, 
is defined as “a creative, active operation that consists in deterritorializing the refrain”. 
Its significance comes precisely in being the most thorough articulation of the machinic 
assemblage as both a matter of internal regulation, territoralization, and an opening to 
the outside, deterritorialization,920 the two aspects articulated together, construction and 
expression. 
 
Here much of our discussion coalesces. Where we started with a notion of immanence 
derived from that of Kantian critique, with the plane of immanence, and of the musical 
practices that are concerned with this plane, with the move to the order of the machine 
we are speaking of another form of immanence, one which itself circulated through 
Deleuze’s thought from an early stage, that of Spinoza. In Expressionism in Philosophy, 
alongside Difference and Repetition part of Deleuze’s doctoral submission, Deleuze 
makes a statement that is quite difficult to understand through the latter text’s apparatus 
of problematic actualisation, namely that in his reading of Spinozist ontology the modes 
must be made primary, prior to substance, a demand that “substance turn on finite 
modes”.921 In Difference and Repetition, it is said of a philosophy of difference that 
“substance must itself be said of the modes and only of the modes”.922. It is only with A 
Thousand Plateaus that this understanding of the modes gains its fullest articulation, as 
relating to the aforementioned speeds and slownesses on a plane of consistency923 and to 
the advanced conception of becoming, but the crucial question that commands this 
Spinozism – “What can a body do?”924 – is conjoined by Deleuze to his earlier thought 
in Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, a revised and expanded version of 1970’s Spinoza: 
                                                 
919 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 323. 
920 Ibid., 56-57. 
921 Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 
1992), 10, and Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 304. 
922 Ibid., 40. 
923 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 254. 
924 Ibid., 256. 
252 
 
Textes choisis, Deleuze’s final book before his collaboration with Guattari.925  
 
Here and elsewhere Deleuze takes on this question of what a body can do, an emphasis 
on thinking through the modes, by turning to the ethology of Jakob von Uexküll. This 
guides us towards our fullest understanding of Cage’s experimental practice – for 
Deleuze ethology is a “long affair of experimentation, requiring a lasting prudence, a 
Spinozan wisdom that implies the construction of a plane of immanence or 
consistency”,926 precisely insofar as it concerns us not knowing in advance what a body 
can do, not knowing the affects of which a body is capable. Experimentation takes the 
form of a practice without telos, connecting to our initial definition of experimentation, 
concerning acts ‘the outcome of which is unknown’, a notion we can now integrate into 
a rich, complex practice. The accounts of Uexküll’s thought we find in A Thousand 
Plateaus and Spinoza are very similar – Uexküll’s animal world is defined, for Deleuze 
& Guattari, by looking for “the active and passive affects of which the animal is capable 
in the individuated assemblage of which it is part”, not of generic characteristics but of 
relations which are not presumed or predetermined but must be experimentally forged – 
“We know nothing about a body until we know what it can do, in other words, what its 
affects are, how they can or cannot enter into composition with other affects, with the 
affects of another body”927 – and as such Deleuze & Guattari can draw on Uexküll’s 
notion of the milieu (or Umwelt) to define doubly the singular, closed unity of any given 
assemblage and the manner in which this closed unity relates to other assemblages.  
 
Uexküll describes his theory as a “stroll into unfamiliar worlds”,928 indicating that there 
is to be no unity found either at the level of the organism or at the level of the wider 
environment, of an ecosystem. Each body, through a machinic rather than organic 
functioning, can take the same material and imbue it with new connections. The same 
material enters into relations with different bodies and as such is heterogeneously 
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manifest through these varied relations. What is relevant here is no longer the study of 
the animal as an organic whole which relates to an external environment, as such, but 
rather the animal’s various relationships to the elements that make up its environment 
as, in their entirety, a particular type of machinic assemblage. The oak tree, for example, 
serves a different role for each Umwelt it bears relation to, from the fox’s roof to the 
bark-boring beetle’s nourishment.929 For Deleuze this means that with ethology  
 
every point has its counterpoints: the plant and the rain, the spider and the fly. So an 
animal, a thing, is never separable from its relations with the world. So an animal, a 
thing, is never separable from its relations with the world. The interior is only a selected 
exterior, and the exterior, a projected interior.930 
 
In Deleuze & Guattari’s terms the territorial assemblage is staked out by the refrain, that 
is, by its particular rhythmic qualities, but in contrapuntal relation to other refrains it 
becomes – through deterritorialization – thinkable in this wider sense is that of the 
“cosmic refrain”.931 As Deleuze notes in The Fold, echoing Uexküll, “[a]t its limit the 
material universe accedes to a unity in horizontal and collective extension, where 
melodies of development themselves enter into relations of counterpoint, each spilling 
over its frame and becoming the motif of another such that all of Nature becomes an 
immense melody and flow of bodies”,932 gesturing towards Uexküll’s concern with the 
processes of individual, enclosed milieus as part of a wider yet wholly inaccessible 
whole.933 
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In a musical context, then, we are speaking of something quite different than of a 
Messiaen who juxtaposes rhythms but does so under a determining order of a strictly 
musical understanding. Of Cage’s late work it is difficult to find any unifying practical 
principle as we saw through the subtle determination of chance and indeterminacy, with 
James Pritchett describing these final decades as the ‘joy and bewilderment’ period of 
Cage’s work,934 but here we will suggest that these kinds of questions of diverse bodies 
in diverse relations of rhythmic modulation without recourse to any such principle is key 
                                                 
organism does not emerge in relation to a pre-given form, but rather during its embryonic stage it passes 
through a number of phases and breaks during which its organic functionality is determined. The picture 
of organogenesis becomes not one of pre-determined form, but rather of the immanent development of 
structures derived from but not determined by originary genetic information. In this development of a 
genesis of the organism there are derived two theses which can equally be applied to an ontogenesis – 
first, a ‘principle of choice’ emerges, as emergence is not wholly determined by its starting conditions. 
This entails that matter cannot be viewed as a “simple preformed reservoir” (ibid) from which the shape 
and structure of emergent things is already given from the beginning of the process. This in turn 
“eliminates actualism” – that is to say, we are left with an ontology wherein we cannot assert that only 
that which is actual is that which is real, a notion of possible tendencies in matter which are prior to any of 
these tendencies being actualised.  
 
 As such, and corresponding to the project outline in The Visible and the Invisible, this means that 
there can no longer be a distinction between form and matter, and rather that form comes into being only 
through the immanent and processual unfolding of matter. Merleau-Ponty in turn takes Uexküll’s Umwelt 
and draws parallels between it and his own discussion of Gestalt. The Gestalt, as Merleau-Ponty reads it, 
is a whole not reducible to the sum of its parts, a form which emerges through the relations between its 
constituent bodies rather than prior to them. The body, that is, one’s body, as Merleau-Ponty is here 
maintaining the primacy of a kind of human perception, is a Gestalt in itself, but likewise it bears relation, 
is in some sense also within, every other Gestalt. It is as such that Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Uexküll 
serves a purpose comparable to that made by Deleuze & Guattari – to show at once how a body can be 
thought in its self-sustaining unity and in relation to both other bodies, ending only at the vastness of the 
cosmic milieu. How this is articulated, however, indicates the distance Deleuze & Guattari have put 
between themselves and any phenomenology – this cosmic milieu would be concerned with, as Merleau-
Ponty puts it, “the relation between perceiving body and a sensible […] world” (Merleau-Ponty, The 
Visible and the Invisible, 206), that is, the manner through which the Gestalt provides a “central hinge or a 
pivot” between bodies and the wild Being from which they emerge. In this sense, the relationship between 
an actual body in a given milieu and its virtual or material conditions remains incomplete, the actual body 
never raising above the realm of metaphor in relation to the immanent flux from which it arises. 
 
 The distinction between Merleau-Ponty and Simondon’s projects of ontogenetic individuation, 
then, lies again in the question of perception. Where Simondon’s notion of transduction offers a unity of 
Being characterized by the dephasing of beings, the formal stability of which is only a metastability, 
Merleau-Ponty’s unity of Being in terms of beings comes through the intersubjectivity entailed in the 
activities of perceiving and being perceived. In so doing, Merleau-Ponty again must turn to the 
transcendent nature of the subject-object relation and constitute a gap between subject and matter. See 
also Andrea Bardin’s discussion of Uexküll’s place in the relation between Merleau-Ponty, Simondon, and 
Canguilhem (Bardin, Epistemology and Political Philosophy in Gilbert Simondon, 160). 
934 Pritchett, The Music of John Cage, x. 
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to much of Cage’s seemingly uncategorizable works, and that this understanding is 
particularly useful with regards to understanding the return to a distinctly musical 
simplicity in Cage’s final years. 
 
By way of an intermediary consideration, and connecting to the kind of relationality 
raised by the question of ethology, we will consider two works of the mid-1970s, Child 
of Tree (1975) and Branches (1976). Of his compositional process, Cage described 
several means for making ‘discoveries’ – for instance, through engagement with 
different kinds of ensembles, by more precisely compositional means, or through 
materials, such as that of the radio for Imaginary Landscape No. 4.935 For these two 
pieces the discovery was plant materials, amplified with contact microphones through 
simple sound systems. The scoring for these pieces followed the lead set by Tudor’s 
modifications of Variations II, with a high level of performative freedom allowed in two 
notable respects. First, following Tudor’s example, Cage provided a two-level score that 
requires performers to construct their own performative boundaries through engagement 
with Cage’s dense and complex instructions.936 Second, within this construction of the 
score, improvisation was permitted, the plant material offering this as a possibility while 
still resisting intention in a way traditional instruments would not, insofar as “the 
improvisation can’t be based on taste and memory since one doesn’t know the 
instruments”.937 On top of this, the fragility of the plant material – the physical changes 
caused in the material by using it to produce sounds, be it the rustle of leaves and grass 
or the plucking of cactus spines – adds a degree of indeterminacy to this improvisation, 
as we have seen previously with the prepared piano and Tudor’s amplified piano. The 
performer may well find a ‘pleasing’ sound, and try to repeat this sound, but the 
degradation of the material caused in producing the sound will have changed its 
sounding capacities. Performatively, these pieces see the performers distributed around 
the performance space, working independently with their materials among and around 
                                                 
935 Kostelanetz, Conversing with Cage, 103. 
936 See Christopher Shultis, “The Process of Discovery: Interpreting Child of Tree” (online document, 
2012), accessed 26/09/2015 http://chrisshultis.blogspot.co.uk/2012/11/the-process-of-discovery-
interpreting.html, for a discussion of this process before Shultis’ own performance of Child of Tree.  
937 Kostelanetz, Conversing with Cage, 92. 
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the audience. 
 
In this respect these pieces provide a more interesting connection to the Deleuze-
Guattarian rhizome than only the immediate matter of the metaphor of plantlife. Against 
the arborescent model of classical music, its elements united under the organizing terms 
of the work and the instruments voicing as one towards the listening audience, with 
Branches and Child of Tree there is no evident organizing unity. A listener could walk 
around the space and draw connections between a group of sound sources from one 
position, and then move to another where different connections will take hold – the 
plants organized only rhizomatically. It is therefore important also that the use of plant 
materials was not reducible to their sonorous and performative capacities, as Cage saw 
in the plant a metaphor for a more general social, and indeed ontological, concern. Cage 
uses growing plants as a metaphor for a practice of life: 
 
as we know, our ways of growing plants are to grow only one plant; the result is that 
each plant is separate from the others. But when one mixes the plants up, and it looks 
almost as though it were not agriculture but was wild, then everything regenerates 
everything else and it becomes a healthy situation for the plant. I would say in life too 
[…] after all, our problem is that we’re individuals, that we’re members of society, and 
that society inhabits an environment – and that’s Nature.938  
 
While present from an early stage in the notion of ‘imitating nature in its manner of 
operation’, Nature has been a somewhat obscure term throughout Cage’s thought, but in 
this context it reaches a new clarity, as indeed does this ‘imitation’. It is not that Cage’s 
concern with sound constitutes a kind of return to a primitive nature, of ascribing an 
obscure fundamental metaphysical power to sound in its natural form, but rather that 
nature is understood, as with Uexküll, as a complex of operations in irreducibly 
complicated relation, from the level of sound in its purely sensational form to the human 
and plant relations that are formed through Branches and Child of Tree to social 
questions and beyond. We see no longer the tendency towards a unified organicism 
found in ‘Defense of Satie’ but rather nature defined as, in Julia Robinson’s terms, 
“networks constantly creating new micro/macro systems and ecologies”.939 
                                                 
938 Ibid., 262. 
939 Robinson, “John Cage and Investiture,” 181. 
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Indeed, it is precisely when Cage comes to the conclusion that his problems are no 
longer strictly musical, but social – and as such no longer possibly bound to the 
constrictions of an empirically qualified sound-space which could pass for a kind of 
unified being – that he feels required to reevaluate the place of performative freedom in 
opposition to chance – “I must find a way to let people to be free without their becoming 
foolish. So that their freedom will make them noble”.940 Pieces like Branches bring into 
consideration notions of both space and place, an awareness of a dispersion of bodies – 
performers, listeners, other acoustic objects – in the room and their relation to each 
other, identifying a ‘sounding’ that takes a form not merely auditory. The opening to a 
plurality of types of relations produces more freedom to act at each level, as we have 
seen in the understanding of the machine that pairs construction with expression.941 
Taking us back to a concern of our previous chapter, with the difficulties of musical 
expression, we find here an understanding of expression which resists the assumptions 
of phenomenological intersubjectivity but rather concerns the construction of mobile 
relations. 
 
This practice led to broader, more theatrical – if theatrical can remain the correct term 
for a practice which moves towards an erasure of the border between performer and 
audience – ideas for Cage, such as a never-realized plan to amplify a park, “a piece of 
music performed by animals, and butterflies”,942 but there is also within it the germ of 
the more musical direction of his late work. In 1987 Cage would start composing what 
have been termed his ‘number pieces’, the final years of his life being some of his most 
productive, with forty-one pieces produced using his new method of time brackets. The 
system for writing these works was remarkably simple, using chance operations to 
determine time brackets, sometimes fixed and sometimes flexible, within which the 
performers can sound notes from a small selection. In this there appears to be a 
departure from theatrical concerns towards a more purely musical outlook, but these 
                                                 
940 Cage, “Indeterminacy,” quoted in Kostelanetz, Conversing with Cage, 120. 
941 See Alliez and Martin, L’oeil-cerveau, 2. 
942 Ibid., 94. There was a failed attempt in Turin in 1979 (Silverman, Begin Again, 338). 
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cannot be distinguished so easily. For instance, the performative freedom written into 
the compositions – again, the performers constructing their scores from Cage’s broad 
instructions – does not predetermine the kinds of relations that take places, and as such 
we find a wide variety being produced in various ways – as Cage notes we will often 
find notes microtonally close in pitch being juxtaposed, “getting in each other’s way 
[…] so that they sounds will be, as it were, rubbing against each other”,943 but also 
curious textural combinations, or the rhythmic shock of percussive elements punctuating 
sustained string tones, even emergent melodic aspects and harmonic shifts. That many 
pieces were written using a very similar method says little of their performative 
potentials – while there are similarities between many of these pieces, there are also a 
great many divergences between both pieces and performances, a vast plurality of 
relations taking place at many levels between score and performance. 
 
In these pieces Cage achieves the remarkable simplicity which Deleuze & Guattari 
would ascribe to La Monte Young’s work, and on some levels many of these pieces bear 
similarities to Young’s pieces, often tending towards the static and singular, but in detail 
there are key points of distinction. Cage maintains the sober conditions of producing 
sounds, a careful understanding of the problem of sound and the loss of sensation that 
occurs when too much is added to the process, but this is not performed as a closure, 
rather a gesture making sonorous how relationality takes place unpredictably, without 
centre, without determination in advance. The lack of a theatrical aspect in these pieces 
is not a rejection of that principle – it can nevertheless be sensed on the edges of the 
performance, in the materiality of timbre, the moments of performative freedoms rising 
through the sonorous. Cage does not dismiss the modernist element of his thought in 
sound-space, nor even the classicist roots in the score, but they are positioned not as 
determining codes but as elements of a much wider machinery, their refinement and 
enclosure letting them act as a powerful creative force in relation to the other bodies 
they come into contact with. 
 
                                                 
943 Cage and Retallack, Musicage, 122. 
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Here composer, score, performer, listener, sounds, space, and beyond are not ‘linked’,944 
by any isomorphism or determining relation, but enter into relations through vibration, 
resonance, and forced movement, oriented towards what could be otherwise – “we do 
not know what a body can do”. These late works of Cage give sonorous bodies a space 
to sound, to articulate their inner differences and to open to an outside. This gives a new 
context to some of the dominant critiques of Cage we have encountered across the 
preceding chapters. Does Cage subsume all of sound into the hegemonic field of music? 
Does he open the subject to an indiscriminate outside with no concern for the ‘inside’? 
Only with a certain understanding of inside and outside. The understanding of inside 
and outside we reach through the machinic body, where the “interior is only a selected 
exterior, and the exterior, a projected interior”,945 resists posing this distinction as an 
opposition which must ultimately fall on one side or the other, and rather posits it as a 
relation of creation of experimentation, at once constructive and expressive. This 
refinement of an experimental relation between inside and outside is central to 
Deleuze’s late texts, particularly in the passage from the “thought of/from the outside” 
that his reading of Foucault circulates around946 to the notion of the brain as a “junction” 
in the closing pages What is Philosophy?,947 or as “this boundary of a continuous two-
way movement between Inside and Outside, this membrane between them”.948 It is 
through the nuanced exploration of this junction that the experimental practices of 
Deleuze and Cage attain their fullest articulation. 
  
                                                 
944 Cage, For the Birds, 129. 
945 Deleuze, Spinoza, 125. 
946 Deleuze, Foucault, 59. 
947 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 208. 
948 Deleuze, Negotiations, 176. 
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Conclusion 
 
We have followed Cage from an early concern with the opening of the field of music to 
noise, to a concern with letting ‘sounds be themselves’ and a concomitant disavowal of 
compositional intention, through to a productive engagement with a constellation of 
emerging artistic practices, and finally to a reinscription of this passage into the field of 
a renewed compositional process. These were bound together by an experimental 
practice, the form of which itself developed as it was practiced, increasingly leading to 
concerns of a shift from the ‘work’ or object to process, to the opening of the field of 
music to the other arts and to life itself, to the shifting and blurring of the roles of 
composer, performer, and listener, and to the accommodation of performative freedoms.  
 
The posing of Cage’s initial musical problems are inextricably implicated in questions 
of post-Kantian aesthetics, and with the passage into the 1950s and 1960s become 
likewise implicated in a phenomenological approach, first Husserlian and then Merleau-
Pontyan, and with structuralism, through both of which a constellation of experimental 
and critical approaches crystallized but likewise a series of impasses and tensions 
emerged. By staging a critical confrontation between Cage and Deleuze, we have 
situated ourselves within this constellation of interpenetrating musical, artistic, and 
philosophical conditions, and developed a notion of an experimental practice taking this 
historical situation as the basis for a projection into the future, towards the unexpected 
and unpredictable. At once the immanent unfolding of a historical practice and the 
enactment of a series of breaks and lines of flight away from the given, we have 
followed this experimental practice to an end point, always provisional, of a machinic 
theory of rhythmic modulation. 
 
This points towards many routes for future enquiry. While we have to some extent 
addressed the status of the GRM and IRCAM as musical institutions, and Cage’s own 
relation to a series of institutions, a Deleuze-Guattarian enquiry into the role of the 
musical institution at these historical junctures and elsewhere could be a fruitful line of 
research. Guattari is critical of the traditional musical institution, regarding its “musical 
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caste system” of conservatories, educational traditions, rules of composition and so on 
as an instance of a collectivity of musical production which “hamper[s] and delay[s] the 
force of deterritorialization inherent in music as such”.949 However, there could be much 
of interest in these non-traditional institutional settings we have considered in our 
discussions. Perhaps the critical challenge of music and music theory is also its site of 
potentiality. Despite the passage of more than half a century, mid-twentieth century 
musical experimentalism has in some respects yet to be weighed down by the distinct 
trajectories that mark art criticism and art theory – movements, schools, institutions – as 
they do the classical music tradition. While similar questions are present in the 
engagement with musical experimentalism, there remains a greater degree of 
indeterminacy pointing in directions and to connections still unexplored – hence the 
emergence of still quite new fields, in some sense still in formation, such as new 
musicology and cultural musicology, or sound studies. Music is still striving to 
determine its problematic field, a still mobile process of formalization. 
 
With regards to sound studies, a renewed understanding of Cage, beyond dominant 
reductive readings, could critically intervene in the impasses that have begun to mark 
this forming field. There would be, for instance, much to be said through our 
understanding of Cage with regards to the often tense relations between those areas of 
sound studies oriented towards understanding sound in a post-deconstructive textual 
manner,950 those connecting with new materialism and affect theory but perhaps at the 
expense of the semiotic depth and engagement with the field of sense of the former 
approach,951 and those which are steeped in a phenomenological discourse.952 Our 
reading of Cage offers points of connection to all three of these approaches, but without 
being reducible to any given one. 
 
More crucially to the status of this current project, in our final chapter we noted a 
                                                 
949 Guattari, “Towards a Micro-Politics of Desire,” in Molecular Revolution, 106-07. 
950 For example, Seth Kim-Cohen, In the Blink of an Ear, or Jonathan Sterne, The Audible Past. 
951 For instance, Cox, “Wie wird Musik zu einem organlosen Körper?”, Hainge, Noise Matters, or Steve 
Goodman, Sonic Warfare: Sound, Affect and the Ecology of Fear (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2010). 
952 For example Salomé Voegelin, Listening to Noise and Silence: Towards a Philosophy of Sound Art 
(New York: Continuum, 2010). 
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seeming blockage in the philosophy of Difference and Repetition of which some 
remnant persists in Deleuze’s work with Guattari, particularly in what can seem to be 
the heavily foreclosed creative space of What is Philosophy?. Here Deleuze & Guattari 
appear to pacify the remarkable freedoms sought in Anti-Oedipus and even the more 
sober and careful theory of creative involution found in A Thousand Plateaus. The 
autopoietic nature of the concept in What is Philosophy? bears some of the restrictive 
qualities found in the problematic Idea of Difference and Repetition, key among these 
being the difficulty in locating any kind of process of reciprocity between an embedded, 
historical practice and the constitution of the concept – between the pedagogy of the 
concept and the pedagogy of historical experience. 
 
We resist this formulation by turning to the concepts of rhythm, modulation, and the 
machine in order to justify a contextual, historical approach which is nevertheless not 
bound by its given conditions, a relation to context and history centered on the 
transformative capacities of an experimental practice. It is not enough, however, to 
simply accept the ‘blockage’ in Deleuze’s thought as a contingent point to be overcome 
through a theory of the machine. Rather, it is crucial that we understand this in terms of 
the extraordinarily stringent conditions for creation which are present in Difference and 
Repetition and which Deleuze reinvests in a different context in his final works. The late 
essay ‘Postscript on Control Societies’ is crucial in understanding this move. Here 
Deleuze raises the concern that with a transition from disciplinary society to control 
society we see a logic of modulation co-opted into the operations of the state,953 in terms 
that sound almost like a self-critique directed towards the Deleuze & Guattari of A 
Thousand Plateaus. 
 
It is on this basis that the line between creation rightly speaking and the discourse of 
‘creativity’ we find in the “disciplines of communication”954 – of enterprise, marketing, 
‘ideas men’, but also paralleled in the later critique of conceptual art – cannot be easily 
drawn, and perhaps why Deleuze returns to such a seemingly foreclosed model 
                                                 
953 Deleuze, Negotiations, 178. 
954 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 10. 
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regarding the legitimation of creation.955  
 
There are moments where we would say that Deleuze resists too much the conditions of 
history, culture, or biography, as in his declining to consider even strikingly pertinent 
biographical features in his study of Bacon – for example the depiction of homosexual 
sex in Two Figures and Two Figures in the Grass. Here there is perhaps a tension 
between the refusal to overdeterminatively narrativize painting, to allow its discourse to 
circulate through information and representation, and the exclusion of a problematic 
condition for Bacon’s work in the question of homosexuality. This could likewise be 
linked to Cage’s reticence regarding his own sexuality. There is no simple resolution to 
the tensions that persist here, and even Deleuze’s critical encounters with Kant, with 
phenomenology, and with structuralism cannot be considered closed. Engaging with 
these persisting tensions will be central to any future research. 
 
We have addressed the problem of Cage’s politics only in passing, and here too the 
question of control is central. There is, for instance, Branden Joseph’s claim that Cage’s 
understanding of power does not develop beyond understanding it as sovereign, with 
freedom consisting in the dissolution of this sovereign power.956 This understanding is 
reflected in Cage’s statements of remarkably simplistic, reductive, and perhaps naïve 
political sentiments – for instance, speaking of the Black Power movement to note that 
 
If blacks free themselves from the laws whites invented to protect themselves from the 
blacks, that’s well and good. But if they in turn want to invent laws, that is, to wield 
power in exactly the same way as whites, what will the difference be? There are only a 
few blacks who understand that with the laws that will protect them from the whites, 
they will just be new whites. They will have come to power over the whites, but nothing 
will change […] Music demonstrates what an ecologically balanced situation could 
be – one in which whites would not have more power than blacks, and blacks no more 
than whites.957 
 
                                                 
955 See Alberto Toscano, “In Praise of Negativism,” in Deleuze, Guattari and the Production of the New, 
ed. Simon O’Sullivan and Stephen Zepke (London ; New York: Continuum, 2008). 
956 Joseph, Beyond the Dream Syndicate, 135. Also of interest in this regard would be an enquiry into 
Cage’s ‘anarchism’, a “radical individualism” (Silverman, Begin Again, 109) which Benjamin Piekut all-
too-quickly reduces to a form of liberalism (Piekut, Experimentalism Otherwise, 23-24) but which we 
believe could produce a more interesting network of connections. 
957 Cage, For the Birds, 230-31. 
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Whatever the nobility of sentiment there nevertheless appears to be a dearth of 
engagement with the subtlety and complexity of the power relations that concerned the 
Black Power movement, and while we believe that our final understanding of a Cage 
whose practice is articulated through a careful and complex theory of rhythmic 
modulation mitigates the reduction his theory to one of sovereign power, these questions 
must nevertheless be confronted directly. As much as the nuance and richness of Cage’s 
experimental musical practice stands in contrast to such blunt political pronouncements, 
the relation between the two must be worked through. 
 
The connection to Black Power points towards another seeming impasse in Cage’s 
work, but one which we believe could produce a rich avenue for future research, namely 
in Cage’s relation to jazz. Cage does not appear intrinsically hostile to the notion of jazz 
as an experimental music, but does question it as it is practiced, suggesting that in most 
cases jazz improvisation “resembles a conversation”,958 not experimental discovery but 
a recourse to memory and to a kind of musical egoism which his own procedures of 
chance and indeterminacy sought to evacuate. 
 
Cage’s attitude is indicative of what George E. Lewis has called the ‘Eurological’ 
approach to improvisation, wherein the white avant-garde obscures what it has 
borrowed from jazz improvisation by adopting it into its own approach, through 
techniques such as indeterminacy, constituting an othering of jazz composers and 
performers which reveals “whiteness as power”.959 For Lewis a racial space has been 
delineated through qualifiers to the word ‘music’ – ‘experimental’, ‘new’, ‘art’, 
‘concert’, ‘serious’, ‘avant-garde’, ‘contemporary’ – from which traditionally black 
practices have been excluded.960 At a more theoretical level, this also concerns an 
                                                 
958 Cage, For the Birds, 171. 
959 George E. Lewis, “Improvised Music after 1950: Afrological and Eurological Perspectives,” in Black 
Music Research Journal 16:1 (Spring, 1996): 99-100. 
960 Ibid., 102. A result of this is the construction of a black avant-garde in the Black Arts Movement – see, 
for example, Jason Robinson, “The Challenge of the Changing Same: The Jazz Avant-Garde of the 1960s, 
the Black Aesthetic, and the Black Arts Movement,” in Critical Studies in Improvisation 1:2 (2005): 20-
36. Amiri Baraka, the founder of the Black Arts Movement, for a period moved in the same artistic and 
social circles as Cage (See Amiri Baraka, The Autobiography of LeRoi Jones (New York: Freundlich 
Books, 1984), 185-86), and his theory could offer an interesting point of connection between the two 
traditions. 
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understanding of rhythm to which the rhythms of jazz have been deemed inimical, as in 
Messiaen’s dismissal of syncopation in describing jazz as “non-rhythmic music which is 
thought rhythmic”.961 
 
While Cage makes no notable gesture in the direction of jazz in his later works, his 
reinvestment in questions of performative freedom and specifically improvisation is of 
note here. This comes at the end of a long process of determining conditions of 
experimentation and is realized, we have argued, through the freedoms that are offered 
by a compositional, performative, and listening practice which could be characterized in 
terms of a machinic assemblage operating through rhythmic modulation. Indeed, such a 
model has served to connect Deleuze & Guattari’s thought to jazz improvisation in the 
work of Nick Nesbitt,962 and Jeremy Gilbert has likewise engaged on the question of 
improvisation more generally.963 As George Lewis argues, a more nuanced view of 
improvised music than that of the white avant-garde “might identify as more salient 
differentiating characteristics its welcoming of agency, social necessity, personality, and 
difference, as well as its strong relationship to popular and folk cultures”,964 a statement 
we would apply also to rhythm. This offers a basis for a critical re-engagement on the 
level of these two terms, rhythm and improvisation, beyond the restrictive version that 
motivates an exclusionary avant-garde. By taking on the subtlety of Cage’s late 
experimental allowance of collective improvisation in its fullest, we believe an approach 
to a relation across musical practices could take place precisely through the question of 
rhythm, and serve as the catalyst for a productive encounter between ‘Eurological’ and 
‘Afrological’ approaches. 965 
  
                                                 
961 Messiaen, Music and Color, 68. 
962 Noting the “instrument-club-musician-head-solo-influences-practice-time-mood assemblage”, see Nick 
Nesbitt, “Critique and Clinique: From Sounding Bodies to the Musical Event,” in Sounding the Virtual, 
159. 
963 Speaking of a blurring of the lines between “composers, producers, performers and audiences”. Jeremy 
Gilbert, “Becoming-Music: The Rhizomatic Movement of Improvisation,” in Deleuze and Music, ed. Ian 
Buchanan and Marcel Swiboda (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), 120. 
964 Lewis, “Improvised Music after 1950,” 110. 
965 I provide a sketch of this trajectory in Iain Campbell, “Avant-Gardes, Afrofuturism, and Philosophical 
Readings of Rhythm,” in Afrofuturism 2.0: The Rise of Astro-Blackness, vol. 2 [title tbc], ed. Reynaldo 
Anderson and Charles E. Jones (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, forthcoming 2016).  
267 
 
Bibliography 
 
 
Adorno, Theodor W., Aesthetic Theory, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor. London ; New 
York: Continuum, 1997. 
 
Adorno, Theodor W., Sound Figures, trans. Rodney Livingstone. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1999. 
 
Adorno, Theodor W., Essays on Music, trans. Susan H. Gillespie, ed. Richard Leppert. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002. 
 
Adorno, Theodor W., Philosophy of New Music, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor. 
Minneapolis ; London: University of Minnesota Press, 2006. 
 
Alliez, Éric, De l’impossibilité de la phénoménologie: Sur la philosophie français 
contemporaine. Paris: Vrin, 1995. 
 
Alliez, Éric, “On Deleuze’s Bergsonism,” trans. Tom Conley and Melissa McMuhan. In 
Discourse 20:3 (Fall 1998): 226-246. 
 
Alliez, Éric, The Signature of the World, Or, What is Deleuze and Guattari’s 
Philosophy?, trans. Eliot Ross Albert and Alberto Toscano. New York ; London: 
Continuum, 2004. 
 
Alliez, Éric, and Jean-Clet Martin, L’oeil-cerveau: nouvelles histoire de la peinture 
modern. Paris: Vrin, 2007. 
 
Alliez, Éric, “Undoing the Image.” In Aesthetics and Contemporary Art, ed. Armen 
Avanessian and Luke Skrebowski. Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2011. 
 
Alliez, Éric, “Structuralism’s Afters: Tracing Transdisciplinarity through Guattari and 
Latour.” In Theory, Culture & Society Special Issue: Trandisciplinary Problematics 
(2015): 1-20. 
 
Altshuler, Bruce, “The Cage Class.” In FluxAttitudes, ed. Cornelia Lauf and Susan 
Hapgood. Gent: Imschoot, 1991. 
 
Anderson, Virginia, “The Beginning of Happiness: Approaching Scores in Graphic and 
Text Notation.” In Sound & Score: Essays on Sound, Score and Notation, ed. Paulo de 
Assis, William Brooks, and Kathleen Coessens. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2014. 
 
Ansell-Pearson, Keith, Germinal Life: The Difference and Repetition of Deleuze. 
Routledge, London: 1999. 
 
 
268 
 
Artaud, Antonin, The Theatre and Its Double, trans. Mary Caroline Richards. New York: 
Grove Press, 1958. 
 
Artaud, Antonin, Artaud Anthology, ed. and trans. Jack Hirschman. San Francisco: City 
Lights Books, 1965. 
 
Attali, Jacques Noise: The Political Economy of Music, trans. Brian Massumi. 
Minneapolis ; London: University of Minnesota Press, 1985. 
 
Augst, Bertrand, “Descartes’s Compendium on Music.” In Journal of the History of 
Ideas 26, no.1 (1965): 119-132. 
 
Bachelard, Gaston, The Poetics of Space, trans. Maria Jolas. Boston: Beacon Press, 
1969. 
 
Badiou, Alain, “Philosophy and Psychoanalysis,” trans. Raphael Comprone and Marcus 
Coelen. In Umbr(a) 1:1 (1996): 19-26. 
 
Badiou, Alain, Deleuze: The Clamor of Being, trans. Louise Burchill. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2008. 
 
Badiou, Alain, Theory of the Subject, trans. Bruno Bosteels. London: Continuum, 2009. 
 
Balibar, Étienne, “Structuralism: A Destitution of the Subject?,” trans. James Swenson. 
In differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 14:1 (2003): 1-21. 
 
Baraka, Amiri, The Autobiography of LeRoi Jones. New York: Freundlich Books, 1984. 
 
Bardin, Andrea, Epistemology and Political Philosophy in Gilbert Simondon: 
Individuation, Technics, Social Systems. Dordrecht: Springer, 2015. 
 
Battier, Marc, “What the GRM brought to music: from musique concrète to acousmatic 
music.” In Organized Sound 12:3 (December 2007): 189-202. 
 
Bell, Clive, Art. Chatto and Windus: London, 1914. 
 
Bell, Jeffrey A., The Problem of Difference: Phenomenology and Poststructuralism. 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998. 
 
Bennett, David, “Checking the Post: Music, Postmodernism, or Post-Postmodernism.” 
In New Formations 66 (2009): 7-27. 
 
Berger, Maurice, Labyrinths: Robert Morris, Minimalism, and the 1960s. New York: 
Harper & Row, 1989. 
 
 
269 
 
Bergson, Henri, Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell. New York: The Modern 
Library, 1944. 
 
Bernstein, David. W, “‘In Order to Thicken the Plot’: Towards a Critical Reception of 
Cage’s Music.” In Writings through John Cage’s Music, Poetry, and Art, ed. David W. 
Bernstein and Christopher Hatch. Chicago ; London: The University of Chicago Press, 
2001. 
 
Betancourt, Michael, “Chance Operations/Limiting Framworks: Sensitive Dependence 
on Initial Conditions.” In Tout-fait: The Marcel Duchamp Studies Online Journal 2:4 
(January 2002). Accessed 23/09/2015 http://toutfait.com/chance-operations-limiting-
frameworks-sensitive-dependence-on-initial-conditions/ 
 
Black, Colin, “International Perspectives on the Historic Intersections of Electroacoustic 
Music and the Radio Medium.” In Organized Sound 19:2 (August 2014): 182-191. 
 
Boivin, Jean, “Messiaen’s Teaching at the Paris Conservatoire: A Humanist’s Legacy.” 
In Messiaen’s Mystical Language of Love, ed. Siglind Bruhn. New York ; Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2012. 
 
Bondanella, Peter, Umberto Eco and the Open Text: Semiotics, Fiction, Popular 
Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
 
Born, Georgina, Rationalizing Culture: IRCAM, Boulez, and the Institutionalization of 
the Musical Avant-Garde. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995. 
 
Boulez, Pierre, “Alea,” trans. David Noakes and Paul Jacobs. In Perspectives of New 
Music 3:1 (Autumn – Winter, 1964): 42-53. 
 
Boulez, Pierre, Notes of an Apprenticeship, trans. Herbert Weinstock. New York: Knopf, 
1968. 
 
Boulez, Pierre, Boulez on Music Today, trans. Susan Bradshaw and Richard Rodney 
Bennett. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971. 
 
Boulez, Pierre, Orientations: Collected Writings, ed. Jean-Jacques Nattiez, trans. Martin 
Cooper. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986. 
 
Boulez, Pierre, and John Cage, The Boulez-Cage Correspondence, trans. Robert Samuel, 
ed. Jean-Jacques Nattiez and Robert Samuel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993. 
 
Bouveresse, “Philosophy from an Antiphilosopher: Paul Valéry.” In Critical Inquiry 
21:2 (Winter, 1995): 354-381. 
 
 
270 
 
Bowden, Sean, “Gilles Deleuze, a Reader of Gilbert Simondon.” In Gilbert Simondon: 
Being and Technology, ed. Arne de Boever, Alex Murray, Jon Roffe and Ashley 
Woodward. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012. 
 
Bowie, Malcolm, “Lacan and Mallarmé: Theory as Word-Play.” In Meetings with 
Mallarmé in Contemporary French Culture, ed. Michael Temple. Exeter: Exeter 
University Press, 1998. 
 
Brassier, Ray, “Stellar Void or Cosmic Animal? Badiou and Deleuze.” In Pli: Warwick 
Journal of Philosophy 10 (2000): 200-17. 
 
Bryant, Levi, Difference and Givenness: Deleuze’s Transcendental Empiricism and the 
Ontology of Immanence. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2008. 
 
Buchanan, Brett, Onto-Ethologies: The Animal Environments of Uexküll, Heidegger, 
Merleau-Ponty, and Deleuze. Albany: SUNY Press, 2008. 
 
Buchloh, Benjamin H. D., “A Conversation with Robert Morris in 1985.” In Robert 
Morris: October Files 15. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2013. 
 
Bürger, Peter, Theory of the Avant-Garde, trans. Michael Shaw. Minneapolis, University 
of Minnesota Press, 1984. 
 
Cabanne, Pierre, Dialogues with Marcel Duchamp, trans. Ron Padgett. New York: 
Viking Press, 1971. 
 
Cage, John, Silence: Lectures and Writings. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University 
Press, 1961. 
 
Cage, John, A Year from Monday: New Lectures and Writings. Middletown, Conn.: 
Wesleyan University Press, 1968. 
 
Cage, John, M: Writings ‘67-’72. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1973. 
 
Cage, John, For the Birds: In Conversation with Daniel Charles. London ; New York: 
Marion Boyars, 1976. 
 
Cage, John, Empty Words: Writings ‘73-’78. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University 
Press, 1981. 
 
Cage, John, X: Writings ‘79-’82. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1983. 
 
Cage, John, I-VI. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990. 
 
Cage, John, “On the Work of Nam June Paik.” In Nam June Paik: Video Time, Video 
Space, ed. Toni Stooss and Thomas Kellein. New York: Harry Abrams Publishers, 1993. 
271 
 
Cage, John, John Cage: Writer, ed. Richard Kostelanetz. New York: Cooper Square 
Press, 1993. 
 
Cage, John and Joan Retallack, Musicage: Cage Muses on Words Art Music. Hanover ; 
London: Wesleyan University Press, 1996. 
 
Campbell, Edward, Boulez, Music and Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010. 
 
Campbell, Edward, Music After Deleuze. London: Bloomsbury, 2013. 
 
Campbell, Iain “Avant-Gardes, Afrofuturism, and Philosophical Readings of Rhythm.” 
In Afrofuturism 2.0: The Rise of Astro-Blackness, vol. 2 [title tbc], ed. Reynaldo 
Anderson and Charles E. Jones. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, forthcoming 2016. 
 
Cazenave, Catherine, “Le coup de dès ou l’affirmation du hazard.” In Cahiers Critique 
de Philosophie 2 (Avril 2006): 103-16. 
 
Chanan, Michael, Musica Practica: The Social Practice of Western Music from 
Gregorian Chant to Postmodernism. London ; New York: Verso, 1994. 
 
Charles, Daniel, “Entr’acte: ‘Formal’ or ‘Informal’ Music?” In The Musical Quarterly, 
51:1 (Jan., 1965): 144-165. 
 
Charles, Daniel, “Figuration and Prefiguration: Notes on Some New Graphic Notions.” 
In Writings about John Cage, ed. Richard Kostelanetz. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1993. 
 
Chion, Michel, Guide des objets sonores: Pierre Schaeffer et la recherché musicale. 
Paris: Institute National de l’Audiovisuel/Chastel, 1983. 
 
Chukwu, Peter, Competing Interpretations of Husserl’s Noema: Gurwitsch Versus Smith 
and McIntyre. New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2009. 
 
Combes, Muriel, Gilbert Simondon and the Philosophy of the Transindividual, trans. 
Thomas LaMarre. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013. 
 
Conrad, Tony, “Inside the Dream Syndicate.” In Film Culture 41 (Summer 1966): 5-8. 
 
Cook, Nicholas, Music, Imagination, and Culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1992. 
 
Cowell, Henry, “Drums along the Pacific.” In Modern Music (Nov-Dec 1940): 46-49. 
 
 
 
272 
 
Cox, Christoph, “Wie wird Musik zu einem organlosen Körper? Gilles Deleuze und 
experimentale Elektronika.” In Soundcultures: Über digitale und elektronische Musik, 
ed. Marcus S. Kleiner and Achim Szepanski. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2003. 
Accessed 18/09/2015 http://faculty.hampshire.edu/ccox/Cox-Soundcultures.pdf 
 
Cunningham, Merce, The Dancer and the Dance: In Conversation with Jacqueline 
Lesschaeve. New York: Marion Boyars, 1985. 
 
Dahlhaus, Carl, “Qu’est-ce que l’improvisation musicale?,” trans. Marion Siéfert and 
Lucille Lisack. In Tracés: Revue de Sciences humaines 18 (2010). Accessed 25/09/2015 
http://traces.revues.org/4597 
 
Debussy, Claude, Debussy on Music, ed. and trans. François Lesure and Richard 
Langham Smith. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977. 
 
Delalande, François, “The technological era of ‘sound’: a challenge for musicology and 
a new range of social practices.” In Organized Sound, 12:3 (December 2007): 251-258. 
 
Deleuze, Gilles, Anti-Oedipe et Mille Plateaux – Cours Vincennes, 27/02/1979. 
Accessed 26/09/2015. 
http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/texte.php?cle=186&groupe=Anti+Oedipe+et+Mille+P
lateaux&langue=2 
 
Deleuze, Gilles, Cours 17 du 05/05/81- 3, transcribed Sandra Tomassi. Accessed 
17/09/2015. http://www2.univ-paris8.fr/deleuze/article.php3?id_article=83 
 
Deleuze, Gilles, Kant’s Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties, trans. Hugh 
Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1984. 
 
Deleuze, Gilles, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, trans. Robert Hurley. San Francisco: 
City Lights, 1988. 
 
Deleuze, Gilles, The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1990. 
 
Deleuze, Gilles, Bergsonism, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. New 
York: Zone Books, 1991. 
 
Deleuze, Gilles. Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume’s Theory of Human 
Nature, trans. Constantin V. Boundas. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991. 
 
Deleuze, Gilles, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton. New York ; London: 
Continuum, 1994. 
 
Deleuze, Gilles, Negotiations: 1972-1990, trans. Martin Joughin. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1995. 
273 
 
Deleuze, Gilles, Essays Critical and Clinical, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. 
Greco. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1997. 
 
Deleuze, Gilles, Desert Islands and Other Texts 1953-1974, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. 
Michael Taormina. Los Angeles ; New York: Semiotext(e), 2004. 
 
Deleuze, Gilles, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, trans. Daniel W. Smith. 
London ; New York: Continuum, 2004. 
 
Deleuze, Gilles, Foucault, trans. Séan Hand. London ; New York: Continuum, 2006. 
 
Deleuze, Gilles, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson. New York ; London: 
Continuum, 2006. 
 
Deleuze, Gilles, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. Tom Conley. London: 
Continuum, 2006. 
 
Deleuze, Gilles, Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975-1995, trans. Ames 
Hodges and Mike Taormina. New York: Semiotext(e), 2006. 
 
Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. 
Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1983. 
 
Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi. Minneapolis ; London: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1987. 
 
Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and 
Graham Burchell. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994. 
 
Deleuze, Gilles and Claire Parnet, Dialogues II, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara 
Habberjam. London ; New York: Continuum, 2006. 
 
DeLio, Thomas, Circumscribing the Open Universe: Essays on Cage, Feldman, Wolff, 
Ashley and Lucier. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984. 
 
Derrida, Jacques, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore ; 
London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1976. 
 
Descartes, René, Compendium of Music, trans. Walter Robert. Rome: American Institute 
of Musicology, 1961. 
 
Dillon, M. C., “Merleau-Ponty and the Reversibility Thesis.” In Man and World 16 
(1983): 365-388. 
 
274 
 
Dillon, M. C., Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988. 
 
Dohoney, Ryan, “Charlotte Moorman’s Experimental Performance Practice.” in 
Charlotte Moorman and the Avant-Garde, 1960-1980, ed. Corrine Granoff. Evanston, 
Ill.: Northwestern University Press, forthcoming 2016. 
 
Dosse, François, Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives, trans. Deborah 
Glassman. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010. 
 
Duve, Thierry de, Pictorial Nominalism: On Marcel Duchamp’s Passage from Painting 
to the Readymade, trans. Dana Polan with the author. Minneapolis ; Oxford: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1991. 
 
Duve, Thierry de, Kant After Duchamp. Cambridge, Mass. ; London: The MIT Press, 
1996. 
 
Eco, Umberto, La structure absente: Introduction à la recherché sémiotique. Paris: 
Mercure de France, 1972. 
 
Eco, Umberto, The Open Work, trans. Anna Cancogni. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1989. 
 
Erlmann, Veit, Reason and Resonance: A History of Modern Aurality. New York: Zone 
Books, 2010. 
 
Evens, Aden, Sound Ideas: Music, Machines, and Experience. Minneapolis, University 
of Minnesota Press, 2003. 
 
Eyers, Tom, Lacan and the Concept of the ‘Real’. Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012. 
 
Fallon, Robert, “Self-Portraits of Boulez: Reflexivity in the Incises and Anthèmes 
Works,” delivered at Exploring the Labyrinth: An international study day on the music 
of Pierre Boulez. Southbank Centre, London, 1 October 2011. 
 
Feldman, Morton, Morton Feldman Essays, ed. Walter Zimmermann. Kerpen, West 
Germany: Beginner Press, 1985. 
 
Fetterman, William, John Cage’s Theatre Pieces: Notations and Performances. 
Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1996. 
 
Fink, Bruce, The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1994. 
 
Foster, Hal, “Postmodernism: A Preface.” In Postmodern Culture, ed. Hal Foster. 
London: Pluto Press, 1983. 
275 
 
Foucault, Michel and Pierre Boulez, “Contemporary Music and the Public.” In 
Perspectives of New Music 24:1 (Fall-Winter, 1985): 6-12. 
 
Foucault, Michel, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A. M. Sheridan. London: 
Routledge, 2002. 
 
Foucault, Michel, The Order of Things: An archaeology of the human sciences. London 
; New York: Routledge Classics, 2002. 
 
Fried, Michael, “Art and Objecthood.” In Minimal Art: A Critical Anthology, ed. 
Gregory Battcock. Berkeley ; Los Angeles ; London: University of California Press, 
1995. 
 
Gable, David “Words for the Surface: Boulez, Stockhausen, and ‘Allover’ Painting.” In 
Variations on the Canon: Essays on Music from Back to Boulez in Honor of Charles 
Rosen on His Eightieth Birthday, ed. Robert Curry, David Gable, and Robert Lewis 
Marshall. Rochester, New York: University of Rochester Press, 2008. 
 
Gallet, Bastien, “Techniques électroniques et art musical : son, geste, écriture.” In Revue 
des musiques populaires 1:1 (2002): 17-28 
 
Gangle, Rocco, “Divinatory Chances.” In SubStance 39:1 (2010): 76-86. 
 
Gann, Kyle, “La Monte Young’s The Well-Tuned Piano.” In Perspectives of New Music 
31:1 (Winter 1993): 134-162. 
 
Gann, Kyle, “Thankless Attempts at a Definition of Minimalism.” In Audio Culture: 
Readings in Modern Music, ed. Christoph Cox and Daniel Warner. London ; New York: 
Continuum, 2004. 
 
Gann, Kyle, No Such Thing as Silence: John Cage’s 4’33”. New Haven ; London: Yale 
University Press, 2010. 
 
Gayou, Évelyne, “The GRM: landmarks on a historic route.” In Organised Sound 12:3 
(December 2007): 203-211. 
 
Gilbert, Jeremy and Ewan Pearson, Discographies: Dance Music, Culture and the 
Politics of Sound. London: Routledge, 1999. 
 
Gilbert, Jeremy, “Becoming-Music: The Rhizomatic Movement of Improvisation.” In 
Deleuze and Music, ed. Ian Buchanan and Marcel Swiboda. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2004. 
 
Goddard, Michael, Benjamin Halligan and Paul Hegarty, ed. Reverberations: The 
Philosophy, Aesthetics and Politics of Noise. London: Continuum, 2012. 
 
276 
 
Goddard, Michael, Benjamin Halligan and Nicola Spielman, ed. Resonances: Noise and 
Contemporary Music. London: Bloomsbury, 2013. 
 
Goehr, Lydia, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay on the Philosophy of 
Music. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. 
 
Goldman, Jonathan, “Structuralists contra Serialists? Claude Lévi-Strauss and Pierre 
Boulez on Avant-Garde Music.” In Intersections: Canadian Journal of Music 30:1 
(2010): 77-94. 
 
Goodman, Nelson, Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols. Indianapolis 
; New York ; Kansas City: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1968. 
 
Goodman, Steve, Sonic Warfare: Sound, Affect and the Ecology of Fear. Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 2010. 
 
Greenberg, Clement, Art and Culture: Critical Essays. Boston: Beacon Press, 1961. 
 
Greenberg, Clement, The Collected Essays and Criticism, Volume 4: Modernism with a 
Vengeance, 1957-1969, ed. John O’Brian. Chicago ; London: University of Chicago 
Press, 1993. 
 
Greenberg, Clement, “Recentness of Sculpture.” In Minimal Art: A Critical Anthology, 
ed. Gregory Battcock. Berkeley ; Los Angeles ; London: University of California Press, 
1995. 
 
Griffiths, Paul, Modern Music: A Concise History from Debussy to Boulez. London ; 
New York: Thames and Hudson, 1978. 
 
Grubbs, David, Records Ruin the Landscape: John Cage, the Sixties, and Sound 
Recording. Durham: Duke University Press, 2014. 
 
Guattari, Félix, Molecular Revolution: Psychiatry and Politics, trans. Rosemary Sheed. 
New York: Penguin, 1984. 
 
Guattari, Félix, Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm, trans. Paul Bains and 
Julian Pefanis. Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1995. 
 
Guattari, Félix, “Ritornellos and Existential Affects,” trans. J. Schiesari and G. Van Den 
Abeele. In The Guattari Reader, ed. Gary Genosko. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996. 
 
Guattari, Félix, The Machinic Unconscious: Essays in Schizoanalysis, trans. Taylor 
Adkins. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2011. 
 
Gurwitsch, Aaron, Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology. Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1966. 
277 
 
Hainge, Greg, Noise Matters: Towards an Ontology of Noise. London: Bloomsbury, 
2013. 
 
Hall, Patricia and Friedemann Sallis, ed. A Handbook to Twentieth-Century Musical 
Sketches. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
 
Hallward, Peter, Out of this World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation. London: 
Verso, 2006. 
 
Hamilton, Andy, Aesthetics and Music. London: Continuum, 2007. 
 
Hanslick, Eduard, The Beautiful in Music, trans. Gustav Cohen. New York: The Liberal 
Arts Press, 1957. 
 
Haskins, Rob, John Cage. London: Reaktion Books, 2012.. 
 
Hayles, N. Katherine, “Chance Operations: Cagean Paradox and Contemporary 
Science.” In John Cage: Composed in America, ed. Marjorie Perloff and Charles 
Junkerman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994. 
 
Hegarty, Paul, Noise/Music: A History. London: Continuum, 2010. 
 
Helmholtz, Hermann, On the Sensations of Tone as a Physiological Basis for the Theory 
of Music, trans. Alexander J. Mellis. New York: Dover Publications, 1954. 
 
Helmreich, Stefan, “Seashell Sound.” In Cabinet 48 (Winter 2012/13). Accessed 
18/09/2015 - http://www.cabinetmagazine.org/issues/48/helmreich.php 
 
Henderson, Linda, The Fourth Dimension and Non-Euclidean Geometry in Modern Art. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983. 
 
Herder, Johann Gottfried, Selected Writings on Aesthetics, trans. and ed. Gregory 
Moore. Princeton: Priceton University Press, 2006. 
 
Holmes, Thom, Electronic and Experimental Music: Pioneers in Technology and 
Composition, second edition. New York ; London: Routledge, 2002. 
 
Husserl, Edmund, Cartesian Meditations, trans. Dorion Cairns. The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1960. 
 
Husserl, Edmund, Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a 
phenomenological philosophy: first book, trans. F. Kersten. Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1998. 
 
Husserl, Edmund, Logical Investigations, Volume II, trans. J. N. Findlay. Abingdon, 
Routledge, 2001. 
278 
 
Husserl, Edmund and Ludwig Landgrebe, Experience and Judgement, trans. James L 
Churchill and Karl Ameriks. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1973. 
 
Hyer, Brian, “Before Rameau and after.” In Music Analysis 15, no. 1 (1996): 75-100. 
 
Iamblichus, Life of Pythagoras or Pythagoric Life, trans. Thomas Taylor. London: J.M. 
Watkins, 1818. 
 
Iddon, Martin, John Cage and David Tudor: Correspondence on Interpretation and 
Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
 
James, Richard S., Expansion of Sound Resources in France, 1913-1940, and Its 
Relationship to Electronic Music. PhD dissertation: University of Michigan, 1981. 
 
Jameux, Dominique, Pierre Boulez, trans. Susan Bradshaw. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991. 
 
Jensen, Marc G., “John Cage, Chance Operations, and the Chaos Game: Cage and the I 
Ching.” In The Musical Times 150:1907 (Summer, 2009): 97-102. 
 
Johnson, James. H., Listening in Paris: A Cultural History. Berkeley ; Los Angeles ; 
London: University of California Press, 1995. 
 
Joseph, Branden W., “Robert Morris and John Cage: Reconstructing a Dialogue.” In 
October 81 (Summer, 1997): 59-69. 
 
Joseph, Branden W., Random Order: Robert Rauschenberg and the Neo-Avant-Garde, 
Cambridge, Mass. ; London: The MIT Press, 2003. 
 
Joseph, Branden W., “Chance, Indeterminacy, Multiplicity.” In The Anarchy of Silence: 
John Cage and Experimental Art, ed. Julia Robinson. Barcelona: Museu d’Art 
Contemporani de Barcelona, 2009. 
 
Joseph, Branden W., Beyond the Dream Syndicate: Tony Conrad and the Arts after Cage 
(A “Minor” History). New York: Zone Books, 2011. 
 
Judd, Frederick Charles, Electronic Music and Musique Concrète. London: Neville 
Spearman, 1961. 
 
Kahn, Douglas, “Track Organology.” in October 55 (Winter, 1990): 67-78. 
 
Kahn, Douglas, Noise, Water, Meat: A History of Sound in the Arts. Cambridge, Mass. ; 
London: The MIT Press, 1999. 
 
Kandinsky, Wassily, Complete Writings on Art, trans. Peter Vergo, ed. Kenneth C. 
Lindsay and Peter Vergo. Boston, Mass.: Da Capo Press, 1994. 
279 
 
Kandinsky, Wassily, Concerning the Spiritual in Art, trans. Michael T. H. Sadler. 
Auckland: The Floating Press, 2008. 
 
Kane, Brian, Sound Unseen: Acousmatic Sound in Theory and Practice. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014. 
 
Kaneda, Miki and Tone Yasunao, “The ‘John Cage Shock’ Is a Fiction! Interview with 
Tone Yasunao.” In Post: Notes on Modern & Contemporary Art Around the Globe 
(March 8, 2013). Accessed 21/09/2015 http://post.at.moma.org/content_items/178-the-
john-cage-shock-is-a-fiction-interview-with-tone-yasunao-1 
 
Kant, Immanuel, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Present 
Itself as a Science, trans. P. Gray-Lucas. Manchester, Manchester University Press, 
1953. 
 
Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
 
Kant, Immanuel, Critique of the Power of Judgement, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric 
Matthews. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
 
Katz, Jonathan, “John Cage’s Queer Silence; or. How to Avoid Making Matters Worse.” 
In Writings through John Cage’s Music, Poetry, and Art, ed. David W. Bernstein and 
Christopher Hatch. Chicago ; London: The University of Chicago Press, 2001. 
 
Kim, Rebecca Y., “The Formalization of Indeterminacy in 1958.” In John Cage: 
October Files 12, ed. Julia Robinson. Cambridge, Mass ; London: The MIT Press, 2011. 
 
Kim-Cohen, Seth, In the Blink of an Ear: Towards a Non-Cochlear Sound Art. London: 
Bloomsbury, 2009. 
 
Kirby, Michael, Happenings: An Illustrated Anthology. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 
1965. 
 
Kivy, Peter, Music Alone: Philosophical Reflections on the Purely Musical Experience. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990. 
 
Kostelanetz, Richard, ed. John Cage. London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1971. 
 
Kostelanetz, Richard, The Theatre of Mixed-Means: An Introduction to Happenings, 
Kinetic Environments, and Other Mixed-Means Presentations. New York: RK Editions, 
1980. 
 
Kostelanetz, Richard, Conversing with Cage, second edition. New York, London: 
Routledge, 2003. 
 
280 
 
Krauss, Rosalind, “Sense and Sensibility: Reflection on Post ‘60s Sculpture.” In 
Artforum 12:3 (November 1973): 43-52. 
 
Krauss, Rosalind E., Passages in Modern Sculpture. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 
1981. 
 
Krauss, Rosalind, “Sculpture in the Expanded Field.” In The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on 
Postmodern Culture, ed. Hal Foster. Port Townsend, Washington: Bay Press, 1983. 
 
Krauss, Rosalind, The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths. 
Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1985. 
 
LaBelle, Brandon, Background Noise: Perspectives on Sound Art. New York: 
Continuum, 2006. 
 
Lacan, Jacques, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Seminar XI: The Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psychoanalysis, trans. Alan Sheridan. New York ; London: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 1998. 
 
Lacan, Jacques, Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English, trans. Bruce Fink. New 
York ; London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006. 
 
Lefort, Claude, “Flesh and Otherness.” In Ontology and Alterity in Merleau-Ponty, ed. 
Galen A. Johnson and Michael B. Smith. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University 
Press, 1990. 
 
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Philosophical Essays, trans. Roger Ariew and Daniel 
Garber. Indianapolis ; Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989. 
 
Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim, Laocoon: An Essay upon the Limits of Painting and Poetry, 
trans. Ellen Frothingham. Mineola, N.Y.: Dover, 2005. 
 
Lévi-Strauss, Claude, The Raw and the Cooked: Introduction to a Science of Mythology, 
trans. John and Doreen Weightman. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1986. 
 
Lewis, George E., “Improvised Music after 1950: Afrological and Eurological 
Perspectives.” In Black Music Research Journal 16:1 (Spring, 1996): 91-122. 
 
Lord, Beth, Kant and Spinozism: Transcendental Idealism and Immanence from Jacobi 
to Deleuze. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. 
 
Lotringer, Sylvère, “Becoming Duchamp.” In Tout-fait: The Marcel Duchamp Studies 
Online Journal 1:2 (May 2000). Accessed 23/09/2015 
http://www.toutfait.com/issues/issue_2/Articles/lotringer.html 
 
 
281 
 
Lotringer, Sylvère, Mad Like Artaud, trans. Joanna Spinks. Minneapolis: Univocal, 
2015. 
 
Lucchese, Filippo Del, “Monstrous Individuation: Deleuze, Simondon, and Relational 
Ontology.” In differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 20:2-3 (2009): 179-
193. 
 
Lucero, Guadalupe, “Musique-pratique : du formalisme au partage du temps.” In 
Filigrane. Musique, esthétique, sciences, société Numéros de la revue, Deleuze et la 
musique (20/01/2012). Accessed 23/09/2015 
http://revues.mshparisnord.org/filigrane/index.php?id=429 
 
Maciunas, George, Diagram of Historical Development of Fluxus and Other 4-
Dimensional, Aural, Optical, Olfactory, Epithelial and Tactile Art Forms. Copenhagen: 
Kalejdoskop, 1981 
 
Mackay, Robin, “Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Wildstyle in Full Effect.” In Deleuze 
and Philosophy: The Difference Engineer, ed. Keith Ansell Pearson. London: 
Routledge, 1997. 
 
Maimon, Salomon, Essay on Transcendental Philosophy, trans. Nick Midgley, Henry 
Somers-Hall, Alistair Welchman and Merten Reglitz. London ; New York: Continuum, 
2010. 
 
Maldiney, Henri, Regard, parole, espace. Lausanne: L’Âge d’Homme, 1973. 
 
Maldiney, Henri, “Flesh and Verb in the Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty.” In Chiasms: 
Merleau-Ponty’s Notion of Flesh, trans. Claire E. Katz, ed. Fred Evans and Leonard 
Lawlor. New York: State University of New York Press, 2000. 
 
Mallarmé, Stéphane, trans. Les poèmes d’Edgar Poe. Bruxelles: Deman, 1888. 
 
Mallarmé, Stéphane, Un coup de dés jamais n’abolira le hazard: Poéme. Paris: 
Gallimard, 1914. 
 
Mallarmé, Mallarme: Selected Prose Poems, Essays, and Letters, trans. Bradford Cook. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1956. 
 
Marinetti, Filippo Tommaso, “The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism.” In Futurism: 
An Anthology, trans. Lawrence Rainey, ed. Lawrence Rainey, Christine Poggi, Laura 
Wittman. New Haven ; London: Yale University Press, 2009. 
 
McClary, Susan, Conventional Wisdom: The Content of Musical Form. Berkeley ; Los 
Angeles ; London: University of California Press, 2000. 
 
 
282 
 
McCreless, Patrick, “Formalism, Fair and Foul.” In Nonsite 8 (2013). Accessed 
17/09/2015. http://nonsite.org/article/formalism-fair-and-foul 
 
Meillassoux, Quentin, The Number and the Siren: A Decipherment of Mallarmé’s Coup 
de dés, trans. Robin Mackay. London: Urbanomic, 2012. 
 
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, Signs, trans. Richard G. McCleary. Evanston, Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press, 1964. 
 
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, The Visible and the Invisible, trans. Alphonso Lingis and ed. 
Claude Lefort. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968. 
 
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, Nature: Course Notes from the Collège de France, trans. 
Robert Vallier. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2003. 
 
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, “Eye and Mind.” In The Merleau-Ponty Reader, trans. Galen 
Johnson and Michael Smith, ed. Ted Toadvine and Leonard Lawler. Evanston, Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press, 2007. 
 
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Donald A. Landes. 
London ; New York: Routledge, 2012. 
 
Mertens, Wim, American Minimal Music: La Monte Young, Terry Riley, Steve Reich, 
Philip Glass, trans. J Hautekiet. London: Kahn & Averill, 1983. 
 
Messiaen, Olivier, Music and Color: Conversations with Claude Samuel, trans. E. 
Thomas Glaslow. Portland: Amadeus Press, 1994. 
 
Messiaen, Olivier, Traité de rythme, de couleur, et d’ornithologie, trans. Melody Ann 
Baggech. Oklahoma: Norman, 1998. 
 
Metzger, Heinz-Klaus, “Abortive Concepts in the Theory and Criticism of Music.” In 
Die Riehe 5 (1961): 21-29. 
 
Meyer, James, Minimalism: Art and Polemics in the Sixties. New Haven ; London: Yale 
University Press, 2001. 
 
Michelson, Annette, “Robert Morris: An Aesthetics of Transgression.” In Robert 
Morris: October Files 15. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2013. 
 
Moholy-Nagy, László, The New Vision and Abstract of an Artist, trans. Daphne M. 
Hoffmann. New York: George Wittenborn, 1947. 
 
Molderings, Herbert, Duchamp and the Aesthetics of Chance: Art as Experiment, trans. 
John Brogden. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010. 
 
283 
 
Moreno, Jairo, Musical Representations, Subjects, and Objects: The Construction of 
Musical Thought in Zarlino, Descartes, Rameau, and Weber. Bloomington ; 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004. 
 
Morris, Robert, Continuous Project Altered Daily: The Writings of Robert Morris. 
Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1993. 
 
Munroe, Alexandra, Japanese Art After 1945: Scream Against the Sky. New York: Harry 
N. Abrams Inc., 1994. 
 
Nattiez, Jean-Jacques, Fondements d’une semiologie de la musique. Paris: Union 
Générale d’Éditions, 1975. 
 
Nattiez, Jean-Jacques, Music and Discourse: Towards a Semiology of Music, trans. 
Carolyn Abbate. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1990. 
 
Negri, Antonio, “Gilles-félix.” In The Guattari Effect, trans. Shane Lillis, ed. Éric Alliez 
and Andrew Goffey. London ; New York: Continuum, 2011. 
 
Nesbitt, Nick, “Critique and Clinique: From Sounding Bodies to the Musical Event.” In 
Sounding the Virtual: Gilles Deleuze and The Philosophy of Music, ed. Brian Hulse and 
Nick Nesbitt. Farnham, Ashgate, 2010 
 
Nono, Luigi, “The Historical Reality of Music Today.” In The Score 27 (Jul 1960): 41-
45. 
 
Nyman, Michael, Experimental Music: Cage and Beyond, second edition. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
 
Olkowski, Dorothea, Gilles Deleuze and the Ruin of Representation. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1999. 
 
Ono, Yoko, Grapefruit: A Book of Instructions and Drawings by Yoko Ono. New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1970. 
 
Orden, Kate van, “On the Side of Poetry and Chaos: Mallarméan Hasard and Twentieth-
Century Music.” In Meetings with Mallarmé in Contemporary French Culture, ed. 
Michael Temple. Exeter: Exeter University Press, 1998. 
 
Osborne, Peter, “Art Beyond Aesthetics: Philosophical Criticism, Art History and 
Contemporary Art.” in Art History 27:4 (September 2004): 651-670. 
 
Osborne, Peter, Anywhere or Not at All: Philosophy of Contemporary Art. London ; 
New York: Verso, 2013. 
 
 
284 
 
Osborne, Peter, “October and the Problem of Formalism,” in Quaderns portàtils 28 
(2013): 1-16. 
 
Ouellette, Fernand, Edgard Varèse, trans. Derek Coltman. New York: The Orion Press, 
1968. 
 
Ouzounian, Gascia, “The Uncertainty of Experience: On George Brecht’s Event 
Scores.” In Journal of Visual Culture 10:2 (2011): 198:211. 
 
Oteri, Frank. J, “La Monte Young and Marian Zazeela at the Dream House: In 
Conversation with Frank J. Oteri.” In NewMusicBox (October 2003). Accessed 
26/09/2015, http://www.newmusicbox.org/article.nmbx?id=2216 
 
Palmer, Robert, “A Father Figure for the Avant-Garde.” In Atlantic 247:5 (May 1981): 
48. 
 
Palombini, Carlos, Pierre Schaffer’s Typo-Morphology of Sonic Objects. PhD 
dissertation: Durham University, 1993. Accessed 19/09/2015, 
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/1191/ 
 
Palombini, Carlos, “Machine Songs V: Pierre Schaeffer – From Research into Noises to 
Experimental Music.” In Computer Music Journal 17:3 (Fall 1993): 14-19. 
 
Palombini, Carlos, “Pierre Schaeffer, 1953: Towards an Experimental Music.” In Music 
& Letters 74:4 (1993): 542-57. 
 
Palombini, Carlos, “Technology and Pierre Schaeffer: Pierre Schaeffer’s Arts-Relais, 
Walter Benjamin’s technische Reproduzierbarkeit and Martin Heidegger’s Ge-stell.” In 
Organised Sound 3:1 (April 1998): 35-43. 
 
Panzner, Joseph Edward, The Process That Is the World: 
Cage/Deleuze/Events/Performances. PhD dissertation: Ohio State University, 2012. 
 
Pater, Walter, “The School of Giorgione.” In The Renaissance: Studies in Art and 
Poetry. London: Macmillan, 1912. 
 
Patterson, David, “Cage and Asia: History and Sources.” In The Cambridge Companion 
to John Cage, ed. David Nicholls. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
 
Patterson, David, “The Picture That is Not in the Colors: Cage, Coomaraswamy, and the 
Impact of India.” In John Cage: Music, Philosophy, and Intention, 1933-1950, ed. 
David W. Patterson. New York: Routledge, 2002. 
 
Patterson, David, “Two Cages, One College.” In The Journal of Black Mountain Studies 
4 (Spring 2013). Accessed 20/09/2015 
http://www.blackmountainstudiesjournal.org/wp/?page_id=1866 
285 
 
Perlis, Vivian and Libby Van Cleve, Composers’ Voices from Ives to Ellington: An Oral 
History of American Music. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005. 
 
Peyser, Joan, To Boulez and Beyond. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2008. 
 
Pickstock, Catherine, “God and Meaning in Music: Messiaen and Deleuze.” In Sacred 
Music 134:4 (2007): 40-72. 
 
Piekut, Benjamin, Experimentalism Otherwise: The New York Avant-Garde and Its 
Limits. Berkeley ; Los Angeles ; London: University of California Press, 2011. 
 
Piekut, Benjamin, “Sound’s Modest Witness: Notes on Cage and Modernism.” In 
Contemporary Music Review 34:1 (February 2012): 3-18. 
 
Pinch, Trevor and Frank Trocco, Analog Days: The Invention and Impact of the Moog 
Synthesizer. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002. 
 
Pinhas, Richard, Les larmes de Nietzsche: Deleuze et la musique. Paris: Flammarion, 
2001. 
 
Pole, Anthony, “Messiaen’s Musical Language: an Introduction.” In The Messiaen 
Companion, ed. Peter Hill. Portland: Amadeus Press, 1995. 
 
Pratella, Francesco Balilla, “Manifesto of Futurist Musicians.” In Futurism: An 
Anthology, trans. Lawrence Rainey, ed. Lawrence Rainey, Christine Poggi, Laura 
Wittman. New Haven ; London: Yale University Press, 2009. 
 
Pritchett, James, The Music of John Cage. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993. 
 
Pritchett, James, “David Tudor as Composer/Performer in Cage’s Variations II.” 
Delivered at The Art of David Tudor, Getty Research Institute, 2001. Online text 
accessed 25/09/2015 
https://www.getty.edu/research/exhibitions_events/events/david_tudor_symposium/pdf/
pritchett.pdf 
 
Protevi, John, “Review of Peter Hallward, Out of this World: Deleuze and the 
Philosophy of Creation.” In Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews: An Electronic Journal 
(08/03/2007). Accessed 24/09/2015 https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/23058-out-of-this-world-
deleuze-and-the-philosophy-of-creation/ 
 
Radice, Mark A., “Futurismo: Its Origins, Context, Repertory, and Influence.” In 
Musical Quarterly, 1 no. 17 (1989): 1-17. 
 
Rainer, Yvonne, “Looking Myself in the Mouth.” In John Cage: October Files 12, ed. 
Julia Robinson. Cambridge, Mass ; London: The MIT Press, 2011. 
286 
 
Ramaut-Chevassus, Béatrice, “Capter des forces : l’exemple des processus répétitifs 
américains.” In Gilles Deleuze: la pensée musique, ed. Pascale Criton and Jean-Marc 
Chouvel. Paris: Centre de documentation de la musique contemporaine, 2015. 
 
Rameau, Jean-Philippe, Démonstration du principe de l’harmonie servant de base à tout 
l’art musical théorique & pratique. Paris: Durand, Pissot, 1750. 
 
Rameau, Jean-Philippe, Treatise on Harmony, trans. Philip Gossett. New York: Dover 
Publications, 1971. 
 
Reich, Steve, Writings on Music 1965-2000. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
 
Reichardt, Jasia, Experimental Workshop. London: Annely Juda Fine Art, 2009. 
 
Revill, David, The Roaring Silence – John Cage: A Life. New York: Arcade Publishing, 
1992. 
 
Ricoeur, Paul, Husserl: An Introduction to his Phenomenology, trans. Edward G. Ballard 
and Lester E. Embree. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1967. 
 
Robert, Martial, Pierre Schaeffer: des Transmissions à Orphée: Communication et 
Musique en France entre 1936 et 1986. Paris: L’Harmattan, 1999. 
 
Robinson, Jason, “The Challenge of the Changing Same: The Jazz Avant-Garde of the 
1960s, the Black Aesthetic, and the Black Arts Movement.” In Critical Studies in 
Improvisation 1:2 (2005): 20-36. 
 
Robinson, Julia, “John Cage and Investiture: Unmanning the System.” In John Cage: 
October Files 12, ed. Julia Robinson. Cambridge, Mass ; London: The MIT Press, 2011. 
 
Roffe, Jon, Badiou’s Deleuze. Durham, NC: Acumen, 2011. 
 
Ross, Alex, The Rest is Noise: Listening to the Twentieth Century. London: Harper 
Perennial, 2007. 
 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings, trans. and 
ed. Victor Gourevitch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
 
Russolo, Luigi, The Art of Noises, trans. Barclay Brown. New York: Pendragon Press, 
1986. 
 
Sakamoto, Mikiko, “Takemitsu and the Influence of ‘Cage Shock’: Transforming the 
Japanese Ideology into Music.” In Student Research, Creative Activity, and Performance 
School of Music Paper 23 (2010). Accessed 21/09/2015 
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/musicstudent/23. 
 
287 
 
Sartre, Jean-Paul, The Transcendence of the Ego: An Existentialist Theory of 
Consciousness, trans. Forrest Williams. New York: Noonday, 1972. 
 
Schaeffer, Pierre, “Vers une musique expérimentale.” In Revue musicale, 236 (1957): 
18-23. 
 
Schaeffer, Pierre, Traité des objets musicaux: essai interdisciplines. Paris: Éditions du 
Seuil, 1966. 
 
Schaeffer, Pierre, Machines à communiquer: volume 1, Genèse des simulacres. Paris, 
Éditions du Seuil, 1970. 
 
Schaeffer, Pierre, In Search of a Concrete Music, trans. Christine North and John Dack. 
Berkeley ; Los Angeles ; London: University of California Press, 2012. 
 
Schenker, Heinrich, Free Composition: Volume III of New Musical Theories and 
Fantasies, trans. Ernst Oster. Hillsdale: Pendragon Press, 1979. 
 
Schiller, Friedrich, On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters, trans. 
Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967. 
 
Scruton, Roger, The Aesthetics of Music. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. 
 
Seigl, Jerrold, The Private Worlds of Marcel Duchamp: Desire, Liberation, and the Self 
in Modern Culture. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995. 
 
Shaviro, Steven, Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze, and Aesthetics. 
Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009. 
 
Shultis, Christopher, “Cage in Europe.” In The Cambridge Companion to John Cage, 
ed. David Nicholls. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
 
Shultis, Christopher, “The Process of Discovery: Interpreting Child of Tree.” Online 
document, 2012. Accessed 26/09/2015 http://chrisshultis.blogspot.co.uk/2012/11/the-
process-of-discovery-interpreting.html 
 
Silverman, Kenneth, Begin Again: A Biography of John Cage. New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2010. 
 
Simondon, Gilbert, L’individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et d’information. 
Grenoble: Milion, 2005. 
 
Smith, Daniel, Essays on Deleuze. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012. 
 
Smith, David Woodruff, Husserl. London ; New York: Routledge, 2007. 
 
288 
 
Smith Brindle, Reginald, The New Music: The Avant-Garde Since 1945. London ; 
Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1975. 
 
Solomos, Makis, ‘Schaeffer phénoménologue.’ In Ouïr, entendre, écouter, comprendre 
après Schaeffer. Paris: Buchet/Chastel-INA/GRM, 1999. 
 
Solomos, Makis, “Bruits « entonnés » et sons « convenables » : Russolo et Schaeffer ou 
la domestication des bruits.” In Filigrane. Musique, esthétique, sciences, société, 
Numéros de la revue, Musique et bruit, 16/06/2011. Accessed 19/09/2015 
http://revues.mshparisnord.org/filigrane/index.php?id=227 
 
Somers-Hall, Henry, Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation: Dialectics of 
Negation and Difference. New York: State University of New York Press, 2012. 
 
Sonnenfeld, Albert, “Mallarmé and His Musicians Webern and Boulez.” In Mallarmé in 
the Twentieth Century, ed. Robert Greer Cohn. London: Associated University Presses, 
1998. 
 
Spence, Keith, ‘Debussy at Sea.’ In The Musical Times, 120 no. 1638 (Aug., 1979): 640-
642. 
 
Straus, Erwin, The Primary World of Senses: A Vindication of Sensory Experience, trans. 
Jacob Needleman. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963. 
 
Strickland, Edward, Minimalism--origins. Bloomington ; Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1993 
 
Sterne, Jonathan, The Audible Past: Cultural Origins of Sound Reproduction. Durham ; 
London: Duke University Press, 2003. 
 
Stoïanova, Ivanka, Geste-texte-musique. Paris: Union générale d’éditions, 1978. 
 
Swed, Mark, “A dean of Japanese music talks boundaries, John Cage and life with Yoko 
Ono.” In LA Times (15/05/2015), accessed 21/09/2015 
http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/arts/la-ca-cm-toshi-ichiyanagi-profile-20150517-
column.html 
 
Teruggi, Daniel, “Technology and musique concrète: the technical developments of the 
Groupe de Recherches Musicales and their implication in musical composition.” In 
Organised Sound 12:3 (December 2007): 213-231. 
 
Tisdall, Caroline and Angelo Bozzolla, Futurism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1978. 
 
Tomkins, Calvin, Duchamp: A Biography. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1996. 
 
289 
 
Tomlinson, Gary, Music in Renaissance Magic: Towards a Historiography of Others. 
Chicago ; London: Chicago University Press, 1993. 
 
Toop, David, Ocean of Sound: Aether Talk, Ambient Sound and Imaginary Worlds. 
London: Serpent’s Tail, 1995. 
 
Toop, David, Sinister Resonance: The Mediumship of the Listener. London ; New York: 
Continuum, 2010. 
 
Toscano, Alberto, The Theatre of Production: Philosophy and Individuation between 
Kant and Deleuze. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. 
 
Toscano, Alberto, “In Praise of Negativism.” In Deleuze, Guattari and the Production of 
the New, ed. Simon O’Sullivan and Stephen Zepke. London ; New York: Continuum, 
2008. 
 
Tuinen, Sjoerd van, “Difference and Speculation: Heidegger, Meillassoux and Deleuze 
on Sufficient Reason.” In Deleuze and Metaphysics, ed. Alain Beaulieu, Edward 
Kazarian, and Julia Sushytska. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014. 
 
Uexküll, Jakob von, A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans, with A Theory of 
Meaning, trans. Joseph D. O’Neil. Minneapolis ; London: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2010. 
 
Valéry, Paul, Paul Valéry: An Anthology, trans. Jackson Mathews, ed. James R. Lawler. 
London ; Henley: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1977. 
 
Varèse, Edgard, “The Liberation of Sound.” In Audio Culture: Readings in Modern 
Music, ed. Christoph Cox and Daniel Warner. London ; New York: Continuum, 2004. 
 
Varèse, Louise, Varèse: A Looking-Glass Diary. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 
1972. 
 
Voegelin, Salomé, Listening to Noise and Silence: Towards a Philosophy of Sound Art. 
New York: Continuum, 2010. 
 
Voss, Daniela, “Maimon and Deleuze: The Viewpoint of Internal Genesis and the 
Concept of Differentials.” In Parrhesia, 11 (2001): 62-74. 
 
Weber, Max, The Rational and Social Foundations of Music, trans. Don Martindale, 
Johannes Riedel, Gertrude Neuwirth. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 
1958. 
 
Wilhelm, Richard, “Introduction.” In The I Ching or Book of Changes, trans. Richard 
Wilhelm and Cary F. Baynes. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950. 
 
290 
 
Williams, James, Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction 
and Guide. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003. 
 
Williams, James, Gilles Deleuze’s Philosophy of Time. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2011. 
 
Young, La Monte, ed. An Anthology of Chance Operations. New York: La Monte Young 
& Jackson Mac Low, 1963. 
 
Young, La Monte, “Lecture 1960.” In The Tulane Drama Review 10:2 (Winter, 1965): 
73-83. 
 
Young, La Monte, “Interview with Peter Dickinson, New York City, July 2, 1987.” In 
CageTalk: Dialogues with & about John Cage, ed. Peter Dickinson. Rochester, NY: 
University of Rochester Press, 2006. 
 
Young, La Monte and Marian Zazeela,”Notes on The Theatre of Eternal Music and The 
Tortoise, His Dreams and Journeys.” Online document, 2000. Accessed 26/09/2015 
http://melafoundation.org/theatre.pdf 
 
Zepke, Stephen “The Concept of Art When Art is Not a Concept: Deleuze and Guattari 
Against Conceptual Art.” In Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 2:1 (April 
2006): 157-167. 
 
Zourabichvili, François, Deleuze: A Philosophy of the Event, trans. Kieran Aarons. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012. 
 
 
Filmography 
 
John Cage: Journeys in Sound, dir. Alain Miller and Paul Smaczny. UK: Accentus 
Music, 2012. 
 
 
Selected Discography 
 
Cage, John, The 25-Year Retrospective. [Not on label], 1959, LP. 
 
Cage, John, Indeterminacy: New Aspect of Form in Instrumental and Electronic Music. 
Smithsonian Folkways, 1992, CD. 
 
Conrad, Tony, Early Minimalism Volume One. Table of the Elements, 1997, CD. 
 
Schaeffer, Pierre, Dix ans d’essais radiophoniques du studio au Club d’Essai: 1942–
1952. Phonurgia Nova, 1989, CD. 
 
